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IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR SOUTH
Stephen J. DeCanio
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fulfillment of the requirementsfor the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
This study attempts to formulate and test a set of competing
hypotheses about Southern agriculture after the American Civil War.
The most important question considered was whether or not the agri-
cultural labor force was exploited. In addition, the relative pro-
ductivities of blacks and whites were measured, and the desirability
of cotton compared to the alternative crops was determined. The find-
ings illuminate several of the outstanding historical issues of the
post-bellum South, such as the role and position of the black population,
possible sources of agrarian discontent, and whether the high levels of
racial tension and political violence originated in the economic con-
ditions characteristic of the region.
Chapter I sets the investigation in the context of some of the
main problems of post-bellum Southern economic history, and introduces
the major hypotheses to be tested. This chapter also presents the
major conclusions of the investigation.
Chapter II is a survey of the views of contemporary (19th century)
observers on the various questions under review. This evidence is
contradictory, suggesting that the anecdotal historical accounts are
insufficient to distinguish between the alternative hypotheses at the
aggregate level.
Chapter III demonstrates that under certain assumptions plausible
for Southern agriculture of this period, the theoretical difficulties
associated with the coexistence of different forms of agricultural
tenure, the existence and estimation of aggregate production functions
and the non-homogeneity of land as an agricultural input, can all be
dealt with successfully in a general equilibrium framework.
Chapters IV and V present estimates of agricultural production
functions based on the county cross-sectional data in the censuses of
1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910. The production functions are specified
such that the estimated values of their parameters will support one or
the other of each of the alternative hypotheses on labor exploitation,
productivity of the different groups of farmers, and desirability of
the alternative crops.
Chapter VI presents an interpretation of the agricultural history
of the late 19th century South which holds that the productivity of the
different groups of farmers was determined primarily by the quality of
the land they occupied, and that their incomes depended largely on their
ownership of non-human factors of production. This interpretation is
shown to be consistent with all the econometric evidence, as well as
having support in the writings and statements of contemporary observers.
Chapter VII consists of estimates of cotton supply functions,
which further test the hypotheses on the behavior and institutional
arrangements of Southern farmers. The cotton supply functions are also
compared to similar wheat supply functions of Western farmers in the
United States which were estimated by other researchers.
The Appendices contain a further discussion of several of the
theoretical and statistical points raised in the main body of the text,
as well as detailed discussion of the data employed.
Thesis Supervisor: Peter Temin
Title: Professor of Economics
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I. INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS
A. The Main Questions of Post-Bellum Southern Economic History
The social and economic upheavals during and following the
American Civil War were enormous in depth and magnitude. Not only
did the nation stagger under the impact of the war itself, with its
hundreds of thousands of battle deaths and millions of dollars of
property damage, but the institutions, social conventions, and indi-
vidual attitudes of both South and North were profoundly altered.
Four million slaves were freed. The federal government entered into
massive welfare and reconstruction work. State governments rose, fell,
and rose again during the political turbulence of reconstruction.
The patterns of race relations which would characterize the next
hundred years began to form. Waves of agrarian discontent periodically
swept over the West and the South.
In particular, the course of Southern development after the Civil
War was unique in the history of the nation. In the wake of defeat,
that unhappy region was characterized by exceptional levels of political
and racial violence. Lynchings, tortures, election frauds, night riding,
and chain gangs were widespread. The newly freed blacks were special
targets of these outrages. Racial discrimination and caste-like
restrictions persisted long after the abolition of the "peculiar
institution" of slavery. These practices cannot be explained in eco-
nomic terms alone, but an adequate description of the economic climate
is a necessary precondition for understanding them.
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It is natural to ask whether Southern social and legal insti-
tutions during this period were founded on some sort of economic
imperative. Did the repressive atmosphere of rural life serve the
economic interests of any group or groups? One promising approach
to this question follows from Evsey Domar's suggestion that slavery
and serfdom may originate in the availability of free land [1]. Domar's
hypothesis rests on the obvious fact that if land is a free good (due,
for example, to the proximity of a fertile and unsettled frontier),
then no landowner can collect any income by renting out his land. A
prospective tenant would prefer to move to the untouched frontier and
to set up his own farm as opposed to paying any positive rent at all.
Because of this, Domar argues that if land and labor are the only fac-
tors of production, the coexistence of (1) free land, (2) a free
peasantry (free in the sense of being able to move, bargain for wages,
etc.), and (3) a non-working class of agricultural owners which lives
off rents, is impossible. If the land is free, the non-working class
must draw its income from exploitation of the agricultural laborers,
by paying them a wage less than the value of the marginal product of
labor, and by controlling the state apparatus to enforce a form of slavery
or serfdom on the peasants.
Domar recognizes that a more realistic model requires the inclusion
of capital and management. Nevertheless, he argues that
... so long as agricultural skills can be easily acquired, the
amount of capital for starting a farm is small, and the per
capita income is relatively high (because of the ample supply
of land), a good worker should be able to save or borrow and
start on his own in time.. .. But until land becomes rather scarce,
and/or the amount of capital required to start a farm relatively
large, it is unlikely that a large class of landowners...could
be supported by economic forces alone... [2].
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In this case as well as in the land-and-labor-only model, political
intervention in the labor market to hold the wage below its market
equilibrium level would be necessary for the maintenance of the
landlords.
The Domar hypothesis seems attractive in explaining several con-
crete historical instances of slavery and serfdom, including the case
of the United States [3]. If the existence of the frontier accounts
for why slavery took such deep root in the Southern states [4], the
post-bellum period might well have been marked by the development of
an alternative system of agricultural serfdom or peonage. The war did
not abolish the frontier. If anything, it raised the land/labor ratio
through the deaths of large numbers of actual and potential farmers.
In addition, the Southern planter class did not disappear. Indeed,
by the end of the 1870' s, many of the same individuals who had played
a prominent part in the Rebellion were again in control of the Southern
state governments [5]. The legal and social restrictions placed on the
Southern farmer population, particularly the freedmen, may thus have
constituted a re-enslavement or enserfment of the type envisioned by
Domar.
Interestingly enough, at least one Southern observer anticipated
Domar's reasoning [6]. In 1869, S.W. Trotti of South Carolina wrote:
We think... nothing more certain to prevent this transformation
[from laborer into proprietor] than the accumulation of popul-
ation, and nothing so sure to bring it about as the present
limited supply of laborers. If labor is scarce and high, and
land abundant and cheap, there will soon be no laborers, but all
proprietors. And when all are homesteaded, what will become of
the present land-holder, the upper strata of society? They will
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suffer a degradation commensurate with the elevation of the
lower orders. And who dare say, that because the hewers of
wood and drawers of water are elevated, at the sacrifice of
intelligence and refinement, that civilization has achieved
a triumph?
Mr. Trotti unmistakably captured the essence of the Domar hypothesis,
that the South, sparsely populated but endowed with abundant and fertile
land, would soon be transformed into a region of independent freeholders,
given the abolition of slavery and the absence of any alternative mech-
anism for exploitation of labor.
Any straightforward application of the Domar hypothesis to post-
bellum conditions is besetwith several difficulties, however. The
main problem with the simple (land-and-laboronly) version is that itsma-
jor premise, land's being an economically free good, was not satisfied.
The price of land in the South was not zero either before or after the
war. As for the more realistic version including capital costs, movement
to the western frontier for purposes of homesteading was expensive.
Danhof estimated that at least $1000 was required to start a Western
farm in the 1850's [81, and even if the cost of starting a Southern
cotton farm after the Civil War had been only half that figure, it was
still probably beyond the reach of the penniless freedman or sharecropper.
The idea that there may be a link between repressive institutions
and exploitation of labor does not require free land and negligible
farm-making costs, however. Free land and existence of a non-working
landlord class may be sufficient conditions for the exploitation of labor,
but they are not necessary conditions. Equality of the wage and the
value of the marginal product of labor is not a logical consequence of
the existence of a labor market. Political and economic freedoms may
be abrogated to hold the wage below the value of the marginal product
of labor whatever the factor ratios. A non-productive landowning class
could exert its influence to restrict labor mobility, restrain compe-
tition among employers for laborers, and deny labor bargaining rights,
all to the economic disadvantage of the working population. Land
could have a positive price and workers might exhibit some mobility
even given such exploitation of labor. Nevertheless, the labor market
would be imperfect, and the society would reflect in its institutions
and mores the formal and informal mechanisms of the landowners' market
power.
Throughout this study, "exploitation" will be used in its technical
economic sense of labor receiving a wage below the value of its marginal
product. This "Robinsonian" definition of exploitation is different
from the Marxian notion of "exploitation," in which the appropriation
by private owners of the returns to non-human factors of production in
itself constitutes "exploitation" of workers, whatever the relation
between the free market wage rate and the actual wage rate. Most non-
economist writers past and present use the term much more loosely than
either of these precise meanings. It generally has come connotation of
"unfairness," but such a concept is vague. There is usually no way to
determine from purely textual analysis which meaning (or mixture of
meanings) is intended. A purely competitive economy in which all fac-
tors receive payments corresponding to their marginal products may
generate institutions which maintain the status quo, but it is the
16
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Robinsonian type of exploitation which necessitates extraordinary
interventions and distortions in the labor market.
Clearly, slavery before the war is consistent with this type of
exploitation. It has also been implicit in the view of some historians
that the economic status of the freedmen was hardly improved over their
condition as slaves. According to John Hope Franklin,
There can be no question that the majority of Negroes worked,
despite Southern doubts of their efficiency as free workers.
They had no other choice but to cast their lot with their former
masters and assist them in restoring economic stability to the
rural South.... As free workers, however, they gained but little.
The wages paid to freedmen in 1867 were lower than those that had
been paid to hired slaves [9].
If the wage paid to a hired slave was equal to the marginal product
of labor (and there is no reason to think that it would not be, since
the payment was made to the slaveowner ), then Franklin's argument
amounts to saying that the post-emancipation wage was again set at an
exploitative level. W.E. B. DuBois reasoned along similar lines,
when he wrote "Property control especially of land and labor had always
dominated politics in the South, and after the war, it set itself to
put labor to work at a wage approximating as nearly as possible
slavery conditions..." [10].
This conception of the course of Southern labor history is shared
by Paul S. Taylor, who believes that for the blacks, the period follow-
ing the Civil War was an "intermediate phase" in their long transforma-
tion from slaves to free men. During this transition, the blacks con-
tinued to be subjected to coercion and exploitation:
... The failure of the Radical Republicans to carry through
their program [of guaranteeing full freedom for the ex-slaves]
left the freedmen with neither land nor the political equipment
of free men for their own protection. And during the struggle
to attain the northern program, southern whites forged an iron
determination to reestablish and maintain what emancipation had
loosened, namely, their strong controls over Negro laborers.
... The plantation system was continuing to exert pressure to
compel the freedmen to labor just as it had exerted pressure from
its beginning in 17th century Virginia; and the planters were
strong enough politically to enact laws to support this renewal
of coercion of the laborer which seemed to them so unanswerably
necessary and desirable [11].
In contrast with this view is the possibility that abolition
destroyed the complex of labor market imperfections embodied in the
slavery institution. In addition to its other legal and political bene-
fits, freedom brought the blacks [12] the concrete economic gains of
higher wages and income levels, as the wage was allowed to rise to its
market equilibrium level. After the extirpation of slavery, the Southern
economy was free to function according to the competitive ideal.
Even so, competition in the labor market may not have been suf-
ficient to guarantee prosperity or an adequate living standard for the
laborers. Kenneth Stampp argues that the deficiencies and deprivations
which followed the freedmen out of slavery were the origin of many of
their subsequent difficulties:
To be sure, some of the radicals, especially those who had been
abolitionists before the war, never lost faith in the Negro, and
in the years after reconstruction they stood by him as he struggled
to break the intellectual and psychological fetters he had brought
with him out of slavery....
Because the ante-bellum slave codes had prohibited teaching slaves
to read or write, only a small minority of Negroes were literate.
In this respect, as in most others, slavery had been a poor train-
ing school for the responsibilities of citizenship. It gave
Negroes few opportunities to develop initiative or to think
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independently; it discouraged self-reliance; it put a premium on
docility and subservience; it indoctrinated Negroes with a sense
of their own inferiority; and it instilled in many of them a fear
of white men that they would only slowly overcome. A writer in
Harper's Weekly reminded friends of the Negroes that the freedmen
were but "the slaves of yesterday... with all the shiftless habits
of slavery [to be] unlearned.... They come broken in spirit, and with
the long, long habit of servility... "[13].
In the language of an e.conomist, Stampp holds that the freedmen were de-
ficient in human capital- -education, work orientation, and entrepreneur-
ship. Blacks possessed of nothing but their raw labor power would be
bound to fare poorly in a competitive labor market after emancipation.
Related to the issue of black poverty is the problem of the condition
of the white farmers. White incomes in the South were also lower than
in the other regions [14], and the agrarian unrest that swept through
the South recurrently in the late 19th century was by no means confined
to blacks alone. Whites also may have been plagued by exploitation in
the labor market or inadequate human capital resulting from deficiencies
in the Southern educational system. In addition, the agrarian unrest
of the 1880' s and '90' s have often been seen in terms of two related
but separable issues: absence of crop diversification (cotton over-
production) and exploitation of farmers by merchants. In the standard
account of the Populist movement, John Hicks has written of the South:
The evils of the one-crop system were compounded again and
again. When prices went down, the farmer, with a mounting
balance against him at the store, saw no way out except to rent
more land and raise more cotton. By attempting to farm too much
he of course cut down the effectiveness of his work and got a
smaller return per acre. He found, moreover, that his expenditures
for seed, fertilizers, and supplies had increased as much as
the returns from his crop, and his debt at the store might be
even more than it had been the year before. But with the lesson
still unlearned he sought the next year to raise more bales of
cotton rather than to devise means of cutting down his purchases.
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Could he have produced for himself even the corn and bacon
and hay he bought, he might have freed himself in a short time
from the toils of the credit system. Little wonder that
intelligent men campaigned earnestly for diversification....
Those farmers who raised foodstuffs were generally in better
condition financially than those who did not, but in spite
of their example the hold of cotton upon the ordinary southern
farmer remained unbroken... [15].
Hicks depicts the operation of the credit system and the exploitation
of farmers by merchants in classical terms:
The effect of the crop liens [the main instrument of the
credit system] was to establish a condition of peonage through-
out the cotton South. The farmer who gave a lien on his crop
delivered himself over to the tender mercies of the merchant
who held the mortgage. He must submit to the closest scrutiny
of all his purchases, and he might buy only what the merchant
chose to sell him. He was permitted to trade with no other mer-
chant except for cash, and in most cases his supply of cash was
too meager to be worth mentioning. He must pay whatever prices
the merchant chose to ask. He must market his crop through the
merchant he owed until the entire debt was satisfied, and only
then had he any right to determine the time and method of its
disposal. If his crop failed to cancel his debt, as was the case
with great regularity, he must remain for another year--perhaps
indefinitely--in bondage to the same merchant, or else by remov-
ing to a new neighborhood and renting a new farm became a
fugitive from the law. Estimates differ, but probably from
three-fourths to nine-tenths of the farmers of the cotton South
were ensnared to a greater or less degree by the crop-lien
system.*
The high prices charged by the merchants on credit accounts
contributed immeasurably to the distress of the Southern farmer....
The fact that large margins of profit were realized from the credit
trade is not open to question....
The credit system contributed also to the one-crop evil, which
did more than its full share to insure to the farmer a permanent
condition of indebtedness. Cotton almost served the purpose of
money, for it was always marketable, it was comparatively imperisha-
ble, it could not be consumed by the producer and thus destroyed,
as could corn, for example, and it was comparatively easy to handle.
The merchant, therefore, wished his customers to raise cotton,
and he objected strenuously if they proposed to raise instead
such articles as hay, corn, wheat, or potatoes. It was far more
expedient, if not more profitable, for the farmer who found himself
in need of credit to do what the merchant desired--plant nothing
but cotton [16].
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In this traditional view, merchant usury and the "one-crop evil" were
the two major sources of economic hardship in the cotton South. Farmers
clung to cotton both because of their own irrationality (planting
more and more cotton as the price fell ever farther) and because they
were forced to grow the staple by monopolistic merchants.
It would be possible to develop these themes further by examination
of the historical literature, uncovering different points of emphasis
and changes in nuance. More progress can be made, however, by posing
a series of questions which embody the main points at issue:
(1) Was Southern agricultural labor exploited? Was labor paid
(in the aggregate) a wage equal to the value of its marginal product?
(2) What were the relative productivities of white and black
agricultural labor? If productivity differences did exist, were they
attributable to human capital differences?
(3) Was cotton more or less productive and profitable than the
alternative crops? Related to this question is the second one, that is,
were Southern farmers irrational or constrained in their concentration
on cotton?
(4) To what extent did the rural furnishing merchants exercise a
monopoly in the credit market?
To each of these questions of fact, there corresponds a pair of
essentially distinct historical hypotheses which have broader implications
in interpretation of the economic and political history of the South
during this period. Because the competing hypotheses imply different
answers to the factual questions (1)-(4), empirical determination of the
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answers to (l)-(4) would constitute a first critical test of the alter-
native descriptions of the historical reality. The hypotheses tested
by answering (l)-(4) are the following:
(lA) The Exploitation Hypothesis. This is the economic inter-
pretation of Southern social, legal and political history which holds
that political and economic freedoms were denied the working population
for the economic advantage of the landlord class. It identifies the
various repressive laws and racial customs as the manifestations of
legal and extra-legal exercise of market power by employers.
(lB) The Competition Hypothesis. This alternative describes the
post-bellum labor market as relatively free of imperfections. Given
the Competition Hypothesis, any explanation for the social tensions and
racial discord of the post-bellum period must fit within the context
of a normally functioning labor market.
(2A) The Legacy of Slavery Hypothesis. This consists of the
notion that slavery deprived the blacks of the human capital required
to achieve reasonable levels of productivity after emancipation. It
predicts that blacks as a whole were less productive than whites as a
whole. Given the establishment of the Competition Hypothesis, the
Legacy of Slavery Hypothesis would provide an explanation of a wage and
income differential between whites and blacks.
(2B) The Land Occupancy and Ownership Hypothesis. The alternative
in this case attributes productivity differences associated with the
different groups of farmers to differences in the quality characteristics
of the land they farmed, and income differences to unequal non-human
factor ownership.
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(3A) The Overproduction Hypothesis. This hypothesis summarizes
the suggestions that Southern cotton farmers clung to cultivation of
their staple, either because of their own traditionalism or merchants'
insistence on cotton, in the face of adverse price movements and
despite the benefits which would have followed diversification.
(3B) The Rational Crop Choice Hypothesis. This alternative
states that Southern farmers were rational in their concentration on
cotton, because of the suitability of Southern soil and climate for
cotton as opposed to the other agricultural possibilities. Cotton
enjoyed a "comparative advantage" [17] in the South in the sense that
in areas where it could be grown, it earned farmers higher returns than
were obtained from comparable factor inputs in other areas of the South
which grew alternative crops. In addition, farmers in general responded
rationally to the fluctuations in relative price of cotton and the
alternative crops.
(4A,B) The obvious alternatives are that furnishing merchants
either were or were not monopolists in the rural credit market. How-
ever, factual question (4) cannot be answered here, due to limita-
tions in the investigator's resources and the paucity of data on
Southern country stores. The issue of exploitation by merchants will be
discussed in the context of question (3),but it cannot be settled with
the same confidence as the other questions at this time.
Of course, these are not the only hypotheses which can be proposed
concerning the structure of Southern agriculture. Nevertheless, they
are in the spirit of both the contemporary accounts and the historical
24
literature. In addition, the hypotheses seem to be reasonable a priori--
none of them has the attributes of the implausible "straw man." Even
when the hypotheses are mutually exclusive in the particular (e.g., a
farmer cannot be both exploited and paid a competitive market wage),
examples of each might well be found to coexist side by side. Further-
more, black/white productivity differences could have resulted from
both human capital differences and land quality differences. For these
reasons, the determination of the answers to question (l)-(3) will focus
on the aggregate situation. The settlement of questions (l)-(3) in the
aggregate will be sufficient to reject some of the hypothesized descrip-
tions of the 19th century Southern economy, and will provide a starting
point for further investigation of the remaining hypotheses.
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B. Results and Conclusions
The main findings of this study can be summarized as a series of
established propositions.
(a) The narrative, anecdotal, non-quantitative historical sources
are insufficient to establish or disprove the hypotheses of post-bellum
Southern economic history proposed here. Convincing documentation can
be found for both sides of factual questions (l)-(3)--whether the labor
market was imperfect or competitive, whether Southern farmers were
rational or irrational in concentrating on cotton, and whether black
labor suffered from a lower level of skill and productivity than whites.
This negative conclusion is partly of a methodological nature. Non-
quantitative testssimply do not have the power to resolve historical
reality in enough detail to test the hypotheses at issue.
(b) Nevertheless, more powerful statistical tests can be developed,
based on estimation of agricultural production and supply functions for
the post-bellum period. It is possible to show that different ranges
of parameter values in properly specified agricultural production and
supply functions correspond to the different possibilities inherent in
(1)-(3).
(c) There is no evidence for over-all aggregate exploitation of
agricultural labor. Production function estimates indicate that mar-
ginal product factor pricing is entirely consistent with the known
levels of wage and sharecrop payments. If anything, labor tended to
receive a wage somewhat higher than the value of its marginal product.
In addition, the agricultural production functions were, for all prac-
tical purposes, constant returns to scale.
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(d) Race-associated productivity differences did exist. Whites
were not more productive as a group than blacks in all states, however.
In one specification of the production function, blacks in the cotton
belt states appeared to be less productive than whites, while blacks
in the border and peripheral states were more productive than whites
in these states. In a more generalized specification which allows
productivity differences within each racial group according to the
crop grown, white cotton farmers were the most productive everywhere,
followed by black cotton farmers, black non-cotton farmers, and white
non-cotton farmers in that order, with the blAck and white non-cotton
farmers roughly equal in productivity at the bottom of the scale.
(e) Whatever the specification of the production function, cotton
culture was more productive in value terms than the alternatives,
other factors being equal.
(f) Regarding conclusions (d) and (e), it is impossible to identi-
fy whether the productivity differences associated with crop and race
were due to human capital differences or to differences in the quality
of land farmed by the different groups of farmers. The productivity
results do, however, contradict the simple Legacy of Slavery notion
that blacks as a whole were less productive than whites as a whole.
All the results are consistent with either the Land Occupancy and
Ownership Hypothesis or with a more complicated human capital explan-
ation which allows for differentiation of skill levels within each
racial group.
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(g) Southern cotton farmers were about as price-responsive in the
short run as Western wheat farmers, and their speed of adjustment
to changes in relative prices of the alternative crops was such that
relatively full adjustment to once-and-for-all price changes would have
been completed in only a few years' time. In addition, most of the
Southern states showed a positive trend in share of planted acres
devoted to cotton, as well as a low long-run price elasticity of cotton
supply consistent with a comparative advantage for cotton.
(h) The data and results are insufficient to settle the question
of exploitation of farmers by merchants.
These results have broader implications for the interpretation of
post-bellum Southern history. First, competition in the labor market
cannot be rejected. Nothing in the results indicates any departure
from marginal product factor pricing, at least after 1880. Sharecroppers
received a fair market wage. The various repressive laws and acts of
violence perpetrated against blacks were indeed widespread, but were
not instruments of economic exploitation in the labor market.
The main source of income inequality and relative poverty was the
same as in any ordinary capitalist market economy, that is, in the
unequal distribution of ownership of the non-human factors of production.
Some productivity differences may have been due to human capital dis-
parities, but these differences were small compared to the returns
from ownership of land and capital. Income and standard of living
depended more on an agriculturalist's non-human factor endowment than
on anything else.
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The notorious pecularities of Southern agriculture, the sharecrop
tenure system and discrimination against blacks, appear to have been
relatively unimportant economically. The sharecropping institution had
little or no impact upon either the distributional shares of labor, land
and capital, or on the patterns of resource allocation. While it is
true that blacks and whites differed in total productivity, these
differences can be explained by the Land Occupancy and Ownership Hypothesis,
with the productivities of the different groups depending on their
location on different qualities of land. Even if some of the productivity
differences were the result of different amounts of human capital
possessed by whites and blacks, there is still no evidence of any de-
viation from marginal product factor pricing.
Both the production function and supply function estimates indicate
that Southern farmers were almost certainly rational in their concen-
tration on cotton. Cotton culture was associated with an unmistakable
advantage in output as compared to the alternative uses of land. Cotton
farmers were as elastic in their responses to relative price changes as
wheat farmers of the West, and were neither slow nor irrational in
responding to market price signals.
It is reasonable to assume that the slave "wage" was lower than the
value of the marginal product of labor. Given the exploitation of slave
labor, the transition to competitive market wage rates by 1880 meant
that emancipation had concrete economic benefits for blacks. The social
and political advancements of freedom were also great, despite setbacks
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in the realization of full civil rights by all strata of the black
population. Still, the defeat of the various land reform proposals
made at the close of the Civil War was important in allowing a con-
tinued unequal distribution of wealth and income in the South, and
this persistent inequality impeded the movement of both blacks and
poor whites toward full social and political equality.
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II. THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
The first step in testing the hypotheses of the previous chapter is to
determine what support for them can be found in the reports and accounts
of Southern agricultural practices of the nineteenth century. It will
be shown in this chapter that a strong case can be built on either side
of the main questions. These questions will be taken up one at a time,
with the mass of narrative and anecdotal sources summarized in as co-
herent a manner as possible. Since the objective is simply to show the
breadth of evidence that can be mustered for each of the opposing argu-
ments, no systematic appraisal of the relative reliability of the
sources will be attempted. In many instances, the same source contains
points in favor of both sides of the questions, and these contradictions
will be pointed out from time to time in the body of the chapter.
A. Exploitation in the Labor Market
Examination of the historical literature leaves no doubt that after
the Civil War the Southern labor market was either characterized by
widespread imperfection, or that segments of the planter population
exerted great effort to acquire market power. Before considering the
equally convincing documentation of competition in the labor market,
the entire case for exploitation will be presented, point by point.
Southern observers did not frequently announce their exploitation
of agricultural labor in modern terminology, so it is necessary to
decide exactly what kinds of evidence can be taken as indications of
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labor market imperfection. The following list is not exhaustive, but
should serve as a useful guide:
(1) Evidence of legal limitations placed on labor mobility, or on
the ability of laborers to seek out employment at the highest offered
wage.
(2) Other evidence of limitations on labor mobility or bargain-
ing rights, in the form of intimidation, laws, and ad hoc punishments
for labor organizing or bargaining activity.
(3) Direct and indirect evidence of planters' collusion to depress
the wages of workers.
(4) Evidence of a consciousness on the part of either employers
or workers of exploitative labor relations.
(5) Legal or informal attempts to eliminate or restrict insti-
tutions, such as labor agencies, which would increase the flow of job
information and smooth the operation of the labor market.
(6) Use of forced labor in various forms such as convict labor,
illegal slave labor camps, or similar types of involuntary servitude.
(7) Evidence of the closure or restriction of occupations out-
side agriculture to sections of the farm labor force, particularly
blacks.
(8) Attempts by planters to bend the Freedmen's Bureau and other
relief agencies into becoming organs for the enforcement of exploitative
contracts.
Each of these manifestations of actual or potential employer
monopoly in the labor market can be found in the latter half of the
nineteenth century. Some appeared occasionally or infrequently,
while others were almost constantly present.
The blacks were particular targets of real or intended exploit-
ation. After the surrender of the Confederate armies, a series of
interim state governments was set up according to the reconstruction
plans of President Andrew Johnson [1]. Among the first acts of those
governments was to pass a series of laws known collectively as the
"Black Codes" [2]. These laws were designed to regulate race re-
lations, in particular black labor and contracts. In addition
to the more notorious provisions of these codes limiting black civil
rights, prohibiting intermarriage, and regulating other social relations
between the races [3], many of the codes contained severe infringements
of the freedom of black labor. It is worthwhile to cite these codes
at some length, because many of the restrictive devices introduced
in them were to reappear in various forms throughout the post-bellum
period.
Mississippi extended its statutory definition of vagrants to in-
clude "all freedmen, free negroes, and mulattoes in this State, over
the age of eighteen years, found on the second Monday in January, 1866,
or thereafter, with no lawful employment or business..." and subjected
such "vagrants" to a fine of fifty dollars and imprisonment for not
more than ten days. If the "vagrant" was unable to pay the fine, he
could be hired out to any person who would pay it, with the amount of
the fine deductible from the freedman's wages. Thus, Mississippi
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blacks were denied the option of being unemployed at any time.
Mississippi also levied a yearly $1 capitation tax on every freedman,
non-payment of which was prima facie evidence of vagrancy [4].
Georgia also defined as vagrants those who "are able to work and
do not work," and gave the courts the power to sentence such vagrants
to be "bound out to some person for a time not longer than one year"
upon posting of a bond not exceeding $300 (or less, at the court's
discretion)[5]. South Carolina required any "person of color" who was
engaged in any type of work other than farm labor to obtain a licence
from the district judge and pay a fee ranging from $10 to $100 per
year [6]. Florida also levied a head tax on all male inhabitants
between 21 and 55 years old, with the usual punishment of hiring-out
to follow on conviction of non-payment [7].
Hiring out of convicts was a recurring motif, and the definition
of unemployed Negroes as criminals was not the only attempt by the de-
feated States to regulate the labor market through the criminal code.
Violation of labor contracts was widely defined as a criminal offense.
The Florida vagrancy law of 1866 provided that
... when any person of color shall enter into a contract as
aforesaid, to serve as a laborer for a year, or any other
specified term, on any farm or plantation in this State, if
he shall refuse or neglect to perform the stipulations of his
contract by wilful disobedience of orders, wanton impudence
or disrespect to his employer, or his authorized agent,
failure or refusal to perform the work assigned to him, idleness,
or abandonment of the premises or the employment of the party
with whom the contract was made, he or she shall be liable,
... to be arrested and tried before the criminal court of the
county, and upon conviction shall be subject to all the pains
and penalties prescribed for the punishment of vagrancy:
Provided, That it shall be optional with the employer to require
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that such laborer be remanded to his service, instead of
being subjected to the punishment aforesaid... [8].
Mississippi added that any person could earn a fee of $5 plus 10/ a
mile for arresting and returning a freedman, free Negro, or mulatto
who quit his lawful employer before the expiration of his contract,
the fee to be deducted, as usual, from the freedman's wages [9].
Louisiana restrained a laborer from "...leaving his place of employment
until the fulfillment of his contract, unless by consent of his employer,
or on account of harsh treatment, or breach of contract on the part of
the employer; and if they do so leave, without cause or permission,
they shall forfeit all wages earned to the time of abandonment" [10].
The regulation of labor extended beyond the enforcement of con-
tracts with criminal procedures. The South Carolina Black Code in-
cluded the humiliating provision that "All persons of color who make
contracts for service or labor shall be known as servants, and those
with whom they contract as masters" [11]. North Carolina in 1866
amended its apprentice law to apply to blacks in general, giving
former 'masters the option of administering the "apprenticeship."
Runaway apprentices could then be arrested for "desertion" and returned
to their master or mistress [12]. South Carolina allowed the district
judges to usurp the role of parents by providing that
Colored children between 18 and 21, who have neither father
nor mother living in the district in which they are found,
or whose parents are paupers, or unable to afford them a
comfortable maintenance, or whose parents are not teaching
them habits of industry and honesty, or are persons of
notoriously bad character, or are vagrants, or have been con-
victed of infamous offenses, and colored children, in all
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cases where they are in danger of moral contamination, may
be bound as apprentices by the district judge or one of the
magistrates for the aforesaid term [13].
Mississippi also gave the courts broad powers to apprentice out black
children, with preference given to former owners [14].
The regulation of labor extended in some cases to a detailed
specification of exactly what behavior was required and prohibited on
the job. Louisiana in 1865 legislated that, "when in health, the laborer
shall work ten hours during the day in summer, and nine hours during
the day in winter, unless otherwise stipulated in the labor contract";
and that "Bad work shall not be allowed." Injuries to farm animals
were to be deducted from wages, the laborers were not allowed to leave
home without permission of the employer, and "disobedience, impudence,
swearing, or indecent language to or in the presence of the employer,
his family or agent" were prohibited. Laborers were not to receive
visitors during work hours, and they were to be allowed to keep no
livestock without the permission of the employer [15].
The Black Codes' regulation of the labor market was not confined
to provisions applying only to freedmen. Also common in these codes
were the "anti-enticement" provisions which made it a crime for land-
lords to compete for labor in the marketplace. Mississippi provided
that
... if any person entice away any apprentice from his or her
master or mistress, or shall knowingly employ an apprentice,
or furnish him or her food or clothing, without the written
consent of his or her master or mistress, or shall sell or
give said apprentice ardent spirits without such consent,
said person so offending shall be guilty of a high mis-
demeanor, and shall on conviction thereof before the county
38
court, be punished as provided for the punishment of persons
enticing from their employer hired freedmen, free negroes, or
mulattoes [Emphasis added] [16].
Georgia similarly provided that it was a criminal offense "for any
person to interfere with, hire, employ, or entice away, or induce to
leave the service of another, any laborer or servant," as well as
specifying that any laborer who left his employer without "justifiable
excuse" should be guilty of a misdemeanor. The discovery of a person
in another man's employ before expiration of a legal contract was taken
as prima facie evidence of violation of the anti-enticement law by the
new employer, and interestingly enough, the provisions of this act do
not seem to have been restricted to employment of blacks by whites, but
included all "laborers or servants" [17]. Florida went even further in
the severity of its anti-enticement law, providing that
...if any person shall entice, induce, or otherwise persuade
any laborer or employee to quit the service of another to
which he was bound by contract, before the expiration of the
term of service stipulated in said contract, he shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined in a sum
not exceeding one thousand dollars, or shall stand in the
pillory not more than three hours, or be whipped not more than
thirty-nine stripes on the bare back, at the discretion of the
jury [18].
Considering this law in conjunction with the Florida vagrancy law, which
defined unemployment as vagrancy and empowered the courts to bind out
convicted vagrants for one year, the net effect was an attempt to
legislate the labor market out of existence. This was one instance in
which the freedmen and whites received equal treatment under the Black
Codes--convicted vagrants could also be punished by whipping and the
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pillory, though the limits of these tortures are not specified in the
case of the freedmen [19].
The Black Codes were short-lived, and were overturned either by
the federal military authorities or when the Johnson Reconstruction
governments were swept away by Congress in 1867 [20]. Still, the codes
indicate at the very least the determination of the leading Southern
elements to retain control of the black labor force in the face of
emancipation. It is also interesting that the messages of several of
the federal military governors striking down the Black Codes contain
explicitly anti-monopoly language. Major General A.H. Terry's order
commanding the non-enforcement of the Virginia Vagrant Act is worth
quoting at length. General Terry first summarized the provisions of
the Act, which were entirely similar to the Vagrancy Acts cited above.
He then concluded:
Among those declared to be vagrants are all persons who, not
having the werewith to support their families, live idly and
without employment, and refuse to work for the usual and common
wages given to other laborers in the like work in the place
where they are.
In many counties of this State meetings of employers have
been held and unjust and wrongful combinations have been
entered into for the purpose of depressing the wages of the
freedmen before the real value of their labor, far below the
prices formerly paid to masters for labor performed by their
slaves. By reason of these combinations wages utterly inade-
quate to the support of themselves and families have, in many
places, become the usual and common wages of the freedmen. The
effect of the statute in question will be, therefore, to compel
the freedmen, under penalty of punishment as criminals, to accept
and labor for the wages established by these combinations of
employers. It places them wholly in the power of their employers,
and it is easy to forsee that, even where no such combination
now exists, the temptation to form them offered by the statute
will be too strong to be resisted, and that such inadequate wages
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will become the common and usual wages throughout the State.
The ultimate effect of the statute will be to reduce the freed-
ment to a condition of servitude worse than that from which
they have been emancipated--a condition which will be slavery
in all but its name.
It is therefore ordered that no magistrate, civil officer
or other person shall in any way or manner apply or attempt to
apply the provisions of said statute to any colored person in
this department.
By command of Major General A.H. Terry, [21]
Ed. W. Smith, Assistant Adjutant General.
Hardly a clearer perception of the efforts of the defeated Southern
planters to maintain their monopoly control over labor could be found.
Nor is General Terry's message the only example of the recognition by
the Union authorities of the intent of the Black Codes. General Sickles,
in disallowing the South Carolina Code, forbade the levy of any tax or
fee for a licence for the practice of lawful trades, and stated that "no
person will be restrained from seeking employment when not bound by
voluntary agreement, nor hindered from traveling from place to place,
on lawful business. All combinations or agreements which are intended
to hinder, or may so operate as to hinder, in any way, the employment of
labor--or to limit compensation for labor--or to compel labor to be in-
voluntarily performed in certain places or for certain persons; as well
as all combinations or agreements to prevent the sale or hire of lands
or tenements, are declared to be misdemeanors..." [22].
Southern employers' efforts to exploit the emancipated blacks imme-
diately following the war were not confined to passage of the Black
Codes alone. There is some evidence of an attempt on the part of
Southern opinion to influence the Freedmen's Bureau into becoming the
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agency for the enforcement of stringent and restrictive contracts
on black labor. George Ruble Woolfolk uncovered a correspondence
between William King, a Georgia planter, and Oliver 0. Howard, Director
of the Freedmen's Bureau, concerning ways in which the Freedmen's
Bureau might make Negro labor more serviceable. According to Woolfolk,
"King represented a group of planters who had met at Savannah for the
purpose of effecting plans to solve the labor problem, and had written
General Howard about it" [23]. King recommended for "All freedmen who
have not permanent supporting employment, in cities, towns, and
villages, to be required to remove to the country and make engagements
for their labor, " and that "All capable labor shall at once make engage-
ments to labor in the country or agriculture, or otherwise for a term
not less than 12 months from the date of contract at such wages as
both parties may agree upon" [24]. In King's plan, the Freedmen's
Bureau was to avoid issuing rations to any freedman who was capable
of working, and in the event that a freedman broke his contract, the
response of the Bureau was to be severe:
Any Freedmen who shall abandon in place of labor or fail to
perform properly and faithfully the duties he has contracted
to perform, or for other bad conduct, shall be reported to the
nearest local superintendent, who shall immediately institute
an examination of the case reported, and decide on its merits,
and should such superintendent determine and decide, that the
Freedman has been guilty of improper or unfaithful conduct,
such Freedman shall be immediately placed in solitary confine-
ment (and supplied only with bread and water) for such length
of time as may be determined on, not however to exceed the term
of his contract, and during the period of such absence from
labor his wages shall cease and he shall yet be chargeable with
the expense of supporting the non-supporting members of his
family" [25].
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Solitary confinement on bread and water was also the penalty re-
commended by King for freedmen who had neglected or refused to make a
contract for a year' s labor before the first of January of each year.
In addition to enforcing the making and maintenance of labor contracts,
the Freedmen's Bureau was admonished to punish any freedman who
trespassed on the property of others, or who made visits to farms or
plantations other than the one where he was employed,without permission
of his employer [26]. Needless to say, these recommendations were ig-
nored, at least in the official policy of the Bureau. Nevertheless,
such sentiments undoubtedly reflected a substantial segment of planter
opinion, and there were instances of local Freedmen's Bureau officials'
carrying out this sort of policy. For example, Brigadier General
Fullerton, upon assuming control of the affairs of the Freedmen's
Bureau in New Orleans immediately after the war, issued an order "that
all persons of color in and about the city of New Orleans who did not
produce evidence immediately of being employed should be arrested as
vagrants. The consequence was that in the course of twenty-four or
forty-eight hours a very large number of colored persons who were
found upon the streets without evidence of employment with them were
put in prison." General Fullerton's order was revoked within 48 hours
by General Canby, commander of the district, but the incident was
probably repeated in other cases [27]. One historian even found that
Employers sometimes took advantage of the credulity of the
Negroes to cheat them, or to offer better working conditions
and induce them to break their contracts with another employer
in order to take advantage of higher wages. Indeed, so common
was this latter practice that the Freedmen's Bureau provided
that planters should be fined from $100 to $500 for the
offense [281.
It is difficult to know whether the "offense" referred to was fraud or
competition by an employer for labor.
Reference to the Exploitation Hypothesis helps to explain the
often-repeated complaint of Southern planters that they faced a "labor
shortage." This cry was most often raised in the years just following
the end of the war. A letter from a frustrated Mississippi planter to
The Southern Cultivator, one of the most important agricultural maga-
zines of the post-war period, is typical: "Labor is wanting; none of
the plantations in this vicinity are fully stocked with hands" [29].
DeBow' s Review attributed the decline in the size of the plantation
labor force to three causes:
...we fear... that labor in cotton culture is fast diminishing.
It is from three causes: Emigration from the cotton fields to
the towns and cities; the deaths on the plantations; and, the
retiring of women from cotton growing [30].
This same article estimated the loss by death in the black population
during the Civil War as between 500,000 and 1,000,000 persons [31]. But
planters' compaints of a "scarcity of labor" implied in the simplest
sense that they wished to employ more labor than was forthcoming at the
offered wage. This is consistent with the offered wage's being below the
market-clearing equilibrium wage, because of planters' obstinate refusal
to increase the offered wage. Instead, they attempted to force the
blacks to work under compulsion, and found a "shortage" of labor.
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It should be pointed out that an offered wage below the market
wage in the years immediately following the war is also consistent with
a slow planter adjustment from paying slave wages to paying competitive
wages, in the face of a temporary labor market disequilibrium follow-
ing emancipation. There is some evidence that the wage increased
just after the war ended, and this will be discussed subsequently as
part of the conflicting evidence that the labor market was operating
competitively.
The belief that the blacks would not work without compulsion and
the disposition of the planters to exploit them were linked. Carl
Schurz' s Report on his fact-finding mission through the defeated Con-
federacy contained both direct and indirect evidence of this. Schurz
himself drew the gloomy conclusion that "In at least nineteen cases of
twenty the reply I received to my inquiry about their [ southern whites']
view of the new system [of free labor] was uniformly this: 'You cannot
make the negro work without physical compulsion.' I heard this hundreds
of times, heard it wherever I went, heard it in nearly the same words
from so many different persons, that at last I came to the conclusion
that this is the prevailing sentiment among the southern people."
Schurz continued;
A belief, conviction, or prejudice, or whatever you may
call it, so widely spread andapparently so deeply rooted as
this, that the negro will not work without physical compulsion,
is certainly calculated to have a very serious influence upon
the conduct of the people entertaining it. It naturally pro-
duced a desire to preserve slavery in its original form as much
and as long as possible--and you may, perhaps, remember the ad-
mission made by one of the provisional governors, over two months
after the close of the war, that the people of his State still
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indulged in a lingering hope slavery might yet be preserved--
or to introduce into the new system that element of physical
compulsion which would make the negro work. Efforts were,
indeed, made to hold the negro in his old state of subjection,
especially in such localities where our military forces had
not yet penetrated, or where the country was not garrisoned
in detail. Here and there planters succeeded for a limited
period to keep their former slaves in ignorance, or at least doubt,
about their new rights; but the main agency employed for that
purpose was force and intimidation. In many instances negroes
who walked away from the plantations, or were found upon the
roads, were shot or otherwise severely punished, which was cal-
culated to produce the impression among those remaining with
their masters that an attempt to escape from slavery would
result in certain destruction [32].
Schurz then summarized the accounts which were sent to him of exploitative
practices. Typical of these reports are those of Captain W.A. Poillon,
Assistant Superintendent of the Freedmen's Bureau in Mobile. In a letter
dated July 29, 1865, Poillon listed some of the murders, mutilations,
and other acts of violence perpetrated against Negroes who left the
plantations of their former masters in his district, and concluded
... Murder with his ghastly train stalks abroad at noonday and
revels in undisputed carnage, while the bewildered and terrified
freedmen know not what to do. To leave is death; to remain is
to suffer the increased burden imposed on them by the cruel
taskmaster, whose only interest is their labor wrung from them
by every device an inhuman ingenuity can devise. Hence the lash
and murder are resorted to to intimidate those whom fear of an
awful death alone causes to remain, while patrols, negro dogs, and
spies (disguised as Yankees) keep constant guard over these un-
fortunate people [33].
In another letter, Capt. Poillon reported that "laborers on the plantations
are forced to remain and toil without hope of remuneration" [341.
Schurz's documents leave the distinct impression that white employers
recognized no limitation on the level of violence exercised to prevent
free travel and free labor contracting by blacks during the years imme-
diately following the conclusion of the war.
Schurz referred to a series of "attempted municipal regulations"
in Louisiana which had all the attributes of the state-wide Black
Codes, regulations "to prevent the freedmen from obtaining employment
[away] from their former masters" and "applying exclusively to the
negro, and depriving him of all liberty of locomotion..."
The negro is not only not permitted to be idle, but he is
positively prohibited from working or carrying on a business
for himself; he is compelled to be in the "regular service"
of a white man, and if he has no employer he is compelled to
find one. It requires only a simple understanding among the
employers, and the negro is just as much bound to his employer
"for better and for worse" as he was when slavery existed in
the old form. If he should attempt to leave his employer on
account of non-payment of wages or bad treatment he is compelled
to find another one; and if no other will take him he will be
compelled to return to him from whom he wanted to escape. The
employers, under such circumstances, are naturally at liberty to
arrange the matter of compensation according to their tastes,
for the negro will be compelled to be in the regular service of
an employer, whether he receives wages or not [35].
Schurz was pessimistic about the willingness of the white South to accede
to the full emancipation of Negro labor. His conclusion in this regard
may be taken as an original statement of the Exploitation Hypothesis:
As long as a majority of the southern people believe that "the
negro will not work without physical compulsion," and that
"the blacks at large belong to the whites at large," that belief
will tend to produce a system of coercion, the enforcement of
which will be aided by the hostile feeling against the negro now
prevailing among the whites, and by the general spirit of violence
which in the south was fostered by the influence slavery exercised
upon the popular character. It is, indeed, not probable that a
general attempt will be made to restore slavery in its old form,
on account of the barriers which such an attempt would find in its
way; but there are systems intermediate between slavery as it
formerly existed in the south, and free labor as it exists in
the north, but more nearly related to the former than to the
latter, the introduction of which will be attempted [36].
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Schurz included in his Report documentation of attempts by
planters to restrain competition among themselves for black labor as
well. A list of suggestions submitted to Schurz by a committee of
planters on November 24, 1864 recommended "A law to punish most severely
any one who endeavors, by offering higher wages, gifts, perquisites,
&c., &c., to induce a negro to leave his employer before the expiration
of the term for which he has engaged to labor without the consent of
said employer" [37]. A letter from T. Gibson of the N.O. and 0. Rail-
road dated December 1, 1864, urged Schurz that "Wages, rules, and
regulations should be fixed and uniform; nothing left to discretion.
A penalty should be inflicted on every employer who deviates from the
established rates, maximum rates.... Wages should be extremely moderate
on account of the unsteadiness of labor and exceeding uncertainty of
crops of all sorts, but especially of cane and cotton" [38].
Needless to say, these overt and unsubtle efforts on the part of
the defeated South to re-subjugate the black population did not meet
with favor among the abolitionist, radical, and even moderate Unionist
population of the North. The Black Codes were nullified, the provisional
State governments dissolved, and the progress of Reconstruction was
taken over by the Congress. In preparation for this, Congress estab-
lished in 1865 the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, composed of
members of both Houses "who shall inquire into the condition of the
States which formed the so-called Confederate States of America, and
report whether they, or any of them, are entitled to be represented
in either house of Congress..." [39]. This Joint Committee included
prominent Radical Republications, among them Thaddeus Stevens, but it
was actually controlled by the moderates [40]. Testimony before it
supports in some places the Exploitation Hypothesis, in others the Com-
petition Hypothesis. The evidence for competition will be presented
later, in keeping with the organization of the material in this chapter.
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction, like Schurz, found abundant
grounds for believing that large segments of Southern opinion favored
re-establishment of some kind of slavery. Richard Hill, an ex-slave
living in Hampton, Va., testified that ". .it seems to be a prevalent
idea, that if their [the Southern states'] representatives were received
in Congress the condition of the freedmen would be very little better
than that of the slaves, and that their old laws would still exist by
which they would reduce them to something like bondage. That has been
expressed by a great many of them" [41]. This opinion was shared
by Major General George H. Thomas, commander of the military division
of Tennessee, who said that "...if all restraint should be removed,
the freedmen would be thrown back into a condition of virtual slavery;
that is, they would be compelled by legislative enactments to labor for
little or no wages, and the legislation would assume such a form that
they would not dare to leave their employers for fear of punishment" [42].
Nor were such opinions confined to pro-abolition spokesmen. Major
General Clinton B. Fisk, a Mississippi Freedmen's Bureau Official,
related that he had attempted to obtain the release to her mother of a
little girl being held by a Mississippi planter. General Fisk entered
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into the record of his testimony the close of the letter he received
in reply from the planter:
As to recognizing the rights of freedmen to their children,
I will say there is not one man or woman in all the south
who believes they are free, but we consider them as stolen
property--stolen by the bayonets of the damnable United
States government.
Yours truly,
T. Yancey.
General Fisk characterized the Yancey letter thus: "That is a sample
of very much of the correspondence we have with that class of people" [43].
The theme that the freedmen would not work without compulsion was also
reiterated by several witnesses before the Joint Committee [44].
The Committee uncovered many "outrages" committed against the
free black population in attempts to regulate the labor market. Madison
Newby, a black resident of Surrey county, Va., testified to a bizarre
perversion of wage bargaining:
... In Surrey county they [the employers] are taking the
colored people and tying them up by the thumbs if they do
not agree to work for six dollars a month; they tie them
up until they agree to work for that price, and then they
make them put their mark to a contract.
QUESTION. Did you ever see a case of that kind?
ANSWER. Yes, sir, I did.
QUESTION. How many cases of that kind have you ever seen?
ANSWER. Only one; I have heard of several such, but I have
only seen one.
QUESTION. What is the mode of tying up by the thumbs?
ANSWER. They have a string tied around the thumbs just strong
enough to hold a man's weight, so that his toes just
touch the ground; and they keep the man in that position
until he agrees to do what they say. A man cannot
endure it long.
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QUESTION. What other bad treatment do they practice on the
blacks? Do they whip them?
ANSWER. Yes, sir; just as they did before the war; I see
no difference...[45].
Captain J.H. Matthews, a provost marshal or sub-commissioner of
the Freedmen's Bureau in Mississippi, reported that in "ninety-nine
cases out of a hundred" the freedmen were driven from the plantations
at the end of the year without payment for their work, and that the old
system was flogging was practiced extensively: "Inhuman flogging, to
the extent, in some cases, of 350 lashes" [46]. Major General David
S. Stanley remembered "four or five instances where negroes were killed
for trying to leave their masters" in the state of Texas [47].
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction also found direct evidence of
planters' collusion to maintain low wage levels. Major General Clinton
B. Fisk, the Alabama Freedmen's Bureau official quoted previously, con-
tributed this account of wage-fixing,under questioning by Representative
Boutwell of Massachusetts:
QUESTION. Do you know of any combinations among employers for
the purpose of regulating the price of labor among
the freedmen?
ANSWER. There were such combinations made early in the summer,
among the planters in their conventions, fixing a very
low rate of compensation for the labor of the freedmen.
But the combinations were broken up by the officers of
the Freedmen's Bureau. My orders prohibited any com-
binations of the people, or of communities, fixing any
rate of wages. My directions to my subordinates were,
to let labor, like any other commodity, compete in an
open market [48].
Major General Thomas of Tennessee also reported that he had received
rumors of such combinations of employers, and had warned the officers
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of the Freedmen's Bureau to "take steps to prevent any undue advantage
being taken by employers over the laborers they employ" [49]. The
tension between the opposing forces--the employers striving for market
advantages and the federal occupation armies acting to prevent it--is
highlighted in these testimonies, with the ultimate resolution in
doubt. It seems likely that the Union generals would claim success in
their campaign against the "combinations" even if the planters had
been able to sidestep all efforts to break them up. In any case, Major
General Edward Hatch had little doubt that many of the planters' "combi-
nations" formed to begin re-restablishing slavery had as their main
objective the regulation of wages:
The men there [in Tennessee] who dislike the present state
of things do not like to give up the negro. They think that
by some kind of legislation they can establish a kind of
peonage, not absolute slavery, but that they can enact such
laws as will enable them to manage the negro as they please--
to fix the prices to be paid for his labor. That is a very
general idea among that class of men. But those men of broad
views who know that labor will find its level, are in favor
of hiring the negro and paying him fairly. But they are in
the minority [50].
Reports of planter collusion during the '60' s were not confined
to accounts and testimony of hostile Northerners. DeBow' s Review,
organ of the most respectable planter opinion, reported an 1868 meeting
of citizens in Summerville, Alabama, which resolved, among other things:
Whereas, The present disorganized anlinefficient System
of Labor is causing great loss to the citizens of this community
and country, and must ultimately result in the entire destruction
of the agricultural interests of the country; and whereas the
interests of the whites and blacks are identical; therefore,
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1st. Resolved, That concert of action is indispensable
among those hiring laborers for the ensuing year.
2nd. That every one hiring laborers should impress upon
them the necessity of complying with the terms of their contract;
and in the event of their failure to do so, they should be dis-
charged.
3rd. That as good citizens, and acting in good faith
towards each other, we pledge ourselves not to employ any
laborers discharged for a violation of contracts, without a
certificate of recommendation from the person last employing them.
6th. That we should adopt a schedule of prices equalizing
the wages paid laborers; and that we recommend the following
classification: for lst class field hands $10 per month; 2nd class
$8 per month; 3rd Class $6 per month [51].
At about the same time, the planters in Amite County, Mississippi, re-
commended that if a freedman be discharged for poor work, or for attend-
ing "club meetings" without permission, the planters should "pledge
ourselves not to hire or give such freedmen employment under any cir-
cumstances" [52].
All these quotations point unmistakably to a will on the part of the
former Southern slave holders to interfere with the free operation of the
labor market. The existence of the will does not imply that a way was
found, however. The provision governments were dissolved, the Black
Codes overturned, Republication reconstruction governments established
throughout the defeated Confederacy with black participation, and the
great Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution passed. The
immediate post-war codes and combinations may have been futile efforts to
maintain an advantage lost with abolition. But if so, the planters were
persistent. The same sorts of oppressive laws and practices were tried
over and over throughout the nineteenth century.
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It would be impractical here to attempt to summarize the pro-
visions of Southern legislation regarding agricultural labor relations
for the period between the Civil War and World War I. Fortunately,
other scholars have done this work, and their findings will be drawn
on here. Oscar Zeichner, writing in the Political Science Quarterly
in 1940,surveyed Southern laws regarding agricultural labor from the
time of the Civil War through the thirties, and concluded that in ad-
dition to the crop lien laws, "...the laws dealing with labor contracts,
false pretenses, emigrant agents, and the enticing of laborers have
assured the planter of legal support in his effort to secure a stable
labor supply during the agricultural year" [53]. It is interesting to
see exactly how these laws guaranteed a "stable labor supply."
Several Southern states passed "false pretenses"laws "to keep
agricultural laborers on the plantation for the duration of their con-
tracts. The North Carolina law was typical:
In North Carolina it is a criminal offense, punishable by fine
or imprisonment, for anyone to obtain advances "with intent to
cheat or defraud... " from a person or corporation, and then
"willfully fail, without a lawful excuse, to commence to com-
plete such work according to contract.... "* It constituted a
like violation in twenty-one counties of the state for a tenant
or sharecropper to receive supplies from his landlord and then
refuse to cultivate the crop or abandon it "without good cause
and before paying for such advances. "**
As of the dates indicated, Alabama (1928), Georgia (1933), and South
Carolina (1932) had similar"false pretenses"laws on the books [54].
All the "false pretenses" laws were designed to make violation of labor
contracts a criminal offense. The Mississippi Supreme Court in 1912
had struck down a Mississippi law which made it a crime for a laborer,
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renter or sharecropper to break a written contract without securing
the landlord' s permission, and to make another contract without notify-
ing the second employer of the existence of the first agreement [55],
and the U. S. Supreme Court had overturned a similar Alabama law in 1911
[56]. Since the courts had declared it unconstitutional to make the
mere breach of a labor contract a criminal offense, the "false pretenses"
statutes were drawn up ostensibly to punish fraud [57].
The "false pretenses"laws were not the only echo of the Black Codes.
Zeichner' s description of the "anti-enticement" laws could scarcely be
more graphic:
Complementing the false pretense laws are those prohibiting
the "enticing" of croppers, tenants and laborers from their
employers. Farm hands might be kept on the plantation by threat
of economic loss and legal punishment, but planters still had
to eliminate the danger of outside interference with their
tenants and croppers. The chief competitors for the cheap and
tractable labor supply on the plantations were, first, the in-
dustrial enterprises of the North and to a lesser extent those
of the South, and, secondly, farm operators, who because of
labor shortages or other crises had to secure immediate extra
help. In order to eliminate the danger from the first source,
some states, notably Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi and South
Carolina, have placed prohibitory restrictions upon employment
agents who solicit and send labor out of the state. In Alabama
all "emigrant agents", as they are usually called, and their
assistants, partners and employees are required to pay an annual
tax of $5,000 to the state. Each county of the state in which
the agent operates can levy an additional tax up to a maximum
of $2,500.* In Mississippi, labor agents must pay a fee of $500
for each county in which they work.** Georgia requires emigrant
agents to post a bond acceptable to the Commissioner of Commerce
and Labor "conditioned to pay any valid debt" owed by the
solicited laborer to a citizen of the state. In addition they
are taxed $1,000 for every county in which they carry on business.***
South Carolina also requires that emigrant agents be licensed by
state and county. In both cases the licenses are renewable an-
nually. The state fee is $500 for each county in which labor is
solicited, while every county demands $2,000 for the similar pri-
vilege within its jurisdiction.**** Violations of these provisions
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in all of the above states are punishable by heavy fine or
imprisonment [58].*****
In addition, as of the dates indicated, Alabama (1928), Arkansas
(1937), Georgia (1933), Louisiana (1932), Mississippi (1930), certain
counties of North Carolina (1935) and South Carolina (1932) forbade
"the 'enticing' or employment of tenants, sharecroppers and laborers...
already under contract, and whose period of work has not ended" [59].
The United States Congress in 1898 set up an Industrial Com-
mission to "investigate questions pertaining to immigration, to labor,
to agriculture, to manufacturing, and to business,," [60] and its in-
vestigation revealed that Kentucky, Arkansas, South Carolina, Georgia,
Tennessee, North Carolina, Mississippi, Florida, and Alabama all had
anti-enticement statutes on the books at that time [61]. One witness
before the Industrial Commission argued that North Carolina's "Land-
lord and Tenant Act," a law ostensibly designed to provide a "home-
stead exemption" of $1,000 worth of real estate and $500 worth of
personal property "not liable to execution for debt on any judgement
acquired," had the result of virtually enslaving tenants to landlords.
The Landlord and Tenant Act preserved the "homestead exemption" by
making non-payment of debts a criminal offense, and this law was ap-
parently used by some landlords to prevent labor mobility-
I believe that the homestead law in our section of the country
is really a hindrance and trouble rather than a benefit to the
poor man, whom it was intended to benefit. These technical
violations of the criminal law, however, are not, as I should
like to emphasize, invoked by the better element of our land-
lords. They are, as a rule, liberal; it is only by some
shyster fellow who wants to stop me when I am disposed to go
elesewhere with a view of bettering my condition. He finds
56
that I have technically violated some of these laws. It is
difficult for a man to live on premises for a time without
violating any law--if not the spirit, some part of the letter.
He uses that as a lever to hold them over, under a promise of
immunity from prosecution in the courts.
The law is in favor of the landlord, and, if need be, he can
use it to the detriment of the tenant. That is the general
trend of the law through North Carolina... [62].
Charles S. Mangum, Jr., in his 1940 monograph The Legal Status
of the Negro, chronicled the see-saw balance between the Southern
states' attempts to restrict the freedom of agricultural labor through
various types of peonage laws, and the federal courts' overturning of
those laws [63]. In a Florida case decided in 1905, the federal court
found that if an employer charged a runaway debtor with a crime for
the sole purpose of having the debtor released to his custody to work
off his debt, the federal anti-peonage statutes were violated.
Similarly,
In a South Carolina case a federal court held that one is guilty
of peonage who by reason of his superior economic and social
position induces a party to labor for the purpose of paying
debts by threats of prosecution under criminal statutes, if by
reason of such threats the will of the party is overcome.*
Again, it has been said that one is guilty of peonage if he
falsely pretends to another that the latter is accused of a
criminal offense and offers to prevent his conviction if he will
pay the prosecutor a sum of money in satisfaction, thus inducing
him to sign a labor contract to reimburse the one who is supposed
to have paid such a sum for him and to submit to a deprivation
of liberty in the meantime [64].**
It should be noted that all these cases (as well as certain others not
cited here) were decided in the first decade of the 1900' s, just at
the close of the period under study here. Clearly, the peonage issue
was the subject of much adjudication in the South around the turn of
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the century, and where there is so much smoke, there is likely to be
a substantial amount of fire. Mangum concluded that as late as 1940
"Situations exist... in the South as well as in other sections of the
nation where Negroes are held in circumstances which approach involun-
tary servitude" [65]. In his judgment, at least, the outcome of the
legal struggle over labor peonage was not entirely in favor of the
blacks.
These laws were not simply dead letters, remaining on the books
because no one bothered to repeal them. A.B. Hart was one of the most
perceptive observers of the South in the late 19th century. In 1910
he wrote The Southern South, based on his correspondence with Southern-
ers, conversations with his students at Harvard, and "... in the last
twenty-five years... a dozen or more visits to various parts of the
South ranging in length from a few days to four months,..." as well as
a journey through rural parts of the South during the winter of 1907-8
[66]. Hart found ample evidence of practices completely consistent
with the laws discussed previously. "Of recent years a new and rather
a renewed cause of race hostility has been found, because the great
demand for labor, chiefly in the cotton fields, gives rise to the
startling abuse of a system of forced labor, commonly called peonage,
which at the mildest is the practice of thrashing a hand who mis-
behaves on the plantation, and in its farthest extent is virtually
slavery" [67]. Also, "the conditions of the old slavery times are
more nearly reproduced in the cotton field than anywhere else in the
South" [68]. Part of this peonage system was the expected collusion
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among employers:
It is unwritten law among some planters that nobody must
give employment for the remainder of the year to a hand who
is known to have left his crop on another plantation; and
still further, that no contract should be made at the be-
ginning of the year with a family which, after accounting
for the previous crop, is still in debt to a neighbor... [69].
Possibly more remarkable, the peonage system also "began to be applied
to Whites" [70]. Hart also noted the operation of the "false pretenses"
laws, and gave some typical examples of their operation, usually through
the subsequently outlawed device of having a runaway employee arrested,
fined, and remanded to the employer. In one instance, a woman made a
contract; before it expired, she married a man she had not yet met when
the contract was made. Despite this, she was found guilty of "false
pretenses" in signing the contract [71].
Even moreappalling were some of the barbarities committed against
blacks for purposes of enforcing exploitative contracts. In "the most
frightful case of peonage as yet recorded,"
A woman was accused of a misdemeanor; it is doubtful whether
she had committed any; but at any rate she was fined fifteen
dollars; Turner [a Southern planter] paid the fine; she was
assigned to him and he set her to the severe labor of clearing
land. And then what happened? What was a hustling master to
do with a woman who would not pile brush as fast as the men
brought it, but to whip her, and if she still did not reform,
to whip her again, and when she still would not do the work,
to string her up by the wrists for two hours, and when she
still"shirked," God Almighty at last came to the rescue; she
was dead [72]!
The popular magazines of the period contain much support for the
Exploitation Hypothesis. In the Atlantic Monthy just after the turn
of the century, "Nicholas Worth" observed that "A large part of the
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Southern people have persuaded themselves that the Negro must be kept
to a level reminiscent of slavery, forgetting that on this level he can
only be a burden" [73]. This opinion was also expressed in a series
of articles appearing in The Outlook at about the same time. An
anonymous Episcopalian clergyman of Virginia is quoted there as saying,
"I suppose I'll shock you, when I tell you that I still believe in
slavery. I believe slavery was of divine origin" [74]. The writer of
the latter series went on to observe that disagreements over wage rates
and labor supplied were the main source of friction between the races,
more so even than the specters of rape and mob violence:
At any rate, it was clear that employers wanted better work
than the negroes would do, and everywhere negroes wanted
higher wages than they could get. This labor situation in a
region where there are plenty of negroes to do the work needed,
and at a time when there seemed to be plenty of work for negroes
to do, was oftener mentioned than any other cause--than even
criminal assault and mob reprisals--as occasion for mutual
distrust between the races, especially for distrust of the
negroes by the whites [75].
Another article in The Atlantic Monthly, this one dealing with
the famous "Negro Exodus" from the lower Mississippi Valley to Kansas
during the late 1870' s, indicated that the Southern opposition to this
"exodus" went so far as to try "influencing the regular lines of steam-
boats not to carry the refugees" [76]. This "influence" apparently went
quite far, because it was reported elsewhere that "Four of five of the
Mississippi steamboats which carried colored emigrants North while the
exodus was at its highest last spring [ of 1879], have been seized and
libeled for violation of the law in taking more deck passengers than
their registers allowed them to carry" [77].
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Support for the Exploitation Hypothesis can be found in popular
farmers' magazines as well. The eminently practical agricultural trade
journal The Southern Cultivator included in its helpful advice to
farmers recommendations for collusion to regulate labor. In a letter
to the editor titled "Concert of Action Among Farmers" in 1869, F.A.
Dulany of Camden, Alabama, advised the readers of The Southern
Cultivator thus:
Is it not important that cotton growers should also organize
in some manner? Not only the farmers of the North, but
professional men everywhere, can see the necessity of associ-
ation, consultation, and concert of action, but mention the
matter to some of our planters (as I have done here) and just
ask them to subscribe to the Cultivator, and they begin to
decry at once "book-farming"... [78].
This writer left open whether he was referring to concert of action
with respect to setting wages, marketing, or whatever, but a subse-
quent letter to the Cultivator a few months later left no doubt:
There should be, as there is in almost all other countries,
a certain agreed price for all classes of labor, or some sys-
tem in relation to the matter. As it is, we are all working
against each other, and cannot prosper as a country, so long
as it lasts.... Would it not be well to organize ourselves in
the only field that we can operate? The only help is within
ourselves, God, and our Mother Earth [79].
Another letter to the editor extolling the benefits of agricultural
associations contained the following prescription:
Laborers might be introduced Ito the members of the Association]
and those among us better controlled and made more reliable....
Our system must be improved. The time was, when planters relied
on physical force to make up for all the deficiencies, but now
every furrow plowed and every hill hoed must be paid for in
money, and but few [are] willing to plow or hoe [80].
In other words, planters' collusion could substitute for the physical
force that served to "control" agricultural labor prior to the abolition
of slavery.
It is interesting to point out that the implication of the second
letter quoted above is that the planters at that time were actively
competing for labor. Indeed, that is consistent with the main point
of this examination of the historical sources--a convincing argument
can be made for either the Exploitation Hypothesis or the Competition
Hypothesis. For the moment, however, only the existence of a desire by
some planters to exploit the agricultural laborers and a consciousness
of how that might be accomplished needs to be shown.
Advocacy of collusion by planters was repeated much later in the
pages of the Southern Cultivator. W.J. Northen, President of the State
Agricultural Society of Georgia [81], a frequent contributor to the
Cultivator and subsequently governor of Georgia [82], wrote in an
article entitled "The Situation":
All efforts to recover our losses, by tinkering on outside
issues, will be worse than vain, until we strike the funda-
mental trouble and control the labor on our farms. Come
together in communities and counties and sections and deter-
mine what is fair and just and honest as to wages and service,
and then demand it until it is given. There is no necessity
for unkind or unreasonable exactions; these would be unworthy
of a honorable man; but it is the high duty of every man to do
his part in protecting the community against idleness, pilfer-
ing and vagrancy, and to encourage and demand, as far as his
authority may go, such industry and application as will bring
thrift and preserve the good order of society [83].
The rhetoric is high-sounding, but the advice is to combine for the
control of labor. Northen was an influential Georgia planter,
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and must have represented the sentiments of a wide section of that
population. Northen repeated his advice in even stronger terms in
1889:
Not only in the matter of trusts, but in the management of
labor do farmers need uniform discipline and control. Hired
help, on the farm, cannot be controlled when its worthless
services will be accepted in a neighboring field, with great
latitude in idleness and general indulgence. A laborer who
leaves the farm and abandons his contract, without just cause,
at an opportune time for the farmer, ought not to have opened
to him a paying position on another farm in the same community,
until his wrongs are adjusted. The labor in a community of
farms should be managed under a fair and just policy, determined
by farmers in council; and its requirements should be adhered to
and strictly enforced.
The management of the labor is the most important element
in farm economy. It cannot be successful if farmers are not
uniform and cooperative.... [Our] farms must be controlled
by the superior intelligence of the landlord, and through a
firm discipline, that should be enforced by the uniform manage-
ment of the neighborhood [84].
At the height of the populist movement in Georgia, a Democratic
Party county chairman went so far as to urge the "Democratic Farmers
and Employers of Labor in Wilkes County" to use their market power to
avert the impending danger of a Populist electoral victory:
This danger however can be overcome by the absolute control
which you yet exercise over your property. It is absolutely
necessary that you should bring to bear the power which your
situation gives over tenants, laborers, and croppers.... The
success [of the Populists] ...means regulation of control of
rents, wages of labor, regulation of hours of work, and at cer-
tain seasons of the year strikes....
The peace, prosperity, and happiness of yourselves and your
friends depend on your prompt, vigorous and determined efforts
to control those who are to such a large extent dependent upon
you: [85].
A distinctive part of the afterimage of the late 19th century South
is the chain gang. What is sometimes lost among the grisly descriptions
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of the abuses which characterized this forced-labor system is that
the convict laborers were paid at best a subsistence wage (and some-
times, apparently, not even that). This fact was not lost on con-
temporary observers, however. "It [the convict lease system] proved
profitable . . .to the lessee, as the latter could almost always under-
bid free labor" [86]. A.B. Hart wrote that
The men on the chain gang are perhaps employed on city or
county work, and if their terms expire too fast, the authorities
will run out of labor; hence, the Negroes believe, perhaps
rightly, that judges and juries are convinced of their guilt
just in proportion to the falling off of the number of men in
confinement; and that if necessary, innocent people will be
arrested for that purpose....
On the whole, one would rather not be a negro convict in a
Southern state, or even a white convict, for many state and
county prisons are simply left-over examples of the worst side
of slavery....
The first trouble with the Southern convict system is that
it still retains the notion, from which other communities began
to diverge nearly a century ago, that the prisoner is the slave
of the state, existing only for the convenience and profit of
those whom he serves.... They [convicts] used to be rented to
cotton growers, and a planter could get as few as two convicts
or even one, over whom he had something approaching the power
of life and death. This was a virtual chattel slavery....
Governor Vardeman in a public message in 1908 thought it neces-
sary to say that "Some of the most atrocious and conscienceless
crimes that have been perpetrated in the State are chargeable
to the county contractor. I have known the poor convict driven
to exhaustion or whipped to death to gratify the greed or anger
of the conscienceless driver or contractor. The tears and
blood of hundreds of these unfortunate people cry out for this
reform" [87].
Blacks were not the only victims of this system [88], but they were cer-
tainly the most frequent victims. Hart concluded that the convict lease
system was tantamount to slavery:
Most of the cases of peonage arise out of the practice of
selling the specific services of a convict to an individual;
and it carries with it practically the right to compel such
a person to work by physical force. What is to be done with
a bondman who refuses to touch a hoe, except to whip him, and
to keep on whipping him till he yields? The guards and wardens
of prisons in the South use the lash freely, but they are sub-
ject at least to nominal inspection and control. To transfer
the distasteful privilege to a contractor or farmer is to
restore the worst incidents of slavery [89].
It is difficult to know exactly how widespread this practice was, but
in 1900, all the Southern statesstill had provisions in their penal
codes providing for the use of convict labor in agriculture. The South
was not unique in this regard, as many northern and western states also
allowed use of convicts in farming. Some northern states, however,
such as California, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and New York did not
allow the use of convict labor in agriculture [90].
The extent to which convict labor constituted a significant source
of agricultural labor is hard to assess, because the exploitation of
chain-gang convicts by planters was only one facet of the entire labor
market situation. Nevertheless, an anonymous black editorialist
eloquently expressed the economic and legal oppression which must have
been felt by many of the victims of chain gang justice.
Colored men are punished in this state [ Georgia] without
intelligent discrimination; old and young, thug and mischief
maker, and often men and women, are herded together after
unfair trials before juries who would rather convict ten
innocent Negroes than let one guilty one escape. The sentences
inflicted are cruel and excessive; 25 percent of the convicts
are condemned for life and 60 percent for ten years and more.
White men often escape conviction or are promptly pardoned.
These slaves of the state are men sold body and soul to private
capitalists for the sake of gain, without the shadow of an
attempt at reformation, and are thrown into relentless competition
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with free Negro laborers. The fortune of many a prominent
white Georgia family is red with the blood and sweat of black
men justly and unjustly held to labor in Georgia prison camps:
the state today is receiving $225,000 a year of this blood
money and boasting of her ability to make crime pay [91].
This passage raises the general question of whether the blacks
themselves believed they were exploited in the labor market. The
answer is by no means easy to give, especially since Southern black
farmers left few records, and had scant access to any medium by which
they might articulate their grievances. Judging from scattered sources
that do survive, however, there is strong evidence that many blacks did
believe landlords unfairly exerted market power against them.
The Southern Workman, newspaper of the Hampton Institute and the
organ of the "Hampton-Tuskegee" philosophy of Negro advancement through
education and self improvement [92], was hardly a radical journal.
Nevertheless, the Southern Workman contains many expressions of per-
ceived exploitation by blacks during the '70' s, '80' s and '90' s.
The editors of the Workman apparently believed that on the whole, com-
petition prevailed in the labor market (see the subsequent discussion
in Section B of this chapter), yet they opened the pages of their news-
paper to statements such as the following:
.. the colored people are being robbed, cheated, insulted,
buldozed and murdered. What will remedy this?.... The colored
people perform all the labor at the South, make all the corn,
raise all the cotton and tobacco, the substance of immense
revenue to the white tyrant. Notwithstanding this, the
colored people are styled the "pauper class" and twitted by
the whites as an improvident, shiftless and worthless class.
They are reviled, spit upon, tyrannized over and persecuted.
They are branded as cowards and petty thieves. This they have
borne with a "patient shrug" and humiliation which are disgust-
ing and which outrage every instinct of true bravery and true
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manhood; which have been the cause of much unfavorable
comment from our friends and more ridiculous criticisms from
our enemies.
We have increased the cotton crops steadily until the
yield has reached prodigious figures and we deserve commen-
dation. But what do we get? The blood of our fathers is the
price we receive for our labor. Profaned thresholds we re-
ceive for our fidelity and forbearance. Night is made hideous
with the yells of denunciation and anathemas directed against
us. Riot, racking in blood; mad rapine and organized bands of
relentless murderers track us to our homes, our churches, our
places of business and our public meetings, and there is no
retreat, no succor, no commiseration for us. We must submit to
this or take the only alternative--defend ourselves with our
manhood, our valor and, if need be, with our blood. We are
shot down like dogs, let us shoot back. We are cheated out of
our earnings, let us demand renumeration and apply the torch
when the demand is not acceded to as the means of removing the
subject of contention. We can no longer afford to lie supinely
upon our backs to be tread upon by ruthless robbers [93].
One of the main features of Southern Workman was the reprinting of
articles and news dealing with Negroes from other periodicals. Several
of these references allude to either the desire or actual attempts by
Southern planters to re-enslave the blacks. The following excerpt from
an unnamed Southern newspaper was given as an example of a body of Southern
opinion:
.. . We know several of our largest planters who treat the negroes
working for them exactly as they did their slaves, working them
from daylight to sundown, allowing no idling; and if a darkey
trespasses any of the rules he is tied up and a sound thrashing
administered to him; then, if he leaves, the employer hunts him
up, brings him back, and doubles the dose. This generally
makes an effectual cure, and the offender resumed work, makes
a good hand, and is anxious to hire to the same man another year.
The employer has got value received out of his hands, and is,
consequently, able to pay full wages. Govern your hands, and
all sides will be better satisfied. Let them govern you, and
the country will soon go to the dogs [94].
In a similar vein, the Workman reprinted a long article from the New York
Times dealing with the same subject
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There are, indeed, in several of the cotton States, notably
in South Carolina, Alabama, and Louisiana, a number of so-
called leaders who freely express the belief that the negro,
to be made useful, must be kept in a state little better than
bondage, in short, as nearly in a condition of slavery as is
possible under the law.
To bring about this result, the Rifle Clubs of South Carolina
and a number of the most prominent Democrats in Alabama and
Louisiana are engaged in a determined effort to reorganize the
old Labor Leagues, and secure such legislative enactments as will
place the unfortunate black laborer absolutely under their
control.... They ask, in the first place, that agricultural con-
tracts to be drawn by individual employers, or drawn by them and
approved by the Labor Leagues... every violation by a colored man
of such a contract would be considered a misdemeanor, to be
punished by imprisonment, forfeiture of crops, or, as is proposed,
in Edgefield and other White League strongholds, by the lash.
Further than this, it is proposed that all colored men found
out of employment or trespassing upon the lands of the whites
shall be regarded as vagrants and punished accordingly. Should
such laws go into effect, and their advocacy by the powerful
Labor Leagues of South Carolina, and the secret organization
known as the State Grange of Louisiana, leaves no doubt that
there is grave danger of this being the case, the Southern black
men would be almost as completely at the mercy of their white
masters as they were twenty years ago....
The Labor Leagues threaten, as a last resort, to openly take
the law into their own hands, as they have already substantially
done in secret, and agree among themselves not to rent land or
give work to any laborer without the consent of his former master,
or to buy corn, cotton, or produce of any kind from any employee
without the consent of the proprietor of the land upon which it
has been raised. In the same way, that is by an agreement among
themselves, it will be a very easy matter for the Labor Leagues
to determine what rates of wages they will pay their laborers [95].
Interestingly enough, the editors of Southern Workman commented on this
article by criticizing its major premise. In keeping with the Hampton-
Tuskegee philosophy, they argued that the main problem of the Southern
black problem was "internal," a lack of education rather than exploitation
by Southern whites. "They [the Times, and Northern liberals in general,
presumably] can make votes for themselves by showing that the black
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man is in danger of re-enslavement, but would lose votes rapidly by
passing around the hat for funds to relieve the negro from his bondage
to ignorance" [96]. The interchange is a striking example of the
clash of the Exploitation Hypothesis and the Legacy of Slavery Hypothesis.
This theme recurred in subsequent issues of the Workman:
In discussing the schemes of colored emigration, the real issue
is quite neglected. The complaint of the colored men in
Louisiana, in North Carolina and Mississippi, is, that they are
not protected in their political rights, are charged high and ex-
cessive rentals for land, or are compelled to pay exorbitant
prices for it, when purchased, and that, in short, their con-
dition is very intolerable. There is truth in this statement
of grievances, but there are other facts which should modify an
opinion based solely on these ex parte statements. Land in the
South is cheap enough, and the colored man' s money will buy it
as quickly as the white man's. We have yet to hear of a case
where, under ordinary circumstances, his money has been refused.
And in view of the utterly exhausting way all rented land is
tilled by the tenant, the rental money is not high. Many white
men at the South are at the same disadvantage as the Negro in
the matter of paying high rents, and in the inability to purchase
land. It is the misfortune of poverty, and there is no exception
on race account [97].
Despite its editorial position, the Southern Workman continued to report
the statements and activities of more militant black spokesmen. In 1886,
an article from Timothy Thomas Fortune's Freeman's Journal was reprinted,
in which Mr. Fortune argued the Exploitation Hypothesis in the strongest
terms:
... we assert, without fear of successful contradiction, that
nowhere else in the world can there be found a more odious,
unjust and tyrannical landlord system than that which obtains
in the South. It is a virtual continuation of the slave system
with the landlord relieved of the obligations imposed upon him
by the laws of the slave system and his right in the person as
well as the labor of the slave.
All the land laws in the South are made in favor of the
planters, and it is notorious that the wages paid by them to
their employees are simply pauper wages; and this is aggravated
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by the store account and order system by which the laborer
seldom ever sees a dime of cash and is frequently allowed to
overdraw his account, or is overcharged, for the purpose of
being held at the pleasure of the planter [98].
This same Timothy Thomas Fortune was an active and radical black
spokesman in the 1880's and '90's. He has been described as "the fore-
most Negro journalist of his time" [99]. Black and White, written by
Fortune in 1885 "during the most radical phase of his career," [100]
contains some of the most passionate denunciations of capitalism and
exploitation to appear in the United States before or since:
What are millionaires, any way, but the most dangerous enemies
of society, always eating away its entrails, like the vultures
that preyed upon the chained Prometheus? Take our own breed
of these parasites; notehow they grind down the stipend they
are compelled to bestow upon the human tools they must use to
still further swell their ungodly gains! Note how they take
advantage of the public; how they extort, with Shylock avarice,
every penny they possibly can from those who are compelled to
use the appliances which wealth enables them to contrive for
the public convenience and comfort; how they corrupt legislatures
and dictate to the unscrupulous minions of the law. The
Athenians were wise who enacted into law the principle that
when a citizen became too powerful or rich to be controlled within
proper bounds, the safety of society demanded that he should be
exiled--sent where his power or riches could not be used to the
detriment of his fellow-citizens [101].
Fortune also argued that the wage is driven down to subsistence, "to the
lowest possible point at which he [the worker] can live and still pro-
duce" [102]. Fortune was more specific in bringing similar charges
against landowners:
Every hamlet, town, city, and state in the Union is in the
grasp of the individual land holder. Starting with his fellows
as a pioneer two hundred and fifty years ago, with his pickaxe
on his shoulder, he has steadily grown in size and importance,
so that to-day he holds in his hands the destinies of the
Republic and the life of his fellow citizens. His bulk has
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become mastodonian in proportions and his influence has
shrivelled up the energies of the people. More absolute
than the Iron Prince of Germany, he pays no taxes; he limits
production, not to the requirements of the population but to
the demand of the market, at such figures as he can extort
from the crying necessities of the people through the oper-
ations of "corners"; he regulates the wheels of government, State
and Federal, and dictates to the people by making them hungry
and naked [103].
It should not be thought that Fortune was an isolated fanatic. He was
editor of the New York Age, which, after two changes of name, became
"the leading Negro paper in the country during the 1880's and 1890's,"
and "in 1887 Fortune founded the Afro-American League, an equal rights
organization that antedated the Niagara Movement and the NAACP" [104].
The Southern Workman reported the 1890 convention of the Afro-American
League, of which Fortune was elected temporary chairman. One of his
speeches at this convention was "frequently interrupted by loud and
long continued applause" from the 200 black participants:
We are met here to-day, the representatives of eight million
freedmen, who know our rights and have the courage to defend
them. We are here to emphasize the fact that the past condition
of helplessness and dependence upon men who have used us for
selfish and unholy purposes, who have murdered, and robbed, and
outraged us, must be reversed.
We have been robbed of the honest wages of our toil; we have
been robbed of the substance of our citizenship by murder and
intimidation; we have been outraged by our enemies and deserted
by our friends. It is time to call a halt. It is time to
begin to fight fire with fire. I speak as an Afro-American,
first, last, and all the time, ready to stab to death any
political party which robs me of my confidence and my vote and
straightway asks me what I am going to do about it" [105].
Another fiery champion of black rights during this period was
William Sinclair; ex-slave, missionary, physician, and financial secre-
tary of Howard University [106]. His book The Aftermath of Slavery is,
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if anything, more damning an indictment of white "outrages" against the
black South than Fortune's book, because of its more explicit catalogue
of crimes of all kinds perpetrated against the freedmen. In his chap-
ter devoted to "Negroes and the Law," Sinclair quoted a series of
Southern spokesmen advocating a return to slavery of some form, mild
or otherwise, and observed:
As might be expected, illustrations in the concrete of
this bitter persecution abound on every hand. Laws are en-
acted and enforced in the spirit of persecution, and the
colored people are the victims of such laws; often they are
condemned without even the form or semblance of law.
Regarding the latter, planters have combined or conspired
--in defiance of the law--to arrest under false charges the
number of colored men needed for service, hold mock trials,
one of the conspirators acting as judge, condemn and sentence
the helpless creatures to penal servitude; and then divide the
laborers among themselves, put them in chains, and work them
for long periods of time on their plantations. And this crime
is committed against liberty and humanity rather than pay the
small wages which agricultural laborers command in the South! [107]
Sinclair next traced out the practices that have already been referred
to: penal enforcement of labor contracts, forced labor to repay debts,
and collusion between police and planters to secure slave-wage convict
labor. He recounted examples of Negroes beaten for attempting to leave
the plantations they were working, and noted that "The Department of
Justice is preparing to take up again the subject of peonage in the
South" [103]. But perhaps the most harrowing passage in Sinclair's
book is the first-person narrative of a black man who had been for
thirteen years a prisoner in a "peon camp" owned by a Southern
state senator. This first-hand account originally appeared in the
Independent of New York City, but the quotations are in the words of the
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victim. After working as free laborers for a period of years for the
senator, and being forced to buy all supplies from his commissary, the
narrator and several of his friends decided to leave and seek work
elsewhere. The senator said they were free to go, so long as they
signed "acknowledgements" of their accumulated debts to the commissary.
Anxious to leave, the black men made their marks, only to find
... in the papers we had signed the day before, we had not only
made acknowledgement of our indebtedness, but that we had also
agreed to work for the senator until the debts were paid by hard
labor. And from that day forward we were treated just like con-
victs. Really we had made ourselves lifetime slaves, or peons,
as the laws called us. But, call it slavery, peonage, or what
not, the truth is we lived in a hell on earth what time we spent
in the senator's peon camp.
The wife of the man telling his story was made a concubine of the white
men who operated the camp, as were the wives of some of the other
Negroes. His wife bore two children by some of the "white bosses," but
at least she was able to live in a house. The other women were forced
to live and work with the male peons, in dwellings he described as
"cesspools of nastiness." Whippings and other tortures were performed
on recalcitrant or exhausted peons, with the result that "many came
away mained and bruised, and, in some cases, disabled for life."
Recruits to the peon camp were obtained by sending agents to the
local courts, advising blacks charged with petty offenses to plead
guilty and work off their fines at the peon camp; but the charges made
against their accounts at the commissary always exceeded their wages,
so that "by the time he has worked out his first debt another is hang-
ing over his head, and so on and so on, by a sort of endless chain, for
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an indefinite period; as in every case the indebtedness is arbitrarily
arranged by the employer." One of the commonest "crimes" leading to
the peon camp was adultery. After his release from the peon camp,
while his wife was still held in concubinage, the black narrator summed
up his experience:
I have been here in the district since they released me,
and I reckon I'll die either in a coal mine or an iron fur-
nace: it don't make much difference which. Either is better
than a Georgia peon camp. And a Georgia peon camp is hell
itself I [109]
Black concern over exploitation, intimidation and forced labor
was reflected by the new civil rights organization, the NAACP. The
Crisis, official magazine of the NAACP, carried in each issue a "crime
report" giving as much information as was available on the lynchings
and "outrages" which had taken place during that publishing period.
In the majority of instances reported, blacks were lynched for rape,
assault, or for no apparent reason at all. The causes of "race wars"
or fights between individual blacks and whites resulting in a lynching
were often not specified. But at least one case confirmed the obser-
vation made earlier that labor disputes were a significant cause of
deadly violence:
On June 13, near Rochelle, in Wilcox County, Ga., McHenry,
a Negro who wounded a planter, C.S. Ritchie, was lynched.
McHenry was a tenant of Ritchie's and the two quarreled,
the Negro shooting Ritchie, but not inflicting a serious wound.
McHenry was taken to the Ritchie home and identified by the
wounded man. Then the mob of "leading citizens" hanged the
Negro to a tree near the Ritchie home and cut the body to
pieces with bullets.
When Ritchie was shot he was attacking the Negro because
the latter was tardy in going to work [110].
Forced labor did not always end in the extreme of murder. The Crisis
also reprinted the following letter from the Savannah Tribune, regard-
ing the "large number of Negroes...being arrested as vagrants":
Is it because there are no loafers among the other races?
Or is it on account of the explicit order from the chief of
police to arrest Negroes only? A week or ten days ago 108
able-bodied men were arrested and detained in the barracks
on suspicion--men who are working every day, or at least when-
ever an opportunity for work is offered. The "milk in the
cocoanut" is that the farmers want cotton pickers at star-
vation price and worst treatment, and at the same time there
will be races with automobiles very soon--convict labor as
opposed to free labor is required to further the money-making
scheme of a body of enterprising citizens. .. [111].
Also published periodically was a list of the number of "Colored Men
Lynched Without Trial," which gave the following figures through
1911 [112]:
1885 . . . 78 1899 . . . 84
1886 . . . 71 1900 . . . 107
1887 . . . 80 1901 . . . 107
1888 . . . 95 1902 . . . 86
1889 . . . 95 1903 . . . 86
1890 . . . 90 1904 . . . 83
1891 . . 121 1905 . . . 61
1892 . . . 155 1906 . . . 64
1893 . . . 154 1907 . . . 60
1894 . . . 134 1908 . . . 93
1895 . . . 112 1909. . . 73
1896 . . 80 1910 . . . 65
1897 . 122 1911. . . 63
1898 . . . 102
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. ,521
If economic history were written according to the advocacy system,
the case for the Exploitation Hypothesis could be rested at this point.
Surely the evidence presented is overwhelming that Southern labor re-
lations after the Civil War included elements of exploitation. That is
75
an important fact, but it does not settle the question of whether ex-
ploitation was prevalent in the aggregate. There is no way of knowing
whether the previously detailed instances were typical or exceptional,
and no way of assessing whether some planters' intentions to forcibly
control labor were shared by the entire employing class. Even if
planters were all of a single mind, it does not necessarily follow that
they were able to translate their desires into social reality.
Even these objections would remain rather abstract, were it not
for the fact that a similar and, it seems, equally persuasive brief
can be written for the Competition Hypothesis. Using many of the same
sources, and the same procedure of seeking out direct and indirect
evidence of competition in the labor market, it can be "proved" in
the same way that the Southern labor market was largely free of im-
perfections after the surrender of the Confederate armies.
76
B. Competition in the Labor Market
As with the Exploitation Hypothesis, it is useful to list the
kinds of evidence which could be considered support for competition
in the labor market. The following list again is not exhaustive, but
should be roughly comparable with the list supporting exploitation.
Traces of competition for labor will be found in:
(1) Evidence of labor mobility, particularly in response to
the prospect of higher wages and/or better working conditions.
(2) Direct evidence of planters' competition for labor.
(3) Expressions of a consciousness or awareness of competition
in the labor market, either on the part of the employers or on the
part of the agricultural workers. Included in this category would be
arguments introduced into debates on proposals such as immigration.
(4) Evidence of a rise in wage levels just following the war,
as the market presumably changed from one of slave labor to one with
free labor.
(5) Evidence of the existence of alternative employment for
agricultural workers, including blacks.
Examples of each of these manifestations or preconditions of
competition can be found without much difficulty.
The planters complaintof a scarcity of labor just after the war
was paralleled by objections to freedmen's moving throughout the country-
side, refusing to remain and work in one place.
The first effect of emancipation upon many individuals of the
[black] race was to inspire them with a desire to abandon the
scenes that had been familiar to them as slaves, and they
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promptly acted upon this impulse; separated from their former
homes by their own determination, they obtained employment
elsewhere--in many instances in distant parts, of which they
had no previous knowledge. Some even doubted whether they
had been really liberated until they had tested their ability
to leave the old localities without opposition from their
former owners. Even if they were confident that they could
do so just then, they anticipated that their present liberty
would be curtailed so much in the future that they would prac-
tically be reduced to their original condition again. An
emotion of fear, therefore, urged them to depart. Fidelity,
timidity, or sound judgement induced a few to remain permanently
where they had always lived, but the vast majority of negroes
changed their habitations either immediately or in the course of
the first years after they were set free. Many of the largest
plantations were almost depopulated of their former laborers,
the places they vacated being filled by those who had immigrated
from other sections or had come in from the same country-side.
At present, the laborers are not inclined to emigrate to a
great distance by the mere force of a migratory instinct; a
few do so under the terms of temporary contracts into which they
have been tempted by the solicitations of agents, but a large
number are rarely influenced to remove in a body to far off States
in the mere hope of improving their condition. Within the circle
of an extensive division of country, however, they are constantly
shifting; they will rent land for one year and set up on their
own account as mechanics in the next, or they will work for one
planter a month and labor in the employment of another for twelve
months, or attach themselves to the same plantation for many years,
and then suddenly announce their intention to leave... they start
anew as if they were untrammeled, and their ability to do so, is
a strong inducement to them to rid themselves of their burdens in
one locality by settling in another at a distance [113].
The author of this passage shared the low opinion of the freedmen
held by many other Southerners of his time. In actuality, many blacks were
motivated to travel by the "impulse" to find family members from whom
they had been forcibly separated in the slave market. Even so, obser-
vers more sympathetic to the freedmen noted the same phenomenon of wide-
spread black mobility. For example, although Carl Schurz disagreed on
the proportions of freedmen involved, he found that
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... as soon as the struggle was finally decided, and our forces
were scattered about in detachments to occupy the country, the
so far unmoved masses began to stir.... Large numbers of colored
people left the plantations; many flocked to our military posts
and camps to obtain the certainty of their freedom, and others
walked away merely for the purpose of leaving the places on
which they had been held in slavery, and because they could now
go with impunity. Still others, and their number was by no
means inconsiderable, remained with their former masters and
continued their work on the field, but under new and as yet
unsettled conditions, and under the agitating influence of a
feeling of restlessness [114].
This- evidence of considerable mobility should be evaluated in light of
the fact that not all workers have to move in order for competitive
conditions to prevail in the labor market. Only enough need to move
to equalize wages between regions and to allow the market-clearing
wage to be reached.
Just as the planters'lament that Negroes would not work without com-
pulsion was evidence of a continued desire to exploit, the many state-
ments that freedmen were perfectly willing to work for "fair" wages
show planters' willingness to pay the market rate. Schurz wrote that
"In the reports of officers of the Freedmen's Bureau, among the docu-
ments annexed to this [report], you will find frequent repetitions of
the statement that the negro generally works well where he is decently
treated and well compensated. Nor do the officers of the Freedmen's
Bureau alone think and say so. Southern men, who were experimenting
in the right direction, expressed to me their opinion to the same
effect." Schurz observed that the number of these satisfied planters
was small, but that it corresponded to those who "gave free negro
labor a perfectly fair trial," and also that Northern men engaged in
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cotton planting "almost uniformly speak of their negro laborers with
satisfaction..." [115].
These findings were echoed in the testimony before the Joint
Committee on Reconstruction. Major General George H. Thomas, com-
mander of the military division of Tennessee, testified:
QUESTION: Do the freedmen generally find employment in
Tennessee?
ANSWER. I do not know of any difficulty in their finding
employment.
QUESTION: And at fair wages?
ANSWER. Yes, sir; and there is a general understanding
among the negroes and among the whites that each is to comply
with his part of the contract, so that there is no difficulty
and no dissatisfaction [116].
The very next witness before the Joint Committee was a Col. William
Spence, a Tennessee farmer and former slaveowner. His testimony
corroborated General Thomas1 s:
In the country where I live in the condition of the freedmen
is very good. There is an agency of the Freedmen's Bureau
there, but there have been very few cases that have to be taken
before it for adjustment. The freedmen have behaved exceedingly
well, and have obtained fair wages [117].
Brigadier General James S. Brisbin, a U. S. Army officer stationed in
Arkansas, recognized that even though an inclination to reestablish
slavery still existed, the general practice was to pay fair wages, and
freedmen were perfectly willing to work for those wages [118]. Dr.
James P. Hambleton, an Atlanta physician, who had lived in Georgia for
15 years and who admitted that "all my interests are in Georgia," went
even further, actually regretting the new-found bargaining power of
the freedmen:
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QUESTION: What has been the conduct of the negroes during
and since the war?
ANSWER. I have seen very little difference. They were
very humble and obedient during the war; no people ever behaved
better. After the war they were under the impression that free-
dom meant freedom from labor, and everything of that sort; most
of them quit work, and refused to do anything until cold weather
came last winter. They fully expected the United States govern-
ment to clothe and feed them. Since then, a great many of them
have made contracts, and are working very well; but the great
difficulty is that they will not stick to a contract; they are
fickle; they are constantly expecting to do better; they will
make a contract with me to-day for twelve or fifteen dollars a
month, and in a few days somebody will come along and offer a
dollar or two more, and they will quit me--never saying anything
to me, but leave in the night and be gone. They are constantly
striking for higher wages [119].
Just as the Joint Committee on Reconstruction received testimony
that planter organizations had been formed with the intent of regulating
wages, it also heard witnesses say that no such organizations existed.
Dr. M.M. Lewis of Alexandria, Virginia, testified:
QUESTION. Is there not, generally, among their [freedmen's]
employers a disposition to constrain the freedmen to work at low
wages?
ANSWER. I rather think not. Like everybody else, they like
to get labor as cheap as they can. That is the disposition
pretty much everywhere.
QUESTION. Do you know of any combinations among employers
to keep down the wages of freedmen?
ANSWER. No, sir; I do not.
QUESTION. There is no general understanding to that effect?
ANSWER. No, sir [120].
The same negative response was elicited from David C. Humphreys of
Huntsville, Alabama [121]. Major J.W. Smith, an army paymaster from
Little Rock, Ark., did "not see much disposition on the part of the
landholders to oppress them [the freedmen], nor do I think there is
much danger of it at this time, from the fact that they want their
labor" [122].
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Other reports show that planters' competition for labor went to even
more extreme lengths. It was not unknown that "men came
to blows over the hiring of one's former workers" [123]. Such an
incident also reveals the bafflement and frustration the planters must
have felt in their changed relations with the labor force.
The complaints of Southern planters went much farther than dis-
satisfaction with the new mobility of the freedmen. Many of the
points listed above as potential evidence for a competitive labor
market were raised explicitly by the perceptive "Southerner" writing
in The Galaxy in 1871. "Southerner's" article deserves to be quoted
at length, not only because it contained evidence for competition, but
also because it showed the depth of planters' dismay at the turn of
events. "Southerner" also addressed various admonitions to other
planters to reverse the labor situation.
... Migratory and fond of change, sure of a home whenever willing
to work on account of the great demand for farm labor, the freed-
man manifests a singular indifference to contracting, and many of
them rarely live two years in succession on the same place. It
seldom or never occurs that a man works exactly the same force in
different years both as to numbers and individuals.
The employer or his overseer, though giving good wages, by per-
suasion, begging, or complimentary encouragement, has to induce
the freedmen to work. Often he possesses no power of coercion
and cannot even attempt its exercise. All he can do is to control
his freedmen by moral influence, persuasion, or example; get an
overseer or agent to look after the hands, or dock each freedman
for every half hour of lost time. A threat to discharge, or even
a discharge itself, would prove of little avail, because in the
first place the laborer is wanted, and in the second place he
could readily procure another situation.
With all these drawbacks, it is still absolutely necessary for
the planter to have laborers.... So he speaks to one freedman after
another, mounts his horse and rides hither and thither, sends an
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agent back and forth day after day, announces his willingness
to make liberal contracts, does make large offers, bribes his
own hands to hire others for him, goes to the towns and villages
and addresses the many colored loiterers on the streets, stops at
railway stations and sounds the freedmen he always finds strolling
near, and thus by one means and another gradually obtains as many
hands as he wants, or failing in that, as many as he can....
... Occasionally an advertisement appears in a newspaper, declaring
that such and such a freedman has broken his labor contract, and
that whoever hires him shall be prosecuted according to the law;
but it rarely or never occurs that such a prosecution takes place,
though the freedman is hired by some other planter. Indeed, it is
a difficult matter to discover an absconded freedman, for he can
readily find a home go where he will, so great is the demand for
laborers.
Without delay all Southern planters should agree upon some
general plan of hiring, some well-understood rate of wages, and
some mode of discovering and punishing deliquent laborers. There
should be an entire stop put to the custom, now common and con-
sidered not altogether unfair, of enticing another man's laborers
from him by offering higher wages. A trespass law of general
application is needed, which will prevent strange freedmen from
intruding upon the premises of others, engaging in mischief, steal-
ing, or tempting the laborers to leave their employers and contract
with some one else [124].
"Southerner" also pointed out among the reasons for the disastrous (for
the planters) situation that freedmen were being used to build the
new railroads, and that "The rich lands of Mississippi, Louisiana, and
Texas have drawn many freedmen from other portions of the South, because
the larger the yield the higher the wages" [125].
The planter and agricultural magazines also contained evidence of
labor market competition. DeBow' s Review, in addition to favoring argu-
ments encouraging immigration to freshen competition among the farm
workers (the immigration debate will be separately discussed), contained
explicit references to competition for labor in the years following the
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war. For instance, the "Report on Cotton" in the September 1869 issue
argued that planters should make the best of the new situation:
Inducements to large planting [of cotton] will open employ-
ment to every person able and willing to work, and may renew
a hurtful competition for labor, leading to excessive wages.
All this, however, must be left to adjust itself under the
operation of demand and supply, and further results will com-
plete the imperfect demonstration of the past year, that
cotton-growing by labor left free to assert its own price,
and not burdened by unwise imposts, is cheaper and more profit-
able to the individual planter than planting by slave labor
could be under its most favorable circumstances, while the
community will gain in wealth, and the best uses of wealth,
beyond anything conceived by men of the past generations [126].
Another writer, arguing against Chinese immigration largely on social
and political grounds, reasoned that a Chinese would not necessarily con-
tinue to work at the wage he was "imported" to work for, in the face of
competition among planters;
We may remark here, that many persons with whom we have
conversed are of the impression that the coolie will always
labor at the same rate at which he is imported. Why the coolie
should labor alongside of the negro, at less wages than the
negro received for doing the same amount of work, we cannot
understand. It would be still more incomprehensible that no
planter would bid more for the coolie than the low rate at which
the importer held him. Have we peonage here? Can a man hold a
laborer against his will? If he break his indentures and go
away, can the employer follow him with a fugitive slave law? It
is rather our impression that if planters, cultivating the earth,
should hear that there was half price labor on the plantation of
anybody else that they would explain to those laborers their
rights, and inveigle them to leave their half price situation.
There would be Joss houses and an opium stupefactory, and birds'
nests would be sold in the shops. Every inducement would be
offered and it is not reasonable to suppose that a faithless
heathen, who quits his own country to make money, would resist
the temptation to double his wages. We do not say that a day's
work of a coolie would be equal in value or price to a day's
work by a white man or an African, but that the coolie would
receive, before he had made the second crop, as much for planting,
plowing, and picking an acre as any one else would [127].
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This writer apparently missed the main point of the immigration pro-
ponents, that increased population would drive down the market wage
(see below, pp. 88-94), but he exhibited no sentimentality about the
lengths Southern gentlemen would be willing to go in order to secure
the labor they desired. Writing of conditions in Louisiana, another
contributor to DeBow's wrote:
If we consider that all the labor in the sugar districts
is and has been fully employed, the question arises, where
is the labor to come from for the increased planting? There
is room for double the amount if the projected increase is
carried out. Can it be obtained for bidding higher for it?
We should think it might to a certain extent. Since the war
there has been a rush of all classes to the towns, especially
of negroes, and that is one of the reasons why some of the
plantations have been depopulated. It is now the time for such
to return to their proper avocation instead of eking out a
miserable existence in the towns. Under the circumstances, we
may anticipate what will occur in the country. Those planters
who are already under way and able to pay, will outbid their
poorer neighbors, and there will necessarily occur a rise in
wages. The high prices offered may secure a sufficiency of
laborers to those who bid for them. But for those from whom they
are taken from may well inquire where they are to get others,
and they should look the thing squarely in the face at once. It
will not do to imagine that by cunning management and paying a
little more, one may obtain the number of hands that he wants.
He may be disappointed by the better management of another. In
the squabble, for squabble there will be, it will be each one
for himself and the devil take the hindmost [128].
Disapproval of this sort of competition for labor was not confined to
the aristocratic DeBow's. The more "down-home" Southern Cultivator re-
ferred both explicitly and off-handedly to competition among planters
for agricultural workers. A "Subscriber" wrote the Cultivator in 1869:
... Go to the city of Memphis--and I expect it is so at other
places--and you will find farmers from all the country around,
hunting up freedmen, and offering them wages that they cannot
afford to pay, to go to the country, for the purpose of culti-
vating cotton. Last year, when farmers determined to raise meat
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and bread enough to supply them, and some to spare, it was
not so. Labor was then dependent upon the farmer--now the
farmer is dependent upon the laborer, and the laborer knows
it, and it makes him careless and indifferent; for he knows
that if discharged at one place for indolence, his labor is
in such demand, he can readily find employment at another [129].
Another writer in the same issue argued for yearly contracts but weekly
wage payments, on the grounds that such a payment system was superior
because it discouraged agricultural workers from moving at the end of
the year and "exorcised the evil spirit of discontent that possesses
them" [130].
The Southern Cultivator also decried the increased bargaining
power of the blacks. A Georgia planter complained, "Once we had
reliable labor, controlled at will. Now, we depend upon chance for labor
at all. It is both uncertain and unreliable; and our contracts must
often be made at great disadvantage." Notwithstanding these disadvan-
tages, this planter went on to say that "Negro labor is all we have at
present, and is decidedly preferable to any we are ever likely to
have..." [131], an admission which is relevant to the dispute over
relative black and white labor efficiency to be dealt with in Section C
of this chapter.
Calls for "concert of action" on the part of planters to control
the wage rate were usually accompanied by admissions of the difficulty
of accomplishing such combinations. "Acorn" wrote in 1869:
...It is very ridiculous to charge our people with a want of
sagacity or public spirit, because they don't see the necessity
of organization. Of all classes, the agricultural is the least
disposed to act in concert, because it does not feel the neces-
sity. And at the South, where our population is sparse, and
every man lord of his own manor, it is not easy to get up social
gatherings, at which farmers can exchange opinions and compare
notes [132].
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Also, the operation of a competitive labor market is hinted by S.W.
Trotti, the same contributor who anticipated the Domar Hypothesis
(see above, Chapter I):
... It is true, under the present order of things, the Southern
planter is seldom presented with the alternative of giving
higher wages or a cessation of labor; but as a substitute for
strikes, he is blessed with what we may call quits, under the
operation of which he wakes up some fine morning and finds
that half his hands or perhaps all of them without warning on
their part, or sufficient provocation on his, have gone into
the employment of his neighbor [133].
Planters' awareness of the improved competitive position of the black
agricultural workers was even expressed in verse appearing in the
Cultivator. (It is of such little artistic value that it hardly de-
serves to be called poetry.) Repeated over and over for purposes of
ridicule are the various aspects of the improved situation of the blacks.
One stanza deals with planter-freedman relations:
Before his throne proud planters bow,
For help to wield the hoe and plough,
See him in social confab now
Beside the Digger--
His antecedents disavowed,
To please the nigger [134].
The author of this doggerel was trying to satirize the extent to which
the "proudplanters" had been laid low--they were forced to actually
speak personally to the blacks in order to elicit needed labor from them!
To modern eyes, of course, it is the would-be satirist who appears
ridiculous.
There is some scattered evidence that the compensation of black
agricultural workers rose immediately after emancipation. An article
"Condition and Wants of the Cotton Raising States" in the February, 1869
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DeBow ts Review included the following highly suggestive passage:
... We have been compelled for some time past, to recognize
the fact that the whole question of labor rests in the hands
of the negro. This has been fully illustrated by their con-
duct since the year 1865, when first they fully comprehended
that they were a free people. That year, the hands, with few
exceptions, remained in their old situations, and were con-
tented with a share in the cotton and corn crops, ranging from
an eighth to a twelfth. In 1866, many, influenced by a desire
for change, or a prospect of doing better elsewhere, left their
homes, and hired themselves to others. The experience of the
preceding year had made them afraid of contracting for a share
in the crop; consequently, they demanded money wages, and, of
course, money wages had to be paid. The scale of wages, gradu-
ated according to the capability of the hand, ranged from six
to eight dollars for women, from eight to twelve dollars for
men. However, in 1867, they again demanded a share in the crops.
But their estimate of the value of their labor had risen, instead
of an eighth of the cotton and corn, they demanded a fourth of
every thing raised on the plantation. They demanded it, and,
of course they got it. If a planter demurred to accede to it,
he immediately found himself without hands. Notice, that
there was no concert of action on the part of the planters to
oppose these ever increasing exactions; had this been done in
the first instance, the negro would not have imbibed the idea
that his services were indispensable to the planter, and that
he had only to nane his terms to have them accepted. On the
contrary, every man tried to out bid his neighbor, and to fill
up his requisite quota of hands at the expense of every one
else [135].
This writer went on to argue that "until some competition is produced
by the importation of labor, the negro element will have the question
of wages pretty much in their own hands" [136]. It would certainly be
difficult to find a clearer example of what could be expected to happen
during the transition from an imperfect labor market (slavery) to a
competitive one (after emancipation).
Other contemporary observers apparently saw the same phenomenon:
...Harry Hammond attached significance to the fact that as
early as 1866 a freedman in the upper pine belt had come to
believe that the share of the laborer should be one-fourth of
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the produce plus food and shelter. By 1869, however, a Negro
labor organization was asking half the crop for tenants, and
wages of fifteen to twenty dollars for laborers, presumably
with state supervision of contracts. Gradually contracts were
on their faces liberalized until many of them provided that
three-fourths of the crop should go to the tenant and one-fourth
to the landlord--an arrangement that was characteristic, it will
be recalled, of white tenancy in Chester District as early as
1842 [137].
Southern attitudes towards immigration also revealed the belief
of large segments of the population that competition prevailed in the
labor market. Both DeBow' s Review and the Southern Cultivator contained
a large amount of material devoted to a debate on the pros and cons of
encouraging immigration into the South after the war. DeBow' s Review
was generally favorable to immigration. Each issue contained a "Depart-
ment of Immigration and Labor" [138]. In some cases, immigration was
advocated on social or political grounds, usually as a way of strengthen-
ing white hegemony by increasing the proportion of white population [139].
DeBow' s also advocated immigration specifically to introduce
workers to compete with the black labor. A.R. Lightfoot, the same man
who observed in DeBow' s the increase in wage rates between 1865 and
1867 (see above, p. 87), concluded his article with a defense of immi-
gration on these grounds:
...It is evident that until some competition is produced by
the importation of labor, the negro element will have the
question of wages pretty much in their own hands. Their de-
mands are already so exorbitant, that cotton raising has
nearly ceased to be a money making business. As the price of
labor goes up, the price of land declines. Cotton lands that
were formerly estimated at $30, can now be bought for $10.
Rents have fallen proportionally.
Did the tide of emigration set towards the Southern States,
instead of from them, these evils would be remedied. Labor
would be cheapened, lands would increase in value, and cotton
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raising would once more become remunerative. We want men
of capital to come among us, and introduce white labor...
we see afar off, a brighter future, separated from us, it
is true, by years of privation and endurance, but it is a
future of peace and prosperity [140].
The Southern Cultivator also served as a forum in the immigration
debate. The "immigration for competition" argument was typified by
this excerpt from a letter by "Policy" in 1869:
Chinese immigration would operate beneficially in prevent-
ing the industrious negro from relaxing from industrious
habits owing to the bad example of the idle and intemperate;
while the latter would see the necessity of reforming, as
they no longer commanded the labor market, and must therefore
work or starve; while the improved general industry would
operate beneficially on the rising generation. An amount of
Chinese immigration adequate to effect these objects, would
doubtless prove very salutary. War and emancipation reduced
the available amount of agricultural labor considerably, and
there is a constant tendency to its lessening still more....
... It is desirable, in his own interest, that the negro should
continue industrious, but what security is there that he will,
and how is this to be best insured. The introduction of
another race, equally capable of laboring under a Southern sun,
though comparatively few in numbers, would, by the operation
of the spirit of competition, effect the desired object, to
the mutual advantage of all parties [141].
David Dickson (a frequent contributor to Southern Cultivator), even in
arguing against immigration on the grounds that cotton production should
be curtailed and not expanded, made the unusual point that competition
between Negro and immigrant labor would drive down wages and thereby
lead to strikes which would be to the over-all detriment of the planter
class [142]. Another contributor anticipated the salutary effects of
Chinese competition on Negro labor:
...Bring them [Chinese] here in competition with the negroes,
and the latter may find it to their interest to quit stealing
and going to the legislature, and go to work in the cotton
fields where they belong. If the negroes could be induced to
quit loafing about the towns and country, and could all be brought
to the plantations, the South would have laborers enough... [143].
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It is not the purpose of this discussion to chronicle the entire
course of the immigration debate in the post-war South. The point of
these examples is to illustrate how some spokesmen who advocated bring-
ing immigrants into the South during these years argued as though they
believed that a shift of the labor supply curve to the right would lower
the wage. Such a position is compatible with thinking a more numerous
labor force would be easier to control and exploit, but given the
language of the proposals, which often mention benefits such as the
"spirit of competition" which immigration would foster among workers,
it seems safe to conclude that at least some immigration proponents
held a competitive labor market model in their minds.
The Southern immigration movement has been discussed by other
historians [144], and it is interesting to note that many of their
conclusions are consistent with what would be expected given the com-
petitive model. Loewenberg rejected the theory that prior to 1880 the
South "desired no immigration either from the north or from foreign
countries" [145]. Instead, he concluded "There was a definite desire
for immigration throughout the whole period which expressed itself in
many ways" [146]. Immigration was generally favored by the Southern
periodicals, state laws were passed between 1865 and 1876 favoring
immigration, travelers' recorded impressions showed a "dominant trend
of opinion in favor of immigration, certain Southern real estate firms
became agents for labor (immigration) and even after 1880, strong
official support continued to be given to immigration bureaus and
projects'[147].
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Perhaps more to the point is Berthoff's finding that immigration
was supported by certain economic interests, and opposed by others.
"Plantation owners led the movement to bring in foreigners" [148].
The reason was that "Cheap foreign labor seemed likely not only to
replace emigrating Negroes but also to break down Negro monopoly of
unskilled labor and so keep wages low" [149]. On the other hand, the
majority of Southern people opposed immigration for the same economic
reason that prompted the landlords to support it:
The campaign to develop southern economy on a base of
white immigrant labor failed in two ways. First, of the
millions of Europeans who came to the United States between
1865 and 1914, only an incidental number entered the South.
Second, the economic interests which hoped to profit from
immigrant laborers or land buyers never reconciled most of
the southern people to an influx of foreigners. In fact,
Southerners, though they had little experience with immigrants,
in this period became as outspoken xenophobes as those old-
stock Northerners who objected to the masses of foreigners
actually in their midst....
...When confronted with actual groups of foreigners or with
visions of a mass immigrant invasion, Southerners, unless they
hoped for immediate profit from the immigrants, rallied to
defend their race and culture or to repel the supposed threat
of economic competition [150].
The Farmers' Alliances, forerunners of the Populist Party, displayed
growing opposition to immigration in the late '80's and early '90's [151].
Hostility to immigrants even reached violent proportions--Italians were
lynched in Louisiana and Nssissippi in the '90's [152].
Other evidence that different economic groups held opposing views
on immigration exists. Theodore Salutos found that
...determined and tireless as the larger and more influential
planters were in their quest for foreign labor, the small
white farmers, and to some extent the Negroes, opposed it.
The small whites, in particular, were appalled by a fear that
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the country would be overrun by inferior peoples, and that
they, as small producers, would be placed at a competitive
disadvantage. Apprehensions were also voiced by them over
dangers that would arise from the "jealousies and prejudices
of races widely differing in character, taste, and traditional
customs" [1531.
The Southern Cultivator as late as 1889 reported that the Farmers'
Alliance of Tuskaloosa county, Alabama, "memorialized" the legislature
of Alabama against pro-immigration influence exerted on it by the Alabama
Agricultural Society and the Southern Interstate Immigration Convention.
The Alliancemen asked, "Will the Legislature spend time and money in
an effort to secure cheap labor and salubrious homes for men of other
countries, or will it labor to promote the welfare and happiness of the
people who are here, and are also those whom the Legislature is sup-
posed to represent?" [154]
Nor was Alliance opposition to immigration schemes confined to
the local level;
An important meeting has held in Meridian, Mississippi,
on December 5th [1888]. The National Alliance, the National
Wheel, and the Co-operative Union of Farmers and Laborers,
merged into one body to be known as the Farmers and Laborers
Union, of America, with a consolidated membership of 1,500,000....
A great many matters of vital importance were passed upon.
On the subject of emigration a resolution was adopted to the
effect that while we will welcome emigrants from the Northwest
particularly, and from other parts of the word, we deprecate
any attempt to colonize this country with ignorant and pauper
population... [155].
Berthoff also found evidence of black opposition to immigration.
"More directly threatened than white farmers were Negroes, who might
have been driven out of southern agriculture and industry if some
immigration promoters had realized their plans. Though almost
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inarticulate, Negroes were said in 1907 to oppose immigration" [156].
It is true that the black population was "almost inarticulate," but
a few instances of their opposition to immigration do survive.
And so in the matter of immigration. The material interests
of the State [S.C., 1871] clearly demand it. But the blacks
are against it, as they fear its political consequences. A
late debate in the [state?] Senate illustrated this. A bill
was up to exempt new railroad enterprises and various enumerated
kinds of manufactures from taxation. A black leader debated
it, and in the course of his remarks took occasion to say he
had heard, or overheard, a good deal from the class of people
whom this legislation was designed to benefit; that it was
intended to overslaugh and crowd out the blacks by foreign
immigrants, to be introduced into the State by wholesale.
Now, he wanted everybody to understand that the blacks did not
intend to be crowded out, but that they proposed to stand their
ground and, "fight this thing out to the bitter end." He said
they might bring on their immigrants, and they would find the
blacks ready for them [157].
The Southern Workman printed an editorial (December, 1880) and a
letter (May, 1883) identifying the cheapness of Chinese labor as a
potential factor in depressing all wages, even though the editorial
policy of the Workman was one of not opposing immigration, since it
would expose the Chinese to Christianity [158]. And the Southern Work-
man was not the only black periodical to register opinion against immi-
gration. Alexander's Magazine in 1906 realized that "It has been one
of the pleas of southern senators in congress to increase the influx
of immigrant Poles, Italians, Swedes, etc., in the United States in
order that the South might get a sufficient stock of cheap labor to
supplant the Negro." The article went on to deplore the displacement
of Negro day labor by immigrants--barbers, bootblacks, railroad hands,
street gangs, and brick-yard forces.
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...The South will have its choice of cheap European labor
or that of the despised Negro. In a choice between a white
man and a Negro, for the sane position, in the South the
Negro must suffer, whatever his qualifications.... Many times
the South has threatened to import foreigners to force out
Negro labor. This move on the part of the government will
accomplish what the South has longed for--it will make Negro
labor no longer a necessity. The common laborer being forced
out of employment, the existence of the professional class
will inevitably be undermined. Sooner or later the Negro
must turn to some other corner of the earth to work out an
existence [159].
Alexander's apparently held a strange view of how competition works--
rather than the tide of immigrants depressing wages, the magazine
thought it would only result in blacks being displaced by immigrants.
Whatever its economic theory, Alexander's feared the competition of
immigrants and correctly perceived the motivations of many white
Southern immigration boosters.
Leaving the immigration debate, references to competition in the
labor market continued through the last decades of the 19th century.
Charles Nordhoff, a correspondent for the New York Herald, concluded
on the basis of a tour through the cotton belt in 1875 that
The system of planting on shares, which prevails in most
of the cotton regions I have seen, appears to me admirable in
every respect.* [*Most economists consider it a bad system.]
It tends to make the laborer independent and self-helpful, by
throwing him on his own resources. He gets the reward of his
own skill and industry, and has the greatest motive to impel
him to steadfast labor and self-denial.
I have satisfied myself, too, that the black man gets, wherever
I have been, a fair share of the crop he makes... [160].
Similarly, the Report of the Industrial Commission contains
testimony that would indicate that neither the law nor the market situ-
ation was entirely unfavorable to the agricultural worker. The Hon.
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O.B. Stevens, Commissioner of Agriculture in the State of Georgia, indi-
cated that it was very easy for tenants to move from farm to farm,
despite previously contracted indebtedness.
Q. Is the indebtedness any sign on the part of the
government or the renters holding to a condition of poverty,
or is it the result of some other influence?
A. There is nothing whatever to force a man to stay on
the farm. They usually rent these lands from year to year....
If the tenant is dissatisfied for any cause, he has a perfect
right to go whenever he wants to. The landlord has no lien
and no claim upon the property of the tenant whatever except
for rent and advances, and those only apply to the present crop.
Q. What would be the position of a man, however, who had
defaulted on one farm? What would be his probability of being
able to get another farm in that locality, provided he did not
liquidate his indebtedness in the first instance?
A. Oh, he would not be regarded as a first-class tenant.
But there is always plenty of room there for everybody, and
he always gets a place and gets along in some way. Some people
always take him up ....
...Sometimes you have a tenant on a place, and he finds
he can do a little better somewhere else, and he moves off and
goes to the next place. Sometimes the landlord finds that he
can get a better tenant than the one he has. He lets this
fellow go and gets the other fellow. They are continually moving
around from place to place [161].
Another witness confirmed the existence of the Alabama law making it a
misdemeanor to break a contract, but also noted that this law was seldom
enforced [162]. Turning again to O.B. Stevens of Georgia, he stated
"the law in our state protects the laborer in every instance," and at-
tributed the poverty of the blacks to "the fact of bad management upon
the part of ignorant tenants," rather than to exploitation by whites:
... The garnishee law does not apply to wages. The law pro-
vides that wages for labor of any kind can not be garnisheed.
Labor is protected all around....
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Q. ... I would like to learn what is the cause of the
fact as you stated, that at the end of each year a great
many of the tenants make no money--they are in debt. Is it
because of the oppressive disposition of the white people to
drive hard bargains, or is it because of the bad management
of the tenant when freed from the general management of the
white people? Or is it because of the bad system? Are the
system and the law bad?
A. The law has nothing whatever to do with the systems
that are adopted for farm labor; nothing whatever. The only
law that we have is the law that protects a laborer in collect-
ing his wages, either one way or the other.
Q. Now, may I take the liberty of suggesting that that is
a sufficient answer to that phase of the question. It is not
the law. But is it the oppressive disposition of the white
people?
A. No... [163].
Such testimony from potentially biased planter spokesman must be taken
at something less than face value. But on the other hand, what is
being demonstrated here is the existence of a substantial body of opinion
favoring the hypothesis that the labor market was competitive in Southern
agriculture during the period under review.
It has already been noted that the legal history of Southern labor
legislation fluctuated between the passage and nullification of repressive
laws. One legal scholar writing in 1910 gave a fairly optimistic assess-
ment of the legal situation of black labor. His case was based on the
difference between laws pertaining to race distinctions (the "Jim Crow"
separate facilities laws) and the laws directly restricting the economic
freedom of labor:
Race distinctions do not appear to be decreasing. On the
contrary, distinctions heretofore existing only in custom
tend to crystallize into law. As a matter of fact, most of
the distinctions which are described above as the "Black Laws
of 1865-68" [the infamous Black Codes] are no longer in force.
No state now carries statutes prescribing the hour when a
97
Negro laborer must arise, requiring his contracts to be
in writing, prohibiting him from leaving the plantation or
receiving visitors without his employer's consent, or exact-
ing a license fee of him before he can engage in certain
trades. These laws were vestiges of the slave system and
survived but a short time after that system had been abolished
[164].
The authors of several modern monographs dealing with the South
during this period have also come to the conclusion that strong ele-
ments of competition were prevalent in the labor market. According
to Roger Shugg, in Louisiana after the war "...the free Negro did not
work as hard as a slave,* had less supervision and discipline,...**
Trouble often arose because planters would compete with one another in
bidding for hands. This practice almost demoralized Negroes on the
sugar plantations, according to Bouchereau,*** and led to unorganized
strikes and much dalliance before signing contracts for a new year"****
[165].
LaWanda Cox uncovered one such strike of agricultural workers for
higher wages in 1880:
...attempts on the part of Negro field labor to strike and
organize were infrequent after Reconstruction. There exists,
however, an interesting account of a strike for higher wages
by Negro workers on Louisiana sugar plantations in 1880. The
Negroes went from plantation to plantation getting others to
join them. The State militia was sent out and the ringleaders
were arrested, tried, and imprisoned for trespass. Petitioning
the governor for pardon, they stated that they had thought it
within their rights to go where other laborers were working,
even though on the property of an individual, and induce those
laborers to join them. They now understood this to be a vio-
lation of the law. "When laborers differ with their employers
hereafter about the price of their labor," the petition read,
"it will be in a peacable manner and with law always on their
side." They were released and "quiet was restored." ... .Con-
flict between southern laborer and landowner took forms other
than overt clashes. Most notable was the continued bargaining
throughout the period over wages, shares, or cash rentals, with
each party trying to obtain whichever arrangement would assure
him the largest income [166].
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Enoch Banks' Economics of Land Tenure in Georgia is an old though
still useful economic account of the Southern post-bellum agricultural
economy. Banks, writing in 1905, observed the frequent movement of
blacks following emancipation, although he attributed much of this
mobility to a "political motive" distinct from response to wage dif-
ferentials or other economic incentives [167]. However, he did comment
on the economic motive (wage incentive) involved in migration of labor-
ers off the farm, whites to cotton-manufacturing industry, and blacks
into the cities, both responding at least in part to the lure of higher
wages [168]. Interestingly, Banks apparently anticipated the major re-
sult of this investigation, namely, that agricultural labor received
a wage equal to the value of its marginal product:
The same fundamental economic law works... the laborer
tends to get that part of the product for which he is
economically responsible [169].
He also believed, however, that this result would only be obtained when
the plantation-wages system of labor payments replaced the sharecropping
system, and that the laborer
... is economically responsible for a larger absolute amount
under the plantation system than under the cropping system
and fundamental economic law will tend to give this larger
amount to him [170].
Thus Banks believed in marginal product factor pricing under a straight
wage payment system, which he felt was more efficient than a share-
cropping system. It will be shown later that under plausible assumptions
the form of agricultural tenure had no impact on distribution or ef-
ficiency. (See below,Chapter III.) For the moment it is sufficient
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to point out Banks' conviction that some measure of competition pre-
vailed in Southern agriculture at the time he wrote.
Vernon Wharton, in his meticulous study The Negro in Mississippi,
found that after 1867 there
... was a change in the attitude of the planters, and
especially of the editors and public leaders. They had be-
come reconciled to the fact that slavery was dead, and that
codes to enforce peonage could not be applied. It had be-
come apparent that the Negroes must be paid, and that their
right to move about in search of better contracts could not
be blocked [171].
However, some of Wharton's other evidence shows that this acquiescence
may have been superficial. During the great Negro "Exodus" of the late
'70's, the "small white farmers and their representatives, a majority
of the white population, probably wish to see the Negroes removed from
the state as rapidly and as thoroughly as possible because 'they could
not compete with the Negroes in the production of cotton and could have
no hope until the freedmen were gone'" [172].
The attitude of the employer group was an entirely different
matter. They prophesied general ruin for the state if the
Exodus continued, and quickly turned to newspaper propagand
(sic) to try to dissuade the emigrants.* When propaganda
failed, some did not hesitate to use violence. This included
the use of irregular courts,** the breaking up of crowds of
Negroes waiting for boats,*** the arrest of emigrants on
charges of vagrancy and of obtaining goods under false pre-
tenses,**** and the beating and kidnapping of Negro leaders.
***** [173]
The sane tension between imperfection and competition in the labor market
is evident here as elsewhere. The care and conscientiousness of
Wharton's research in effect uncovered both conflicting tendencies.
Nevertheless, he felt confident to summarize the consequences of
emancipation thus:
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The chief advantage that freedom brought to the Negro
was the ability to move about, and thus to establish among
the employer class a certain amount of competition for his
labor... [174].
Finally, it is again possible to examine statements by blacks
themselves regarding their view of the operation of the labor market.
Again, it is difficult to find Southern black spokesmen. In keeping
with the Hampton-Tuskegee philosophy, the Southern Workman' s editors
generally believed that the labor market was competitive, and that
blacks could increase their incomes only by increasing their level of
education and following that up with hard work. In an 1875 review of
the Southern press, the Workman prefaced its compilation by remarking
that Southern blacks were "deeply stirred by recent political events,"
and that in addition, "Like any other people, they will in the end
collect in those regions where they are best treated and best paid" [175].
Later that same year, the Workman carried an article titled "A Few Words
on the Labor Question," written by a planter who saw unmistakable evidence
of employer competition for black labor:
If, as owners of the soil, possessors of what little
capital there is in the South, and with a superior intel-
ligence, we do not control the labor of our land, the fault
lies at our own doors. We have no system, no concert of
action. To the contrary, we are constantly pulling against
each other. We are the employers, but every farmer has his
own notion of things, and cares nothing for his neighbor's
plans. If I hire hands for wages, one of them may at any
time conclude to leave. If so, he only goes across my line
fence and my neighbor hires him [176].
Beginning in 1878, the Workman carried a series of articles on econo-
mics by T.T. Bryce, and in these articles, Bryce put forward what
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essentially amounted to a competitive model of the determination of
wages, interest, and other prices. For example, Bryce argued that
the wage rate is determined by supply and demand:
The next great law of exchange that I would apply to
labor, is the law of demand and supply.... If there be two
men wanting to buy labor (that is, to hire it), and only
one man to sell his labor, it is certain the man who offers
most in exchange will secure the labor. If, on the other
hand, there be two men to sell their labor, and only one to
buy it, it is equally certain that the one will be hired who
will sell his labor cheaper. This law of demand and supply
is a law of nature, and no amount of legislation can change
it, any more than it could prevent the earth turning on its
axis....
Labor has its market price, just as corn or cotton; if
there be a large supply and small demand, prices will be low;
if there be a small supply and a large demand, prices will be
high-- and no amount of law making, nor mass-meetings, will
prevent it. Everyone tries to buy as cheaply and sell as
dearly as possible; the man with labor to sell will take the
highest price he can get; the man with labor to buy, will give
as little as possible; the price they may agree upon is the
market price, and neither close the bargain if they really
think they can do any better for themselves. Buyer and seller
together make the price, neither can do it alone; and a
Government has no more to do with the price of labor (that is,
the rate of wages) than it has with the price of potatoes.
No Government can fix the price of labor, that is, it cannot
say wages shall be so much or so little. No man can be com-
pelled to employ labor he doesn't want; and no man can be com-
pelled to labor for wages that do not suit him [177].
Would-be exploiters of labor may have had an easier task than try-
ing to "prevent the earth turning on its axis," but Bryce clearly had
legal controls and labor associations in mind when denouncing the fu-
tility of "law making" and "mass-meetings". Bryce also condemned both
forced labor and violent strikes:
...Everyone who attempts to steal another's purse, or deprive
him of his life, is seized and punished by the law. So, too,
with a man's labor; he has a right to the peaceable enjoyment
or employment of it, and anyone who attempts to interfere with
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such peaceable enjoyment or employment by the use of threats,
violates the law, and should be punished by it, as much as if
he had tried to wrest from him his purse or his life....
That all men with particular interests in common should
unite for mutual protection and encouragement is most proper;
that they should endeavor to get the best pay, or, in other
words, the most in exchange for their services, is right and
just; but their efforts must be through reasoning, and the
means of the market-place--and not through violence or threat-
enings [178].
Bryce also believed that "No 'strike' is ever successful, unless the
wages being received by the help are under -the market rate" [179]. The
soundness of Bryce's economic reasoning is not at issue here; what is
important is the prominence given to his articles in the Southern Work-
man. In addition to the article titled "Labor" from which the excerpts
quoted above were taken, subsequent issues of the Workman contained ar-
ticles on "Capital" and "Wages," all emphasizing the same theme, that
competitive conditions were the rule in all markets [180].
Most of the Workman's references to the causes of the various
"Exodus" black mass migrations of the '70's and '80's emphasized response
to wage incentives. An article reprinted from the Newberry, North
Carolina Herald stated:
The Texas fever has laid a strong hold upon the Newberry
Negroes. The week before last one hundred and fifty left
this place for Texas; we learn that a large party will go to-
morrow, and another party on the following Friday. Some of
these emigrants are well-to-do Negroes, but they say that
labor is too cheap here and their wages too hard to collect
after they have been earned [181].
A similar analysis was offered by the Workman itself, later in the same
decade:
The exodus again in progress among the colored people--
from North Carolina into Arkansas, Mississippi and Louisiana,
at the invitation of land companies who pay their way and sell
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them land at nominal prices--may result, like former move-
ments of the kind, in considerable individual suffering and
disappointment, but also, like those, in more of general
benefit. It has at least several encouraging suggestions--
as showing, for instance, that the Negroes are wanted and
welcomed in some parts of the country at any rate, and further-
more, that they are capable of taking hold of their own
problem, and settling their questions for themselves. The
motive for emigration seems to be chiefly in depression of
labor and wages, from failure of crops on the worn out
tobacco fields [182].
As with the other issues, however, Southern Workman was not single-
minded. In May, 1879, it carried with a favorable preface a letter to
the New York Herald of April 14th, from "a clergyman and native of the
South.," who argued that the exodus (which must have been the great
Mississippi Valley to Kansas exodus) was due not so much to "political
intimidations and even outrages against the negro in the South," as to
exploitation:
... They [blacks] realize the fact that their emancipation
in the South has only lifted them from slavery into serfdom.
Behind all this stands the fact that the negro in the
South is systematically cheated out of his wages.... He rents
a tract of land and the landlord has a lien against the whole
crop for the rental. It is a penitentiary offence to move any
part of the crop from the place before the landlord is satis-
fied for his rents. The landlord has the first claim on what
the negro makes....
...Of course under these circumstances emancipation is a huge
disappointment to the negro. He is in a worse condition than
he was in slavery. The white money lender gets all the fruit
of his labor, and is under no obligation to feed and care for
him and his children.
The ultimate effect of all this will be disastrous to the
South.
.... It is already having the effect to drive the negro out of
the South.... The remedy is very simple--even-handed justice to
the negro as a laborer. This will hold him in the South.
Nothing else will [183].
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This contradictory note is an appropriate one for ending this
discussion of the Competition Hypothesis versus the Exploitation
Hypothesis. It has been shown that on the basis of only the narrative
accounts surviving from the post-bellum period, a strong case could
be made for either hypothesis. There is no doubt that the incidents
related here did actually take place--there were peon camps and there
were blacks who responded to wage incentives in moving from place to
place. The repressive laws at times were part of the state penal codes,
and these laws at other times were overruled by the courts.
The fundamental question which cannot be answered by this sort of
investigation is whether Southern agricultural labor was exploited in the
aggregate. At any point in history, a society is likely to generate
unusual, even extraordinary injustices. The problem of historical
interpretation is not primarily concerned with these exceptional cases,
but with the general tendency or trend. Enough reported instances of
both exploitative and competitive behavior exist to support either
hypothesis about the Southern agricultural labor market. It remains to
be shown, using quantitative and statistical methods, which hypothesis
prevailed for the South as a whole.
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C. The Relative Merits of Black and White Agricultural Labor
The degree of competition or imperfection in the labor market is
not the only interesting economic issue of the late 19th century South.
Perhaps of equal interest, because of its connection with the Legacy
of Slavery Hypothesis (that the black population emerged from slavery
deficient in education, initiative, and enterprise, and hence was low
in productivity relative to the whites), is the question of whether
there was any significant quality difference between black and white
labor during the period. At least one careful historian, B.J. Loewen-
berg, has concluded that Southern opinion after the Civil War was in
agreement that free black labor was inferior to white labor [184]. This
assessment is derived from the often-repeated stereotype of the lazy,
shiftless, irresponsible freedman,which was so common in the 19th cen-
tury literature. Because of the ubiquity of this stereotype, only a
few typical examples of it in its "original" form will be presented here.
It is no surprise that many planters and other whites thought badly of
the capabilities of the Southern blacks; what may be unexpected is the
large number of planters' statements that black labor was equal or superior
to that of whites.
It should be pointed out that for the "inferiority" of a certain
type of labor to have an economic meaning, "inferiority" must refer to
lower productivity, ceteris paribus. One type of labor will not be con-
sidered "inferior" in the context of this discussion if the employers
simply have a taste for the other. Similarly, a difference in produc-
tivity attributable to differences in capital per man or the fertility
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of the land farmed cannot be counted as labor "inferiority." The Legacy
of Slavery Hypothesis refers only to deficiencies in human capital or
acculturation which might have followed the freedmen out of slavery.
Nineteenth century observers rarely, if ever, conformed to the ceteris
paribus requirement in their comparisons, so their evaluations of labor
productivities are only of limited value. Nonetheless, their views on
black as against white agricultural labor are still suggestive.
The Land occupancy and Ownership Hypothesis (that productivity dif-
ferences were associated mainly with soil quality differences) will not
be discussed in this section at all. That discussion will be deferred
until after the presentation of the econometric results, in order to be
able to state with real precision what race-associated productivity dif-
ferences must be explained by any proposed hypothesis. This section
will be confined to a simple survey of the 19th century comparisons
of the effectiveness of the members of the two races in Southern
agriculture.
Philip Bruce articulated one very common theme of the planters, that
the blacks were simply incapable of farming successfully without white
supervision:
The greatest injury which a planter can inflict upon the
interests of the community in which he lives, is to rent the
whole of his estate in small lots to colored tenants, especially
if he abandons his home permanently to dwell elsewhere, leav-
ing his property entirely in their hands. The quality of the
soil begins at once to depreciate from improper usage and care-
less cultivation; the buildings and fences soon fall out of order
from natural decay or the depredations of pilferers; the teams
decline to the poorest condition; the crops produced are of an
inferior quality. But this is not all: such an estate soon
becomes the safe harbor of all the depraved negroes in the
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vicinity; the vicious habits of the women and men alike
increase owing to their removal from the control of the pro-
prietor; thievish and superstitious practices are more common
and open, and brawls and quarrels arise more often than else-
where [185].
Such a pessimistic view did not prevent Bruce from remarking elsewhere:
It is plain that in the general conflict between whites
and blacks as laborers, the negro enjoys the chief advantages.
He is physically as vigorous and stanch as the white man; and
is more cheerful and more easily managed; he lives in happiness
under material conditions that would be intolerable to the
humblest white laborer; and has no sentiment or pride that will
prevent him from seeking any kind of employment, however dis-
agreeable that employment may be to ordinary sensibilities, or
in what degraded situations, it may place him.
Not only can the negro successfully compete with the native
white man, and drive him from the field, but he is also able to
expel the immigrant competitor who does not shrink at all from
working in his company and at the same tasks [186].
Perhaps these alleged qualities explained why "The large planters prefer
to make up their complement of hands by employing negroes alone" [187].
Buried under the racial stereotypes, Bruce was grappling with two con-
tradictory ideas. His notion of the racial inferiority of blacks re-
quired that they be incompetent farmers or tenants; yet he was also
faced with an observed predilection of at least some planters for black
workers. This contradiction reappeared, and undermined the attempt of
many a post-bellum planter spokesman to achieve consistency in his
writings about the merits of various types of plantation labor.
Contributors to Southern Cultivator also expressed doubts about
blacks' capabilities:
... planters persist in giving a poor ignorant, lazy, super-
stitious being, who has no property and never intends to have
anything if he can help it, an interest in their crops....
The labor question is a vexed question in the cotton belt;
yet I believe there is a sufficient amount of labor in the
108
South, if it could be judiciously controlled, the opinion
of a great many intelligent planters to the contrary not-
withstanding. If the negro with his ignorance, superstition
and natural inferiority, can't be controlled by the planters
of the South, we as a class are the poorest business men
that we have ever read about [188].
A very extensive outline of this "lack inferiority"argument is given
in a much later issue of the Cultivator, in 1889:
Following up the communication in the last issue of The
Cultivator...I am led to say, that the most marked difference
between farm methods at the West, and those practiced at the
South, will be found in the labor employed. Farm labor in
Ohio is far superior to farm labor in Georgia. Ohio farmers
positively decline to employ negroes in their fields, when it
is possible to secure white labor. They say they have uni-
formly found negroes "indolent, careless, wasteful and
destructive. Their idleness requires constant attendance to
keep them at work; their carelessness, close supervision to see
that their work is properly done; their wastefulness and
destructiveness would bankrupt any man of moderate means, who
is not constantly gathering up behind them."
It has been frequently said that the South will never have
any better farm labor than negroes. If so, I an sorry for the
South, unless they are to be greatly improved. Negroes are
thriftless, not caring to accumulate for themselves and, of
course, indifferent to the accumulation of their employers.
They are extremely idle, and, therefore, cannot be made profit-
able without expensive supervision. They are very destructive
to property and abusive to stock. In these evils they have
been indulged, until their character and conduct have become
uniform for evil [189].
It should be noted that even in the middle of his condemnation of black
labor, the writer felt obliged to acknowledge that "It has been fre-
quently said that the South will never have any better farm labor than
negroes." Other magazine references to the alleged inferiority of black
labor can be found. For example, "Nicholas Worth" in his Autobiography
alleged that black labor actually deteriorated after emancipation:
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...The negro was the principal laborer in producing cotton,
and, without training as farmer and as man, he was becoming a
less efficient laborer. They practically forbade his training.
The pitiful short-staple yield of impoverished acres was sold
for the starving price of low grades because it was not skill-
fully nor promptly gathered from the fields; it was wastefully
handled; it was sold to pay mortgages on itself. Life could
rise no higher till efficiency and thrift came in [190].
A similar opinion was voiced in DeBow's Review:
... To work large plantations with our present labor is
clearly impossible; and the greed for land will hardly endure
while weeds choke up the broad acres once so productive. We
have the soil and the market to ensure successful farming;
but we have very little of the skill and knowledge necessary
to attain the highest results....
It is evident enough that at present even a small plantation,
or farm, as I presume they will in the future be called, cannot
be successfully worked by Freedmen... [191].
The hearings before the Industrial Commission in the 1890's also
included the same sort of testimony.
... I think one of the causes of the depression in agriculture
in the South is the presence of the negro. The negro does not
know how to use improved implements, and does not want to know
how, and it is almost impossible to teach him. If a man farm-
ing cotton on an extensive scale puts an improved implement in
use, every darky says it is impossible to use it, and they do
not. They enter very largely into the agricultural conditions
of the South; the people rent to them, and work on shares with
them. They are averse to making anything in the world except
cotton. They do not want to make corn. They love watermelons
better than any people or any nation on earth, and they do not
know how to make watermelons. They do not care anything about
knowing how, but they do love them.... I believe the presence of
the negro in the South will retard its progress, its industrial
and moral development, and its advantageous development, and its
social development, agricultural development, and all other kinds
of development; and the question is now, What are you going to
do about it? Bishop Turner advocates a separation of the races.
I am with him on it.... There is no question but that if the
negroes were removed from our country their places would be
filled in the future by more intelligent labor [192].
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One of the methods used to "demonstrate" this inferiority of black
labor was to compare the output per man of blacks and some other group
of farmers, and to conclude from lower black output per man that black
labor was deficient. This dubious methodology was employed by an article
in The World' s Work, the June, 1907 issue of which was devoted entirely
to the South. The article, titled "Immigration to the South," reported
a "test" which was performed on "the 'Sunny Side' property, on the
Mississippi River, in Chicot Country, Arkansas." Negro work squads were
compared with Italians, and it was found that "the Italian seems to have
produced more lint per hand, by 1,410 pounds, or 120.1%, and to have ex-
ceeded the Negro's yield per acre by 170 pounds, or 72.91. The differ-
ence in money value in favor of the Italian was $148.89 per hand, or
115.8%, and $18.41 per acre, or 69.8%." It was also found that the
Italians had been more successful in accumulating work stock and in
liquidating their debts at the end of the year [193]. There were several
flaws in this "experiment." First, there was no control for the fer-
tility of the land farmed by the two groups of workers. Second, there
is no guarantee that the black farmers did not face some sort of dis-
crimination that the Italians did not face, such as discrimination in
purchases of capital equipment. Third, the Italian immigrants may not
have been randomly selected representatives of white agricultural workers.
They may have been particularly energetic and innovative simply because
they were immigrants. These objections notwithstanding, the type of
calculation presented in this Arkansas experiment was undoubtedly widely
accepted as evidence of the inferiority of black farm laborers.
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Fleming reported a similar calculation, made in the 1880 Census.
The main points of the Census report were
1. That where the blacks are in excess of the whites there
are the originally most fertile lands of the state. The natural
advantages of the soils are, however, more than counterbalanced
by the bad system prevailing in such sections, viz., large
farms rented out in patches to laborers who are too poor and too
much in debt to merchants to have any interest in keeping up the
fertility of the soil, or rather the ability to keep it up, with
the natural consequences of its rapid exhaustion and a product
per acre on these, the best lands of the state, lower than that
which is realized from the very poorest.
2. Where the two races are in nearly equal proportions, or
where the whites are in only slight excess over the blacks, as
is the case in all the sections where the soils are of average
fertility, there is found the system of small farms worked
generally by the owners, a consequently better cultivation, a
more general use of commercial fertilizers, a correspondingly
high product per acre, and a partial maintenance of the fer-
tility of the soils.
3. Where the whites are greatly in excess of the blacks
(three to one and above), the soils are almost certain to be
below the average in fertility, and the product per acre is
low from this cause, notwithstanding the redeeming influences
of a comparatively rational system of cultivation [194].
Apparent white productivity advantages were attributed to superior white
skills despite inferior soil, while black disadvantages were said to
persist despite blacks' location on the most fertile soils. These find-
ings partially anticipate some of the later results of this study, which
shows productivity differences associated with both race and crop. The
detailed identification of the productivity differences between the
groups will prove to be somewhat different, as will the interpretation
of those differences, however. Fleming also reported a productivity
calculation based on the 1900 Census. In this latter calculation,
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J. C. Hardy, president of the Agricultural College of Mississippi,
found that predominantly black counties with high per-acre land values
produced less output per acre than predominantly white counties with
low per-acre land values [195]. Hardy also reported that the counties
in which black farmers were more closely managed by whites were more
productive than the black counties in which not many white managers
were employed. While Hardy conceded that "...this difference is partly
caused by a difference in the fertility...," he asserted "... the prin-
cipal reason is due to the superior intelligence used in the management
of the first group [where white management prevails]. This is proved
by the fact that in every comparison made between a white county and a
black one the black was the most fertile, yet the white was nearly twice
as productive" [196]. Apparently, Hardy believed that land prices are a
better measure of fertility than output per acre. But just as output per
acre is inadequate as a fertility measure because of possible differences
in land/labor ratios and capital stocks across counties (as well as
potential race-associated differences in labor productivity), so also
land values might reflect factors such as transportation costs and other
locational factors distinct from the intrinsic physical and chemical fer-
tility of the soil. Land values could even reflect the market power of
landlords. Clearly these calculations are inadequate, but Southern
opinion supporting and conditioned by them was both substantial and
influential.
Despite the prevalence of this stereotypic conception of black
inferiority, the opposite view, that black agriculturalists were in no
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way deficient compared to whites, was surprisingly widespread. There
is no dearth of statements testifying to the quality and skill of
black farmers and agricultural workmen.
As early as 1863, a representative of the New England Educational
Commission for Freedmen enthusiastically reported the progress of South
Carolina blacks. This remarkable letter is worth reproducing in full:
Ashdale, near Beaufort,
S.C., August 8th, 1863
The colored people are doing well generally. They are
quite industrious, and well informed in all that appertains
to raising the cotton and all the other productions of the
soil. They are very much interested in all those products
that form the means of their subsistence. They are laboring
assiduously to procure in the coming harvest sufficient to
supply all the wants of the body, with some amount to sell.
The Governor of this department in the spring cut off the
clothes and rations from all the people that were able to
labor in the fields, and it has proved one of the most ef-
ficient means of promoting industrious habits among them.
So long as they saw before them a source from which they
could draw food and clothes, they were contented, and these
contributions had a deleterious effect upon them. Now they
are aware that if they do not produce sufficient to support
themselves, and purchase their clothes, they must suffer, and
they are quite ambitious to get as much as possible. It is
quite surprising to see the ingenuity and tact which many of
them exhibit to accomplish that end. They certainly have
imbibed largely the spirit of trade and commerce, by which
they increase their revenue. Their little fields are guarded
with the strictest care, and the growth of all the products
watched with much eagerness, and the profits calculated by
them, as much as the cargo and the profits to accrue therefrom
are, by the great shippers of our commercial marts. They are
fast learning the value of money, and acquiring an idea of
property, whether it be in a horse or land. There is a grow-
ing desire among them to become owners of land. Hundreds of
them are guarding their little stores with jealous care, and
adding to their stock all they can, in order to have sufficient
to make purchases at the next sales of land. To be able to re-
ceive all the proceeds of their labors, is one of the heights
of their ambition. The adjoining plantation to the one where
I live, was purchased last year by the negroes. They have
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worked it themselves without any direction from white people.
They have exhibited all the skill, thus far, of those that
have been worked by the Governent. They have a large field
of cotton, and a larger one of corn. I see them frequently,
and converse with them about it. They are as proud of their
labors as are any of the farmers of the North when success
follows a period of industry. They have planted and brought
to good growth by the necessary working three acres of cotton,
each of which is, I am told, the maximum of one person' s allot-
ment, when other crops are worked by the same hand to the maximum.
This condition of that plantation excites the emulation of all
the surrounding people, and they frequently say that if they
could work this land in the same way we could see some great
crops. I have no doubt that if the negroes owned the land and
could work it with the expection of receiving all the proceeds,
the cotton crop would have been increased one-third, if not one-
half.
So far as the question of subsistence is involved with these
people, there is not the least doubt about it. They are
abundantly competent, and able and willing, to support themselves,
and in a short time many of them will acquire a competence that
will enable them to demand and supply themselves with many of the
comforts of civilized life.
[signed] A.B. Plimpton [197]
The Joint Committee on Reconstruction heard many witnesses who
thought the blacks were doing well after emancipation. The same Col.
Spencer of Tennessee who told the committee that the freedmen worked
well for fair wages (see above, p. 79) described the poor whites in
terms that were elsewhere applied only to the blacks:
... The poorer classes of whites are not getting along so
well. They have no schools, and where they have no land they
cannot get employment as readily as the colored men can. The
richer men will not employ them, for the truth is, they are
not as valuable for laboring as the negroes are. According
to my judgement the poorer classes of white people, not only
in Tennessee, but all over the south, are scarcely able to take
care of themselves. They are inclined to be idle and lazy, and
think it degrading to work [198].
Speaking directly to the issue of the "unwillingness of the negro
to work," Col. E. Whittlesey, Assistant Commissioner of the Freedmen's
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Bureau for North Carolinawas quite caustic:
QUESTION. What can you say in relation to the negro' s
love of labor? Is he inclined to work for fair wages, or
is he, generally, an idler and a shirk?
ANSWER. I think that there is no more industrious class of
people anywhere than the negroes of North Carolina when they
have proper inducements held out to them. The idleness that
has been witnessed during the last season was due in a great
measure to the disturbed state of the community and to the un-
certainty in their minds (an uncertainty very well founded, too)
whether they would receive any pay at all for their work. I
have heard no complaints of idleness or shirking in places where
I have known that they were receiving fair and prompt payment for
their work [199].
Samuel Thomas, Colonel and Assistant Commissioner of the Freedmen's
Bureau in Mississippi and Northeast Louisiana, agreed in a letter to
Carl Schurz:
It is nonsense to talk so much about plans for getting the
negroes to work. They do now, and always have done, all the
physical labor of the south, and if treated as they should be
by their government (which is so anxious to be magnanimous to
the white people of this country, who never did work and never
will), they will continue to do so. Who are the workmen in
these fields? Who are hauling the cotton to market, driving
hacks and drays in the cities, repairing streets and railroads,
cutting timber, and in every place raising the hum of industry?
The freedmen, not the rebel soldiery. The southern white men,
true to their instincts and training, are going to Mexico or
Brazil, or talk of importing labor in the shape of Coolies,
Irishmen--anything--anything to avoid work, any way to keep
from putting their own shoulders to the wheel [200].
Such favorable assessments of black productivity were not made only
by sympathetic observers. A Southern writer described the changed race
and labor relations prevailing in Georgia after the war this way:
... The confident prophecies of the croakers that Southern
plantations would go to waste, and that nothing but ruin lay
before us, have proved the merest bosh. The enormous increase
in the cotton crop of the South alone shows that the colored
people, as free laborers, have done well, for it is not to be
disputed that they form very nearly the same proportion of
the laborers in the cotton fields that they did when they
were slaves... under no circumstances could worthless labor
have produced the enormous increase in this crop [201].
This same Southerner went on to point out that the blacks did not live
"in dread of the terrible Ku-klux," and that "Very many negro farmers
are capable of directing the working of their own crops," without any
white supervision [202]. James Runnion, in his Atlantic article on
the "Exodus" movement of 1879, repeated the observation that Southern
whites loathed work and that "It is certain that negro labor is the
best the South can have, and equally certain that the climate and
natural conditions of the South are better suited to the negro than
any others on this continent" [203].
According to Vernon Wharton, "It also soon became apparent to those
who gave the matter an actual trial that the freedmen in agriculture
furnished a more satisfactory type of labor than could be obtained from
white workers, either natives or immigrants." Wharton's conclusion
was based on statements such as this "Sensible Communication" to the
Raymond Gazette from a landowner near Terry, Mississippi, written in
1886:
I do not... decry white labor, for I like it, when of the
right kind, but if either must go, give me the nigger every
time. The nigger will never "strike" as long as you give
him plenty to eat and half clothe him: He will live on less
and do more hard work, when properly managed, than any other
class, or race of people. As Arp truthfully says "we can
boss him" and that is what we southern folks like.... I have
worked both kinds of labor, side by side, with varying results.
The nigger will do the most work and do it according to per-
sonal instructions....I record Experience against Theory [204].
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In the 1890 s, the Industrial Commission found planters satisfied
with the quality and competence of black labor. J. H. Hale, who owned
farms in both Georgia and Connecticut and who had direct experience with
both northern and negro labor, was unstinting in his praise:
... I count that the Negro labor of the South is the best
agricultural labor in America today. I will recommend them
way ahead of our New England Yankee. The Yankee boys we
think are perhaps a littler smarter for some expert work,
but for agriculture throughout the year I think the negro
labor of the South, at least the section where I am located,
the Black Belt, is the best agricultural labor in America
today, and I can accomplish more work for $1 in Georgia
than I can for $3 in Connecticut, and get the same crop
result.... The extra advantage is in the efficiency and honesty
of purpose and the faithfulness of the negro labor as com-
pared with what we can get in Connecticut. I went South
with the idea that the negro was a rather stupid creature
and could be used only in the grossest lines of work, and I
have learned different by using them for a number of years....
I do not know how the South could live without negro labor.
It is the life of the South; it is the foundation of its
prosperity; and the great future prosperity I see in the South,
and believe in the South, is because they have such splendid
labor and such good labor. God pity the day when the negroe
leaves the South, or if they have to have labor from foreign
countries to take the places of the negro [205].
Mr Hale went on to explain that Negroes required no more supervision
than northern workers, and that they were improving in efficiency. He
closed his testimony on this subject by giving an example of the faith-
fulness of the blacks employed by him--they took care of his plantation
and house while he was gone on trips, and voluntarily cut their wages
when some of his orchard trees were killed by an unseasonable frost
[206].
Not quite so enthusiastic as Mr. Hale was the Hon. Robert Ransom
Poole, Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of Alabama, who
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nevertheless testified that "If they [negroes] were as economical as
the white people they would absolutely own that country in a few years.
It is getting so that in our section in the black belt the most of the
lands are rented to negro tenants for the simple reason that they can
afford to give more for them than the white man can. I own several
plantations and I rent to the negroes because I can get more rent from
the negro" [207]. According to Mr. Poole, part of the reason for this
was that Negroes did their own labor while whites hired it done [208],
but if that were the case, either blacks were better workers, or the
vaunted advantages of white supervision were illusory. It should be
recalled from the earlier part of this section that another witness
before the Commission saw "one of the causes of the depression in agri-
culture the presence of the negro," so that it would only be fair to
say that the Commission was receiving mixed information. This ambi-
valence of the sources was quite common.
Perhaps the most persuasive arguments for the high quality of black
labor after the war were those given by practical farmers in the Southern
Cultivator. In an 1869 article, "What is the Proper Labor for the South,"
a "Subscriber" discussed the quality of black labor compared to the
alternatives:
- .. Much has been said and written about the uncertainty and
unreliability of free negro labor, and the necessity of
superceding it by foreign white labor. To this end, Immi-
gration Societies have been organized, to bring foreigners
to take the place of the negro, in the cotton and rice fields
of the South.
At the risk of joining issue with many wise and good men,
who really have the welfare of the country at heart, I venture
to controvert the wisdom and propriety of this movement....
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He [the Negro] is already trained to the labor necessary
for... production. He has his important part to perform
in advancing the wealth and prosperity of the South. There
is no adequate substitute for his labor. We have no faith
in the availability of European emigrants, as a substitute
for the negro, in the production of cotton.... Is it not true
that he [the Negro] has proved himself the most patient and
enduring laborer that can be brought into the cotton and rice
fields of the South? Shall we give him up merely because his
bonds have been broken? Shall we cast away an inestimable boon,
which God in his unerring wisdom had bestowed upon us, in the
labor of the negro, because the relation of master and slave
has been destroyed by Puritanical fanaticism [209]?
As is apparent even from the text quoted, "Subscriber " was no believer
in black social or political equality. Nevertheless, he admitted "there
is no adequate substitute for his labor." This opinion was shared by
another writer in the same issue of the Cultivator. Even though Negro
labor was "both uncertain and unreliable" and contracts with it were made
at great disadvantage to the planter, "Negro labor is all we have at
present, and is decidedly preferable to any we are ever likely to have--
all emigration societies to the contrary, notwithstanding" [210]. Still
another contributor held:
I agree with Mr. Dickson as to the labor question. Let
the Germans stay where they are. They will do very well
in the grain region of the West, where they are hired by
the day or week, and where such a thing as holding plow
handles is out of date. There they jump into the seats of
a Cultivator or mower and reaper, and drive "around" with
a huge umbrella aboard if they wish, as if on a frolic.
Just let him come down here, Mr. Editor, and try his hoe
day after day in our "brilin sun," and he will heartily
wish himself back in 'de farder land.' Give me cuffee,
and I can give you cotton, There are no set of laborers
on earth, save the sambol s, [sic ] who can make a cotton
and corn crop, on three pounds of bacon and a peck of meal
per week. A German, on this diet would shrink up so promptly
that a cut gourd vine would not even be a parallel [211].
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As might be expectedsome of the strongest assertions of the capa-
bility of black farmers and agricultural laborers are to be found in
the pages of the Southern Workman. The Workman advanced two main argu-
ments--first, that black labor was in no way inferior to white, and
second, that free black labor was superior to slave labor both in pro-
ductivity and profitability. A self-described "enemy of the Negro"
writing "A Few Words on the Labor Question" in the Workman of 1875
observed:
"Farming don't pay", has been a cant throughout the
South since Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, and almost
as universal has been the accusation, "our labor is too un-
reliable," meaning of course negro labor. Both observation
and experience teach me that "white labor" is as unreliable
as "negro labor" on the farm... the high priced lands of the
North are no evidence of agricultural thrift. Those farmers
live very well it is true, but they work much harder, and are
more troubled with unreliable labor than we of the South. I
have heard northern farmers say, time and again, that during
their busiest season, they have today had all the "help" they
wanted, and to-morrow it was gone [212].
The Workman did seem to be sensitive to the possibility that its state-
ments might be interpreted as special pleading on behalf of the Southern
blacks. At any rate, it frequently printed statements by anti-Negro
Southern spokesmen as to the progress and productivity of the blacks.
An 1877 issue reprinted an article from the Charleston News which ar-
gued that white immigrants failed to make a profit, whereas black work-
men did:
We are a "burnt child" on the question of immigration. We
have tried white employees, beginning with the natives, and
going all through the catalogue, even to those from the very
back-doors of the Continent of Europe, and we are free to con-
fess we have never found one that netted us a dime, while we
know we made money out of Sambo, even though he persists in
voting the Radical ticket.
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The principle we lay down is this: Any white man in
this country who has attained to the age of maturity, and
has never accumulated enough to buy him a home, will be
more of a charge than a profit to me on my plantation. And
this principle is adhered to because it is founded upon the
experience of the past.
Secondly, field hands coming from another country to the
"Sunny South" bring with them no experience as to the culti-
vation of our crops, are not climatized, have less muscle
and endurance under our climate than the negro, have far more
wants, which require a cash capital that the Southern farmer
has not; and for these reasons are less profitable, even with
their superior energy, than the thriftless negro to whom we
have all our life long been accustomed [213].
The height of irony was reached in reprinting a segment of an inter-
view with none other than Jefferson Davis. Mr. Davis "spoke of the
negro race in a rather patronizing way--as children, and not as men....
It was his opinion that, wherever the negro race was found, it must be
as an inferior and servile race, and, in the long run, they would give
way to the superior race under any and all circumstances." However,
Davis acknowledged that he had
...changed his mind entirely upon one question, viz.,
that the great staples of the South, cotton and sugar,
could be produced with greater economy and in greater
abundance by paid labor rather than by the labor of slaves.
He said to your correspondent: 'This has already been
demonstrated, and that fact alone goes far to prove the
advantage which the abolition of slavery has been to the
whites' [214].
Three years previously a northern correspondent, "D.G.F." of Oswego,
N.Y., related to the Workman a conversation he had had with a Texas
gentleman during an extended train journey through the South. The
Texas planter, who had lost 100 slaves by the Act of Enancipation,
found that, after a period of transition,
... among these liberated people there were many, perhaps
a majority, or more, who were industrious, economical, and
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naturally thrifty. Adapting themselves to circumstances
they have bent their energies to improve their own con-
dition and that of their race. As a result, many have
already made large progress in education, many are now
landowners, and on every hand unmistakable evidences are
beginning to appear of prosperity and comfort. To the race,
as a whole, freedom has already proved a blessing [215].
This planter also argued that emancipation had increased productivity
in the South, because under the slave system, weight quotas for picking
and workers' lack of any interest in the crop decreased both the quality
and the quantity of the yield. He concluded that both whites and blacks
had benefited from emancipation, even in those cases when whites were
thrown back to reliance upon their own labor [216]. Finally, the 1878
New York Times article reprinted in the Workman,which was cited pre-
viously, concurred in the opinion that free labor was superior to slave.
Noting that cotton output had increased and that planters were not as
burdened by mortgage as they had been before Emancipation, the Times
stated:
...That the emancipation of the slaves has been the first
great cause of this result, there can be no doubt. The free
colored man, having more self-respect, a greater feeling of
responsibility, more knowledge, and from the necessities of
the case being more industrious and faithful, is much more
valuable as a laborer than was the negro slave. Unfortunately,
there is a very large class of persons in the South who are
not willing to acknowledge these facts, or who are so blinded
by prejudice that they cannot regard them as do practical
business men in other parts of the country [217].
Despite such reported improvements in the condition of freedmen,
the Southern Workmen did not fail to take every opportunity to put
forward its particular prescription for Southern black progress:
When the war closed there were two sets of Radicals
divided in opinion on Negro labor. One of them claimed,
in their own peculiar phraseology, that "Free niggers would
not work"; the other claimed that the colored man would
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labor as well as the white man, and compete successfuly
with him in all branches of human effort. As usual, when
extreme views are stated, there is some truth and some
fallacy in both statements.... If the negro be not so good
a laborer as the white man, it is his misfortune, not his
fault.... During his enslavement the negro had no chance to
learn to labor, although work was the only branch of edu-
cation open to him. A man labors only when he puts forth
an exertion in order to get something in return for it,--
if a man put forth exertion through fear of punishment or
through the compulsion of some other man, he is not a
laborer, he is only a worker... if we would increase the use-
fulness of the negro to himself and to others, he must be
educated [218].
This comparison of the respective qualities of black and white
agricultural labor would not be complete without an inquiry into whether
the levels of wages differed between the races. There is no doubt that
some of the preference expressed by planters for black labor rested on
the cheapness of that labor as compared with white [219]. What is sur-
prising is the infrequent mention of such a discrepancy, and even some
explicit statements that the pay of white and black workers was the sane.
It may be that planter spokesmen felt that the obvious did not need to
be repeated, but there may actually have been no difference in remuner-
ation for identical work. For example, not a single case of black and
white sharecroppers in the same county receiving a different share of
the crop was found.
One of the few systematic collections of wage data was in the
Report of the Industrial Commission. As usual, the evidence is con-
tradictory. The digest of testimony of volume VII of the Report sum-
marized a preponderance of instances in which black mechanics were
paid less than their white counterparts, although there were a few
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cases of equal pay for equal work. Black tradesmen were generally
thought to depress the wages of whites because "they can live on much
less." But one witness believed that in places where the blacks were
organized, their wages were the same as whites. This witness con-
cluded,,"For that reason the white mechanics of the South are assist-
ing the colored men to organize" [220].
The picture is even more confused when attention is focusedon agri-
cultural labor. For farm workers, most Industrial Commission testimony
indicated that blacks and whites received equal pay for equal work.
Some witnesses were explicit:
QUESTION: What is the difference between the competition
of the white labor and black labor in South Carolina?
ANSWER: The cotton is raised by colored people. The
white people raise cotton in competition with the colored man
and for the same work we do not pay any more. My whole place
is arranged in so much for a day's work, and no matter who I
have to plow I pay the same for the work. I have overseers
and a colored foreman that I pay more [221].
Another Southern farmer testified that "The greater portion of our field
labor comes from our colored population. About 20 per cent are white.
All share alike. The contracts are made on the same basis to each
race" [222]. On the other hand, another farmer told the Commission
that the reason immigrants would not come to the South was that black
labor was cheaper than any other type, with the possible exception of
the Chinese [223].
In its over-all statistical summary of Southern wage levels,
however, the Industrial Commission concluded that competition equal-
ized wages for similar kinds of work, and that the only wage advantage
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enjoyed by whites over blacks was due to their concentration in the
more skilled trades:
It would be desirable to show precisely the relative com-
pensation of white and colored laborers. In these investi-
gations it was not practicable to give averages by races.
The returns were by counties, and averages of the whole body
of laborers were calculated. As a very large proportion of
them are of the colored race, especially in cotton-growing
sections, and as any white labor of the same grade of service
is leveled in the competition, a true average for exclusively
colored labor would approximate these records of Southern
labor, which by reason of higher pay of whites in a few more
responsible positions would be somewhat higher than the aver-
age for the exclusively colored [224].
Other comparisons between black and white wages for similar work
are few and far between, though there are other scattered indications
that equal work received equal pay. In one unusual instance, the man
who was Superintendent of the Texas Military Institute just after the
war alleged that freedmen were actually contracting for higher wages
than free whites, but this case was exceptional [225].
A.B. Hart wrote that whites and blacks were treated the same as
laborers.
... Nowadays some Whites are tenants or laborers on large
plantations. Near Monroe, Louisiana, for instance, is a plan-
tation carried on by Acadians brought up from lower Louisi-
ana, with the hope that they will like it and save money
enough to buy up the land in small parcels. There are plan-
tations on which white tenants come into houses just vacated
by negro tenants, on the same term as the previous occupants;
the women working in the fields, precisely as the Negroes do;
there are plantations almost wholly manned by white tenants....
Outside of the administrative force and their families
there are commonly no white people on a cotton plantation.
The occasional white hands make the same kind of contracts,
live in the same houses, and accept the same conditions as
the Negroes; but their number is small and they are likely
to drift out either into cotton mills or into sawmills and
timber work... [226].
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Even after the Jim Crow movement was well under way, whites and
blacks worked side by side on the same jobs, though there is no way of
gauging how frequently or how amicably this took place [227]. One
modern investigator found just after the civil war a rude equality ex-
tending down to overseers' treatment of black and white tenants
alike [228].
Even from this brief survey it should be apparent that there was
no clear pattern of agreement on the relative merits of black and white
agricultural labor after the Civil War. If blacks were less productive,
it was due to a "legacy of slavery" rather than to any intrinsic de-
ficiencies. However, even given the undoubted oppressions and depri-
vations of slavery, there is still copious evidence that the black
agricultural worker was the equal or superior of the white in the post-
bellum years. As in the case of exploitation versus competition in
the labor market, the anecdotal evidence is not sufficient to decide
the question.
127
D. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Cotton Culture
The next major issue of the post-war Southern economy has to do
with the complaint of "overspecialization" in cotton expressed by many
agrarian reformers before 1900. These reformers advocated crop diversi-
fication to alleviate agricultural poverty and distress among both
whites and blacks. By this point, it should be no surprise that the
findings presented here will show that it is possible to support
either the argument that cotton overproduction was the curse of the
South, or that cotton was the most profitable crop available to the
agricultural sector. While it is undeniably true that a host of critics
and relatively impartial observers saw cotton culture as a source of
low incomes and stagnation, it is also true that many similarly quali-
fied commentators hailed cotton as the source of Southern wealth, not
of its poverty.
"Overproduction" is a vague term, and in order to clarify its
economic meaning, it is useful to summarize the main arguments that
the South grew too much cotton:
(1) First, there were simple and unqualified statements that
cotton was not profitable to grow. It is easy to find statements of
this type in the agricultural magazines, but the actual reasons for
the alleged unprofitability were usually either not specified or are
among the subsequent items of this list.
(2) Farmers' speed of adjustment was too slow. That is, farmers
displayed sluggish reactions to changes in prices or in other market
signals. Sometimes this was combined with a notion that the farmers
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knew how to grow only cotton, or would only grow cotton, no matter
what its price. In any case, the causes of "overproduction" were
farmers' irrationality and ignorance rather than any "external"
agency.
(3) Cotton was overproduced because merchants and landlords
insisted that their tenants grow cotton. Usually, the blame was
laid at the door of the rural furnishing merchants. These merchants
allegedly demanded that their tenants grow cotton because the cotton
could not be eaten. Thus tenants had to buy all supplies at the
country stores, at inflated prices and usurious rates of interest.
Sometimes it was also argued that the merchants preferred cotton
because of its salability. These arguments were variations on the
theme that merchants forced farmers to grow cotton, in order to exploit
them in the rural credit market. As a result, farmers were "locked in"
to cotton culture.
(4) Related to these argumentsbut on a larger scale,is the
proposition that the South as a whole needed to diversify in order to
escape its dependence on the rest of the country for food and other
necessary supplies. Sometimes this is combined with a metaphysical
argument that cash farming was somehow enervating, while agricultural
self-sufficiency was enobling [229].
On the other side, the arguments that cotton deserved to remain
"King" even after the war generally follow these lines:
(1) Simple statements that cotton was the best crop of the South,
and that its production should be increased, not decreased. Often such
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assertions were accompanied by crude projections of the world demand
for cotton, which was undeniably increasing throughout the period.
(2) More sophisticated arguments purporting to show that the cot-
ton had a comparative advantage in the South as against the alternative
crops. These arguments were couched sometimes in terms or profitability,
sometimes in terms of climate and physical conditions.
(3) Finally there is evidence that the farmers were price-
responsive, economically rational decision-makers. Although not
usually used to justify the cotton/non-cotton crop mix, these indica-
tions are contrary to the view that Southern farmers were ignorant,
irrational, "traditional" agriculturists.
The same kinds of contradictory evidence on both sides of the
overproduction question can be found, as in the previous cases of the
two labor market hypotheses and the comparison of black and white
agricultural labor. The form of the presentation on the cotton issue
will be slightly different than in the two previous cases, however.
Many of the pertinent statements on cotton culture contain the con-
tradictory evidences side by side. Commentators were prone to con-
clude that diversification was indicated by the growth of cotton
revenues, or that the suitability of Southern soils and climate
created too great a temptation to specialize in cotton. For this
reason, instead of presenting the arguments for overproduction first,
and following them by the arguments for comparative advantage, both
sides of the argument will be presented together. This format under-
scores the deep confusion of the 19th century analysts on this subject.
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A good starting point for this discussion is the Southern
Cultivator, the practical farmers' magazine which was accessible to
most literate Southern farmers [230]. The question of overpro-
duction was probably the greatest source of controversy in its
pages. Most of the magazine every month was devoted to "tips" on
various new techniques or agricultural experiments, but a huge number
of letters and articles touched on the cotton issue.
The Cultivator's preoccupation with the overproduction debate
even antedated the Civil War. In 1849, letters appeared advocating
greater self-sufficiency, more working up of raw materials to be per-
formed in the South itself, and investment in manufactures rather than
in slaves [231]. An article later that year titled "Cotton--Too Much
Planted" argued that "a less quantity would bring them more money,"
even though conceding that "this doctrine has and will be assailed by
the great bulk of cotton planters, both by precept and example... "[232].
After the war, the controversy resumed. 1869 found David Dickson
arguing both sides:
Now we can purchase fifty million dollars worth of guano
in its raw state, and clear one hundred millions of dollar
on it in nine months, and expend nothing additional in manu-
facturing cotton and grain out of it--What say you to that?
Are you not willing to have the money? I say let any for-
eigner have your dollars, when you can with certainty make
two dollars in nine months, clear of cost, for every dollar
spent.
It is in every man's mouth, keep your money at home.
That is impossible--money is not productive, unless kept mov-
ing. This is the point: keep your labor at home--manufacture
everything at home that you can make to any advantage--spin
your cotton and wool in Georgia, and convert it into cloth--
work up raw hides into shoes--lumber into ships--wheat into
flour--corn into bacon and lard--grass into beef, mutton and
wool--iron ore into all manner of useful implements, &c.,
&c.,... [233].
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Part of Dickson's inability to make up his mind may have been due to
the fact that he was a fertilizer and cottonseed magnate in Sparta,
Georgia [234], but the confusion extended far beyond him. The two
opposing arguments ran parallel throughout the years of the '70's and
'80's in the Cultivator [235].
In an 1869 article "What is the Proper Labor for the South," a
"Subscriber" flatly stated "King Cotton re-asserts his power, and we
who are to maintain him on the throne will see to it that we get our
fair proportion of the benefits of his reign. Our redemption, under
the favor of God, is in the cotton crop--out of it is to be realized
the money power, the wealth of the South. By and through it we can
and will control the commerce of this country" [236]. Not quite so
vainglorious, but of the same mind, was "Panola," who argued that at
current prices, cotton was simply more profitable than other crops,
particularly corn:
... I say why plant an unremunerative corn crop, to be culti-
vated all the summer, and consumed in the cultivation of the
succeeding cotton crop, when the same planter, with the same
[labor] force, by leaving off the corn crop, can plant more
cotton, and sow more largely of small grain, and finally put
more money into his pocket, which is the gist of the thing
at last [237]?
"Acorn" wrote that his high hopes for diversification had been
dashed by the prevailing high cotton prices, so that "the hoary despot
still sways his sceptre supremely," i.e., cotton remained King [238].
A Tennessee "Subscriber" made it clear that he did "not advocate the
abandonment of the cultivation of cotton... it is eminently the crop
of the South, but until we devote less of our land, time and attention
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to the cultivation of cotton, and more to the cultivation of grain,
grass and clover, and to the raising of stock, we can never be an
independent and prosperous people" [239]. One "Random" of Egypt
Station, Mississippi told the readers of the Cultivator that of all
the possible food crops for the South, corn was too expensive because
it "has second choice only of good land and good work," wheat was un-
certain, and rye, oats, barley, and buckwheat had not been adopted in
the South as staple breadstuffs [240]. Another contributor reiterated
the profitability of cotton, while cautioning that other crops should
be substituted for the "presumptuous little Cotton King" should the
relative profitabilities of the crops change [241].
In 1872, the Cultivator reported extracts from an address by
Gov. DuPont delivered at Taahassee in December, 1871, in which the
Governor advised that"...cotton be subordinated to the feed crops"
because the extent of cotton planting precluded recovery of labor and
other costs in cotton, and in order to avoid costs of transporting corn
and meat from the Midwest [242]. Another writer in the same year urged
diversification beyond both cotton and corn, to rejuvenate soil fer-
tility and to decrease dependence on the North and West for other
provisions [243].
In 1874, "Acorn" wrote again to the Cultivator bemoaning the over-
specialization in cotton because of its great profitability!
... There is a fascination about cotton planting that seems
irresistible--people all around us are drawn into the vortex;
and we are very much to blame for it--for our papers and poli-
ticians are always blowing about the millions the cotton crop
brings into Southern pockets. It is a mistake, and the sooner
we realize it the better. The profits belong to others--the
loss is ours [244].
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"Acorn" probably believed that the farmers were not receiving the
profits, which would be reason to switch crops if the returns to al-
ternate crops could be retained, but he did not say why the farmers
were unable to keep the cotton profits. The editors also reprinted
an article from the N.Y. Financial Chronicle (date not given) which
noted the profitability of cotton in no uncertain terms:
We have extremely little faith in any falling off in
acreage, except what actually is enforced, either by want
of capital, or through bad weather in spring, preventing
the putting in of seed, or some cause beyond the will of
the planter.
And the reason for this is evident--it lies in the fact
that cotton always has paid better, and even since the war
does pay better, than any other crop [245].
The Chronicle article went on to argue for diversification in any case,
not because cotton is less profitable, but "to guard against unfavor-
able contingencies" [246].
The editors of the Cultivator began their 1874 volume with a de-
nunciation of "money crops--cotton, as the representative of these,
well-nigh absorbing the whole energy of our farmers" [247]. Perhaps
more significant are repeated references to Grange advocacy of diversi-
fication, the first contained in the "Declaration of Principles" by the
National Grange, adopted at St. Louis, February llth, 1874, and re-
printed in full in the April, 1874 issue of the Cultivator.
We shall endeavor to advance our cause by laboring to
accomplish the following objects:....
To reduce our expenses, both individual and corporate;
to buy less and produce more, in order to make our farms
self-sustaining.
To diversify our crops, and crop no more than we can
cultivate....
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In a similar tone, T.J. Smith, Master of the Georgia State Grange, ad-
dressed his Patrons in these words:
...let me earnestly and affectionately entreat you not to
abandon the policy of making an abundance of supplies for
home, and heed earnestly the resolution as passed by the
Cotton States Convention of November last year, and impressi-
vely reiterated in its session of July last, of planting
one-third of our arable land in small grain, one-third in
corn and one-third in cotton.
Hearken to the warning voice of the past whose syren [sic]
song of planting all cotton, hurled us into bankruptcy of
property and well might of credit and character... [249].
A "Cotton-Planting Granger" from Alexandria, Louisiana, wrote the
Cultivator that despite fair crops and good prices after the war,
"three-fourths of the cotton planters were broke" because they had bor-
rowed money and planted cotton exclusively. According to this Granger,
... cotton planters should make cotton with their own money,
and not with borrowed capital; otherwise they are the slaves
of manufacturers, middle men and capitalists generally, when
really they should hold the commanding position, and be in-
dependent of all such classes, which most assuredly would be
the case, did they make cotton with their own means [250].
Another "Subscriber" depicted farmers' irrational predilection to
plant cotton,in characteristically florid phrases:
... In spite of the rains and cold, people here have put forth
every effort to plant a full crop of cotton--as fast as it
died or was washed away, they replanted, until there was no
seed left. They have fought hard for the "Old King," and
whilst badly disappointed in the old gentleman, don't seem
disposed to give up their allegiance yet. For--although
judging in the future by the past,--he promises nothing but
bankruptcy and ruin, they still rally under his time-honored
banner, and persistently refuse to give up the fight.
Cotton is emphatically, their King--and though he kicks and
spurns them, they hail him their Chief, and will die like dogs,
licking the hand that smites them. We glory in their spunk--
but must confess, we fail to see good judgment in it [251].
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In 1878 the same contradictory themes persist. One article
claimed that a well-managed cotton farm on productive lands was capa-
ble of returning 30-50% on capital invested, provided that consumption
expenditures (such as the purchases which made up most of the store
account) were not counted as part of the cost of production [252].
Another, reprinted from Savannah News, provided the results of an ex-
periment in which "broomsedge land" yielded a profit when planted in
cotton, but not in corn [253]. On the other side, one contributor in
that year repeated the argumentfamiliar by nowthat diversification
was necessary to achieve self-sufficiency [254], while another claimed
that cotton production was no longer profitable in North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia [255].
The 1889 volume opened with the Cultivator's editorializing that
money was not the proper objective of farming:
What is the fundamental error of our system, the under-
lying cause of the depression which prevails so generally
among the agricultural classes? It is the fashion to say
that we plant too much cotton and produce too many bales.
Another form of the same reply is, that we plant too little
in grain and other provisions crops and buy too much from
abroad. These are both correct in fact, but they do not go
back to the root of the matter. These errors of detail are
based upon a deeper lying, fundamental error--a misconception
of the true business of a farmer....
The average Southern farmer has been prone to consider the
production of cotton, or sugar, or tobacco, or rice (according
to locality) as the ultimate of his aims and efforts, and to
look upon the production of food supplies, the care of live
stock, and the minor industries of the farm, as so many draw-
backs or hindrances--more or less necessary evils--to his
full and abounding success.... The farmer has been striving to
recoup his losses, or build up a competence or a fortune by
making money, and he is little inclined to produce anything
that will not always command the cash.
But the number is increasing of those farmers who believe
that the essential of farming is to make a living on the
farm...[256].
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Other contributors continued the attack on overspecialization in cotton
and the failure of farmers to achieve self-sufficiency [257]. Concen-
tration on cotton was even satirized in an axticle contrasting Southern
farming "Then and Now," in which specializing in cotton while purchas-
ing "cheap" food and supplies from other regions was presumably ludi-
crous enough to discredit the "all-cotton plan" on its face [258].
Of greater interest, however, is an article devoted to "American
Cotton" which argued simultaneously that the South enjoyed a world-wide
comparative advantage in cotton culture, but that nevertheless diversi-
fication should be practiced.
The true policy of the South is not to make less cotton,
but to make it on less land, and therefore at less cost. It
is the great money crop of the world. The American cotton
is the one crop that can be shipped to all parts of the world.
Wherever a bale of American cotton is turned out it will bring
its value in gold. Our peculiar soil, and desirable climate
together, give us an advantage over all other countries in pro-
ducing it....
The one thing now to be done in order to make the cotton
producers the richest people in the world, is to bring their
lands to the highest state of cultivation possible. To culti-
vate less land in cotton and to cultivate it better, and to
put the balance of our lands in diversified crops [259].
The unnamed writer of this article must have implicitly held an unusual
notion of the agricultural production function, because he did not ad-
vocate expansion of the labor devoted to cotton at the same time--the
land planted in cotton was to be decreased. Such optimism about the
unlimited productivity of the soil was not unknown in the Cultivator.
This muddled reasoning went unchallenged, although a later article made
the point that even though diversification might be desirable, "It
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requires both time and money to convert a cotton plantation into a
grain and stock farm" [260]. W.J. Northen even admonished the farmers
of Georgia to use the profits from the exceptionally good cotton crop
of 1889 to get themselves out of debt and finance a changeover to more
diversified farming [261]! It is apparent that whatever view the
Southern Cultivator's correspondents held on the relative profitability
of cotton farming, they usually recommended diversification.
DeBow's also carried planter opinion in favor of diversification
and self-sufficiency [262]. But consider the following passage:
...our soil and climate are pre-eminently adapted to the
growth and cultivation of the cotton plant. Though this
fact may be universally admitted, we would state in proof
of it, that according to the census of 1860, the State of
Mississippi produced that year one and a quarter million
bales of cotton, it being more than one-fifth of the pro-
duct of all the cotton States. This fact of itself is suf-
ficient to prove that the soil and climate of Mississippi
are both eminently adapted to the production of cotton.
But while this is true, it is equally true that in the past
years, for nearly one-third of a century, we may say from
the year 1830, the cotton planters of the Southern States
have given to the cultivation of cotton an undue and dis-
proportionate, excessive degree of care, attention, labor,
capital and breadth of land, to the exclusion of other crops,
such as cereals, vegetables, fruits, hay and stock of every
description, to the great detriment of themselves and the
ruin of our country [263].
DeBow's did not recoil from an even more blatant non sequitur on this
subject:
The following is what the Commissioner of Agriculture says
in his annual report, just out, on Southern agriculture: The
continued high price of cotton has made its culture more
profitable than at any former period, and the crop of 1868
has yielded a larger amount of money than that of 1859.
I regret to observe, from official correspondence and
during a brief tour through the cotton states, the- tendency to
neglect other crops and concentrate all available labor and
capital upon a single product, however profitable. The in-
evitable result will be more cotton and smaller net returns
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after the purchase of needed supplies and, as a further
result, a slower improvement of neglected lands. This
bane of Southern agriculture is still operative, and may
cease to exist only when low prices, disaster, and des-
pondency shall again arrest the impolitic and irrational
course of production. I would not advise an attempt to
keep up prices by limiting the yield; a somewhat larger
supply of the staple is needed in the markets of the world;
the present rates cannot be sustained indefinitely; but I
would not foster the suicidal mania for cheapening the
money-producing crop while rendering dearer every other
that must be purchased as an auxiliary of its production [264].
Other observers were not free of the inability to make up their
minds about cotton's profitability. Henry W. Grady, writing in
Harper's in 1881, felt that
After sixteen years of trial, everything is yet indeterminate.
And whether this staple is cultivated in the South as a
profit or a passion, and whether it shall bring the South
to independence or to beggary, are matters yet to be
settled. Whether its culture shall result in a host of
croppers without money or credit, appealing to the grana-
ries of the West against famine, paying toll to usurers
at home, and mortgaging their crops to speculators abroad
even before it is planted--a planting oligarchy of money-
lenders, who have usurped the land through foreclosure,
and hold by the ever-growing margin between a grasping
lender and an enforced borrower--or a prosperous self-
respecting race of small farmers, cultivating their own
resources, controlling their crops until they are sold,
and independent alike of usurers and provision brokers--
which of these shall be the outcome of cotton culture the
future must determine [265].
Grady went on to argue half-heartedly for diversification:
Those who have the nerve to give up part of their land
and labor to the raising of their own supplies and stock
have but little need of credit, and consequently seldom
get into the hands of the usurers. But cotton is the money
crop, and offers such flattering inducements that everything
yields to that [266].
Successive articles in the anthology The South in the Building of
the Nation held, first, that "over-production of cotton and failure to
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raise the necessary food supplies on the plantation were the main
causes for the depression, so far as it affected the Southern cotton
growers" [267], and next, that USDA efforts to encourage diversifi-
cation had failed because "the fact remains that the value per acre
of the staples above mentioned [cotton, tobacco, rice and sugar] has
been high compared with that of the cereals. The motive for keeping
a large area in a single crop has been a strong one" [268].
Of course, not all sources are so conflicting. A.B. Hart evidently
thought the South had a strong comparative advantage in cotton. "Since
the South seems better fitted than any other part of the earth for the
cultivation of cotton, since at any price about six cents a pound
there is some profit in the business, and at the prices prevailing
during the last five years a large profit, it seems certain that the
Negro will be steadily desired as a cotton hand" [269]. "Nicholas
Worth" in his autobiography expressed a similar opinion:
It is a marvelous fact, unmatched anywhere under the sun,
that these Southern states have a practical monopoly of one
of the most valuable staple products of the earth. No other
land has such an advantage. Wheat grows on our great prairies;
it grows in many other countries also. So corn; so cattle;
so wool; so even the minerals, gold and silver and copper.
No one land has a monopoly even of tropical products. But
the South is, and always will be, the great source of cotton [270].
The 1907 issue of The World's Work devoted entirely to the economy
and investment prospects of the Southern states argued that the South
exercised a practical monopoly in cotton production because that
region's winters were cold enough to kill the pests that destroyed
cotton, while its warm weather lasted long enough for a full growing
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season. The tropical countries warm enough for cotton did not enjoy
the cold months [271]. This same issue of World's Work included ad-
vertisements extolling the virtues of various cities and states of
the South. Overproduction of cotton was not even hinted in one of
these:
It costs $25 a year to cultivate an acre of cotton.
Poor farmers can raise 250 pounds to an acre which with
the seed is worth at least $32 or a profit of $7 an acre.
A good farmer will make a bale (500 lbs) to an acre or a
profit or [sic] nearly $40 an acre and many make 1 bales
to an acre, or about $65 (allowing for increased cost of
good cultivation), an acre profit. Compare this with the
profits from wheat growing and remember that because there
is more land than population you can buy the land for from
$7 to $40 an acre. As one farmer said: "The most shiftless
Negro can make a living growing cotton. There is no reason
why an intelligent white man should not get rich at it." And
they do... [272].
The Southern Workman advocated diversification, both to stay out
of debt [273] and as behavior towards risk:
All experience points to a diversified system as the
really successful way of farming. Our Southern brethren
have seen the folly of the one crop system, and are now rais-
ing their own grain, and it will not be long before they will
be entirely independent. They will not rely on "King Cotton"
any more. We have but little hope of the farmer who adheres,
with such a tenacity to the one crop plan, never realizing that
good time coming. Furthermore, we think the risk too great for
a farmer to have all his capital in a crop of corn, wheat, oats,
flax or grass, but should, as far as practicable, have a portion
of his farm devoted to each. Then, should one crop fail, or
the price thereof be low, he would not be among the sufferers
from "hard times" [274].
The Workman also listed diversification as part of a 30-year program by
which a man could start from scratch and become a prosperous farm
owner [275].
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Government reports and testimony taken by investigating committees
were more confused. A Senate-sponsored inquiry into the causes of the
agrarian distress of the early '90's concluded that overproduction, the
failure to grow home supplies, speculation in cotton futures, and the
demonetization of silver were the chief causes of the depression among
the cotton farmers [276]. Regarding overproduction, the reasoning of
the Committee was hardly razor sharp: "Overproduction in the sense that
more cotton has been produced than can find an effective demand at fair
prices, in the present condition of the finance and trade of the world,
is undeniably true. Overproduction in the sense that the needs of the
world for cotton and cotton manufactures have been more than met is
denied" [277]. The Committee did acknowledge ".. .That considering our
soil and climate, and the energy and industry and skill of our people,
the Anerican cotton raiser has the advantage over all others, and in
the sharp competition in the future he will be the more successful."
Nevertheless, the majority report recommended diversification to raise
prices and escape the cotton credit system [278].
The Report of the Industrial Commission, if anything, leaned in
the direction of finding cotton the most profitable Southern crop.
In the "Topical Digest of the Evidence" of Volume X, the Commission
admitted,"Diversification of agriculture [is] difficult in the Southern
States," primarily because of Southern land's unsuitability for the
alternative food crops, the high salability of cotton and the ease
with which credit could be obtained against it. The Commission reported
that witnesses advocated diversification nevertheless [279].
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Examining the testimony itself, Mr. P.H. Lovejoy, a merchant and
planter of Hawkinsville, Georgia testified:
... You can not jump right out of all cotton system and go
into the other. They have not the means to do it with, and
they must have help. The cotton crop is the only thing
they can get ready money for in our section.... We have no
market for [corn and wheat and products of that kind]... and
then they can not make enough corn and wheat there to the
acre to make it interesting to go in it. Ten or 15 bushels
of corn is a good crop in our country, That is the reason
why we stick to cotton [280].
L.W. Youmans, a farmer and merchant of Fairfax, South Carolina, told
the Commission that on the basis of experiment and "after mature re-
flection and an experience of 30 years, I thought the best promise
would be in cotton. " Youmans calculated that it was cheaper to buy
some meat and horses from the West than to raise them at home, even
though he did raise his own corn, forage, and bacon. He also found
that "It is cheaper [i.e., more profitable] in my section to raise
cotton than wheat," and his experimentation can be summed up by his
response to a question on diversification: "If I thought I could di-
versify to my advantage, I would do so, but there is no crop there that
I can plant with more certainty of coming out even [than cotton]" [281].
These examples could be multiplied [282]. How is it possible for
such confusion to have existed? One explanation might be that the
profitability of cotton versus alternative crops depended on the rela-
tive prices of the various crop outputs, and since these relative prices
changed from year to year, assessments of profitability were bound to
change. The references given above are not arranged chronologically,
and many of them refer to different years. This objection does not
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apply to the internally inconsistent statements, however. Even so,
it requires a jump in reasoning to go from temporary fluctuations in
price and profitability to the over-all conclusion that chronic "over-
production" was a major source of distress. That leap consists of
some sort of assertion that farmers were slow to react or incapable
of reacting to changes in relative prices by changing their crop mix
[283]. Two sources of farmers' rigidity are usually cited: either far-
mers' ignorance, sluggishness, or irrational predilection for cotton;
or insistence on cotton culture by merchants and landlords as a way
of locking tenants and other poor farmers into an exploitative credit
system. As before, both support and contradiction of these can
be found.
A classic description of the existence and consequences of a
very low speed of adjustment was given by W.J. Northen in Southern
Cultivator:
At these highly remunerative [1867, 1868, and 1869 cotton]
prices, farming in Georgia offered unusual inducements and
magnificent possibilities. Everybody began farming and
everybody planted cotton exclusively. The price dropped from
these high points, yet never low enough to lose hope that it
would rally again. Year after year the delusion has lasted,
until multitudes of men, confronting the horrors of debt,
have seemed utterly unable to tear themselves away from its
constantly fastening power. This is the history, concisely
told, of the depression in Georgia since the war so far as
we are personally connected with it. Under the long-continued
system of one crop and clean culture, our lands have been made
barren, and many who came from the cities, under the delusion
of fifty cents for cotton have abandoned us to our poverty
and the fearful solution of our problem. To the towns and
the cities, and away from the country and the farms, men and
means, frightened as by a spectre, have been drifting, while
debt, cruel and exacting, has wrung from us all but hope and
honor. The country now languishes for the help that could
easily make the wealth of the State... [284].
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The economist Enoch M. Banks commented similarly in 1905:
...mortgages were made to secure debts; they were executed
therefore only in those cases in which the debts lapsed.
These cases were numerous, however, on account of the decline
in the price of cotton from 1874 to 1898, and also on account
of the slowness with which the farmers have been adjusting
themselves in accordance with the best combination of the pro-
ductive factors....
... The croppers do not as a rule make plans with reference
to the future, and bend their energies toward the realization
of those plans. They are content if they can make some arrange-
ment whereby they may be enabled to get the bare necessaries of
life throughout the year that immediately concerns them... [285].
Banks neglected to indicate whether the "decline in the price of cotton"
was an absolute decline or a decline relative to the other relevant
prices [286].
A more poetic expression of the same sort of farmers' ignorance and
rigidity was given by "Nicholas Worth":
The people,--the people of these fertile states,--a vast
multitude, far apart as they dwell from another; pioneers yet
(for the land is unsettled and their life is primitive and
hard), but holding fast to the notion that they are a part of
a long-settled life; fixed in their ways; unthinking and stand-
ing still; a grim multitude, though made up of jovial indivi-
duals; credulous of all old formulas and sayings, whether
true or false, and incredulous of any new thing however obvious;
sprawling in the sun of this happy climate; hungry without know-
ing it, and unaware of their own discomfort; ignorant of the
world about them and of what invention, ingenuity, industry,
and prosperity have brought to their fellows,... a stolid
mystery these country people are in the mass [287].
At times these pessimistic evaluations of the adaptability of the
Southern farmers had racial overtones:
A remedy more and more looked to in all parts of the country
is diversified or intensive farming. For this sort of farming
the general opinion seems to be that the negro laborer is not
suitable. Testimony as to his capability is not all one way,
it is true....
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Others say, however, that the negro can raise cotton and
nothing else; that he can not be trusted to care for stock;
that he is unable to use farm machinery (as has been noted);
that he will not give the attention necessary for diversified
and intensive farming. It is said that any negro renter will
not even cultivate his own garden patch to any great result
in providing supplies for his family [288].
On the other hand, direct evidence of price-responsiveness of the
Southern farmers is somewhat harder to find. It does exist, nonetheless.
Robert Somers, an English traveler, observed in 1870-71 that
The farmers of Tennessee have gone more extensively into the
culture of cotton under the stimulus of high prices than was
probably prudent, and Nashville of late years has been a brisk
cotton market. The reduction of price this season will send
many of the growers back to grain and stock, for which the
soil and climate are well qualified. Yet the cultivators of
the soil in Tennessee, as in other parts of America not supremely
adapted by nature to the growth of any peculiar product for which
there is a great demand in foreign markets, have difficulty in
apportioning their crops, and are always ready to introduce or
extend whatever promises a better return [289].
Somers was not sure these adjustments were a good thing, however:
The old system of corn and cotton for ever on the same
fields in uncertain proportions can no longer suffice to
give a stable interest to the land; and if a large area and
low price of cotton one year are followed by a small area and
high price the next, and gambling in the cotton market is to
be complicated by gambling in the growth of the staple, a most
unfavorable blow will be given to cotton manufactures through-
out the world [290].
An Alabama Commissioner of Agriculture in the 190's also had con-
fidence in the long-term adaptability of the farmers in his state:
... After the increase in price of cotton directly after
the war, every farmer went into raising cotton, thinking
there was more money in the production of cotton than in
other products, and neglected the raising of pork and corn;
the decrease in the price of cotton forced them back to
raise more corn, and now we are raising nearly all we con-
sume in my State [291].
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Possibly farmers' reactions to price changes were among those things
too obvious to mention. Attention to the market is implicit in the
arguments that cotton was the favorite crop because of its profitability,
just as a low speed of adjustment was one of the reasons advanced for
"overproduction." Certainly DeBow's and Southern Cultivator discussed
farming techniques and economics endlessly, which indicates at least
that readers of those magazines kept track of the economic situation.
The incessant debates over diversification, crop rotation schemes, and
the results of agricultural experiments throws doubt on the idea that
Southern agriculture was cast into a "traditional" mold and was carried
on in a spirit of not-so-blissful oblivion. And the demand for publi-
cations of the agricultural experimental stations, as well as subscrip-
tions to the agricultural papers of the South,was rising, increasing
several hundred percent in the first decade of the 20th century [292].
The other agency blamed for overproduction of cotton was the
Southern credit system, particularly furnishing merchants' insistence
that farmers borrowing from them concentrate on cotton. The merchants'
predilection for cotton was usually explained in terms of the low risk
and salability of the cotton crop, the merchants' need for a cash
crop to enable them to satisfy their creditors, or their desire to have
the farmers indebted to them cultivating a crop which couldn't be eaten,
so that the farmers would be forced to purchase all food and supplies
from the merchant. Usually a connection was made between farmers' being
exploited and their being "locked in' to cotton production. This argu-
ment has been developed in its greatest sophistication by Richard Sutch
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and Roger Ransom of the Southern Economic History Project of the
University of California in Berkeley [293].
Two issues need to be separated. The first is whether the fur-
nishing merchant was "a monopolist in a limited local market" [294].
Whether or not the merchants actually exploited farmer-consumers re-
mains an open question, and will not be settled here. The second
question is whether the merchants in fact preferred cotton, and if
they did, whether they insisted on cotton culture to the detriment of
the farmers and tenants who did business at their stores. In other
words, was it true, as Sutch and Ransom argue, that "The merchant's
insistence on cotton and his monopoly of credit may have prevented the
smaller farmers from diversifying even if it was in their own interest
to do so" [295]?
The difference between these two questions needs to be made clear,
especially since it seems to have eluded almost every writer on the
subject. Suppose, for purposes of argument, that the merchant actually
did possess a credit monopoly in relation to the farmers in his area.
This monopoly could have been due to spatial factors, barriers to
entry, or the absence of alternative credit institutions [296]. Sup-
pose further that because of relative prices or physical (soil and
climatic) conditions, corn was the most profitable crop that could be
grown by the farmers in that area. Would the merchant insist on cotton?
Clearly not, if he truly possessed a credit monopoly. Corn was not
the only commodity required by a farming family as working capital--
they also needed clothing, seed, fertilizers, implements, notions; in
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short, all those necessities which could not be produced on the farm.
If the merchant possessed a true credit monopoly, why would he not be
able to realize his full monopoly profits from sales of those commodi-
ties which the farmer still was forced to buy from the merchant, ex-
cluding corn? Could the merchant not charge an exorbitant (monopoly)
price for salt? Or clothing? Or harnesses? Only if the "monopoly"
had consisted of a fixed markup would merchants' profits depend on
the volume of business transacted in his store, and only in this case
would the "inedibility" of cotton recommend it to merchant preference.
But such a situation is not a true credit monopoly. If the merchant
possessed a monopoly claim to a portion of the farmer's income,due to
the farmer's dependence on the merchant for credit and necessities not
produced on the farm, the limit to the merchant's return would have been
how much the tenant or farmer could bear to pay without moving away or
revolting, not the volume of business transacted at the store. If corn
were more profitable than cotton, monopolist merchants would have in-
sisted that their debtors grow corn, in order to maximize profits.
Obviously, the sane argument applies to whatever the most profitable
crop mix actually was.
The absurdity of the "inedibility" argument for cotton has been
recognized by a careful traditional historian of the Southern country
store:
The argument, which has been advanced on numerous occasions
that one main reason for cotton's becoming a staple crop in
the post-war South was its inedibility, would seem to be wholly
fallacious. Certainly no merchant ever hinted at such a thing
in an interview with the author, and no such implication appears
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in the mercantile records examined. Instead, many mer-
chants have been known to advise customers to plant more
food and feed crops in order to leave more of their cotton
money clear.... To argue that the inedibility of cotton was
an important factor in production is ridiculous in the
light of the fact that clothing was practically as much a
matter of primary concern as food. In most communities of
the post-war South spinning wheels and looms were not wholly
unknown, and it was just as possible to lose money on cotton
used for home consumption in the manufacture of clothing as
it was on edible products. The whole point in the furnishing
trade was profit, and an intensive examination of invoice and
account books indicates that perhaps a greater profit was to
be made in the sale of clothing and notions than in provisions.
[Emphasis added] [297].
Clark continued that low risk and high liquidity were incentives
favoring cotton culture [298], but these would not necessarily imply a
conflict of interest between merchant and farmer. A merchant who per-
ceived that the greatest potential agricultural profits lay in raising
cotton would be inclined to recommend or insist that his debtors cul-
tivate the staple, regardless of any monopoly advantage he might have.
Concentration on the most profitable crop would benefit both merchant
and tenant.
Analogously, the preference of landlords for cotton or for alter-
native cops would seem to depend primarily on the relative profitability
or productivity of the various crops, whatever the landlord's market
position vis a vis the farmers or tenants.
Only the questions of the relative profitability of cotton as
against alternative crops, and of the farmers' price-responsivenesscan
be settled using the techniques of the subsequent chapters. The quan-
titative investigation required to determine the market position of the
furnishing merchants awaits future investigators. Farmers' adaptability
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has already been discussed. As in all the previous cases, it is possi-
ble to uncover conflicting evidence on (1) whether or not country
merchants and Southern landlords actually did insist on cotton and
prohibit diversification, and (2) whether the merchants were monopolists
or whether they charged competitive market prices. Because the
monopoly position of the merchants will not be determined in this study,
only evidence pertaining to (1) will be presented.
One of the most persistent proponents of the view that merchants
insisted on cotton culture was the economist Matthew B. Hammond. He
consistently argued that merchants distorted the crop-choice decision
to the detriment of the farmers.
A still greater hindrance to the improvement of the farm-
ing system of the cotton belt was the credit system which had
arisen, and which gave the merchants the power of deciding
what crop should be planted, regardless of their effects upon
the land, or their value to the producer [299].
Elsewhere, Hammond said that
... Unfortunately, there were few of the cotton growers who
were in a position to change from cotton to other crops....
The only security which the tenant farmer could give to the
country merchant who advanced him his food, clothing and
other necessities, was a mortage on his crops and as cotton,
because of its ready sale, was much to be preferred to other
crops, the merchant was obliged to demand it as security for
his advances. This preference shown to cotton by the advanc-
ing merchant led to its over-production and consequent fall
in price.... Escape from this vicious circle proved impossible
for most of the negro croppers and some of the white ones, and
"the cropping system" and the system of "crop-liens" thus
worked conjointly in causing over-production of cotton and agri-
cultural depression in the South [300].
In the Industrial Commission's summary of testimony concerning crop
lines, the same theory was advanced:
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... it is a general custom of cotton planters and their
tenants to use their credit with the neighboring merchants
to obtain their plantation and family supplies in advance
of the maturing of the crop, often even before the seed is
planted. The farmer estimates about how much credit he wants,
and the merchant tells him to produce so many acres of cotton,
allowing a good margin against a possible crop failure....
It is a direct cause of the enormous production of cotton, with
a constant tendency toward overproduction, and of the low price
of cotton.... The store system of the South amounts to a sort
of peonage with the cotton planter. The rate of interest on
the liens of cotton crops averages at least 40 per cent a year,
and the planters are at least a year behind [301].
The Industrial Commission's summary also blamed an overextension of
credit encouraged by the crop lien as a source of distress, but observed
at the same time that the merchants did not prosper under the system,
because of the high risks involved: "Merchants are not prosperous when
the farmers are not, because they lose so much on their advances" [302].
The Congressional Report on the Condition of Cotton Growers reported
the most extreme statement of the inedibility argument. Major W.H.
Morgan, a planter of LeFlore County, Mississippi, informed the investi-
gators:
In short, I would say that it only pays to raise cotton in
order to have a market at home for what you raise other than
cotton. Your tenants or farm laborers are your patrons, and
just so far as you can make them so, you are successful [303].
Needless to say, Major Morgan sold supplies to his tenants and laborers,
doubling as both landlord and furnishing merchant [304].
None of these statements is surprising, in light of the general
acceptance of the merchants' preference for cotton by almost all modern
historians. What may be surprising is that tenant diversifiers found
support among the economically powerful classes. Some landlords not
only permitted, but even encouraged, self-sufficiency on their plantations.
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There is strong evidence that the "garden patch" was an integral part
of the small post-war farm.
In all cases the planter furnished a dwelling-house free,
wood and water (paid for by digging wells), and pasture for
the pigs and cows of the tenant. In all cases the renter
had a plot of ground from one to three acres, rent free,
for a vegetable garden or "truck patch." Here could be raised
watermelons, sugar-cane, potatoes, sorghum, cabbage, and other
vegetables. Besides his pigs and cows, every tenant could
keep chickens, turkeys, and guineas, and especially dogs, and
could hunt in all the woods around and fish in all the
waters [305].
Naturally, landlords'encouragement of the garden patch would tend to
weaken any "lock-in" desired by merchants. Tenant farmers may have
been economically helpless, but landholding planters were surely not.
The Southern Cultivator also reported some instances of planters per-
mitting tenants gardening. In an article praising the agricultural
practices on the South Carolina plantation of Capt. W. Miles Hazzard,
the Cultivator presented a long list of recommendations for dealing
with free labor. Anong the suggestions were
10. To every household a garden spot is allotted:
and to each laborer a portion of rice land--to full hands
one acre, and to others in proportion....
12. They [the laborers] are allowed to keep a reasonable
number of hogs, and to raise poultry ad libitum [306].
Capt. Hazzard's plantation also included a store "where abundant and
diversified supplies are kept," and the Cultivator reported that sup-
plies were "sold to the laborers at the lowest cash prices, taking their
due bills in payment" [307]. Of course, this situation may have pre-
vailed only until the planter/merchant learned the profits to be made
in exploiting his laborers. But an article reprinted in the Cultivator
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from Southern Plantation in 1878 reported similarly a planter who
"allows them [his employees] a certain amount of land to cultivate for
themselves and in their own way" [308]. Perhaps the most remarkable
instance of the active promotion of self-sufficiency among tenants by
a large Southern landowner is to be found in the Appendix of Timothy T.
Fortune's polemical Black and White. Fortune appended the testimony
of Mr. John Caldwell Calhoun before the Blair Senate Committee on Edu-
cation and Labor taken in New York in September of 1883, "because of
the uniform fairness with which he treated the race and labor problem
in the section of the country where he is an extensive landowner and
employer of labor" [309]. John Caldwell Calhoun may have been a pro-
gressive planter, but he was surely no upstart, being the grandson of
John C. Calhoun of South Carolina [310] and a man who, in his own words,
had "been identified with the agricultural interest of the South from
my earliest recollections, and... a practical cotton planter myself since
the war, giving my own personal attention to my interests since 1869"
[311].
Mr. Calhoun furnished his field hands
... free of cost, a house, fuel, and a garden spot varying
from half to one acre; also the use of wagon and team with
which to haul their fuel and supplies, and pasturage, where
they have cattle and hogs, which they are encouraged to
raise [312].
Calhoun continued;
... We encourage him in every way in our power to be economical,
industrious, and prudent, to surround his home with comforts,
to plant an orchard and garden, and to raise his own mea.t, and
to keep his own cows, for which he has free pasturage. Our
object is to attach him as much as possible to his home. Under
whatever system we work, we require the laborer to plant a part
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of his land in food crops and the balance in cotton with which
to pay his rent and give him ready money. We consider this
system as best calculated to advance him....
We have our own gardens, and generally raise our own supplies,
but every planter interests himself to find a market for all
the products of his laborers. For instance, we encourage
them to raise poultry to a great extent. If they have a sur-
plus of potatoes, or eggs, or chickens, we will buy it and
create a market for it, and ship the articles off in order
that if they have any surplus they may realize on it. On
the Mississippi River we have nearly all the markets. We make
the best market we can for the products of our small farmers [313].
Calhoun also stated that in the interior of his own state of Arkansas,
the small farmers were more diversified, and that his own plantation
practiced diversification "in case of disaster to our cotton crops"
[314].
These examples show that at least some landlords encouraged their
tenants' self-sufficiency early in the post-war period. It does seem
that it would have been rational for landlords operating farms on
shares to maximize output. All this indicates (if such an indication
were still needed) the danger of generalizing from anecdotal evidence.
It is not the contention here that some merchants did not prefer cot-
ton; only (a) that elements of one center of economic power, the plan-
ters, were not entirely opposed to diversification, and (b) that even
if the merchants were monopolists exploiting the farmers who borrowed
from them, it does not necessarily follow that farmers had to be
"locked in" to cotton culture.
Again, it should be emphasized that the monopoly power of the mer-
chants cannot be determined on the basis of either the literary evi-
dence or the econometric estimates of the later chapters. The abundance
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of conflicting testimony precludes any definitive assessment of the
"merchant monopoly hypothesis" on the basis of anecdotes or single
instances alone. Furthermore, it will be shown in the next chapter
that the future presumption must be in favor of the Competition
Hypothesis with respect to the labor market, despite the array of in-
dividual incidents of exploitation which can be compiled. This find-
ing suggests caution in accepting any generalization regarding market
imperfections in the post-bellum South. In any case, the question of
merchant monopoly power must be kept distinct from the preference of
merchants or farmers for cotton or other crops.
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E. Summary
The result of this none-too-systematic survey of the 19th centry
sources is in the form of an "impossibility theorem." Traditional
historical methods simply cannot resolve the post-bellum Southern agri-
cultural system sufficiently to distinguish which of the major alter-
native hypotheseswere true in the aggregate. The extraordinary political
and social tensions of that region may have had their origins in ex-
ploitation of agricultural labor and of the blacks in particular, but
a search of the sources will never be able to determine if the docu-
mented instances of exploitation were general or exceptional. Similar-
ly, the poverty of the black population may have been due to education-
al and entrepreneurial deficiencies rooted in the slavery experience,
but conventional methods are incapable of even determining whether the
blacks as a group were less productive than whites as a group. Cotton
overproduction and farmers' traditionalism may have caused stagnation in
the economy and contributed to the agrarian unrest of the '80' s and
'90' s, but equally possible (on the basis of the statements of con-
temporary observers) is that the South' s suitability for cotton culture
was the main pillar of whatever prosperity its people were able to en-
joy. Clearly, if further progress is to be made towards understanding
these historical problems, more powerful techniques must be developed
and applied. That endeavor constitutes the remainder of this investi-
gation.
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III. SOME THEORETICAL DIFFICULTIES
The preceding chapter has established the impossibility of
settling any of the outstanding questions of post-bellum Southern
economic history by reference solely to the writings of contemporary
observers. Subsequent chapterswill develop more powerful quanti-
tative tests of the alternative hypotheses on the labor market, the
over-all productivity of whites and blacks, and the relative profit-
ability of the alternative crops. The rationale of the tests will
be outlined below. In addition, it is necessary to dispose of some
theoretical difficulties involved in designing these tests. That is the
purpose of this chapter.
Chapters IV and V consist of estimates of agricultural production
functions for each Southern state in each census year from 1880 to
1910. The specification of these production functions includes param-
eters which, depending on their values, express one or the other of
the competing hypotheses. Estimation of the values of these parameters,
combined with appropriate statistical tests of significance, will then
determine which hypothesis is consistent with the quantitative historical
data.
For example, given the production function estimates, it is possi-
ble to calculate the share of output which would have been received
by labor had it been paid according to its marginal productivity.
This "competitive" labor share, if compared with the share of output
actually received in payment for labor services alone (which can be
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determined independently of the production function estimates) will
support either the Competition Hypothesis or the Exploitation
Hypothesis. If the marginal productivity labor share implied by
the production function estimates is greater than what sharecroppers
actually did receive in payment for their labor, the Competition
Hypothesis can be rejected in favor of the Exploitation Hypothesis.
Conversely, if the competitive labor share implied by the estimated
parameters of the production function is roughly equal to what agri-
cultural workers actually did receive, the Exploitation Hypothesis
can be rejected in the aggregate.
Similarly, the production function specification will explicitly
parameterize potential productivity differences between the races, and
the estimates of the productivity parameters will be used to test the
hypotheses of systematic black/white productivity differentials.
Finally, the over-all productivity in value terms of cotton as com-
pared to the alternative crops will be parameterized, to determine
whether cotton "overproduction" was manifested in an output loss
associated with concentration in cotton.
Chapter VII uses time series price and acreage data to estimate
farmers' price responsiveness and speed of adjustment in their behavior
as cotton suppliers, to further test the hypothesis that farmers were
"locked in" to an unprofitable cotton crop.
The data which form the basis of the production function esti-
mates are the published census county cross-sections on agricultural
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inputs and output from 1880 to 1910. Because of the nature of the
data and the special institutional arrangements in Southern agri-
culture (e.g., the existence of sharecropping), the production
functions cannot be estimated without consideration of the following
four difficulties:
(1) Did the form of tenure make a difference? In other words,
did the existence of sharecropping in agriculture distort the pattern
of factor allocation or distribution of the output between the factors?
(2) Is it possible to circumvent the identification problem
associated with estimating production functions from input and output
data? Alternatively, what error structure, model of producer behavior,
and estimation technique can lead to well-behaved parameter estimates
given only input and output data?
(3) Is aggregation of the production functions possible? If so,
do the aggregate county input and output data correspond to the appro-
priate aggregate variables in the aggregate production functions?
(4) Is it possible to take account of the intrinsic differences
in soil fertility? "Land" was not a uniformly homogeneous factor of
production, so that serious errors of measurement would result from
using acreage alone as the land input in the production function.
Before presenting and discussing the results of the actual esti-
mations, each of these difficulties must be dealt with and overcome.
(1) Sharecropping and tenure institutions. Any model that pur-
ports to represent the behavior of agricultural workers and landlords
in the late 19th century South must allow for the coexistence of
18o
sharecropping, renting of land for cash, wage labor by agricultural
workers, and owner-operated farms which sometimes employed agri-
cultural workers. Intuitively, if the production functions were
constant returns to scale and if competition prevailed in the factor
markets, the equilibrium in the absence of risk considerations should
have been one in which both workers and landlords were indifferent
between the various tenure arrangements. If workers were free to
move about and to enter work arrangements voluntarily, and if land-
lords were free to operate their farms under any form of tenure they
chose, no tenure arrangement would have been preferred by either workers
or landlords in equilibrium, provided all the different forms of tenure
were coexistent. This conclusion has been reached by other investi-
gators [1]. Of course, a landless laborer would prefer to own
his land, in order to be able to draw the actual or imputed rent, but
that is different from the issue of whether a landless laborer would
rather rent a farm, work on shares, or work for wages.
The contrary "classical" supposition that sharecropping leads
to allocational inefficiency has been incorporated into a general
equilibrium model by Bardhan and Srinivasan [21. Their model requires
as an equilibrium condition that the marginal product of land in share-
cropping be equal to zero [3], which is implausible for the 19th cen-
tury South. The tenant farms of that period were small, and it seems
unlikely that they were so extensively cultivated that additional
acreage would have contributed nothing to output. It is also easy to
show that if the production functions are constant returns, a Bardhan
181
and Srinivasan-type model has no interior solution and is therefore
not consistent with the coexistence of wage labor, cash renting and
sharecropping [4]. Even with decreasing returns, the Bardhan and
Srinivasan model cannot accommodate simultaneous cash rentals and
sharecropping [5]. These properties make the Bardhan and Srinivasan
model inappropriate for agriculture in the 19th century South.
The model used here is similar to the one first proposed by
Cheung [6], but the development will be carried out along lines sug-
gested by Temin [7]. The production functions will include three
factors--land, labor and capital--instead of only land and labor, but
it will be seen that this modification is a minor one. The problem
of non-homogeneous soil inputs will be deferred, since the purpose of
the present demonstration is to show that different tenure arrangements
by themselves have no effect on resource allocation or distribution.
Assume a constant returns production function which is the sane
for each of the forms of tenure. Let this production function also be
well-behaved, so that the first-order conditions for an extremum are
maximum conditions [8]. Assume at first that the landlord provides all
the capital equipment in sharecropping, with the sharecroppers providing
only their labor.
Write the production for a given farm (without any subscript de-
noting the farm) as
qj = Fi(l, hj, ki) i = s, p, w (3-1)
where
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q = output
1 = labor input
h = land input
k = capital input
and the indices s, p, and w designate the outputs and inputs in share-
cropping, cash renting, and owner operation with the use of hired labor,
respectively. Let 10 = the labor contribution of the owner-operator
himself.
For a landlord operating all three types of farm simultaneously,
profit can be written
7T =rF (l ,h ,ks) + ph p + F(l ,h ,k )
-w(l -1 )-v(k +k ) (3-2)
where
r = share received by landlord under sharecropping
p = the rental rate for land
w = the wage rate for hired labor
v = the price of capital.
The landlord' s leisure will be ignored, which amounts to fixing 1o and
excluding it from the landlord' s set of decision variables. Inclusion
of leisure would not alter the model, except that the landlord would
maximize utility instead of profits and l would be a decision varia-
ble. The results of the analysis would be substantially unchanged.
Also, the landlord whose profit function is given in (3-2) above is
one who operates farms under all three forms of tenure. It will be
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seen momentarily that the argument is unchanged even if he is oper-
ating under only one or two of the alternative tenure forms.
This landlord maximizes profits. But if competition prevails
in the labor market, he will face the constraint that no laborer
will work under any form of tenure which earns less income for the
laborer than an alternative form. These constraints can be expressed
as
(1 -r) FP(lS,hS,ks) = wls (3-3)
(1 -r) Fs (1s,hs,ks) = F(l3,hy,k ) -ph -vk (3-4)
where h and k represent the optimal amounts of land and capital which
a laborer would rent at the market rates should he choose to rent a
farm for cash rather than work as a sharecropper. Constraints (3-3)
and (3-4) represent the condition that the sharecropper could earn
an equivalent income working either as a wage hand or as a cash tenant.
The requirement that h and k be optimal amounts of land and capital
x x
for the renter imply
F2(l ,h ,k ) = p (3-5)
and
F3(1s,h ,k) = v (3-6)
What justifies the assumption of perfect labor, land and capital
markets implied by these constraints on the landlord's profit maximiz-
ation, particularly since competition in the labor market is one of the
hypotheses being tested? The answer is this: perfect competition will
be assumed throughout this derivation, as well as in establishing the
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existence of the aggregate production functions. The assumption of
perfect competition is embedded in the entire estimation technique.
The estimated parameters of the production function determine what
share of output would be received by labor under perfectly competitive
conditions. This competitive labor share will finally be compared
with the independently observed share of output actually received by
agricultural laborers (sharecroppers). If the final estimated com-
petitive labor share diverges markedly from the actual observed labor
share, it must mean that at some point the assumption of perfect com-
petition was false. In other words, rough equality between the esti-
mated competitive labor share and the actual labor share is a neces-
sary condition for the Competition Hypothesis. On the other hand, if
the estimated competitive labor share agrees with the actual observed
share, there will be no reason to doubt the operation of competition
in the labor market, even though such a result cannot ultimately prove
the Competition Hypothesis. A fortuitous combination of imperfections
and immobilities could conceivably produce an apparent equality between
the estimated marginal product of labor and the wage. But such an out-
come can hardly be expected. Also, if the aggregation theorems, tenure
results, and consistency of the parameter estimates are robust to
deviations from perfect competition (so that the production function
estimates are accurate), a necessary condition for the Exploitation
Hypothesis is that the calculated competitive labor share be greater
than the actual observed labor share. In the subsequent discussion, the
results will be loosely characterized as supporting either the Exploitation
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Hypothesis or the Competition Hypothesis depending on the outcome
of the comparison between the estimated marginal product of labor
and the actual wage.
Returning to the model, the constraint on the amount of land
owned by the landlord can be expressed as
h +h +h = h (3-7)
s p w
Of course, the landlord could rent additional land and hire labor
to work it, but with perfect competition and constant returns, any
additional output generated by this procedure would be divided by
the owners of these factors, so no increase in profits could be ob-
tained. Hence, this possibility will be ignored.
Thus, the landlord maximizes profits (3-2) subject to (3-3),
(3-4) and (3-7). This leads to the Lagrangean
& =rF5 +ph +Fw-w(l -1 ) -v(k +k ) (3-8)
p w 0 s w
-A[h +hp +h - h]
-4p1[ (1 - r) )Fs - wl]
-p2 [ (1-r)FS -F(ls,hx,kx) +phx +vkx]
The first-order conditions for an interior maximum (with all three
tenure forms present) and with all land utilized will be
og r s s s (s
alg r F - pi1(1-r )Fi + piw - p2( 1-r )Fl + ptgl1shxjkx) = 0 (3-9 )
___ w
5 lw F1 - w = 0 (3-10)
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s r F - - [4( 1-r)Fs - p2(1-r)Fs = 0
3h p - = 0 (3-12)
p
ofw
F- = 0
w
s S s
r F3 - v - pi(1-r)F 3 - p 2(1-r)Fa = 0 (3-14)
S
6Z w
3k =F - v = 0
The landlord s decision variables are the amounts of land allotted
to each of the tenure forms, the labor desired for sharecropping and
as wage help, and the capital employed on the sharecropped and owner-
operated farms. In addition to these first-order conditions, landlord
equilibrium also requires that no money be lost to the landlord as a
result of his use of the sharecropping form. In Cheung, the assumption
is made that the sharecrop share r is itself another decision varia-
ble [9]. Here it will simply be assumed that the equilibrium r be such
as to maximize profits, since otherwise sharecropping would be abandoned.
(Landlords are free to choose the tenure forms they operate with.) In
either case, the additional equation
- F +p1F +p 2F = 0 (3-16)
must be added to the list of first-order conditions. These first-
order conditions together imply ordinary marginal product factor
pricing;
1+ = -1
w
F 1 = w
S
Fp = p
w
F2 = p
S
F:3 = v
w
F3 = v
from (3-16), so
from (3-10)
from (3-11), (3-12) and (3-17)
from (3-12) and (3-13)
from (3-14) and (3-17)
from (3-15)
In addition,
j = iFj- p 2F(1s,h ,kg) from (3-9), (3-17) and
(3-18)
(3-23)
In order to complete the demonstration of ordinary marginal pro-
duct factor pricing under all tenures, it remains to be shown that
F1 = F.(l3 ,hx,kx) (3-24)
From (3-5) and (3-20) and from (3-6) and (3-22) respectively,
x w
F2 = p = F 2
x w
F3 = v = F3
(3-25)
(3-26)
writing F(1g,h ,k ) as F.
But since F is constant returns, (3-25) and (3-26) together imply the
equality of the factor ratios
hw
lw (3-27)
(3-28)
k 
_ kw
S 1S w
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(3-17)
(3-18)
(3-19)
(3-20)
(3-21)
(3-22)
h x
S
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Therefore (3-24) also follows from the properties of constant returns
production functions [10]. Combining (3-17, 18, 23) and (3-24) com-
pletes the demonstration that the marginal product of labor is equal
to the wage under each tenure arrangement.
Modification of the model to allow the capital costs in share-
cropping to be divided between landlord and tenant does not change
the conclusion of marginal product factor pricing in all tenures. The
profit function and the competitive labor market constraints become in
this case
T =rF S +php +F - w(lw - lo) - vkw - r vks (3-29)
(1-r)Fs - (1 - r)vks = wls (3-30)
(1-r)F - (1 - r)vks = FX - ph vk x (3-31)
The only first-order conditions which are altered are the partial
derivatives with respect to k s and with respect to r. These become
=r F3 - rv - p1( 1-r )F3 + p, (1-r )v - pt2( 1-r )Fs + pi,( 1-r )v = 0
(3-32)
=F s- s - pivk s + pF S - pavk s= 0 (3-33)
or
(Fs -vks)(1 + pi+ p2 ) = 0 from (3-33) (3-34)
Now vks is the total capital cost in sharecropping, so as long as
this cost does not constitute the entire output, (3-17) follows from
(3-34). From (3-32),
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F3[r+ (1 - r)(- t- p2)]+v[-r+(1 -r)( 1 + p2 )] = 0 (3-35)
So combining (3-17) and (3-35) yields (3-21) again, provided (3-30)
and (3-31) hold so that il and pt2 are not zero. Hence, none of the
marginal product factor pricing conditions is changed when the
capital costs are shared in sharecropping in the sane proportion as
the output.
It is easy to see that the essential steps in the reasoning are
unchanged if only one or two of the forms of tenure are employed by
the landlord. If only cash renting and wage labor are involved, there
is no doubt that competition will result in marginal product factor
pricing. If only sharecropping and one of the other tenure forms co-
exist, then profit maximization under the appropriate constraint
(either (3-3) or (3-4))will again yield marginal product factor pricing
in all tenure forms. The essential point is the same--if workers are
free to move from farm to farm, and if landlords are free to choose the
form of tenure under which they operate their farms, then constant re-
turns to scale is sufficient to guarantee that sharecropping has no im-
pact on distribution or allocation.
Of course, this somewhat bland result does nothing to explain the
locational pattern of sharecropping throughout the South. Consider-
ations of risk are probably crucial in determining the incidence of
cropsharing [11]. The model developed here and the estimates based on
it do not deal with the risk element at all. The arrangements made for
risk sharing are not directly relevant to the issue of static imper-
fection in the labor market. A risk premium in addition to ground
190
rent accruing to landlords, for example, cannot be considered to be
exploitation. Sharecropping may have amounted to a crude form of
insurance, and insurance premiums are not monopoly profits. In
actuality, one might expect the sharecrop share received by workers
to be somewhat higher than their purely competitive share exclusive
of risk, for in a sharecropping arrangement the tenant and landlord
share the risk, while if the landlord simply hires for wages, the
workers bear none of the risk.
Similarly, the impetus to sharecropping as a means of providing
the labor force with an incentive is not considered here. This ele-
ment of sharecropping may have played a role, but in a competitive
setting the threat of dismissal, piecework incentives, bonuses, etc.,
could equally well have served to motivate otherwise recalcitrant
laborers. The incentive issue may be worth pursuing, but this is not
necessary in the limited context of deciding the question of exploit-
ation versus competition in the labor market.
(2) Least-squares and identification. The production functions
ultimately estimated are all of a generalized Cobb-Douglas form. The
difficulties in estimating Cobb-Douglas production functions from
cross-section input and output data are well known [12]. The general
problem is that if the decision-makers maximize profits subject to the
technical production relation, the inputs will be correlated with any
disturbance appearing in the production function. Therefore ordinary
least squares applied to the input and output data will result in
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biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. However, Zellner, Kmenta
and Dreze have suggested a model which sidesteps this difficulty [13].
Briefly, they assume that the disturbance enters the production function
in the following way:
a P T uoiqi = A li hi ki e (3-36)
where i is the index for the i'th producing unit and u0 i is a nor-
mally distributed random disturbance with mean 0 and variance a 2
"representing factors such as weather, unpredictable variations in
machine or labor performance, etc." [14]. They assume further that
decision-makers maximize expected profits, and that the prices are
either known with certainty or are statistically independent of the
production function disturbance. In addition, random "human error"
deviations from the optimum input selections on the part of producers
are allowed.
This model conforms well to the facts of agricultural production,
since the random "act of nature" component of the production function
(representing weather, pests, or other unforeseen factors) is inde-
pendent of any human errors in production. Furthermore, farmers must
be aware of the random element in their productive process, even though
they cannot know exactly in what direction it will operate. Many pro-
duction decisions, such as allocation of acreage to the different crops
or the initial application of labor to plowing and preparation, must
be made before any knowledge of the random factor in the production
function can be obtained. Hence, farmers would be rational to maximize
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something like expected profits, and the assumptions of the model
would hold. Under these conditions, Zellner, Kmenta and Dreze show
that ordinary least squares applied to input and output data is an
appropriate estimation technique. (See Appendix 1 for a replication
of the proof.)
(3) Aggregation. It is also well known that not all production
functions allow aggregation, even under conditions of perfect compe-
tition [15]. However, constant returns production functions of the
type to be introduced in the later chapters do belong to the class of
functions for which aggregation is possible. In addition, they have
the property that the labor, land and capital aggregates are the natural
aggregates obtained by summing the individual farm inputs over the
county. (See Appendix 2 for proofs.)
(4) Heterogeneity of soils. This problem was treated by allow-
ing the constant term in the production function to vary from county
to county according to the physical and chemical properties of the soil.
Southern soils were assayed and classified in the 1880 census [16].
The existence of this 1880 geographic survey is in some sense a for-
tunate accident, since it provides a ready-made means of identifying
intrinsic fertility differences of the various types of Southern soil.
Variation of the production function constant term across counties
belonging to different soil type categories allows for over-all fer-
tility differences associated with physically heterogeneous soils.
With these difficulties out of the way, it is possible to proceed
to the estimation of the production functions.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER III
[1] Steven N.S. Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1969); Joe D. Reid, Jr., "Some
Risk Is an Impetus to Sharecropping" (Philadelphia: unpublished
manuscript, July, 1971); these conclusions have also been con-
firmed and amplified in discussions with Peter Temin at M.I.T.
[2] P.K. Bardhan and T.N. Srinivasan,"Cropsharing Tenancy in
Agriculture: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," American
Economic Review, LXI, No. 1 (March, 1971), 48-64.
[3] Ibid., 49.
[4] This result is due to Peter Temin. It follows from the fact
that in a Bardhan and Srinivasan model with the three forms of
tenure, both partial derivatives of the production function
evaluated at the equilibrium quantities of land and labor used
in sharecropping are greater than the corresponding partial
derivatives of the production function evaluated at the quantities
of land and labor in fixed rents. Either the production functions
are different under the different forms of tenure (and there is
no reason to expect this should be so) or workers will not divide
their time between sharecropping and working land rented for cash.
Again, this result requires constant returns production functions.
[5] Bardhan and Srinivasan, "Cropsharing Tenancy...," footnote 8,
pp. 51-2.
[6] Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy, 16-29.
[7] Conversations and unpublished work during 1971-72.
[8] Sufficient conditions (i.e., for first- and second-order conditions)
for constrained maximization in models of the type used here (with
more than one constraint) may be found in Kevin Lancaster,
Mathematical Economics (London: The Macmillan Company, 1968), 52-4.
The production functions specified and estimated in subsequent
chapters are "well-behaved" in the sense in which this term is used
here.
[9] Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy, 19-21.
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[10] For any constant returns production function F with three
factors, q = F(1,h,k) can be written
F 1or
q =lF 1 k
Therefore
a =l ( 1 - = F2 1" ) k and
h ~ k11 
ak = F3 1, k
Thus, since dq/6h and aq/3k are functions of h/i and k/i only,
F= p =F and
x
3= v =F
together imply
hx h, k kw
and - -
But
F 1, , ) + F2 k - +1 )F_3 (1 -
F 1, , F 1 -1F 1
which is also a function of only the two factor ratios h/i and
k/l. Hence Fw = Fx.
[ll] This seems to be the consensus among all the recent investigators.
See Cheung, The Theory of Share Tenancy; Bardhan and Srinivasan,
"Cropsharing Tenancy in Agriculture .. . , " Reid, "Some Risk. . .. , "
and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Incentives and Risk-Sharing in Share-
cropping," (unpublished manuscript); although Reid questions some
of Cheung' s conclusions on this point.
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[12] See, for example, Marc Nerlove, Estimation and Identification of
Cobb-Douglas Production Functions (Chicago: Rand McNally and
Company; Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1965).
[13] A. Zellner, J. Kmenta, and J. Dreze, "Specification and Esti-
mation of Cobb-Douglas Production Function Models," Econometrica,
Vol. 34, No. 4 (Oct. 1966).
[14] Ibid., 787.
[15] For a survey of the problem, see Franklin M. Fisher, "The
Existence of Aggregate Production Functions," Econometrica,
Vol. 37, No. 4 (Oct. 1969).
[16] U.S. Census Office, Tenth Census, 1880, Vol. V-VI: Report on
Cotton Production in the United States; also Embracing Agricultural
and Physico-geographical Descriptions of the Several Cotton States
and of California, ed. Eugene W. Hilgard (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1884).
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IV. SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF
THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS
A. Specification
It is useful to begin by reviewing the information sought by
estimation of Southern agricultural production functions:
(i) The estimates should allow calculation of the output share
due to labor under conditions of perfect competition, so that the
hypothesis of exploitation in the labor market can be tested. It has
been shown in the previous chapter that for constant returns production
functions, competition in the factor markets allows the distributional
and allocative impact of sharecropping to be ignored, and the farm pro-
duction functions to be aggregated to the county level. It is desirable
but not necessary that the production function have reasonably simple
distributional properties, so that the competitive labor share not be
too difficult to calculate.
(ii) Potential differences in black and white labor productivity
should be allowed. However, the specification should not require that
both types of labor be present in order for production to take place.
This latter requirement rules out the black and white labor force varia-
bles from entering multiplicatively.
(iii) Similarly, the function should allow for productivity dif-
ferences associated with the cultivation of different crops. This will
allow testing the hypothesis that cotton had lower over-all profitability
(to the entire agricultural sector) than the alternative crops. Again,
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there should be no requirement that all crops be produced in order to
achieve a positive level of output, since many counties reported no
cotton grown at all.
(iv) Intrinsic soil fertility differences due to physical, chemical
and possibly climatic differences should be allowed for.
(v) Finally, the production function should be constant returns
to scale. This requirement is necessary for the theorems on tenure and
aggregation to hold true. Incidentally, estimation of the production
functions without imposing the constraint of constant returns will allow
a test of the constant returns assumption. As in the test of competition,
if the unconstrained estimates do not deviate from constant returns, it
may be concluded that constant returns is consistent with the data. The
constant returns requirement cannot be proved by this test, however.
(vi) The error structure should be such as to allow consistent
estimation of the parameters by ordinary least squares applied to the
county cross-section input and output data.
A production function possessing properties (i)-(vi) is the follow-
ing:
S 2 S
Q =.A.A 2  - AN (aW+bB) (cH+dJ) K euo (4-1)
where
Q = value of all agricultural output net of intermediate
products fed to livestock,
Si = a set of dummy variables, one for each of the N soil
types in each state, with the property that Si = 1 when
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the county described by the production function is of
soil type i, and Si = 0 otherwise,
W = white agricultural labor input,
B = black agricultural labor input,
H = cotton land input
J = agricultural land input for all usages other than cotton
culture,
K = agricultural capital input, and
uo = a random disturbance term, normally distributed with mean
0 and variance a2 .
For a full discussion and detailed definitions of these variables,
see Appendix 3. Also, this aggregate production function is defined for
each county, but the county subscripts on the variables are omitted for
simplicity in notation. The constant terms will vary between counties
belonging to the different soil type categories, but will be the same
for all counties with a given soil type.
As in the previous cahpter, it is assumed that the random disturbance
term embodies unforeseeable factors such as variations in temperature and
rainfall, and that the decision-makers maximize expected profits. The
producing units are the individual farms, but the tentative assumption
of perfect competition within counties allows aggregation to the county
level. The sample of counties for each estimate consists of the counties
making up each of the ten major cotton-producing Southern states in each
of the four Census years 1880-1910. Omitting Texas in 1890 and 1900, and
Virginia altogether [1], there are 38 production function estimates in all.
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The sample limits were chosen to avoid the difficulties involved in
pooling cross-section data over time [2] and to facilitate discussion
of the results by summarizing the estimates as "the" production function
of a given state in a given year [3].
In most of the subsequent discussion, the production function
(4-1) will be discussed in its logarithmic form. Hence
N
f4c Q= ZBjS +0626(aW+bB) +pg.(cH+dJ) +yiogK+u, (4-2)
i=l
with
B j = 2og Ai ; i = 1,2, ...
will also be referred to as "the production function." The results of
estimating the parameters of (4-1) or (4-2) will be designated the
Group I results. In addition, for purposes of discussion of the static
and distributional properties of the model, the disturbance term will
be ignored [4].
It is easy to verify that production function (4-1) satisfies
requirements (i)-(vi). Suppose both whites and blacks are paid the
value of the marginal products of their respective labors. Then labor's
share of output is given by
S =A -W + -Q B] = W + - (4-3)
QW 6B dW Q B Q(
But
W aW+bB
Q= C6 b Q'(4-5)6B aW +bB
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So
S = a -- +± a b (4-6)aW+bB Q aW+bB Q
which is the same as the ordinary Cobb-Douglas result. By an analogous
argument, P =land' s share in output if both types of land are rented
at the value of their marginal products. The share of capital is given
by -, and as in the ordinary Cobb-Douglas function, returns to scale is
given by the sum a +s +y = v.
Differences in black and white labor productivity are embodied in
the values of the parameters a and b. Similarly, crop-associated pro-
ductivity differences are parameterized by c and d. One note of caution
is required in interpreting these parameters, however. If c and d are
different, completely free substitutability between the crops would im-
ply that total specialization in cotton or total abandonment of cotton
would be the outcome of rational crop-choice decisions. Such a conse-
quence of the model would be unrealistic. For example, a finding
that c > d should be interpreted in one of the following ways:
(1) Cotton tended to be concentrated on the most fertile land, and did
not spread over the entire improved acreage because not all land was
suitable for cotton culture. Farmers grew cotton on their best lands,
but could not expand its cultivation indefinitely. (2) There were
some other advantages enjoyed by cotton farmers (greater skills? market-
ing advantage?) which could not be extended throughout the agricultural
population. Conversely, if c < d, the indication would be that farmers
would have been able to produce a greater value of output if they had
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been able to shift out of cotton. If they could not diversify, it
was presumably due to some peculiarity of the soil or to some sort of
"lock in" caused by merchants' control and preference for cotton. In
other words, the estimated values of the parameters c and d are indi-
cative of over-all levels of crop-associated productivity, but they
do not represent productivity differences resulting simply from an
unconstrained decision to plant one crop or the other. However, should
one of the parameters prove to be larger than the other, it would re-
flect a pressure to expand the production of the advantageous crop at
the expense of the alternatives. Increased output of the more pro-
ductive crop could only be restricted by physical, geographical or
institutional factors in this case. The relative magnitudes of c and
d should therefore provide a first test of the notion that Southern
agricultural output could have been increased had the farmers diversi-
fied.
This specification also raises an identification problem, which
will be referred to again and again in the discussion. A difference
in the estimated values of a and b may represent different levels of skill
or human capital differences between the races. It could also represent,
however, differences in the fertility of the lands farmed by members of
the two races. Similarly, the c and d parameters might represent a
skill differential between cotton farmers and non-cotton farmers. For
this reason, the productivity differentials captured by different esti-
mated values of a and b or c and d will always be designated only as
"race-associated productivity differences" and "crop-associated pro-
ductivity differences."
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The coefficients of the dummy variables represent the intrinsic
soil fertility differences after race- and crop-associated productivity
differences are taken into account. The specification will allow a test
of the over-all significance of the coefficients of the Si as compared
to a single constant term, and thereby will verify whether or not the
Hilgard soil type categories actually did correspond to soils of dif-
ferent intrinsic net fertilities.
Thus, requirements (i)-(vi) are satisfied. However, the production
function (4-2) is not linear in all the unknown parameters. In parti-
cular, a, b, c, and d enter the function in a non-linear way. A non-
linear technique could be used to estimate a, b, c, and d, but in view
of the large amount of data to be processed and the difficulty in decid-
ing on an initial point from which to start any search process, it was
decided to approximate the production function by linearizing it in a
Taylor series expansion. Write
f(a,b) = 4 (aW+bB) (4-7)
Expand f(ab) in Taylor series around (aobo). Let this point be
chosen such that ao = bo. This could be considered to be "the point
of insufficient reason" if no a priori judgments are to be made about
the productivity differences between the races. The first few terms
of the Taylor series expansion of this function of two variables are
f(a,b) = f(ao,bo) +(a - ao) oW + (b - bo) a B
aoW + boB aoW +boB
+ (a - ao )2(- 1) Wb _
'.. (aoW +boB) 2
+ 2(a - ao)(b - bo)(-1)
WB_
(aoW +boB) 2
+ (b -bo) 2 (-1) B2 
-
(aoW +boB)2 4
+ higher order terms
Setting ao =bo, this expansion becomes
f(a,b) = 2ag(aoW + aoB) + - 1)( WB +
- 1( -
- ! -
1)2( w B)
1)
W + B
jao W B W+B)
2(W ) 2 + higher order terms.
Inspection of the first few terms of this Taylor series reveals sufficient
conditions for convergence, as follows:
W+B < 1 and B <14+B
SO
WjB k
(W + B) i+k
- 0 as j +k + oo
Also, the numerical coefficients of each term will be of the form
(n )1 0 as n + oo1
n! jro(n - j) !n jw!(n - i)
Therefore., the series will converge if
a
a0
< 1 and b < 1
ao
by comparison to a convergent geometric series [5].
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(4-8)
X
(4-9)
(4-10)
(4-11)
(4-12)
1)2 -L-21 (ao
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Rewriting these inequalities as
-1 < --1<1 d -1 < <1, (4-13)
ao ao
this sufficient condition for convergence becomes
0 < a < 2ao and 0 < b<2a (4-14)
Since ao can be picked arbitrarily, these conditions can always be met.
However, the series will converge more rapidly the closer ao is to a
and b. ao can be picked at will, so it can always be close to a or to
b, but can only be close to both if a is close to b. Hence, the linear
approximation of f(a,b) obtained by dropping the quadratic and all higher
order terms will be a better approximation the closer a is to b. But
the linear approximation can still be used even if a and b are greatly
different, since the Taylor series always converges for some value of ao.
Thus, if all non-linear terms are omitted,
f(a,b) =u Mao + 4(W+B)+ a W + b. B
ao W+B ao W+B
But
W B
W+B W+B,
f(a,b) =-ao + + 4(W +B) + 1 (b - a) B (4-16)ao ao W+B
So that
(aW +bB) = C'+ a ( W+B) + (b - a) B
ao W+B
A similar argument can be made to show
P oq(cH + dJ) = C"+p. (H+ J)+- (c - d) H (4-18)
co H + J
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Combine all these results, write W + B = R and H + J = T, rename the
constants, and note that for any constant D,
N N N
BiSi +D = Z (Bi +D)Si since Si = 1 (4-19)
i=1 i=i i=1~
Therefore, the final linear approximation of (4-2) is
N aB H
4Q = UC.S+ R+ @T +yK+ - (b - a) + (c-d) - (4-20)
i=l
Several comments can be made about this approximation technique.
First, because the values of ao and co are absorbed by the constant
term, there is no need to guess a priori values of ao and co close to
the actual values of a and c. On the other hand, this advantage is
partially offset by the fact that since ao and co are not distinguisha-
ble from the constants (or each other), there is no way to recover any
information on the absolute magnitudes of a and b or c and d. It might
be thought that a and c could be scaled arbitrarily at, say, a = 1 and
c = 1 since scaling can be absorbed in the Ci constants. This would be
possible except that it would necessitate constrained estimation of the
coefficients of B/R and H/T. Unconstrained estimation would admit the
possibility of negative estimated values of b and d, which would make
no economic sense.
For suppose the scale were set so that a= 1. Then expand
f (b) = 4 (W + bB) (4-21)
in Taylor series around b = 1. Ignoring the higher-order terms as
before, the result is
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f(b)= g(W(+B) + (b - 1) W+B (4-22)
Thus the coefficient of B/R in the estimated equation would be
O= cx(b - (4-23)
So that
6b =-+1 (4-24)
If 0 is not constrained, it is possible for the estimated values of b
to be less than zero, which is economically meaningless. In fact,
b < 0 if 0 < 0, a > 0, and 101 > 6. Unconstrained estimation could
well generate values of 0 and C6 in this range, and indeed, examination
of the results below shows a large number of cases of 0 and C6 combinations
which imply b < 0 if a = 1. Since the purpose of the Taylor series
approximation is to simplify the estimations and to avoid costly search
procedures or intractable constrained estimation, the arbitrary scaling
of a = 1 cannot be used.
Therefore the only information that can be extracted from the
estimates of the coefficients of B/R and H/T are the signs of the dif-
ferences (b - a) and (c - d), and whether these differences are signifi-
cantly different from zero. Not being forced to guess values of ao and
co a priori guarantees that the Taylor series approximation will con-
verge (and hence that linearization is feasible), but because ao and
co are unknown, the actual magnitudes a, b, c, and d cannot be recovered.
The Group I results of estimating (4-15) are as follows:
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TABLE IV.1
North Carolina -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
(b - a)
(c -d)
.260(.0819)
[3.175]
.407(.0674)
[6.036]
-326(.0682)
[4.780]
.687(.173)
[3.965]
1.219(.226)
[5.389]
.993(. 0470)
[-.149]
R' .961
F(m,n) 255.4(8,84)
obs 93
u*'u* 2.38447
.448(.0936)
[4.790]
.335(.114)
[2. 937]
.275(.116)
[2.372]
.372(.189)
[1.963]
.438(.262)
[1.674]
1. 058(. 0585)
[.991]
919
122.4(8,86)
95
3.75025
.325(.0640)
[5.087]
.500(.0773)
[6.473]
.156(. 0879)
[1.773]
. 424(.134)
[3.156]
. 488(.191)
[2.559]
. 981(.0377)
[-.504]
. 958
244.0(8,86)
95
1.68962
.345(.0685)
[5.037]
.518(.0725)
[7.149]
.143(. 0840)
[1.706]
.452(.146)
[3.103]
1. 307 (.190)
[6.868]
1. 006(. 0406)
[-.148]
.966
288.5(8,82)
91
1.86561
3.93311 1.98743
y
a0
Co
v
2.18748u'Tu 2.53224
208
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
South Carolina -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
.203(.157)
[1.292]
.277(.135)
[2. 047]
-407(.0995)
[4. 087]
.292(.232)
[1.258]
1.044(.372)
[2. 812]
.887(.0794)
[-1. 423]
.967
F(m,n) 71.76(9,22)
obs 32
.415(.185)
[2.237]
.517(.186)
[2. 777]
.148(.159)
[.931]
-.212(.268)
[-.790]
.930(.469)
[1.985]
1.080(.102)
[.784]
.936
39.08(9,24)
34
.200(.135)
[1. 480]
.537(.142)
[3. 780]
.227(.150)
[1.518]
-. 441(.145)
[-3.050]
1.265(.262)
[4.823]
.964(.0544)
[-.662]
.965
86.24(9,28)
38
-.186(.137)
[-1. 357]
.645(.109)
[5.926]
.447(.0908)
[4.916]
-. 455(.145)
[-3.137]
1.800(.236
[7.623J
.978
143.4(9,29)
39
u*
t u* .286584 .592397 .240073
.951389 .605753
a
y
- (b
ao
P (cCo
- a)
-d)
v
.186624
.823080u' u .396139
-209
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Georgia -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1890 1900 1910
.590(.0671)
[8.795]
.283(.0645)
[4.386]
.243(. 0536)
[4.544]
- a) -. 116(.0991)
[-1. 168]
1. 124 (.208)
[5. 407]
(c - d)
v 1. 116 (. 0362)
[3.204]
R .960
F(m,n) 244.6(12,121)
obs 134
u*'u* 3.07850
.444(.0589)
[7.534]
.407(.0590)
[6.893]
. 170(. 0495)
[3.427]
.221(. 0824)
[2.685]
1. 521(.178)
[8.526]
1.021(.0316)
[.665]
.970
317.1(12,119)
132
2.27590
.450(.0677)
[6.641]
.377(.0676)
[5.573]
.221(. 0715)
[3.090]
-. 258(.0730)
[-3. 531]
.905(.177)
[5.120]
1. 048 (. 0283)
[1.696]
.968
301.3(12,118)
131
1.67515
2.12863
.164(.0467)
[3.520]
.524(.0378)
[13.857]
333 (. 0437)
[7.633]
-. 0604(.0595)
[-1. 015]
1.294(.124)
[10.409]
1. 021(. 0211)
[.995]
.986
759. 4(12,128)
141
1.18222
1880
U (b
ao
co
u'u 3.75645 2.53452 2.44083
210
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Florida-- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
.364(.126)
[2.889]
.365(.110)
[3. 301]
.201(. 0783)
[2.573]
-.413(.378)
[-1. 092]
2.004(.799)
[2. 507]
.930(.0921)
[-.760]
.955
77. 21(8,29)
38
1.62567
u' u 2.38727
.521(.158)
[3. 300]
.107(.181)
[. 592]
.484 ( .141)
[3. 429]
-. 132 (. 437)
[-. 301]
.454(.815)
[.557]
1.112(. 0924)
[1.212]
.919
49. 35(8, 35)
44
4.30723
5.00741
.227(.156)
[1.4521
.0400(.102)
[.392]
. 745(.120)
[6. 227]
-.497(.317)
[-1.565]
2.469(.735)
[3. 358]
1. 012(.0884)
[.136]
- 935
57.69(8,32)
41
1.83362
2.46329
-.335(.230)
[-l. 460]
.159(.147)
[1. 085]
1. 133(.165)
[6.871]
.163(.546)
[.298]
1.229(1.036)
[1.186]
.915
45.85(8, 34)
43
3.84342
4.81499
ao
(b - a)
(c -d)
v
F(m, n)
obs
u* u*
R 2
211
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Tennessee -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
.404(.112)
[3. 613]
.137 (.
[l.
118)
156]
421(. 0892)
[4. 716]
- a) .266(.195)
[1.367]
-d) 1.369(.330)
[4.145]
-.0319(.0640)
[-.499]
. 659(. 0821)
[8. 024]
. 339(. 0656)
[5.175]
.270(.157)
[1.722]
.493(.257)
[1. 916]
.962 (. 0344.)
[-1.105]
.978
F(m,n) 211.3(16,75)
92
1. 34740
2.56976
.984
285.1(16,75)
92
.792777
.247(.0628)
[3.935]
. 503(.0712)
[7. 065]
.238(. 0676)
[3. 520]
-.148(.168)
[-.880]
.481(.299)
[1.612]
. 988(. 0276)
[-.435]
. 980
223. 7(16, 75)
.240(.0619)
[3.885]
. 453(.0805)
[5.630]
. 333(. 0729)
[4. 574]
.105(.182)
[.577]
.206(. 314)
[.655]
1. 026(. 0298)
[.872]
.980
222. 5(16, 74)
92
.838624
1.51585 1.25621
1.04603
2.56563
T
(b
ao
- (cCO
v
R2
ob s
u*'u U
212
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Alabama -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
.808(.126)
[6. 4001
.340(.103)
[3.294]
-.0183(.0827)
[-.222]
-.194(.187)
[-1. 041]
- d) 1.669(.381)
[4. 382]
V
.974
F(m,n) 144.5(13,51)
65
1.01875
.434(. 0993)
[4.372]
.539(.0644)
[8.3761
.158(.0700)
[2.256]
[-1.003]
1.087(.272)
[3.990]
1.131(.0607)
[2.158]
.982
200. 3(13, 49)
63
.524055
.443(.0820)
[5.400]
.541(.0585)
[9.251]
.108(.0829)
[1.305]
-.284(.0859)
[-3.308]
1.024(.227)
[4.503]
1. 092 (. 0429)
[2.1451
.984
231.7(13,49)
63
.250262
.187(.0598)
[3.127]
.625(.0573)
[11.082]
.264(.0607)
[4.353]
-.453(.0766)
[-5.914]
1.125(.198)
[5.6941
1.076(.0398)
[1.910]
.979
171.6(13,49)
63
.209915
1.53858 .344849
a-
ao
(b - a)
R2
obs
U*t U*
.381332U'u 1.37078
213
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Mississippi -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
(b - a)
.212(.104)
[2. 042]
.295(.0986)
[2. 993]
.529(.0815)
[6. 489]
-.225(.284)
[-. 792]
(c - d) 1. 707 (. 450)
c'0 [3. 792]
v 1.036(.0709)
[.508]
R2 .959
F(m,n) 107.2 (13, 60)
obs 74
u*'u* 2.90427
.118(.103)
[1.140]
.672(.108)
[6.193]
.150(.106)
[1. 415]
.585(.207)
[2.833]
.842(. 309)
[2. 726]
.940(.0648)
[-. 926]
. 960
112. 1(13, 61)
75
2.07485
.357(.0522)
[6.839]
.334(. 0426)
[7.844]
.303(.0654)
[4.636]
-.122(.0823)
[-1. 483]
.976(.126)
[7. 728]
.994(.0278)
[-.216]
.989
403. 3(13, 61)
75
.355923
.228(.0597)
[3.811]
.396(.0557)
[7.101]
.364(.0752)
[4.838]
-. 309(.0895)
[ -3. 451]
1. 475(.178)
[8.293]
.988(.0320)
[-. 375]
.990
475. 2 (13, 63)
77
.490952
3.81807 .639033
ao
1.15984u' u 3.11330
214
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Arkansas -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
(b - a)
.410(.101)
[4. 065]
.377(.0967)
[3. 898]
.199 (. 0702)
[2.837]
-. 408(.134)
[-3. 054]
- d) 2.281(.214)
[10. 666]
.986(.0362)
[-. 387]
.957
F(m,n) 139.0(10,62)
obs 73
u*'u* .839847
lu' 1.00982
.301(.105)
[2.871]
.315(.0911)
[3.459]
.307 (.0661)
[4. 649]
.168(.117)
[1. 446]
1.358(.157)
[8. 627]
.923(.0321)
[-2.399]
. 970
204.7(10,63)
74
.595576
.277(.103)
[2. 691]
.138(.110)
[1.257]
.633(. 0965)
[6. 553]
-. 0822(.114)
[-. 718]
1.244(.185)
[6.739]
1. 048(. 0361)
[1.330]
. 964
169.7(10,63)
74
.569946
.239(.102)
[2.341]
.376(.0884)
[4.258]
. 365(.0751)
[4.864]
-. 527(.106)
[-4. 949]
1.972(.168)
[11.744]
.980(.0458)
[-.4371
.968
183.3(10,61)
72
.628253
.675252 .644752
a0
- (
P (cCo
v
R2
.982887
215
TABLE IV.1 - Continued
Louisiana -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
(b - a)
- d)
.202(.159)
[1. 268]
.374(.144)
[2.607]
-448(. 0935)
[4.788]
.673(. 378)
[1.779]
501(. 409)
[1.224]
v 1.024(.0959)
[.250]
R2  .916
F(m,n) 44.71(11,45)
obs 57
u*Tu* 3.83072
.393(.112)
[3. 516]
.220(.0779)
[2.819]
.378 .0608)
[6.213]
.664(.248)
[2. 674]
.600(.255)
[2. 353]
.991(.0724)
[-. 124]
.927
53.25(11,46)
58
2.16770
.335(.113)
[2. 972]
.476(.110)
[4.3331
.167(.0553)
[3. 028]
.294(.212)
[1.386]
.495(. 324)
[1.525]
.978(.0651)
[-. 338]
. 924
50.88(11,46)
58
1.75323
.229(.106)
[2.157]
.290(.0904)
[3.209]
.424(. 0782)
[5.414]
-.0123(.224)
[-.0552]
1.127(. 425)
[2. 649]
.943(.0716)
[-.796]
.924
49.68(11, 45)
57
1.77907
2.61086 2.65074
T
a0
(c
CO
u' u 4.58390 2.32386
216
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Texas -- Group I
Estimated Parameter 1880 1910
T
a (b - a)
a0
P
0
(c - d)
v
R2
F(m,n)
obs
u*' u
u'u
.157(.0760)
[2. 070]
.313(.0683)
[4.584]
.681(. 0943)
[7. 225]
.500(.815)
[. 614]
2. 474(1. 442)
[1.715]
1.151(.0819)
[1.844]
.954
.263(.0907)
[2. 903]
.703(.0778)
[9. 033]
.172(.105)
[1. 631]
.487(.450)
[1. 080]
2.049(.339)
[6. 051]
1.138(. 0597)
[2. 312]
.911
286. 4(15,206) 148.5(15,218)
222
275.199
289.358
234
72.5995
77.8685
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TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
North Carolina -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
C 2.021(.409)
1 4 [4.944]
C 2.125(.439)
2 2 [4.841]
C 2.171(.447)
3 1 [4.853]
C 2.102(.429)
3 [4.900]
1.630(.535)
4 [3.050]
1.687(.579)
3 [2.914]
1.788(.581)
2 [3.076]
1.789(.561)
1 [3.189]
2.656(.351)
4 [7.578]
2.850(.378)
1 [7.547]
2.725(.378)
3 [7.205]
2.774(.362)
2 [7.656]
2.777(.381)
2 [7.282]
2.879(.411)
1 [7.013]
2. 702(. 407)
3 [6.642]
2.563(.385)
4 [6.653]
218
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
South Carolina -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
C 3.443(.766)
1 4 [4.495]
C2 3.660(.748)
1 [4.895]
C 3.595(.811)
2 [4.434]
C 3.439(.775)
5 [4.436]
C 3.542(.808)
5 3 [4.384]
1.730(1.044)
4 [1.658]
2.207(.951)
1 [2.322]
1.936(1.101)
2 [1.759]
1.684(1.057)
5 [1.593]
1.742(1.108)
3 [1.572]
3.009(.543)
3 [5.543]
3.265(.542)
1 [6.028]
3.100(.,560)
2 [5.532]
2.861(.549)
4 [5.208]
2.767(.551)
5 [5.024]
3.297(.509)
2 [6.477]
3.458(.523)
1 [6.615]
3.257(.508)
3 [6.414]
3.137(.505)
4 [6.209]
2.906(.505)
5 [5.754]
219
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Georgia -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
C 1.588(.353)
1 6 [4.500]
C 1.423(.336)
2 7 [4.240]
C 1.653(.349)
3 5 [4.734]
C 1.664(.347)
4 4 [4.801]
C 1.343(.368)
8 [3.653]
C 1.681(.338)
6 3 [4.971]
C 1.695(.324)
2 [5.236]
C 1.732(.311)
8 1 [5.572]
2.143(.312)
7 [6.868]
2.043(.304)
8 [6.725]
2.191(.312)
4 [7.028]
2.173(.309)
5 [7.024]
2.210(.328)
3 [6.745]
2.164(.304)
6 [7.124]
2.302(.293)
1 [7.866]
2.228(.276)
2 [8.074]
2.179(.285)
7 [7.642]
2.149(.277)
8 [7.7591
2.203(.280)
6 [7.874]
2.322(.287)
3 [8.098]
2.257(.306)
5 [7.366]
2.295(.286)
4 [8.026]
2.351(.276)
2 [8.506]
2.375(.255)
1 [9.331]
2.128(.224)
8 [9.498]
2.150(.213)
7 [10.113]
2.221(.219)
6 [10.128]
2.3177(.223)
5 [10.402]
2.3180(.237)
4 [9.766]
2.380(.223)
2 [10.657]
2.468(.218)
1 [11.306]
2.344(.208)
3 [11.285]
220
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Florida -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
C 3. 028(.821)
3 [3.686]
C 2.961(.714)
2 4 [4.150]
C 3.192(.752)
2 [4.244]
C 3.550(.682)
1 [5.207]
1.816(.900)
3 [2.018]
1.609(.757)
4 [2.127]
1.824(.799)
2 [2.282]
2.102 (. 704)
1 [2.985]
2.114(.808)
4 [2.617]
2.276(.753)
3 [3.023]
2.335(.745)
2 [3.135]
2.766(.697)
1 [3.970]
1.621(1.236)
4 [1.312]
2.057(1.153)
2 [1.783]
1.795(1.130)
3 [1.588]
2.345(1.079)
1 [2.174]
221
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Tennessee -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
C 3.575(.387)
1 1 [9.229]
C 3.076(.379)
2 2 [8.107]
C 3.014(.388)
3 4 [7.579]
C 2.961(.393)
4 5 [7.542]
C 3.053(.358)
5 3 [8.535]
C 2.948(.363)
6 6 [8.111]
C 2.736(.377)
7 9 [7.267]
C 2.912(.385)
8 7 [7.573]
C 2.644(.341)
12 [7.754]
C1 0
C1 1
C12
2.745(.
8 [7.
364)
534]
2.728(.379)
10 [7.202]
2.699(.372)
11 [7.254]
2.334(.284)
1 [8.203]
2.149(.276)
3 [7.772]
2.021(.277)
5 [7.304]
2.070(.273)
4 [7.572]
2.162(.257)
2 [8.409]
2.019(.257)
6 [7.873]
1.875(.265)
11 [7.066]
1.886(.271)
10 [6.954]
1.889(.241)
9 [7.832]
1. 943(.254)
8 [7.637]
1.815(.264)
12 [6.869]
1.946(.262)
7 [7.412]
3.010(.334)
1 [9.022]
2.827(. 325)
2 [8.708]
2.733(.318)
3 [8.591]
2.638(.312)
6 [8.460]
2.711(.287)
4 [9.438]
2.612(.289)
7 [9.025]
2.580(.295)
8 [8.732]
2.684(.301)
5 [8.925]
2.510(.270)
10 [9.286]
2.508(.282)
11 [8.879]
2.501(.294)
12 [8.512]
2.511(.294)
9 [8.550]
3.138(.372)
1 [8.428]
2.654(.341)
2 [7.782]
2.387(.333)
4 [7.161]
2.343(.325)
5 [7.200]
2.403(.304)
3 [7.894]
2.325(.306)
6 [7.600]
2.233(.312)
8 [7.148]
2.262(.316)
7 [7.163]
2.164(.284)
9 [7.605]
2.062(.301)
11 [6.852]
1.988(.310)
12 [6.405]
2.084(.312)
10 [6.676]
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TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Alabama -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
C 1.594(.653)
1 4 [2.441]
C 1.602(.655)
2 2 [2.448]
C 1.406(.638)
9 [2.205]
C 1.598(.660)
3 [2.421]
C 1.635(.639)
1 [2.561]
C 1.499(.627)
6 7 [2.392]
C 1.529(.
6 [2.
634)
410]
C 1.419(.649)
8 8 [2.186]
C 1.586(.565)
9 5 [2.806]
1.146(.565)
4 [2.026]
1.079(.580)
6 [1.860]
.950(.562)
8 [1.690]
.786(.568)
9 [1.385]
1.068(.553)
7 [1.931]
1.179(.557)
3 [2.119]
1.277(.562)
2 [2.274]
1.139(.569)
5 [2.001]
1.371(.529)
1 [2.592]
1.727(.416)
3 [4.148]
1.644(.427)
6 [3.848]
1.614(.422)
9 [3.824]
1.624(.425)
8 [3.826]
1.730(.411)
1 [4.207]
1.686(.417)
5 [4.044]
1.710(.418)
4 [4.088]
1.640(.420)
7 [3.902]
1.727(.403)
2 [4.291]
1. 654(.422)
4 [3.923]
1.573(.426)
7 [3.693]
1.545(. 429)
9 [3.605]
1. 595(. 431)
6 [3.703]
1.564(.415)
8 [3.766]
1.664(.418)
3 [3.978]
1.700(. 421)
2 [4.041]
1.608(.419)
5 [3.833]
1.734(. 412)
1 [4.208]
223
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Mississippi -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
C 1.815(.678)
8 [2.676]
C 1.821(.692)
2 7 [2.632]
C 1.963(.675)
2 [2.908]
C 1.887(.665)
5 [2.837]
C 1.781(.645)
9 [2.763]
C 1.884(.634)
6 6 [2.972]
C 1.933(.659)
3 [2.934]
C 1.892(.655)
8 4 [2.888]
C 1.986(.583)
1 [3.408]
2.239(.595)
9 [3.765]
2.310(.607)
8 [3.808]
2. 360(.594)
7 [3.975]
2.623(.590)
4 [4.447]
2.615(.573)
5 [4.563]
2.778(.560)
2 [4.964]
2.501(.588)
6 [4.252]
2.723(.587)
3 [4.636]
2.911(.549)
1 [5.306]
2.674(.274)
9 [9.763]
2.733(.278)
5 [9.842]
2.734(.272)
4 [10.061]
2.717(.
7 [10.
272)
006]
2.786(.269)
2 [10.358]
2.970(.269)
1 [11.050]
2.703(.271)
8 [9.992]
2.742(.273)
3 [10.057]
2.727(.265)
6 [10.283]
2.542(.337)
8 [7.535]
2.620(.339)
6 [7.727]
2.756(.331)
2 [8.319]
2.591(.334)
7 [7.752]
2.388(.325)
9 [7.352]
2.948(.341)
1 [8.657]
2.709(.332)
5 [8.167]
2.719(.336)
4 [8.101]
2.745(.320)
3 [8.574]
224
TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Arkansas -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
C 2.671(.341)
1 2 [7.832]
C 2.720(.333)
2 1 [8.167]
C 2.612(.348)
3 [7.514]
C 2.576(.337)
6 [7.643]
C5  2.591(.346)
5 [7.480]
C 2.608(.340)
6 4 [7.665]
3.221(.283)
1 [11.400]
3. 099(.284)
4 [10.905]
3.150(.297)
2 [10.622]
3.064(.285)
6 [10.754]
3.105(.294)
3 [10.575]
3.087(.290)
5 [10. 644]
1.882(.332)
1 [5. 673]
1.796(.332)
2 [5.413]
1.730(.341)
6 [5.074]
1.737(.330)
4 [5.267]
1.731(.339)
5 [5.114]
1.769(.334)
3 [5.289]
2.868(.429)
1 [6.692]
2.756(.423)
2 [6.521]
2. 490(. 429)
6 [5.809]
2.632(.413)
3 [6.373]
2.556(.419)
5 [6.095]
2. 609(.406)
4 [6.419]
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Louisiana -- Group I
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
C 1.988(.865)
1 3 [2.297]
C2  2.126(.900)
2 [2.361]
C 2.142(.892)
1 [2.401]
C 1.760(.890)
6 [1.979]
C 1.628(.944)
7 [1.725]
C 1.849(.847)
6 4 [2.182]
C 1.828(.900)
5 [2.031]
2.602(.681)
2 [3.819]
2.780(.708)
1 [3.925]
2.571(.690)
5 [3.727]
2.586(.704)
4 [3.672]
2.449(.743)
7 [3.297]
2.599(.671)
3 [3.873]
2. 492 (.712)
6 [3. 501]
2.901(.632)
4 [4.590]
3. 014(. 646)
2 [4.666]
3.341(.623)
1 [5.363]
2.766(.664)
6 [4.166]
2.945(.696)
3 [4.230]
2.772(.626)
5 [4.432]
2.672(.676)
7 [3.953]
2.890(.671)
6 [4.307]
3.080(.714)
3 [4.312]
3.225(.692)
1 [4.660]
2. 592 (.708)
7 [3. 661]
3.158(.760)
2 [4.157]
3.041(.680)
4 [4.472]
2.993(.713)
5 [4.200]
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TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
Texas -- Group I
Estimated Parameter 1880 1910
C
C 2
C3
Cs3 5
C 6
C 7
C 8
C 9
C 1 0
C 1
-. 160(.830)
5 [-.193]
.249(.846)
2 [.295]
-. 143(.924)
4 [-. 155]
-. 268(.826)
8 [-. 325]
-. 293(.836)
10 [-. 350]
-. 195(.754)
6 [-.259]
-. 0355(1.003)
3 [-.0354]
-. 227(1.166)
7 [-.195]
-. 427(1.102)
11 [-.388]
.467(.571)
1 [.817]
-. 268(.240)
9 [-1.116]
.404(.628)
6 [.643]
1.245(.658)
1 [1.893]
.571(.686)
3 [.833]
.239(.630)
7 [.380]
.180(.641)
9 [.281]
.182(.632)
8 [.288]
.488(.719)
4 [.679]
.444(.786)
5 [.565]
.789(.769)
2 [1.026]
.126(.592)
10 [.212]
.125(.579)
11 [.216]
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Notes to the Group I Regressions
(1) Each column consists of the production function estimates
for the indicated state in the Census year at the head of the column.
The numbers in parentheses just to the right of the parameter estimates
are the standard errors of the estimates; the numbers in square brackets
just below the standard errors are the associated t-statistics for test-
ing the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero. The only exception
to this is that the t-statistic reported along with the estimate of v,
the return to scale, is actually V - 1 divided by its standard error, and
hence is appropriate for testing the hypothesis that v= 1.
(2) R2 is the multiple correlation coefficient. The F statistics
with m and n degrees of freedom directly below the R2 values test the
over-all significance of the regressions.
(3) Obs. = the total number of observations (i.e., the number
of counties in each state for the particular Census year).
(4) u*'u* = the sum of squared residuals when the soil type dummy
variables are included in the regression, and
utu = the sum of squared residuals when the soil type dummy
variables are all replaced by a single constant term in the regression.
u*'u* and u'u will be used subsequently in testing the over-all signi-
ficance of the coefficients of the soil type variables.
(5) The estimates of the coefficients of the soil-type dummy
variables are reported for each state separately from the e.stimates of
the input variables' coefficients, for ease in reading the tables.
The numbers directly beneath the soil type coefficient estimates are
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TABLE IV.1 -- Continued
the ranks by size of the respective coefficients for each state and
each Census year.
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B. Interpretation of the Results of the Group I Regressions
(i) Fit and a priori reasonableness. These estimates of the
production function coefficients show generally an excellent fit, and
estimated coefficients significantly different from zero in most
cases. There are only five instances of estimated input elasticities
outside the zero,-to-one range, and two of these are in the same state
and year. Altogether 114 input elasticities were estimated, so these
a priori unreasonable estimates could easily be due to chance alone.
The t-statistics associated with the estimated input elasticities are
less than 2 in only 21 of the 114 possible cases. The calculated R2
values are greater than .9 in every one of the Group I regressions.
On grounds of fit and conformity to a priori expectations, the pro-
duction model is very successful.
(ii) Exploitation of Labor: Appendix 4 reports the results of
a sampling of the reported values of the output shares received by the
factors of production in Southern agriculture after the Civil War.
Every example of the shares of output received by the factors which
was found during the research was recorded. This sample includes the
systematic report of factor shares contained in the 1880 Census Survey
of Cotton Production. The figures are not strictly comparable with each
other, of course, since uniform definitions of the services rendered by
each factor were not used and the carefulness of the observers varied
greatly. In this sample, out of 56 observations corresponding roughly
to the share of output received for labor services alone, only one lies
outside the range from 1/4 to 1/2. The unweighted average of all
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these observations is .415. The relative unifonnity of these observa-
tions, given the wide variation in their location, point in time,
factor definitions, and reliability, constitutes very strong evidence
that the share received by agricultural laborers was somewhere between
1/4 and 1/2. 1/2 would seem to be the upper limit of the share of out-
put paid for labor alone.
Examination of the Group I regression results reveals that only
3 of the 35 non-negative estimated labor input elasticities are greater
than 1/2. The estimated parameters values vary somewhat from year to
year, without any particular pattern, and the results are even clearer
if the values of these estimates are averaged over the four Census
years for each state. (See following table.) If this is done, it can
be seen that the average output share received by labor if the wage had
been equal to the value of labor' s marginal product would have been less
than 1/2 for every one of the ten states. Only Mississippi and Texas
show labor input elasticities less than 1/4, and both of theirs are
greater than .2. The over-all unweighted average labor input elasti-
city is .309, less than the over-all unweighted average of the direct
observations, which was found to be equal to .415.
These findings, combined with the excellent fit and high signifi-
cance of the coefficients, constitute strong support for the Competition
Hypothesis. The observed sharecrop agreements on division of the pro-
duct are entirely compatible with marginal product factor pricing in
the labor market. If anything, the observed sharecrop shares seem to
be slightly greater than the output shares which would have been received
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TABLE IV.2
Four-Census Mean Values -- Group I Regressions
State
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
a
.345
.273
.412
.371
.297
.355
.229
.307
.290
.210
Over-all unweighted .309
average
V
.44o
.444
.398
.171
.364
.568
.424
.302
.340
.508
.396
.225
.261
.242
.477
.331
.177
.336
.376
.354
.427
.321
1.010
.978
1.052
1.019
.992
1.100
.990
.985
.984
1.145
1.026
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by labor under an institutional arrangement of perfect competition and
straight wage payments. Stiglitz [6] has shown that in a competitive
sharecropping model with uncertainty, deviations from ordinary marginal
product factor pricing can be attributed to different risk preferences
on the part of landlords and tenants, so it is possible that risk con-
siderations led to an actual wage slightly greater than the average value
of the marginal product of labor. In any case, there is no evidence
that workers were paid less than the value of their marginal product
in the aggregate. Even if the discrepancy between the estimated labor
input elasticity and the actual observed labor share remains unexplained,
the fact that the competitive labor share is less than the actual share
only strengthens the argument for rejection of the Exploitation Hypothesis.
It is worth repeating that these conclusions apply only to the
labor market. They say nothing about possible exploitation of the
agricultural workers by monopolistic furnishing merchants, or about the
equity of the distribution of the factors of production among the various
classes. Nevertheless, the lack of imperfection in the labor market
is important, and may have constituted the chief economic benefit of
abolition to the freedmen. Also, marginal product factor pricing is
not quite synonymous with perfect competition. Competition is the
simplest mechanism by which marginal product factor prices are achieved.
But strictly speaking, competition has only been hypothesized to bring
about this equilibrium wage rate within the counties described by the
production functions. There is no guarantee that wage rates were
equalized over more extensive areas, though there is no evidence against
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such an outcome, either. The size of the effective labor markets
remains to be determined.
(iii) Returns to scale. These results can also be used to test
the hypothesis of constant returns to scale. The sum of the estimated
values of the coefficients, minus the expected value of the sum,
divided by the sample standard error of the sum will be distributed
as t with the same degrees of freedom as the t statistics for the
individual coefficients [7]. The Group I tables show these test
statistics for the null hypothesis that v = 1 for each production
function.
It should be recalled that the estimation process did not con-
strain the returns to scale at all--ordinary least squares was simply
applied to the input and output data. Nevertheless, 17 out of 34 cal-
caulted values of v were greater than one, while 17 were less than one.
(The returns to scale parameter v was not calculated if any of the
input elasticities lay outside the zero to one range.) The test
statistic for the null hypothesis that v = 1 is greater than 2 in ab-
solute value in only 5 out of the 34 cases, and is greater than one in
absolute value in only 12 of 34 cases.
Support for the hypothesis of constant returns to scale is also
provided by the 4-Census state averages. Average returns to scale are
greater than one for 5 states, less than one for 5 states. The over-all
unweighted average returns to scale differs from 1 by only 2.6%. In
short, there is no indication that the agricultural production functions
exhibited anything other than constant returns to scale over-all.
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While it is true that constant returns is required for meaningful aggre-
gation, and therefore also for estimation of the production functions
from the county data, the finding that the unconstrained estimates show
constant returns is not vacuous. If the estimated returns to scale had
been substantially different from one, it would show that some sort of
discordance existed between the data and the assumptions required for
aggregation and estimation. The constant returns of the estimated functions
cannot prove the assumption of constant returns required to derive them,
but finding constant returns in the unconstrained estimates does in a
sense vindicate the assumption. The data are not inconsistent with the
assumption of constant returns.
(iv) Soil fertility parameters. The results can be used to deter-
mine whether the Hilgard soil type classifications represented by the S
dummy variables do in fact correspond to soils of different intrinsic
fertilities. Two questions need to be answered: (a) Does inclusion of
the dummy variables significantly decrease the unexplained variance in
each regression compared to regressions including only a single constant?
(b) Do the coefficients of the S. maintain a stable relationship to each
other in successive Census years? In other words, does their over-all
significance (if such is found) follow from fertility differences, or is
it due to some transitory county differences not connected at all to
the composition of the soil?
The first of these two questions can be answered by performing a
series of Chow-type F-tests on the over-all significance of the coefficients
of the dummy variables, as compared to a single constant [8]. Ina general
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model where the S 's are the soil-type dummy variables and X represents
the vector of all the other independent variables, with the relation
between the variables given (except for the disturbance) by
Y=X1 + Sl + S 2 2 + S3 23+ ... + S N 2N (4-25)
Recall that, by definition
N-1
S = 1- Z S. (4-26)N1 i =1
Then
N-1
Y = XP + S P21 + S 22 + ... + (1 - S i)@2N (4-27)
i =1
= 1 + P2N + S1 (@2 1 - 2N) + S2P22 -2N)+ ... +SN-1 2N-1 2N
So let @2N = C. To test the hypothesis that the remaining N-1 coef-
ficients of S, S2'' ''SN-1 are different from zero, compute
F(mn) = (u - u*'u*)/(N-l) (4-28)u*'u*/Z - (k+N-l)
where
k = the number of variables in X plus one, N = number of soil
types, Z = number of observations, m = N-1, n = Z-(k+N-l), u'u is the
sum of squares of the residuals from a regression in which the coefficients
of S,. *'SN-1 are restricted to be zero, and u*'u* is the sum of squares
of residuals from the regression in which these coefficients are not all
restricted to zero. These F values are tabled below.
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TABLE IV.3
F-test on Over-all Significance of Coefficients
of S as Compared to a Single Constant --
Group I Regressions
1880 1890 1900 1910
North
Carolina
max. P-value
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
1.735(3,84)
.25
2.103(4,22)
.25
3.807(7,121)
.001
4.684(3,30)
.01
6.185(11, 75)
.001
2. 203(8,51)
.05
.540(8,60)
.90
2.510(5,62)
.05
1.475(6,45)
.25
1.060(10,206)
.50
1.398(3,86)
.50
3.636(4,24)
.025
1.932(7,119)
.10
1.897(3,35)
.25
6.219(11,75)
.001
11. 857 (8, 49)
.001
6.406(8,61)
.001
1.686(5,63)
.25
1.567(6,46)
.25
5.053(3,86)
. 005
10.662(4,28)
.001
4.563(7,118)
. 001
5.311(3, 32)
.005
3.395(11,75)
.005
2.315(8,49)
.05
6.065(8,61)
.001
1.654(5,63)
.25
3.925(6,46)
.005
4.716(3,82)
.01
24.725(4,29)
.001
19.467(7,128)
.001
2.865(3,34)
.10
9.773(11,74)
.001
5.002(8,49)
.001
10.729(8,63)
.001
6.887(5,61)
.001
2.297(6,45)
.10
1.582(10,218)
.25
State
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Note to the F-test table: The number listed below each F value in the
table is a P-value which is at least as large as the area under the
appropriate F distribution to the right of the tabled F value. The
exact P-values were not given because the F tables used [9] gave only
the "critical" F values for P-values equal to .75, .50, .25, .10, .05,
.025, .01, .005, and .001.
area = true P-value for
P(F) calculated F of
Chow test.
area = max P-value shown
in table
F
.citc , FF as calculated by Chow test
critical" F-value
listed in table
If the proper degrees of freedom were not listed in the table, the
max P-value was again chosen to be at least as large as the true P-value.
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In most cases, the test statistic is significant at the 5% level, but
even more pertinent is the significance of the four F values for each
state taken together. The cumulative area under any continuous probabil-
ity density function is uniformly distributed over the interval 0 to 1
[10]. For each of the F-statistics, the cumulative distribution function
equals 1 - P-value. It can be shown (see Appendix 6) that if ( = the sum
of the P-values for the four test statistics of each state, the probabil-
ity that ( < 1 will be less than .05. Consulting the table, < 1 for
all nine states that have four test statistics. Hence, the results of
the Chow tests show that over the entire period, the soil-type dummy varia-
bles were more significant as a group than a single constant for every
state but Texas.
However, examination of the coefficients of the S. in successive
census years reveals a certain amount of fluctuation in the relative rank-
ings of those coefficients. In order to determine the degree of stability
in the relative rankings, a Friedman two-way analysis of variance by
ranks [11] was performed. This test determines the probability that the
ranks of the C. (for a given state) were drawn from the same population
over the four census years. The null hypothesis is that there was no
stable ranking of coefficients, so that in each census year, the likeli-
hood that a given C. would have a high rank was the same as the probability
that it would have a low rank. Hence the mean rank of each C.
over the four censuses should be the same under the null hypothesis.
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The test statistic is
2 12 k 2X k(k+l) (R - 3N(k+l)
=1
where
k = the number of soil types
N = 4, number of census years--1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910.
R. = sum of ranks for soil type j coefficient over the four
census years.
2
The statistic X is distributed approximately as chi-square with k-l
r
2
degrees of freedom. The values of X2 with appropriate degrees of freedom,
r
and their associated P-valuesare listed below:
State
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Texas
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
Xrdf2
X 2(3) = 3.90
X2 (4) = 12.60
X2 (7) = 22.17
X 2(3) = 9.30
X2 (11) = 39. 92
X 2(8) = 16. 07
X 2(8) = 17. 07
x 2(5) = 11. 43
X 2(8) = 12.64
X 2(10) = 11.82
P-value
between 0.1 and 0.5, .34 by inter-
polation
< .025
< .005
< .05
< .005
< .05
< .05
K .05
K .05
between 0.5 and 0.1, .35 by inter-
polation
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f(X2
.area = P-value
X2
r
These low P-values are sufficient to reject the null hypothesis of
no rank-stability at the .05 level in 8 of the 10 states, and certainly
do not support the null hypothesis in the other two cases. Further-
more, the largest P-value is for Texas, which provided only a pair of
coefficient rankings to base the test upon, rather than the four sets
of rankings in the other states. All in all, the situation here is
similar to that in the case of the F-tests on the over-all significance
of the coefficients; the evidence is sufficient to reject the null
hypothesis in most cases, and is certainly not favorable to the null
hypothesis in the remainder. This preponderance of evidence suggests
that indeed the soil type categories corresponded to soils of different
net fertilities, and that these differences persisted in a stable pattern
over the 40-year period under consideration.
The S. coefficients are always described as measuring the "net
fertility" or the "net residual fertility" of the Hilgard soil types.
This is because the specification of the production function with race-
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and crop-associated productivity differences may result in some soil-
type fertility differences' being measured by the coefficients of the
B/R and H/T variables, not by the S. coefficients. For example, if
cotton were systematically plantedonthe more fertile soils, then
c-d, the coefficient of H/T, would tend to be positive. Thus the dif-
ferent suitability of the Hilgard soil types for the more productive
cotton culture would not necessarily be measured by the S. coefficients.
Similarly, if members of one race were systematically located on better
lands, this would influence the measured difference in race-associated
productivity, b-a, and the soil fertility differences associated with
race might not show up clearly in ranking the estimated coefficients of
the S.. In short, there is a problem of identification in determining
whether productivity differences associated with crop and/or race are due
to soil fertility differences or to other sources. Because of this iden-
tification problem, the relative fertility of cotton soils, for example,
cannot be determined by correlating the percentage of acres in cotton with
soil type coefficient forthe cross-section of counties, since the soil
type coefficients measure fertility net of possible crop-associated fertility
differences.
(v) Crop-associated productivity differences. The estimated coefficient
of H/T, the proportion of improved acres devoted to cotton, provides infor-
mation on the relative output of cotton land compared to other improved
land, ceteris paribus. Referring back to the development of (4.15), the
coefficient of H/T is - (c - d). Since there is no way to know a priori
c0
the value of c0, the starting point for the Taylor series expansion,
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there is no meaningful way to compare the magnitudes of these coefficients
either across states or over time. The parameters c and d include an
unknown amount of "scaling," and there is no constraint forcing the scale
to be the sane across states or over different census years. Hence the
maximum amount of information that can be recovered from the coefficient
is the sign of the difference c - d, and whether or not this difference is
significantly different from zero. Even with these limitations, the re-
sults of the Group I regressions are unambiguous. All 38 estimated co-
efficients of H/T are positive. The t-statistics of these estimates are
greater than 2 in 28 out of 38 cases. Clearly there was a productivity
advantage associated with cotton growing.
These results are contrary to the hypothesis that overproduction of
cotton was a source of poverty and agricultural distress in the South.
Given the pattern of production as it actually was, cotton culture was
responsible for relatively greater value of output than the alternative
crops or livestock products, factor inputs being equal. To sustain the
"overproduction" hypothesis, it would be required for the cotton farm-
ers to have been able to produce even more output had they switched to other
crops. Suppose the cotton productivity advantage were due entirely to cot-
ton's being produced on the better lands. It might have been the case
that the farmers on those lands could have produced a greater value of
output had they diversified. More likely, however, is the notion that
land was good land partly because it was cotton land; that is, because it
could be planted in the valuable staple.
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It is not possible to test directly the association of cotton with
soil fertility because the difference between parameters c and d may
partly reflect a fertility difference, hence the coefficients of the
soil type variables S. measure only net fertility. However, if diversi-
fication would have produced even more value of output than cotton
culture, a positive association between cotton concentration and net
residual fertility would be expected. If cotton were concentrated in
fertile counties, and if farmers had been able to realize more output
from cultivation of the alternative crops and livestock in these counties,
then cotton should appear to have been concentrated in the counties of
greatest net residual fertility. Cultivators of the alternative crops in
the cotton counties should have been generally more productive than culti-
vators of the alternative crops in non-cotton counties.
Instead there appears to be no association between cotton concen-
tration and net residual fertility. The difference between the average
proportion of acres planted to cotton in the counties with greatest net
residual fertility, and the average proportion of acres planted to cotton
in the counties with lowest net residual fertilityis positive in 19 out
of 38 possible cases, and negative in 19 out of 38 cases. (See Appendix
5 for the details of these calculations.) That is, cotton acres were
not concentrated in the counties of greatest net residual fertility as
measured by the S. coefficients. In addition, this difference in mean
proportion of cotton acres between the residually "best" and "rest" of
the counties as measured by the C. is not statistically significant in
any states but North Carolina, Tennessee, and Florida, none of which
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was an important cotton-producing state. The overproduction hypothesis
would seem to require an involved and intricate justification in order
to be brought into accord with the results.
A preferable explanation of the observed productivity advantage is
simply that cotton was well-suited for Southern conditions. The agri-
cultural population may have accumulated special skills in cotton pro-
duction over the years. Even more likely, certain Southern soils and
the climate may have been ideal for cultivation of a crop in great de-
mand. The positive values of the parameter difference c - d are, in this
view, nothing but a reflection of these advantages of cotton reflected in
the amount of dollar output from the agricultural sector.
Clearly such an explanation implies that rational farmers would
have been motivated to concentrate even more heavily in cotton production,
if there were no scarcities, bottlenecks, or other limitations prevent-
ing them from doing so. There is some evidence that such a trend ac-
tually did take place, but was weak and not universal. For example,
over the entire South the proportion of improved acres planted to cotton
increased with each census from 1880 to 1910. Texas was being opened
to settlement during this period, and grew tremendously in improved
acres, but even more in cotton acres. When Texas is excluded the share
of improved acres in cotton increased from 1880 to 1910, but fell in
1900 from its 1890 high. Disaggregating, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama and Texas displayed an over-all increase in proportion
of improved acres in cotton, while Florida, Tennessee, Mississippi,
Arkansas and Louisiana showed a decrease. Out of 30 possible increases
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or decreases in this proportion from one census year to the next, it
increased in 16 instances. Finally, in a subsequent chapter cotton
supply functions are estimated in which the share of acres in cotton
compared to total acres in all crops is the dependent variable. The
supply functions cover the period 1883-1914, and include a pure trend
term. The coefficient of this trend is positive in 7 of the 10 states.
All in all, the evidence for increasing specialization in cotton is
inconclusive. There was surely no overwhelming shift out of other
crops into cotton.
The South's failure to specialize completely is evidence that
the cotton productivity advantage was due to the location in the South
of some factor which could not be increased easily. If the productivity
advantage was due to the existence of good cotton-growing land in the
South, then over time there would be a tendency to increase the pro-
portion of acres devoted to cottonin order to capture the greater re-
turns available in cotton compared to other crops. Counteracting this
tendency would be the fact that the best cotton lands would have been
settled first, given the long-standing brisk demand for cotton and con-
sequent profitability of the staple back even to the pre-war years.
Hence, as the expansion of improved acres went on, a relatively lower
proportion of those lands would be suitable for cotton culture than of
the lands already improved by 1880. The outcome of these two conflict-
ing tendencies is impossible to predict, and probably accounts for the
mixed behavior of the over-all proportion of cotton acres over time
and within each state.
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TABLE IV.4
Statewide Values of H/T
Sign of
4-year Trend in Cotton
1880 1890 1900 1910 Averages Supply Function
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
.138
9
.330
3
.319
4
.259
7
.085
.147
9
.378
2
.349
4
.198
7
.080
.121 .145
10 10 10 10
Alabama .365
2
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
Total
Total without
Texas
359
3
.404 .421 .382
1
.290
6
.316
5
.172
8
1
.311 .236
6
.336
5
.190
8
.244 .257
.264 .282
The number below each state value of H/T is that state
in cotton concentration for the indicated census year.
State
9
359
3
331
5
.147
8
.061
8
.419
1
.397
2
.146
9
.072
.370
2
.138
9
.372
2
.349
4
.188
8
.075
10
. 370
3
. 396
1
. 276
6
.282
5
.270
7
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
1
385
3
.377
4
.267
6
.181
7
.363
5
.301
.278
7
.295
6
.356
4
.280
.257
Note: Is rank
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It should be noted that Texas was really the only "frontier" state
of the 10, and Texas shows the strongest increase in proportion of im-
proved acres planted in cotton. It might be hypothesized that the reason
for this is that Texas still contained virgin lands in 1880, and that
the best cotton country had not all been settled. Thus, as Texas land
was improved towards the end of the 19th century, the farmers responded
to the strong world demand for cotton by increasing their cotton acres
in proportion to other improved uses. This is only a conjecture, how-
ever.
To summarize, cotton displayed a sustained and unmistakable pro-
ductivity advantage in the South over the period 1880-1910. The most
plausible explanation of this is that cotton culture enjoyed a comparative
advantage over the alternative agricultural activities during this period.
Specialization in cotton was not complete,because some factors required
for it (good cotton land most probably) could not be expanded easily.
Cotton was King because it was profitable to the agricultural sector as a
whole. The local furnishing merchants may have preferred cotton to the
alternatives, but only because there was more money in it than in pro-
ducing anything else. In all likelihood, independent farmers would have
also favored concentration in cotton, provided they had access to land
suitable for its cultivation. Again, these results say nothing about the
distribution of the profits from cotton culture among the various indi-
viduals in the agricultural sector. The crop choice decision as an issue
in the exercise of monopoly power by merchants will be taken up later in
Chapter VII.
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(vi) Race-associated productivity differences. In contrast to the
coefficient of H/T, the coefficient of B/R displays no immediate pattern.
In some cases it is positive, in others negative; sometimes the differ-
ence b - a is significant, sometimes not. For reasons analogous to those
given regarding the c - d difference, only the sign and significance of
the difference b - a can be determined in this model, not the absolute
magnitudes of the parameters b and a. The following frequencies summar-
ize the estimates:
b - a 17 21
t > 2 t < -2 It| < 2
b 6 8 24
No clear productivity advantage is associated with either race over the
entire South. Nevertheless, it does appear that b lacks were concentrated
in the most fertile counties. First of all, the proportion of blacks
in the total population is positively correlated with the proportion of
improved acres devoted to cotton in every state and every census year
except for South Carolina in 1890. (See the following table.) Second,
the average proportion of blacks tended to be larger in the counties of
greatest residual fertility (those counties having soil types with
the largest C. coefficients.) The table in Appendix 5 showing the
1
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TABLE IV.5
Simple Correlation Coefficient (R2
Between B/R and H/T
State 1880 1890 1900 1910
North Carolina .683 .624 .562 .597
South Carolina .049 -.0097 .0039 .107
Georgia .633 .551 .548 .548
Florida .665 .481 .393 .107
Tennessee .704 .679 .684 .665
Alab ama .836 .762 .794 .818
Mississippi .720 .762 .709 .684
Arkansas .862 .870 .897 .797
Louisiana .380 .415 .511 .371
Texas .651 .274
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difference in means between B/R in the "best" counties (= p ) and I~/R
in the "rest" of the counties (= pR) reveals the following sign frequencies:
(The indicated t ranges in the second table are for the t statistics
associated with pB - + -
pB - 29 9
t > 2 t < -2 ItI < 2
p - pR 23 2 13
These frequencies indicate that blacks were concentrated in the counties
of greatest residual fertility.
In addition to the pattern of blacks' being located in the cotton
counties and in the counties of greatest residual fertility, there is
an intra-regional pattern in the signs of the b - a coefficients. Blacks
tended to be less productive than whites in the cotton belt, and more
productive than whites in the border or peripheral states. This can be
seen after first constructing an index of a state' s concentration in
cotton.
State
Mississippi
South Carolina
Alabama
Georgia
Four-Census Average Proportion of Improved Acres
in Cotton, by Rank
. 396
.372
. 370
.349
Louisiana .282
Arkansas .276
Texas .270
Florida
North Carolina
Tennessee
.188
.138
.075
These states fall into three rough groups. Mississippi, South
Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia, all east of the Mississippi River,
clearly showed concentration in cotton; Florida, North Carolina, and
Tennessee were "peripheral" both in location and in cotton production.
It is not clear whether Louisiana, Arkansas and Texas belong to one
group or the other, and these are grouped as "intermediate" states.
The frequencies of the signs of b - a for each of these groups of states
are as follows:
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East of Miss. River
Cotton States 3 13 Pr = .0106
Intermediate
States
Eastern
Periphery
6rii
8L4I
Pr = .3770
Pr = .1938
Under the null hypothesis that the sign of b - a is a random variable
with equal probability of being positive or negative, and independent
within states and over time, the probabilities of the observed sign
frequencies or ones more unbalanced are given by the cumulative bi-
nomial distribution. These probabilities are listed to the right of
each frequency table. The low probabilities under the null hypothesis
for the East of the Mississippi Cotton States and Periphery, combined
with the different balance of signs between those two regions, are sug-
gestive of a systematic variation in the sign of b - a according to
region.
A stronger test can be performed if the number of intra-regional
groups are decreased. On purely geographical grounds, Texas is more
a peripheral state than a cotton belt state, and in addition, its
average proportion of improved acres in cotton was the lowest of the
intermediate states. On casual grounds a priori, it seems reasona-
ble to group Louisiana and Arkansas with the rest of the cotton belt
states. If these assignments are made, the sign pattern in a 2 X2
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contingency table is even more striking:
Sign of b - a
Cotton Belt
(South Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi, Ar-
kansas, Louisiana)
Region Periphery
(North Carolina, Florida,
Texas, Tennessee)
A Fisher Exact Probability Test can be used to test the null hypothesis
that there is no systematic association between region and the sign of
b - a [12]. The probability of observing a particular set of frequencies
in a 2 x 2 table, when the marginal totals are regarded as fixed, is
given by the hypergeometric distribution. The Fisher test consists of
calculating the probabilities of the observed frequency distribution
or one more extreme, keeping the marginal totals fixed; that is, of
7 17 6 18 5 19 4 20 3 21
or or or - or
10 4 11 3 12 2 13 1 14 0
7 17
10 4
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This probability is
241. 14! 171 211 24! 14! 17! 211 241 14! 17! 21!
381 7! 171 101. 4! + 381 61 18! ll! 31 + 381 5! 191 121 21
24! 14! 17! 21! 241 141 17! 211
381 4! 201 13! 1! 38! 31 21! 141 01
= .0120 + .0017 + .0001 + .0000 + .0000, to four places
= .0138
This probability value is extremely low, and justifies rejection of the
null hypothesis of no association between the sign of b - a and region,
with as low as 2% probability of a Type I error.
The same test performed for only those values of b - a which have
associated t-statistics greater than 2 yields the same result:
b - a
t > 2 t < -2 Jtl < 2
Cotton Belt
Region
Periphery
3 8 13
4 0 10
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The probability of the significant portion of this table under the
null hypothesis of no association between the sign of b - a and region
is given by
S= ll'. 4. 7. 8. 0256
151. 3! 8! 4! 0 -
which again is very low.
Individually the states conform reasonably well to this pattern.
The estimate of b - a is positive in a majority of the four census years
in North Carolina, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Texas; it is negative in a
majority of the years in South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama,
Mississippi, and Arkansas. Florida is an exception to the regional
pattern, but Florida was not an important cotton state. The other ex-
ception, Louisiana, belonged to the "intermediate" group of states with
proportion of improved acres in cotton in the middle of the range for
the 10 states.
The conclusion seems inescapable. Whites appear to have been more
productive over-all than blacks in the cotton belt, but less productive
over-all than blacks in the peripheral states.
This result, combined with the previous results, suggests a paradox.
Consider the following findings:
(a) Cotton was more productive in value terms than the alternative
agricultural outputs.
(b) Blacks were concentrated on the cotton lands, as well as on
the lands of greatest residual fertility.
(c) Nevertheless, blacks appear less productive than whites in
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the cotton belt, but more productive than whites in the peripheral
states.
How can these findings be reconciled? If blacks were concentrated
on cotton lands, and if cotton lands tended to be more fertile than the
lands devoted to other crops, why does the coefficient b - a not reflect
some of this locational advantage? It must be kept in mind that the
parameters a and b reflect race-associated productivity differences.
If blacks were concentrated on more fertile lands than whites, this ad-
vantage could just as easily appear as a positive b - a value as could a
black productivity advantage based on a difference, in skill. The identi-
fication problem cannot be escaped; the parameters a, b, c, and d measure
only productivity differences, not the source of the productivity
differences.
Similarly, if the black/white differences were due to the "legacy
of slavery" manifested in lower productivity of black workers because
of deprivation in education, entrepreneurship, or initiative, why should
there be a regional pattern to the black/white productivity difference?
Did the "legacy of slavery" weigh heavier on the freedmen in the deep
South than in the border states?
The results are too strong to be ignored, yet these are real problems
of interpretation. In particular, the identification problem cannot be
surmounted with the given specification of the production function. In
order to confront this identification problem explicitly, it is possible
to modify the production function to recognize the systematic association
of race and crop.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER IV
[1] Production functions for Texas in 1890 and 1900 were not estimated
because the census tabulations of the Texas county cross-sections
in those two years were extremely difficult to code in a form suita-
ble for machine processing. Virginia was not included in the sample
of states because by 1880 hardly any cotton was grown there.
[2] For a discussion of these difficulties, see Marc Nerlove, Estimation
and Identification of Cobb-Douglas Production Functions, (Chicago:
Rand McNally & Company, 1965; Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing
Company, 1965), 157-190.
[3] But see Appendix 8 on the essential arbitrariness of this breakdown
of the data into manageable samples.
[4] The assumptions made about the disturbance term allow consistent
estimation of the production function parameters from the input and
output data. If uncertainty were eliminated (set uo = E(uo)), the
"production function" remaining would have the same parameters as (4-1)
but it would contain no random disturbance. (Even the constant terms
would be the same, since E(uo) = 0.) Thus discussion of the distri-
butional properties of the production function omitting the disturb-
ance term corresponds to exploring the properties of the model in the
absence of uncertainty, which is exactly what the objective of the
investigation is.
[5] George B. Thomas, Calculus and Analytic Geometry, Second edition
(Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.,
1951, 1953), 603.
[6] Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Incentives and Risk-Sharing in Sharecropping,"
(mimeographed).
[7] J. Jonston, Econometric Methods (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc., 1963), 131-135.
[8] Franklin M. Fisher, "Tests of Equality Between Sets of Coefficients
in Two Linear Regressions: An Expository Note," Econometrica, Vol. 38,
No. 2 (March, 1970) contains a particularly useful method for carry-
ing out the Chow test. Fisher's development is followed here.
[9] F. James Rohlf and Robert R. Sokal, Statistical Tables (San Francisco:
W.H. Freeman and Company, 1969), Table S: "Critical values of the
F-distribution," 168-167.
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[10] Robert V. Hogg and Allen T. Craig, Introduction to Mathematical
Statistics (Second Edition), (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1965), 178.
[i] Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral
Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956),
166-172.
[12] Ibid., 96-104.
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V. A MODIFICATION OF THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION
The natural generalization of the production function of the pre-
vious chapter is to allow productivity differences between members of
the same race, depending on which crop is grown, as well as fertility
differences for the lands devoted to each crop, depending on the race
of the farmers working them [1]. Such a production function, still of
the generalized Cobb-Douglas typeis
N
og.Q = ( Z A.S. ) +cag.(aW +a W +b B b2B2)+og.(c. H +
i=l 1 22 11 22 11
+ c 2H2 + d1 J+d 2 J 2 ) +yfg. K (5-1)
where
W = white labor devoted to growing cotton
W2 = white labor devoted to growing non-cotton alternative
crops
B = black labor devoted to growing cotton
B2 = black labor devoted to growing non-cotton alternatives
H = cotton acres farmed by whites
H = cotton acres farmed by blacks
J = other improved acres farmed by whites
J2 = other improved acres farmed by blacks
Q = value of output not fed to livestock
S. are the soil type dummy variables, and
K = agricultural capital input.
Next1, write W1 + 2 = W; B1 + 2 = B; H, + H2 = H; J1 +J 2 =
W+B = R and H+ J = T. W, B, H, and J are all observable, i.e., are
reported for each county in the census.
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Unfortunately, W1 , W2, B1 , B2, H1, H2, l and are not observed.
But it probably would not be too far wrong to assume that
W '- (H/T)W (5-2)
that is, the number of whites growing cotton was roughly the total
number of whites times the proportion of total land in cotton, with
a similar relationship holding true for the other unobservable variables.
To preserve generality, however, introduce a new set of "predilection"
parameters k., l., m., and n. such that
H1= -1(-1
W k 1 W ; W2 =k 2  W; B =1 B; B2  1 B (5-3)
H ;m H H2m H; J =n J (5-4)1 hR ' 2 = 2 ~H R J1 nR 2 2 R
These parameters express the "predilection" of whites to grow cotton,
whites to grow alternative crops, blacks to grow cotton, etc. Not
all these new parameters are independent. Since
k -W+k 2 W + 1 - B + 1 - B = R (5-5)1lT 2 T 1lT 2 T
and
m -H+m2 H + n - J + n J = T (5-6)2,R R lR 2 R
it follows that
k - + k J- + 1 + 1 - (5-7)1lRT 2 RT 1lRT 2 RT
WH BH WJ BJ
=m -+m2 
-+n 
-+n n2L1RT 'L-2 RT lE1 T +n2BRT
or
WH (k-n) WJ BH BJ1 - ) + (k 2 -n ) + (1 -m 2 ) +± (1 2 -n 2 )=0 (5-8)
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The only way this expression can be equal to zero whatever the values
of RT, B and H (remembering that these four values will determine W
and J as well) is if k, = m, k2 = n, Y 11= m2 and 12 =n 2 . The pro-
duction function can now be written
N H
Pog Q=( Z A. S. ) +fY (a, k W + a2k 2  W+bl -B+b212 B)i=l 11T
W B W B
+ plog (clm1  H+ c2 m2 B H+d n W J + d2n2 B J) +y1oK (5-9)
Obviously a1 and k1 , a2 and k2--in fact all of the efficiency and
predilection or fertility and predilection parameter pairs--are not
separately distinguishable in this form. It remains useful to write both
of them for convenience in the discussion.
Linearizing this production function in Taylor series around
a0k =a k = a20k20 b10 110 =b 20120 for the labor term and
c0mO = 10lO c202O = dl0nO 2 n2 0 for the land term yields
N
BoQ= S +U oR + o 9T + y4 K
i =1
lkl H W aa2k2 J W ab111 H B ab212 J B
ak T R a0kO T R a0kO T R akO T R
sC1ml W H _ Bc2m2 B H sd 1 n1 W J d2n2 B J
c0m R T c mO RT c m R T cmO R T
Consider only the last two lines of this expression. Collect terms
and eliminate dependencies. The last two lines become
_lkl1 H (R-B)
a0k T R +
c1 ml (R-B) H
+ cm R T+
± a2k 2 sdn 1
a 0 k cOmo
+ -a 0kO 
~ a0kO 0
2k2 (T-H) (R-B) 1 H B 212 (T-H) B
a0k T R + ak T +R a0k T R
PC 2m2 B H Pd1n 1  (T-) pd2n2 B (T-H)
cOmO R T como R T c mO R T
-aa 2k 2 Cb2 12 sd 1n s d2n 2 -B
a [ kO a 0 kO ce m cm R
pclm1  pdln1  H
como c0mo T
-e a k 1 a2k2 ab1 06b212 sclml sc2 m2+ a a a+ Im
aB k 0 aOkO aOk a~ko eO c eo 0m
$d_ n d2n2 1
cOm c0m
B H
R T
So the final form of the equation to be estimated is
N
log Q= C S +
i =1
U log R + @ log T + y log K
(b212
(alk,
- a2k2  + c (n 2 -
- a 2 k2  + cIm (cim, 
-11M
d1n,
d n1)
B
ER
H
T
+ a (a 2 k 2 - alk +bl 1 - b212) +Pc m (c2m2 - c1m +d 1 n - d2n2)] B
The estimates of the parameters of this equation will be referred to as
the Group II results.
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(5-11)
(5-12)
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TABLE V.1
North Carolina -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900
(s.e.)
[t]
T
Coefficient
of B/R
Coefficient
of H/T
Coefficient
(B/R)- (H/T)
v
F(m,n)
obs
u*' u*
.281(.0781)
[3. 601]
.413(.0641)
[6.439]
.291(.0657)
[4.427]
1.109(.212)
[5.227]
2.758(.533)
[5.173]
of
-3. 434(1.089)
[-3.155]
.985(.0444)
[-.388]
.965
252.3(9,83)
93
2.19214
.480(.0922)
[5.209]
.335(.111)
[3.010]
.243(.114)
[2.132]
.779(.253)
[3.084]
1.733(.605)
[2.864]
-3.280(1. 390)
[-2. 360]
1.058(.0581)
[.998]
.924
115.2(9,85)
95
3.51969
.324(.0643)
[5. 038]
.504(.0780)
[6. 467]
.155(.0882)
[1.759]
.361(.179)
[2.019]
.264(.459)
[.576]
.591(1.106)
[.535]
.983(.0378)
[-. 450]
.958
215.1(9,85)
95
1.68395
.347(.0688)
[5.037]
.515(.0730)
[7.053]
.144(.0843)
[1.706]
.531(.190)
[2.791]
1.550(.418)
[3.705]
-.633(.969)
[-.653]
1. 006 (. 0409)
[.147]
.966
254.7(9,81)
91
1.85582
ut u 2.37030
1910
3.82705 1.94015 2.15589
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
South Carolina -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
.224(.153)
[1.465]
.267(.131)
[2. 031]
.359(.101)
[3.2546]
Coefficient
B/R
Coefficient
H/T
of
of
Coefficient of
(B/R)- (H/T)
v
F (m, n)
obs
u*t u*
1. 061(.542)
[1 -956]
2.415(.950)
[2. 541]
-2. 475(1. 588)
[-1. 559]
.850(.0801)
[-1. 873]
.971
69.02(10, 21)
32
.256867
.416(.196)
[2. 1161
.517(.192)
[2. 694]
.148(. 163)
[.909]
-.227(.845)
[ -. 269]
.905(1.400)
[. 647]
.0458(2.422)
[.0189]
1.081(.114)
[.711]
.936
33. 71(10,23)
34
.592387
.203(.139)
[1.466]
.533(.146)
[3.660]
.230(.153)
[1.502]
-.507(.379)
[ -1. 336]
1.140(.714)
[1. 598]
.211(1.121)
[.188]
.966(.0566)
[-. 601]
.965
74.94(10, 27)
38
.239759
-.187(.140)
[-1. 336]
.645(.111)
[5.819]
.448(. 0932)
[4. 804]
.491(.440)
[ -1. 116]
1.746(.665)
[2. 623]
.0984(1.131)
[.0870]
. 978
124. 6 (10, 28)
39
.186573
.597322 .783471
r
R 2
U'u .347336 .923953
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Georgia -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
Coefficient
B/R
Coefficient
H/T
of
of
Coefficient of
(B/R) -(H/T)
v
R2
F(m, n)
obs
u*' u*
.546(.0600)
[9.093]
351(. 0584)
[6.016]
.201(.0481)
[4.172]
.818(.183)
[4. 472]
2.670(.323)
[8.257]
-3. 424(. 588)
[-5. 819]
1.098(.0326)
[3.006]
.969
289. 7(13, 120)
134
2.40091
.440(. 0591)
[7.443]
.407(. 0590)
[6. 897]
.171(. 0496)
[3. 452]
.390(.202)
[1. 933]
1.771(.326)
[5. 434]
-.535(.584)
[-. 917]
1.018(.0319)
[.564]
.970
292. 4(13, 118)
132
2.25981
.433(.0694)
[6.245]
.402 (. 0715)
[5. 626]
.211(. 0721)
[2. 921]
-.0969(.165)
[-. 587]
1.133(.275)
[4.123]
-.532(.491)
[-1. 085]
1. 046(. 0283)
[1.625]
.969
278.7 (13,117)
131
1.65847
.168(.0467)
[3. 604]
. 504:(. 0405)
[12. 463]
. 351(. 0454)
[7. 725]
-.235(.142)
[ -1. 654]
1. 081(.200)
[5. 398]
.483(.357)
[1. 353]
1. 023(. 0209)
[1. 100]
.986
705.6(13,127)
141
1.16542
2.72415 2.42691u Iu 1.96734 2.34433
266
TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Florida -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
Coefficient
B/R
Coefficient
H/T
of
of
Coefficient of
(B/R)- (H/T)
v
R2
F(m, n)
obs
u* U*
.376(.127)
[2. 949]
.335(.117)
[2.870]
.203(.0787)
[2.572]
-.691(.508)
[-1. 359]
1.473(1.030)
[1.430]
1.865(2.261)
[.825]
.914(.0941)
[-.914]
.956
67.95(9,28)
38
1.58713
.521(.160)
[3.253]
.111(.184)
[.604]
.488(.144)
[3.395]
-. 00444(.640)
{-.00694]
.731(1.302)
[.561]
-.913(3.316)
[-.275]
1.120(.0966)
[1.242]
.919
42. 71(9,34)
44
4.36052
.165(.162)
[1. 016]
.0551(.102)
[.541]
755(.119)
[6.368]
-. 898(.439)
[-2. 048]
.809(1.461)
[.554]
3.896(2.974)
[1. 310]
.975(.0920)
[-.272]
.939
52.62(9,31)
41
1.73744
-.346(.231)
[-1. 500]
178(.149)
[1.200]
1.138(.165)
[6. 877]
.561(.701)
[.800]
2.709(1.930)
[1.403]
-3. 900(4.288)
[-. 910]
.917
40.64(9, 33)
43
3.74942
2.18361 4.80509u'Iu 2.27680 4.90785
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Tennessee -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
T
Coefficient
B/R
Coefficient
H/T
of
of
Coefficient of
(B/R)- (H/T)
v
R2
F(m, n)
ob s
u*' u*
.398(.113)
[3. 515]
. 154:(. 125)
[1.228]
.406(. 0954)
[4.261]
.341(.260)
[1. 310]
1.549(. 529)
[2. 928]
-. 469(1.076)
[-. 436]
.958(.0361)
[ -1. 163]
.978
196.7(17, 74)
92
1. 34395
-.0324(.0646)
[-.502]
. 661(. 0860)
[7.694]
.337(.0702)
[4.801]
.284(.205)
[1. 390]
.520(.356)
[1. 460]
-.0869(.790)
[-.110]
.984
264.8(17,74)
92
.792645
.247(.0631)
[3.917]
.511(.0727)
[7.030]
.226(.0704)
[3.216]
-.0695(.212)
[-. 329]
.691(.453)
[1. 525]
-.567(.919)
[-.617]
.984(.0283)
[-. 565]
.980
208.8(17,74)
92
.834327
.238(.0618)
[3.856]
. 471(. 0819)
[5. 745]
.312(. 0754)
[4.138]
.298(.253)
[1. 181]
.565(.453)
[1.249]
-1.077(.977)
[-1.102]
1. 021(. 0305)
[.689]
.980
210.1(17,73)
91
1. 02892
2.32767 1.44126 1.19037 2. 35344u' I
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Alabama -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
Coefficient
B/R
Coefficient
H/T
of
of
Coefficient of
(B/R) -(H/T)
v
R2
F(m,n)
obs
u*' U*
.765(.123)
[6.199]
.306(.101)
[3. 048]
. 0282 (. 0825)
[.342]
.597(.401)
[1. 488]
2.447(.
[4.
509)
807]
-2. 314(1. 049)
[-2.206]
1.099(.0663)
[1. 493]
.976
144. 7 (14,50)
65
.928375
.431(.102)
[4.272]
.537(.0652)
[8. 244]
.161(. 0713)
[2.258]
-. 0229(.309)
[-. 0741]
1.176(.393)
[2. 993]
-.264(.830)
[-. 318]
1.129(.0619)
[2. 084]
. 982
182.6(14,48)
63
.522949
.443(. 0829)
[5.339]
.540(.0592)
[9.121]
.109(. 0839)
[1.295]
-. 302(.209)
[-1. 443]
1.007(.295)
[3. 412]
.0511(.542)
[. 0943]
1. 092(. 0434)
[2.120]
.984
210. 8(14, 48)
63
.250216
.197(.0627)
[3. 142]
.623(.0615)
[10. 124]
.263(.0612)
[4.295]
-.352(.192)
[ -1. 830]
1.284(.340)
[3.778]
-.296(.513)
[-. 577]
1. 083(.0407)
[2. 039]
. 979
157.2(14,48)
63
.208466
1.06562 1.47770uIu .324767 .309178
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Mississippi -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
Cx
T
Coefficient of
B/R
Coefficient of
H/T
Coefficient of
(B/R). (H/T)
v
R2
F (m, n)
obs
u*' u*
.223(.105)
[2.115]
.286(. 0998)
[2. 862]
.530(. 0819)
[6. 480]
.103(.533)
[.193]
2.219(.836)
[2. 654]
-.898(1.232)
[-. 729]
1. 039(. 0713)
[. 547]
.959
98. 78(14, 59)
74
2.87837
.112(.110)
[1.020]
.679(.117)
[5. 824]
.148(.107)
[1.384]
.531(.380)
[1. 399]
.750(.623)
[1.204]
.147(.865)
[.170]
.939(. 0651)
[-. 937]
.960
102. 4(14, 60)
75
2.07385
.356(.0529)
[6.738]
.338(. 0475)
[7.106]
.301(. 0666)
[4.528]
-.156(.195)
[-. 798]
.917(.332)
[2. 759]
0975(.506)
[.193]
.995(. 0288)
[-.174]
.989
368. 6 (14, 60)
75
.355703
.230(.0600)
[3.834]
. 414(. 0605)
[6. 840]
. 350(. 0773)
[4.532]
-. 491(.248)
[-1. 979]
1.220(..370)
[3. 300]
.503(.638)
[.788]
. 994(. 0338)
[-.178]
. 990
422. 0(14,62)
77
.486083
3.10534 3.81516 .616220 1.05682uu 
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Arkansas -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
Coefficient
B/R
Coefficient
H/T
of
of
Coefficient of
(B/R)- (H/T)
v
R2
F(m,n)
obs
u*' u*
.455(.0882)
[5.157]
.286(.0864)
[3.3101
.290(. 0642)
[4.526]
.572(.243)
[2. 355]
2.620(.200)
[13.102]
-2.261(.492)
[-4. 593]
1. 031(. 0324)
[.957]
. 968
169.2(11,61)
73
. 624040
.307(.106)
[2.908]
.312(.0917)
[3.401]
.309(.0665)
[4.649]
.281(.203)
[1.385]
1.410(.175)
[8. 040]
-. 233(.344)
[-. 678]
.928(.0335)
[-2.149]
.970
184.6(11,62)
74
.591193
.273(.104)
[2. 628]
.131(.113)
[1.162]
.644(.104)
[6.176]
-.0161(.249)
[-.0648]
1.264(.198)
[6. 385]
.157(.524)
[-.299]
1.048(.0363)
[1.322]
.964
152.0(11,62)
74
.569125
.239(.103)
[2. 319]
.377(.0891)
[4.237]
.366(.0756)
[4.835]
-.454(.246)
[-1.847]
2. 000(.189)
[10.585]
-.168(.506)
[-. 332]
.982(.0468)
[-.385]
.968
164.3(11,60)
72
.627102
.953464 .672615u'Iu .627412 .926825
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Louisiana -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
Yr
Coefficient
B/R
Coefficient
H/T
of
of
Coefficient of
(B/R)- (H/T)
v
R 2
F(m, n)
obs
u* u*
.300(.160)
[1.8731
.342(.139)
[2.456]
. 403(. 0923)
[4.370]
1.476(.522)
[2. 8281
2.069(.830)
[2. 493]
-2.352(1.096)
[-2.146]
1. 045(. 0935)
[.481]
.924
44. 65(12, 44)
57
3. 46765
.394(.113)
[3.489]
.228(.0829)
[2.744]
.375 (. 0623)
[6. 014]
.752(.384)
[1. 957]
.744(.542)
[1. 372]
-.249(.827)
[-. 301]
.997(.0751)
[-. 0399]
.927
47. 85(12,45)
58
2.16334
.314(.110)
[2.855]
.446(.107)
[4.155]
.185(. 0543)
[3. 413]
-. 260(.344)
[ -. 755]
-. 406(.548)
[-. 740]
1.796(.896)
[2. 003]
.945(.0650)
[-. 846]
.930
50. 03(12,45)
58
1. 60968
2.28250
.210(.109)
[1. 933]
.273(.0928)
[2. 945]
.448(. 0834)
[5. 372]
-. 323(.424)
[-. 762]
.523(.819)
[. 638]
1.388(1.607)
[. 864]
.931(.0727)
[-. 949]
.925
45. 34 (12, 44)
57
1. 74941
4.31804 2.59331 2.29340u' I
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Texas -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1910
13
Tr
Coefficient
B/R
Coefficient
H/T
of
of
Coefficient of
(B/R)- (H/T)
V
R2
F(m,n)
obs
u*' u*
.154(.0764)
[2. 0121
.315(.0685)
[4.593]
.676(. 0949)
[7.118]
.979(1.224)
[.800]
3.133(1.913)
[1.637]
-2.302(4.384)
[-. 525]
1.145(.0831)
[1.745]
.954
267.6(16,205)
222
274.829
.236(.0917)
[2. 575]
.686(.0782)
[8.777]
.200(.106)
[1. 881]
1.859(.929)
[2. 001]
2. 442 (. 410)
[5. 956]
-3. 579(2.121)
[-1. 687]
1.122(. 0605)
[2. 017]
.912
140.6(16,217)
234
71.6597
288.995 75.6390uu 
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
North Carolina -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
C (s.e.)
rank [t]
C 2
C
C 4
1.945(.389)
4 [4.997]
2.083(.418)
3 [4.987]
2.141(.425)
2 [5.034]
2.182(.409)
1 [5.337]
1.532(.523)
4 [2.931]
1.622(.565)
3 [2.871]
1.721(.567)
2 [3.036]
1.823(.547)
1 [3.334]
2.654(.352)
4 [7.538]
2.841(.380)
1 [7.485]
2.718(.380)
3 [7.150]
2.750(.366)
2 [7.505]
2.767(.383)
2 [7.225]
2.876(.412)
1 [6.981]
2.697(.408)
3 [6.605]
2.581(.388)
4 [6.659]
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
South Carolina -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
3.455(.742)
5 [4.655]
3.508(.731)
3 [4.799]
3.649(.786)
1 [4.640]
3.465(.751)
4 [4.612]
3.582(.783)
2 [4.572]
1. 730(1. 066)
4 [1.623]
2.210(.983)
1 [2.248]
1.935(1.125)
2 [1.720]
1.684(1.080)
5 [1.560]
1.741(1.132)
3 [1.538]
3.020(.555)
3 [5.438]
3.286(.562)
1 [5.848]
3.109(.572)
2 [5.431]
2.870(.561)
4 [5.113]
2.778(.563)
5 [4.932]
3.308(.533)
2 [6.211]
3.474(.563)
1 [6.173]
3.267(.530)
3 [6.168]
3.147(.528)
4 [5.959]
2.917(.529)
5 [5.518]
C 1
C 2
C3
C4
C5
5
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Georgia -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
C
C 2
C 3
C 4
C 5
C 6
C 7
C8
1.411(.314)
4 [4.487]
1.446(.298)
2 [4.858]
1.385(.313)
6 [4.424]
1.406(.311)
5 [4.527]
1. 074(.329)
8 [3.260]
1.374(.304)
7 [4.513]
1. 450(.290)
1 [5.000]
1.427(.280)
3 [5.088]
2.101(.316)
6 [6.657]
2.041(.304)
8 [6.714]
2.132(.318)
4 [6.696]
2.119(.315)
5 [6.726]
2.147(.335)
3 [6.411]
2.100(. 312)
7 [6.734]
2.242(.300)
1 [7.470]
2.149(.289)
2 [7.426]
2.1242 (.289)
7 [7.344]
2.1239 (.278)
8 [7.646]
2. 130(.288)
6 [7.404]
2.241(.296)
3 [7.571]
2.173(.316)
5 [6.877]
2.212(.296)
4 [7.480]
2.281(.284)
2 [8.040]
2.296(.265)
1 [8.675]
2.162(.225)
7 [9.620]
2.153(.212)
8 [10.162]
2.273(.222)
6 [10.241]
2.375(.226)
5 [10.505]
2.379(.241)
4 [9.877]
2.439(.227)
2 [10. 751]
2.521(.221)
1 [10.402]
2.402(.211)
3 [11.362]
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Florida -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900
3.166(.843)
4 [3.757]
3.185(.767)
3 [4.151]
3.431(.810)
2 [4.236]
3.707 (.712)
1 [5.210]
1.742(.951)
2 [1.831]
1.502(.860)
4 [1.746]
1. 714(. 902)
3 [1.899]
2.030(.761)
1 [2.668]
2.501(.852)
4 [2.936]
2.737(.823)
3 [3.324]
2.814(.823)
2 [3.422]
3.129(.743)
1 [4.213]
1.378(1.267)
4 [1.088]
1.727(1.212)
2 [1.425]
1.483(1.183)
3 [1.253]
2.115(1.111)
1 [1.904]
1910
Cl
C
2
C
3
C 4
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Tennessee -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
C
C 2
C 3
C 4
C 5
C 6
C 7
C 8
C 9
C 1 0
C 11
C1 2
3.573(.389)
1 [9.173]
3.084(.382)
2 [8.074]
3. 028(. 392)
4 [7.727]
2.957(.395)
5 [7.491]
3.063(.360)
3 [8.499]
2.957(.366)
6 [8.079]
2.753(.381)
9 [7.235]
2.918(.387)
7 [7.542]
2.662(.345)
12 [7.708]
2.760(.368)
8 [7.502]
2.744(.383)
10 [7.172]
2.718(.377)
11 [7.216]
2.332(.287)
1 [8.140]
2.152 (.280)
3 [7.682]
2. 024(.280)
5 [7.219]
2. 070(.275)
4 [7.522]
2.164(.259)
2 [8.344]
2.022(.259)
6 [7.807]
1.878(.269)
11 [6.986]
1. 888(.274)
10 [6.902]
1. 893(.246)
9 [7.706]
1.947(.258)
8 [7.538]
1.819(.268)
12 [6.788]
1.949(.266)
7 [7.316]
3.002(.335)
1 [8.952]
2.856(.329)
2 [8.669]
2.766(.324)
3 [8.541]
2.651(.314)
6 [8.447]
2.739(.292)
4 [9.381]
2.642(.295)
7 [8.967]
2.616(.302)
8 [8.650]
2.709(.305)
5 [8.890]
2.546(.278)
10 [9.172]
2.542(.289)
11 [8.794]
2.536(.300)
12 [8.442]
2.548(.301]
9 [8.471]
3.170(.373)
1 [8.500]
2.700(.343)
2 [7.870]
2.439(.336)
4 [7.255]
2.362(.325)
6 [7.258]
2.449(.307)
3 [7.982]
2.372(.308)
5 [7.690]
2.298(.318)
8 [7.238]
2.301(.317)
7 [7.251]
2.234(.291)
9 [7.672]
2.125(.306)
11 [6.947]
2.050(.315)
12 [6.508]
2.152(.318)
10 [6.773]
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Alabama -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
C
C 2
C 3
C 4
C
C 6
C 7
C 8
C 9
1.665(.630)
2 [2.641]
1.638(.631)
4 [2.594]
1.533(.617)
9 [2.483]
1.641(.637)
3 [2.578]
1.721(.617)
1 [2.790]
1.540(.604)
8 [2.549]
1.585(.612)
7 [2.589]
1.608(.632)
5 [2.545]
1. 601(.545)
6 [2.937]
1.139(.571)
5 [1.994]
1.073(.586)
6 [1.832]
.949(.568)
8 [1.672]
.779(.573)
9 [1.360]
1.062(.558)
7 [1.902]
1.171(.562)
3 [2.084]
1.269(.567)
2 [2.236]
1.144(.575)
4 [1.991]
1.361(.534)
1 [2.547]
1.734(.428)
3 [4.054]
1.652(.439)
6 [3.765]
1.621(.432)
9 [3.754]
1.632(.436)
8 [3.744]
1.737(.422)
1 [4.119]
1.693(.429)
5 [3.950]
1.718(.431)
4 [3.989]
1.644(.427)
7 [3.849]
1.735(.414)
2 [4.188]
1.664(.425)
4 [3.917]
1.583(.429)
7 [3.688]
1.562(.433)
9 [3.611]
1.610(.434)
6 [3.705]
1.574(.418)
8 [3.762]
1.668(.421)
3 [3.960]
1. 709(.424)
2 [4.031]
1. 630(. 424)
5 [3.844]
1.733(.415)
1 [4.176]
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Mississippi -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
1.626(.729)
8 [2.231]
1. 632 (.742)
7 [2.200]
1.764(.730)
2 [2.415]
1.701(.715)
5 [2.380]
1.590(.698)
9 [2.276]
1.723(.674)
4 [2.557]
1.733(.716)
3 [2.421]
1.696(.711)
6 [2.385]
1.857(.611)
1 [3.038]
2.266(.620)
9 [3.653]
2.336(.630)
8 [3.707]
2.389(.622)
7 [3.842]
2.650(.616)
4 [4.306]
2.641(.598)
5 [4.415]
2.800(.579)
2 [4.836]
2.531(.618)
6 [4.095]
2.753(.617)
3 [4.459]
2.936(.573)
1 [5.128]
2.678(.277)
9 [9.677]
2.7380(.281)
5 [9.744]
2.7382(.275)
4 [9.964]
2.720(.274)
7 [9.920]
2.789(.272)
2 [10.269]
2.972(.271)
1 [10.964]
2.707(.274)
8 [9.894]
2.747(.276)
3 [9.957]
2. 730(.268)
6 [10.198]
2.555(.339)
8 [7.542]
2.627(.340)
6 [7.722]
2.769(.333)
2 [8.323]
2.602(.336)
7 [7.754]
2. 418(. 328)
9 [7.371]
2. 934(.342)
1 [8.577]
2.726(.333)
5 [8.177]
2.739(.338)
4 [8.113]
2.769(.323)
3 [8.585]
C 2
C3
0
Cs
C 77
C 9
08
09
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Arkansas -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
2.224(.312)
1 [7.129]
2.178(.313)
2 [6.968]
1.961(.334)
6 [5.878]
1.981(.320)
5 [6.186]
2. 034(.324)
4 [6.269]
2.125(.314)
3 [6.771]
3.174(.292)
1 [10.869]
3.044(.297)
4 [10.252]
3.078(.316)
2 [9.734]
2.998(.303)
6 [9.911]
3.049(.306)
3 [9.948]
3.038(.300)
5 [10.132]
1.858(.344)
1 [5.404]
1.767(.348)
2 [5.071]
1.691(.368)
6 [4.592]
1.703(.351)
4 [4.854]
1.702(.355)
5 [4.799]
1.744(.347)
3 [5.030]
2.849(.436)
1 [6.537]
2.735(.430)
2 [6.356]
2.457(.443)
6 [5.551]
2.601(.427)
3 [6.096]
2.533(.428)
5 [5.922]
2.591(.413)
4 [6.278]
C
C 2
C3
C4
Cs
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Louisiana -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1890 1900 1910
1.434(.872)
3 [1.644]
1.551(.907)
2 [1.711]
1.682(.885)
1 [1.902]
1.176(.898)
6 [1.310]
C
C 2
C 3
C 4
C
C 6
C 7
939)
191]
1.263(.860)
4 [1.469]
1.230(.909)
5 [1.353]
2. 500(. 765)
2 [3.267]
2.670(.803)
1 [3.327]
2.475(.765)
5 [3.235]
2.478(.797)
4 [3.110]
2. 345(. 826)
7 [2.838]
2.495(.761)
3 [3.279]
2.379(.812)
6 [2.931]
3.430(.667)
4 [5.144]
3. 605(.692)
2 [5.211]
3.859(.657)
1 [5.877]
3.302(.697)
6 [4.740]
3.499(.729)
3 [4.799]
3.319(.665)
5 [4.994]
3.283(.722)
7 [4.545]
3. 068(.704)
6 [4.359]
3.296(.759)
3 [4.344]
3.399(.722)
1 [4.704]
2.799(.749)
7 [3.735]
3. 354(. 795)
2 [4.219]
3.245(.722)
4 [4.496]
3.210(.757)
5 [4.238]
1.118(.
7 [1.
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Texas -- Group II
Estimated
Parameter 1880 1910
C
C 2
C 3
C 4
C 5
C 6
C 7
C 8
C 9
C 1 0
C 1 1
-.196(.834)
6 [-.235]
.198(.853)
2 [.232]
-. 184(.929)
5 [-.199]
-.314(.832)
8 [-..3781
-. 336(.841)
9 [-.3991
-.184(.756)
4 [-.243]
-. 0882(1.010)
3 [-.0874]
-.339(1.187)
10 [-.285]
-.373(1.109)
11 [-. 336]
.497(.575)
1 [.865]
-.272(.241)
7 [-1.127]
.370(.626)
4 [.591]
1.019(.669)
1 [1.524]
.348(.695)
5 [.501]
.154(.629)
8 [.245]
.150(.638)
9 [.234]
.129(.631)
10 [.205]
.448(.716)
3 [.625]
.160(.800)
7 [.200]
.849(.767)
2 [1.107]
.128(.590)
11 [.216]
.165(.577)
6 [.286]
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TABLE V.1 -- Continued
Notes to the Group II Regressions
1. All definitions of the tabled entries are the same as for
the Group I results, except for the coefficients of B/R, H/T and
(B/R)(H/T), which are different because of the change in specification.
2. The three tables following the main regression results are
analogous to the corresponding tables of the previous chapter. The
four-census averages of the estimated input elasticities were computed
omitting from the average any values from a year in which one of the
three input elasticities was outside the zero-to-one range. The max
P-values just below the F statistics on the test of over-all signi-
ficance of the C. compared to a single constant are maximum values for
the area under the appropriate F distribution to the right of the cal-
culated F value. The approximate P-values of the X2 test statistics
for the Friedman Two-Way Analysis of Variance by Ranks were calculated
by interpolation.
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The first thing to observe about these results is that the con-
clusions based on the Group I results regarding fit and reasonableness,
exploitation of labor, returns to scale, and the over-all significance
of the soil ty-pe coefficients are substantially unchanged. There are
only four estimated land, labor and capital elasticities outside the
zero-to-one range. The four-census averages of these elasticities are
given in the following table, and none of these average values is
greater than 1/2. Only Alabama's average labor elasticity is greater
than .4. For the entire South, the over-all average labor elasticity
is .319, compared with .309 for the Group I results. The averages of
the estimates of P and y are not very different, either. The production
functions display constant returns to scale, with 19 of 35 estimated
returns to scale parameters greater than one, 16 less than one. The
t-statistic for testing the hypothesis that v = 1 is larger than 2 in
absolute value in only 6 cases. Again, the soil type duamary variables'
coefficients are usually significant as a group compared to a single
constant term, and the four F values taken together are significant at
the 5% level for every state but Texas. The values of the test statistic
for the Friedman Two-Way Analysis of Variance by Ranks also show that
the Hilgard categories still represent stable levels of residual fer-
tility in this specification.
TABLE V.2
Four-Census Mean Values -- Group II Regressions
State a_
North Carolina .358 .442 .208
South Carolina .281 .439 .246
Georgia .397 .416 .234
Florida .354 .167 .482
Tennessee .294 .379 .315
Alabama .459 .501 .140
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
.230
.319
.305
.195
Over-all unweighted .319
average
.429
.277
.322
.500
.387
.332
.402
.353
.438
.315
285
1.008
.966
1.047
1.003
.988
1.100
.991
.998
.980
1.133
1.021
286
TABLE V.3
F-test on
of S as Compared
State
North Carolina F(m,n)
Max P-value
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
Over-all Significance of Coefficients
to a Single Constant -- Group II Regressions
1880 1890
3.134(3,83)
. 05
1.849(4,21)
.25
2.308(7,120)
.05
4.201(3,29)
. 025
4.924(11,74)
.001
.924(8,50)
.51 *
.582(8,59)
.90
6.440(5,61)
.001
1.798(6,44)
.25
2.474(3,85)
.10
3.218(4,23)
.05
1.246(7,118)
.50
1.423(3,34)
.50
5.505(11,74)
.001
10. 954(8, 48)
.001
6.297(8,60)
. 001
1.708(5,62)
.25
1.491(6,45)
.25
1900
4.311(3,85)
.01
10.067(4,27)
.001
3.113(7,117)
.01
2.654(3,31)
.10
2.871(11,74)
.005
1.788(8, 48)
.25
5.493(8,60)
. 001
1.270(5,62)
.50
3.135(6,45)
.025
1.057(10,205)
.50
1910
4.366(3,81)
.01
22.395(4,28)
.001
18. 353(7,127)
.001
3.097(3,33)
.05
8.543(11,73)
.001
2.899(8,48)
.025
9.100(8,62)
.001
5.735(5,60)
.001
2.280(6,44)
.10
1.205(10,217)
.50
*by interpolation
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Test statistic for Friedman Two-Way Analysis of Variance by Ranks,
Group II Regressions:
State
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
X (d.f.)
2
X ( 3) = 3. 60
X2 (4 ) = 9. 00
X 2(7) = 15.58
X2 (3) = 8. 40
X 2(11) = 39.77
X 2(8) = 14.73
X 2(8) = 17.87
X 2(5) = 12.71
X 2(6) = 12.64
X2 (10) = 9.45
Approximate P-value
(by interpolation)
. 32
. 06
. 03
. 04
<.01
.07
. 02
.03
.05
. 49
It is interesting to note that the max P-values calculated for the
F-test on the over-all significance of the S coefficients are generally
larger in the Group II regressions than in the Group I regressions.
This is a reflection of the fact that the C. represent residual fertility
differences, after race and crop-specific differences have been accounted
for. Since the modified specification of the production function con-
tains an "interaction" term (B/R)- (H/T), the residual soil differences
left to be measured by the coefficients of the S. will be relatively less
important than in the Group I specification. As before, the Hilgard
variables seem to have little meaning in the case of Texas.
288
At first glance, the inclusion of the interaction term (B/R)- (H/T)
does not seem to accomplish very much. Only two of the t-statistics
associated with its coefficient are greater than two in absolute value
after 1880, and there does not appear to be any particular pattern in
the sign of its coefficient. However, while each of these estimated co-
efficients may not be significant alone, all of them taken together do
follow a pattern. To see why this is true, it is necessary to explore
in more detail the terms making up each coefficient. It will be shown
that the important sign is not the sign of the coefficient of (B/R)- (H/T)
itself, but the signs of various combinations of the coefficients of all
three ratio terms.
For convenience in the subsequent discussion, write the coefficients
of B/R, H/T, and (B/R)- (H/T) as
aO1 (b212 - a2 k2  + cm (dn 2 - dln1 ) = x (5-13)
a (a k - ak2  + cm (clm 1 - d n ) = y (5-14)
a0 k0 00 Om
a (a 2k2 - alk, + bl 1 -b212  + cPO (c2m2 ~ clm1 +dn 1 - d2 n2  z
a0 k0 2212 00n im
(5-15)
Then
X +Z a (b 1 1 - alk1 ) + c m (c2m2 - cym1 ) (5-16)
y+z = aO (b 1 - b2 12 ) + (c2m2 -d2 n2) (5-17)
Substituting the predilection parameter identities derived from (5-8)
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allows (5-13), (5-14), (5-16) and (5-17) to be rewritten as
x = aOU (b212 - a2k2  + 0 212 - d.k2) (5-18)
a0 k0 00 d' d1
y = aO (ak 1 - a2k2 ) + c (c k  - d1k2) (5-19)
x + = aO1 (b 1 - a k1 ) + c (c2 1 - c k) (5-20)
y+z = (b 1 - b212  + c m (c211 - d212 ) (5-21)
a0 k0 00 Om
As with the Group I results, the unknown Taylor series expansion
point prevents any information's being recovered from these expressions
but their signs and statistical significance as compared to zero. But
the signs of (5-18)-(5-21) are more difficult to interpret than in the
Group I case. Consider (5-18)-(5-21) one at a time.
It is possible for x to be greater than zero if b2 > a2, d2 > d1,
12 > k 2, or some combination of the above inequalities. In words, x > 0
if black non-cotton growers are more productive than white non-cotton
growers, if the non-cotton lands farmed by blacks are more productive
than the non-cotton-lands farmed by whites, or if blacks have a greater
predilection for non-cotton farming than whites. Thus, even this speci-
fication does not avoid the fundamental identification problem:
there is no way to distinguish between the efficiency of farmers and
the fertility of the land they work, from knowledge of total productivity
alone. There is no way to determine from the sign of x whether a positive
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value is due to the greater efficiency of black non-cotton farmers
over white non-cotton farmers, or whether the blacks worked on more
fertile lands. Either b2 > a2 or d2 > d1 (or both) leadsto x > 0.
However, there are strong grounds a priori for believing that blacks
had a predilection for cotton farming and not for the alternative types
of farming. Recalling the definitions of the parameters,
B2  T 
B2
1 ---- W
2 _ B J _ 2 (5-22)
k W
2 _2. T B3
W J W
That is, 12 > k2 if the ratio of black non-cotton farmers to white non-
cotton farmers was greater than the ratio of blacks to whites in the
population as a whole, or alternatively if the proportion of blacks who
farmed crops other than cotton was greater than the proportion of whites
who farmed crops other than cotton. Strictly speaking, these farmers may
have grown both cotton and alternative crops, in which case the inter-
pretation of 12 > k would be that the proportion of black labor time
devoted to non-cotton crops was greater than the corresponding proportion
of white labor time. However, all indications point to blacks'being more
heavily committed to cotton culture. The previous chapter showed that
there was a positive correlation between the proportion of blacks in a
county's population and the proportion of its improved acres in cotton
in every state and every census year but South Carolina in 1890. Also,
the testimony of contemporary observers indicated blacks' predilection
for cotton. In the most extreme version of this view, blacks could grow
nothing else:
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This farmer [whose testimony was just referred to], it should be
noted, had no complaint to make about the efficiency of the labor
employed, and others agree with him in considering the negro a
satisfactory cotton laborer.... [But as for]... .diversified or
intensive farming.... the general opinion seems to be that the
negro laborer is not suitable....
[Some say] that the negro can raise cotton and nothing else;
that he can not be trusted to care for stock; that he is unable
to use farm machinery (as has been noted); that he will not give
the care and attention necessary for diversified and intensive
farming. It is said that any negro renter will not even cultivate
his own garden patch to any great result in providing supplies for
his family [2].
Of course, in light of the findings of Chapter II, such testimony can
hardly be considered conclusive. Nevertheless, it does confirm the ex-
pectation a priori, supported by the concentration of blacks in the cotton
counties, of a black predilection for cotton.
This is important for interpreting the results. Blacks' predilection
for cotton (k2 > 12) would tend to make x < 0, thus working against those
tendencies in productivity or fertility (b2 > a 2 and d2 > dl) tending to
make x > 0. If the estimates of the production functions show a pre-
ponderance of values of x > 0 (and it will be seen that they do), then the
blacks' predilection for cotton strengthens the conclusion that black
non-cotton farmers were more productive than white non-cotton farmers.
Similarly, in three of four interpretations of the signs of expressions
(5-18)-(5-21), blacks' predilection for cotton strengthens the conclusions
based on the simple sign pattern of the estimates.
Similarly, y > 0 if a, > a2, cl > d1 , k1 > k2, or some combination
of these inequalities. Recalling the definition of the predilection param-
eters,
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k T W1 W H H2 (5-23)
2 2 T -
W J
so that k > k2 if the ratio of white labor time devoted to cotton over
white labor time devoted to alternative crops was greater than the ratio
of cotton land to non-cotton land over-all. That is, y > 0 if white cot-
ton farmers were more efficient than white non-cotton farmers, if the
cotton lands farmed by whites were more fertile than the non-cotton lands
farmed by whites, or if whites had a predilection for cotton.
x+z < 0 if a 1 > b, c1 > c12 k1 > l or some combination of the in-
equalities. In words, x+z < 0 if white cotton farmers were more skill-
ful than black cotton farmers, if the cotton lands farmed by whites were
more fertile than the cotton lands farmed by blacks, or if whites had a
predilection for cotton as compared to blacks.
Finally, y + z > 0 if b1 > b d2' 11 1 or some combination
of the inequalities. That is,y+z > 0 if blacks were more productive
in cotton than in alternative crops and livestock, cotton land worked by
blacks was more fertile than other land worked by blacks, or if blacks
had a predilection for cotton. It will be seen momentarily that this is
the only case of blackst predilection for cotton inclining the sign of
one of the expressions in the direction actually observed.
Now consider the actual pattern of sign frequencies for the ex-
pressions (5-18)-(5-21). The table below summarizes these frequencies,
as well as showing the probability of the given sign frequency or one more
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TABLE V.4
Coefficient Sign Pattern -- Group II Regressions
x y
x +z
y +z
1880
+ +
1890
+ +
1900
- +
+
+
1910
- +
+
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
+ + - + - + - +
+- + +- + - +
+ + + + - + + +
+- + +
+- + -I+ +
+ + + + - + - +
+ + + + - + - +
+- + +- -- +
++ + +
State
North
Carolina
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extreme under the null hypothesis that the distribution of signs is
random, with plus and minus equally likely [3].
x 18 20 Pr(Total - I s > 20 Ho Pr(Z > .324)~.373
y 37 Pr(Total+' s > 37 Ho)~Pr(Z > 5.840)~0.000
x+y 11 27 Pr (Total -s > 271Ho) ~~Pr(Z > 2.596) .005
y+z 29 9 Pr(Total + Is > 29 Ho)~Pr(Z > 3.244)~.0006
Clearly the null hypothesis can be rejected in the last three cases,
and cannot be rejected in the first case. (Note that if a two-tail
test has been performed in the first case, the probability value would
be doubled: .746. A two-tailed test would not make any difference in
the other cases. ) Write WC for white cotton farming, BC for black cotton
farming, WN for white non-cotton farming, and BN for black non-cotton
farming. Let the relation stand for "is more productive than,"Q
for "is roughly as productive as," and for "is at least as productive
as. " Then for the South as a whole over the entire period, these sign
frequencies lead to the conclusion that
WC BE Q BN WN (5-24)
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Also, the predilection of blacks for cotton reinforces the strength of
this relation in every case but that of BC BN. Nevertheless, the
preponderance of positive values of y+z strongly suggests the indicated
direction of the relation. It might be safest to say that BC BN,
however. It should be noted that in all cases of comparisons across
race, the blacks' predilection for cotton tends to reverse the direction
of the relation.
This is a striking relationship, with white farmers occupying both
the top and the bottom of the agricultural productivity ladder. But
before discussing it in more detail, it should be observed that basically
the same relation between the productivities of the different groups of
farmers holds when the sub-regions of the South are considered separately:
x
y
South Carolina + Georgia + Alabama + Mississippi
+ Arkansas + Louisiana ("Cotton Belt")
10 14
23 1
x+z 7 17
y+z 21 3
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North Carolina+ Florida+ Tennessee +Texas (Periphery + Texas)
x
y
x+z
y+z
8 16
14 0
4 10
8 6
The x coefficient displays a majority of positive signs in one case, a
majority of negative signs in the other; but in both cases the majori-
ties are slim. The other three expressions show the same sign majori-
ties as for the South as a whole, even though the majority of positive
signs of y +z is slim for the peripheral states. The probabilities of
these sign frequencies or frequencies more extreme are not as small as
for the South as a whole, which is to be expected for the smaller
samples. Of greater importance than the exact binomial probabilities
is the correspondence of the majorities to those for the entire region.
To summarize these results:
WC Q BC Q BN (9WN for the South as a whole, (5-24)
1880-1910
WC (3 BC 0 BN (9WN for the Cotton Belt (5-25)
WC 0 BC (DBN (D WN for the Periphery (5-26)
although the relations (5-25) and (5-26) are not as firmly established
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as (5-24) because they are based on smaller samples of coefficients.
It is also interesting that the same pattern of sign majorities holds
in the case of y, x +z and y+z for the three sub-regions consisting
of South Carolina + Georgia + Alabama +Mississippi, Arkansas + Louisiana +
Texas, and North Carolina+Florida+ Tennessee. For x one group has a
majority of positive signs, one group a majority of negative signs, and
one group an equal number of positive and negative signs. Again, the
small sample sizes make exact probability calculations less valuable than
for the South over-all.
South Carolina + Georgia + Alabama + Mississippi (Cotton states east of
the Mississippi River)
x
x+z
y+z
6 10
16 0
3 13
14 2
Arkansas + Louisiana + Texas (The "intermediate" states)
x
y
x+z
y+z
6 4
9 1
4 6
8 2
North Carolina + Florida +
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Tennessee (The eastern "Periphery" states)
x 6 6
y
x+z
y+z
120
48
7 5
Another interesting way of looking at these results is to examine
the sign frequency pattern over time. Dividing the period into two sub-
periods, 1880-1890 and 1900-1910, the sign frequency patterns are
1880-1890
15 4
19 0
5 14
13-6
1900-1910
x
y
x+z
y+z
3 j 16
181
6 13
16 3
x
y
x+z
y+z
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These frequencies seem to indicate that the relative positions of
white and black non-cotton farmers reversed themselves over the period--
while all the other relationships remained the same, and were the same
as for the South as a whole. The relations could be written:
WC (> BC BN( WN 1880-1910, the entire period (5-27)
WC BC BN3 WN 1880-1890 (5-28)
WC BC BN WN, and WC ( WN 1900-1910 (5-29)
The white non-cotton farmers' position improved in the latter sub-
period. White cotton growers remained more productive than white non-
cotton growers (y > 0) in both sub-periods, and therefore there is no
way of assessing the relative productivities of white non-cotton and
black cotton farmers in the 1900-1910 sub-period. Again, because of
the small size of the samples for the sub-periods, the productivity
rankings (5-28) and (5-29) cannot be considered as firmly established as
the over-all aggregate productivity rankings for the South as a whole.
These are the main empirical findings of the production function
estimations. However, in order to place these results in the context
of the hypotheses under investigation, it is necessary first to suggest
a plausible sequence of actual historical events which accounts for the
observed productivity differences. This will be the task of the next
chapter.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER V
[1] This modification, key to the subsequent results, was originally
suggested by Franklin Fisher.
[2] U.S. Industrial Commission, Reports of the Industrial Commission,
Vol XV: Reports of the Industrial Commission on Immigration and
on Education (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901), 533.
See also Chapter II above, 108-125 passim, particularly the testi-
mony before the Industrial Commission (Note 192), "A Georgia Plan-
tation"(Note 201), and Southern Cultivator (Note 209).
[3] The normal approximation to the binomial is used,,and Z = a standard
normal variable with mean 0 and variance 1. See Robert V. Hogg and
Allen T. Craig, Introduction to Mathematical Statistics, Second
edition (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), 199.
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VI. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS:
THE LAND OCCUPANCY AND OWNERSHIP HYPOTHESIS
The results of the Group II estimates suggest a hypothesis which
is consistent with all the statistical evidence presented so far, and
which resolves the apparent paradoxes of the Group I results as well.
This explanation rests on the following three conjectures:
(i) Before the Civil War, the large plantations occupied most of the
best cotton land. The big slaveholders were able to capture this land
because their ownership of slaves conferred on them a profit advantage
derived from the exploitation of their slave labor. Some small white
yeoman farmers and a certain number of whites with few slaves also owned
fertile cotton lands, however. The worst lands were occupied almost
entirely by non-slaveholding whites or whites owning only a relatively
small number of slaves.
(ii) After the war and emancipation, the different population
groups remained largely where they had lived before the war. That is,
there may have been mobility of individual blacks from plantation to
plantation, but the blacks as a whole continued to work for former slave-
holders as sharecroppers or tenants. Similarly the pre-war "poor whites"
continued to occupy the least fertile lands of each state.
(iii) In cases in which plantations were divided into smaller farms,
whites tended to be located on the best of these lands. For example, if
a plantation owner was forced himself to undertake farming in the period
of post-war destitution, he would pick for his own use the best acres
of the plantation. Similarly, non-inheriting sons, relatives, former
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overseers, or other whites would have the choice of rental plots over
freedmen. If plantations were driven onto the distressed sales market,
whites would have a better opportunity to buy the best sections of the
plantation, since the blacks emerged from slavery with no capital and
no credit. The same division of cotton lands would be expected of
small ex-slaveholders. A man who had owned one slave might hire the
former slave as a tenant, but he would himself work the best acres of
his small farm. In short, in the cotton farming regions, the whites
would be likely to occupy the very best of the fertile cotton lands
when the unsettled agricultural situation returned to equilibrium again
after the war.
These three propositions imply a pattern of land occupancy that ex-
plains all the results of the Group II regressions. According to (i)-
(iii),white cotton farmers were the most productive group because they
occupied the best land. Blacks followed in productivity, since they had
initially been located on the best lands, and as a group remained con-
centrated in the fertile cotton belt. The poor whites, whose land
could not support cotton culture, had the lowest over-all productivity
because of the poor quality of the land they occupied. The main de-
terminant of any group' s over-all productivity was the fertility of
the land its members worked.
In addition to being consistent with the Group II results, this
Land Occupancy and Ownership Hypothesis (hereafter referred to as the
LOOH) accounts for the Group I findings and apparent paradoxes. Con-
centration of the blacks on the old plantation lands accounts for the
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uniform correlation of the percentage of blacks in the total rural popul-
ation and proportion of improved acres in cotton, as well as the location
of the blacks on lands of greatest residual fertility, without requir-
ing that the blacks occupied the very best of the available lands within
counties. Similarly, the LOOH explains why whites would appear to be
more productive than blacks in the cotton belt, and less productive than
blacks on the periphery. There were relatively few cotton-farming whites
in the peripheral states, compared to large numbers of whites growing
other agricultural products, simply because of the scarcity of cotton land
in those states. On the other hand, the blacks in those states were
concentrated in the cotton counties, even if they did not occupy the prime
cotton lands after the war. The relatively large number of low-productivity
non-cotton-growing whites would tend to lower the over-all white productivity
levels in those border states as compared to the over-all black produc-
tivity level, leading to the apparent finding that blacks were more pro-
ductive than whites in those states. Conversely, in the cotton belt, more
land was available for cotton, so that a relatively larger proportion of
the white population was engaged in high-productivity cotton culture.
Blacks were relegated to the second-best cotton lands, and possibly even
to some plantation lands not suited for cotton. Thus, in the cotton belt,
over-all white productivity appears greater than over-all black produc-
tivity in the Group I regressions.
The fact that the intra-regional difference in over-all productivities
disappears in the Group II specification is strong evidence for the cor-
rectness of that specification. The Group II model captures all the race-
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and crop-associated productivity differences found by the Group I model,
while eliminating the paradoxes which seem to be generated by the Group
I model. The LOOH is consistent with both sets of results.
The Group II regressions maintain the previous finding that a
productivity advantage was associated with cotton. The LOOH would
indicate that the source of this advantage was in the peculiar suitabil-
ity of certain Southern lands for cotton culture, but does not require
this. In any case, the Overproduction Hypothesis fares as badly under
the specification of the Group II model as under the specification of
the Group I model.
In addition, these results create insurmountable problems for any
simple Legacy of Slavery Hypothesis. If differences in "human capital"
were the source of productivity differentials, and if the blacks as a
group emerged to freedom deficient in education, entrepreneurship and
farming trade skills, how can the position of white non-cotton farmers
on the bottom of the productivity ladder be explained? The estimates
show that white cotton farmers were most productive, white grain farmers
least productive; as well as substantial productivity differences between
black cotton farmers and black grain farmers. Blacks as a group were
simply not less productive than whites as a group.
Similarly, how could the "legacy of slavery" explain the Group I
regional differences? Sutch and Ransom have summarized the Census re-
ports on the different levels of illiteracy among blacks and whites
in the years following the Civil War [1]. Part of one of their tables
shows these differences had no pronounced regional component, though
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literacy levels did vary with race and over time. Except for 1880,
the whites as well as blacks were, if anything, more literate in the
Periphery, though the statistical significance of the difference in
regional literacy levels is impossible to ascertain. In any case, if
literacy was any measure of productivity-raising human capital, whites
should have been more productive than blacks everywhere, not only in the
cotton belt.
Blacks
South Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana
Eleven states of Old
Confederacy (the 10
states plus Virginia)
Native Whites
South Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi,
Louisiana
Eleven states of Old
Confederacy
Percentage of population ten years of
over recorded as unable to write
1870 1880 1890 1900
87.2
86.3
79.0
77.1
21.9
22.7
66.5
61.8
17.0
15.9
54.1
49.3
13.1
11.8
An argument could be made that the freedmen had actually learned
more about farming during their servitude than was known by the ignorant
poor whites of the back woods. The top productivity of the white cotton
farmers would be attributed, in this view, to the knowledgeability of
this group, drawn as it was from former planters, overseers, yeoman
cotton farmers and small slaveholders. Due to the now-familiar
age and
1910
39.3
34.5
9.2
8.2
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identification problem, there is no way to reject this possibility on
the basis of the productivity evidence. However, such localization of
productivity differences would be so different from the simple "legacy
of slavery" idea that it would require a totally different description
and rationale.
Another advantage of the LOOH is that it corresponds to the com-
petitive model of income distribution based on factor ownership. The
absence of exploitation in the factor markets, combined with the esti-
mates of the input elasticities of the agricultural production functions
(with the competitive output shares they imply) makesit clear that the
degree of capital and land ownership was a crucial determinant of a
farmer's income. The actual or imputed wage rate, which depended on the
marginal product of labor, was important in determining the farmer's
income; but farm ownership was equally important, since the competitive
land share was comparable to the competitive labor share of output.
Thus a white corn farmer might be less productive than a black cotton
farmer because he worked poorer land, yet still receive a higher income
due to his ownership of that poor land. Even relatively infertile land
was a valuable asset.
Wages may have been equalized between the different counties of each
state, but this is not required for the LOOH or for any of the results
established so far. (Production function aggregation requires that the
wages, rents and capital costs be the same from farm to farm within
counties--see Appendix 2--but not that these factor prices be the same
across counties. ) The results indicate that the factors were paid
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according to the value of their marginal products, but this does not
imply equalization of factor prices everywhere. It only means that the
extent of the area over which competition equalized factor prices was
at least as large as the county. If total productivity differences were
due to soil fertility differences, as is the case under the LOOH, these
differences would be reflected as differential rents' accruing to the
landowners, or possibly as higher wages earned by the fortunate residents
of the more fertile cotton-growing counties, if there was not enough trade
or factor mobility to equalize wage rates between counties. Indeed, if
factor prices were completely equalized across counties, then with perfect
competition there would have been no variation in effective factor ratios,
and no estimates could have been obtained at all.
Since the blacks were emancipated without capital or land, even poor
whites who owned their own land after the war probably had better opportu-
nity to obtain good land as time went on than did landless blacks. This
would help account for the ultimate location of the whites on the best
lands (as postulated by the LOOH). Furthermore, natural abilities being
distributed equally in the white and black populations, the "head start"
enjoyed by the whites in factor ownership could account for the reversal
in non-cotton farmers' productivities between the beginning and the end of
the period. Since the whites started the post-bellum period with more
resources, they could have begun to displace blacks on the better lands
over the years. This is only conjecture, however. If black-white pro-
ductivity differences were due to the legacy of slavery, it seems
that these differences would have been greater the nearer in time to
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emancipation, so that if any productivity reversal were to take place,
the blacks would be in their worst position soon after the Civil War.
An explanation of the productivity reversal based on human capital could
be constructed, but it would have to be far more complicated than any
simple slavery-induced disability.
A further advantage of the LOOH is that it is possible to find
support for it in the narrative evidence from the period. As should be
amply clear from the second chapter, such evidence is neither necessary
nor sufficient for the LOOH or any other hypothesis. Nevertheless it
is encouraging to find scattered examples of exactly the kind of land
occupancy and ownership patterns required for the LOOH.
To begin with, there appears to be a consensus among both historians
and contemporary observers that the slave plantations were located on the
best lands prior to the Civil War. Roger Shugg, who collected information
on the fertility of Louisiana lands in documenting the history of economic
conflicts in Louisiana, found that
In few parts of the world has there been deposited so much
alluvial soil as in Louisiana.... The black and brown clay is so
prodigally fertile that it yields more cotton and sugar than
other Southern soil.*... Such rich land could be profitably ex-
ploited only by rich planters. It early brought prices beyond
the reach of newcomers without plenty of capital. Indeed, none
but the wealthy could afford to cultivate, much less to buy,
these river bottoms** [2].
Shugg also saw the link between the advantages of slaveholding and control
of these premium lands.
Nonslaveholders were depressed and excluded from the plantation
system not only because they failed to secure good land, but also
because they gradually lost the ability to buy Negroes...
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Since nonslaveholding farmers were unable to operate on a
large scale and with cheap labor, they could not specialize in
profitable staples such as cotton and sugar, nor cultivate land
especially valuable for their production.
A host of farmers were therefore expelled from fertile
regions by the expanding plantation system.* The best soil was
needed for commercial agriculture, and planters were able to
command it at a premium because of the profit derived from
slavery.** Yeomen and nonslaveholders had no choice but to move
westward or retreat to sandy patches in the woods and narrow
margins along the swamps and bayous*** [3].
Nevertheless, Shugg reports that even in the leading cotton and sugar
parishes before the war, 1/3 to 1/2 of the farmers owned fewer than six
slaves, indicating that relatively small farms existed alongside the
large plantations before the war [4]. Shugg's findings are corroborated
by another historian of Louisiana:
The great bulk of Louisiana's poor, white rural population
lived outside of the wealth-laden valleys. The small farmers'
land was usually in sections of the state where the soil was
thin and sandy or where it was difficult to use the steamboats
which carried agricultural produce to New Orleans and returned
with imported supplies. It is true that there were some small
farms in the alluvial valleys, but their aggregate value and
production was negligible when compared with that of the neigh-
boring plantations [5].
There is no reason to believe that Louisiana was atypical in this
regard.
Enoch Banks, the economist, found roughly the same situation in
Georgia prior to the war.
...The region in which farms worked by their proprietors tended
to prevail more than elsewhere was outside the region character-
ized by large possessions of lands and slaves. Moreover, such
farms prevailed in the rugged region of the north and the pine
flats of the south, each of which was relatively uninviting from
the economic point of view.... It was, therefore, in the cotton
and rice sections that the slavery plantation system predominated.
Even here, however, it must be remembered, the small farm existed
side by side with the large plantation [6].
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Banks also stated that some of the less aggressive whites who were re-
luctant to become pioneers became "in a few cases, tenants on the poorer
parts of the large plantations" [7]. This assessment of the pre-war
patterns of landownership was shared by so unlikely a source as the
Presbyterian Banner of Pittsburgh, which saw in the gradual take-over of
the best Southern lands by slaveholders the origin of the late 19th cen-
tury poverty and ignorance of the Southern mountain whites:
In 1792 Whitney invented the cotton gin. Cotton lands became
more valuable; slaves did the work. The non-slaveholders could
not find employment, either as artisans or as field hands. Those
that were embarrassed and trying to hold their lands had to sell
out; and thus an increased number had to betake themselves to the
mountains.... There were no schools in the mountains. There were
few church privileges.... Each succeeding generation was more il-
literate than the preceding one. Idleness, hunting and poor soil,
with their isolation, absence of schools, and churches without an
educated ministry, have produced that condition of thriftlessness
and poverty in which they are now found....
"....The present condition of these people is directly traceable
to slavery; for, in making the slave the planter's blacksmith,
carpenter, wheelwright, and man-of-all-work, slavery shut every
avenue of honest employment against the working white man and
drove him to the mountains or the barren sandhills" [8].
It should be noted that this passage contains a mixture of'human capital"
and'land occupancy explanations of the low productivity of the mountain
whites.
Ulrich Phillips observed that as late as the 1920's:
Everywhere east of Texas the best cotton districts are peopled
by a majority of Negroes today, because within the space of three-
score years and seven from the invention of the gin, planters had
carried slaves in predominant numbers to all these districts and
had maintained market inducements causing slave traders to supple-
ment the effects of their own migration. In the same period they
placed the American cotton belt in an unchallenged primacy in the
world's production of the staple [9].
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In the same article, Phillips remarke: ".. no one who could pay any
price for farm land would dally with the pine barrens [poor soil] before
the introduction of commercial fertilizers. Certainly the planters
avoided them with one accord. At the other extreme, the alluvial tracts
were occupied by planters from the beginning, with little participation
by farmers--partly because the problem of flood control put a premium
upon large-scale undertakings" [10].
In fact, given the obvious fact that a large slaveowning planter
was in general richer than a non-slaveholding yeoman farmer in the pre-
war days, it would actually have required perverse operation of the land
market for the best lands to fail to be concentrated in planters' hands.
The scattered quotations given above indicate that various historians and
observers recognized the organization of the most fertile lands into
plantations. Nowhere was any indication given that the poor whites owned
the better lands before the war.
More pertinent to the LOOH are accounts of what happened to the
pattern of land occupany and ownership after the Civil War. The evidence
for the LOOH is of three types:
(1) Evidence that after the war many "poor whites" remained on
lands relatively poor as compared to the old plantation cotton lands.
(2) Evidence that blacks as a group remained largely where they
had been located before the war, on the lands of the old plantations.
(3) Evidence that some old plantation lands, particularly the best
lands, came under the control of whites.
Both direct and indirect evidence for all three of these propositions
can be found.
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A.B. Hart portrayed the condition of the various groups after the
war in exactly the same terms as could have been applied prior to 1860.
In fact, Hart implicitly subscribed to the theory that non-slaveholding
whites suffered a competitive disadvantage against slaveholders, and
thus were driven to the hills in the pre-war years. That is where they
stayed, so after the war the "mountaineers" of the South occupied "the
most sterile of 'upright' and stony farms, farms the very sight of which
would make an Indiana farmer sick with nervous prostration" [11]. Hart
went on to say:
The Mountain Whites ought not to be confused with the Poor Whites
of the lowlands. Although there are many similarities of origin
and life, the main difference is that the mountaineers have almost
no Negroes among them and are therefore nearly free from the dif-
ficulties of the race problem. In the lowlands as in the mountains,
men whose fathers had settled on rich lands, as the country developed
were unable to compete with their more alert and successful neigh-
bors, who were always ready to outbid them for land or slaves;
therefore they sold out and moved back into the poor lands in the
lowlands, or into the belt of thin soil lying between the Piedmont
and the low country. Hence the contemptuous names applied to them
by the planting class--"Tar Heels" in North Carolina; "Sand Hillers"
in South Carolina; "Crackers" in Georgia; "Clay Eaters"in Alabama;
"Red Necks" in Arkansas; "Hill Billies" in Mississippi; and "Mean
Whites, " "White Trash," and "No Count" everywhere [12].
Hart also pointed out that many of the post-war plantations employed
"managers," whose role was analogous to the pre-war overseer, and that
some of these managers had "some opportunity to plant on their own
account..." [13].
A similar view of the Southern poor whites was expressed, without
as much sympathy, by Timothy T. Fortune, the black radical journalist:
As the poor whites of the South were fifty years ago, so they
are to-day--a careless, ignorant, lazy, but withal, arrogant
set, who add nothing to the productive wealth of the community
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because they are too lazy to work, and who take nothing from
that wealth because they are too poor to purchase. They have
graded human wants to a point below which man could not go
without starving. They live upon the poorest land in the
South, the "piney woods," and raise a few potatoes and corn,
and a few pigs, which never grow to be hogs, so sterile is the
land upon which they are turned to "root, or die." These
characteristic pigs are derisively called "shotes" by those who
have seen their lean, lank and hungry development. They are
awful counterparts of their pauper owners. It may be taken as
an index of the quality of the soil and the condition of the
people, to observe the condition of their live stock. Strange
as it may appear, the faithful dog is the only animal which ap-
pears to thrive on "piney woods" land [14].
These assessments are typical of the widely-held view that the poor
whites of the Southern backlands continued to occupy the relatively
infertile lands after the war, just as they had before the war [15].
Many writers commented on the ultimate return of the blacks to the
plantations after they had "tested their freedom" upon emancipation. In
some cases the blacks returned to the very plantations where they had
worked as slaves; in other cases they seem to have changed places with
other blacks.
Carl Schurz noted in his Report that despite the widespread black
migrations and congregations of freedmen at the Union army camps, "Still
others, and their number was by no means inconsiderable, remained with
their former masters and continued their work on the field..." [16].
Fleming's Documentary History of Reconstruction contains several examples
of this same phenomenon. Mrs. Frances Butler, a Georgia plantation
manager whose letters have survived, wrote: "The negroes seem perfectly
happy at getting back to the old place and having us there, and I have
been deeply touched by many instances of devotion on their part..." [17].
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The same story was told by Mrs. V.V. Clayton, in another plantation
reminiscence [18]. A Northern missionary to the South also
found that after the war "the one-time masters undertook to run the
plantations by hiring the former slaves" [19].
In The Plantation Negro as Freeman, Philip Bruce argued that even
in the face of the massive black migrations following emancipation, freed-
men soon were again providing labor on the plantations.
Many of the largest plantations were almost depopulated of their
former laborers, the places they vacated being filled by those
who had immigrated from other sections or had come in from the
same countryside [20].
The perceptive English traveler, Robert Somers, disagreed as to the
freedmen's preferences in employers, but concurred in the belief that
they remained on the plantations:
The old proprietors have an advantage in this respect [securing
their labor supply] over new planters. The negroes seem to
prefer their employment, and, after various changes, come back
and settle down to work in their old places... [21].
At least one modern historian saw in the desire of the freedmen to remain
in the "sections with which they were familiar" an impetus towards estab-
lishment of the sharecropping system [22].
Testimony before the government committees confirmed both the owner-
ship of the best lands by planters and the continued location of blacks on
those lands. In Mississippi
The owners of the large plantations do not wish to cut up
their plantations at all, and all the good land in Mississippi
is generally owned by the large planters. The small planters
generally have poor land, hilly land, while the large plantations
are generally bottom lands. In other words, there is in the
central portion of the State considerable rich land called
"hummock lands," which is generally held in large plantations.
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The valley of the Tombigbee contains a very large negro popul-
ation, and the planters have always hoped to work their plan-
tations with the negroes since the surrender.... I myself told
the negroes at the time of the surrender that it would be much
better for them to go back on the plantations to work, and that
they would be secured under their contracts as long as I was
there and the troops were there; and a large portion of the
negroes did so. This was some time before the Freedmen's Bureau
took charge of them [23].
A witness before the Industrial Commission indicated both that when
blacks moved they went from one plantation to another, and that many
did not even go that far:
...In a general way our labor throughout that section of Georgia
is very content and permanent in its home life. They move about
from plantation to plantation every 2 or 3 years--some of them;
but to-day I have men on my place who were slaves on the place,
living there during the reconstruction troubles, who were very
much alarmed because a stranger came in and bought a farm. They
thought they would have to move off, and they could not keep
their old ways;.... They have always lived there and will probably
die there, right on the plantation where they were born [24].
Again, the point that blacks remained on lands which had formerly
been plantations is hardly to be denied. Emancipated without resources,
the blacks had to survive. The only sources of subsistence were working
for a planter, rations issued by the Freedmen's Bureau, or employment
outside the agricultural sector. Under these circumstances it could
only be expected that after the Freedmen's Bureau had been disbanded,
most blacks who remained in agriculture would find employment on the
productive lands of the old plantations.
The most questionable of the assumptions of the LOOH is the as-
sumption that cotton-growing whites had access to the most fertile
available lands. Nevertheless there are indications scattered through
the narrative accounts suggesting that just such a pattern of land oc-
cupany emerged after the Civil War.
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The 1880 Census' discussion of the reliability of its statistics
on cotton production included an offhand reference to the cultivation
of the best plantation lands by the landowners themselves:
Cotton, more over, is now very largely raised "on shares,"
or by special arrangements of a great variety of forms, which
tend to endanger the accuracy of a popular enumeration. Thus,
to take a comparatively simple case, a large planter not infre-
quently cultivates a part of his estate under his own management,
while letting other, perhaps the more distant or less valuable,
parts to be cultivated on shares by others. Herein, it will be
seen, is involved the danger either of duplication or of omission.
The planter, in answering the questions of the enumerator, may
either report only that cotton which he raises on his own account
strictly, or he may include his part of the cotton raised for him
on shares, or he may include all that is raised on his estate [25].
More explicit support for the LOOH would be difficult to imagine.
Other observers attested to similar division of the former plantation
lands between the different groups of farmers. For example, Robert
Somers identified several new sources of white labor on the old plantation
lands after the war--white "croppers," sons of the planters themselves,
and ambitious poor whites of the hill districts who came down from the
mountains to buy or rent lands of the ravaged plantations.
I have seen more than one great plantation absolutely deserted,
and as void of fence or labour as it was at the end of the war.
[Somers is writing in 1870-71.] This state of affairs has given
rise to assiduous efforts to rent out land to cultivators; and a
class of people called "croppers," mostly whites, enter into an-
nual tenancies of land [26].
Somers believed that this type of labor was not generally successful,
unlike operation of some plantations by the sons of planters:
Yet behind all this difficulty there is an undergrowth of
wholesome influences at work that promise ultimately a great
revival and deliverance. The sceptre falling from the hands of
fathers is being grasped by vigorous and stalwart sons, who are
rallying labour round them, and, while plodding in the cotton field,
are also riding and hunting, courting and marrying, and casting all
the past behind them with hopeful outlook to the future [27].
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Finally, the distress of the planters provided a source of hope and
an incentive to the poor whites of the hills. After a successful year
due to high cotton prices
These small hill farmers come down occasionally into the plain,
looking for land to rent or buy; and it is not improbable that
many of the better and more industrious class of families in "the
mountains," as the gently swelling uplands are called, will
eventually come down altogether, and help to renovate the waste
places, and build up the agricultural prosperity of the Valley [28].
Somers also attributed the increase in the cotton crop in the years fol-
lowing the Civil War to the rise of white cotton farmers. These whites
were small farmers who had not grown cotton before the war, white laborers
who availed themselves of the opportunity to rent and sharecrop, white
villagerswho joined in the cotton harvest or grew small garden plots of
the staple, and
The cloud of white planters and their families, reduced to pover-
ty, who have been the foremost to go down into the Western bottoms,
and there and elsewhere have bent with noble fortitude and ardour
to labour in the fields [29].
Other commentators saw the same trends. Henry W. Grady made the
point that many whites and even some blacks were able to buy former plan-
tation lands at distressed post-war prices:
Let into the market by the low prices to which the best lands had
fallen, came a host of small buyers, to accommodate whom the
plantations were subdivided, and offered in lots to suit purchasers.
Never perhaps was there a rural movement, accomplished without
revolution or exodus, that equalled in extent and swiftness the
partition of the plantations of the ex-slaveholders into small
farms. As remarkable as was the eagerness of the negroes... the
earth-hunger of the poorer class of the whites, who had been un-
able under the slave-holding oligarchy to own land, was even more
striking [30].
Another writer found former overseers following the same route to land-
ownership [31]. Matthew Brown Hammond told the same story:
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The purchasers of these [distressed] lands cane in part
from the North, being chiefly men whom political or military
affairs had brought to the South and who were induced by the
high prices of cotton and the low prices of the land to attempt
the cultivation of this staple. In the main, however, the
purchasers were found within the South itself. The poor whites
whose inability to own slaves had kept them largely out of
cotton growing before the war, were now eager to undertake
the cultivation of this staple on the better lands offered
for sale on such favorable terms. A great increase in the
number of small farms took place during the years following
the war [32].
The 20th century historian of Populism, Hicks, also asserted that the
former overseers and small farmers who had owned land adjacent to the
plantations before the war acquired plantation lands at the depressed
post-war land prices [33].
Vernon Wharton found in Mississippi a movement of both white
tenants and buyers onto vacant plantations. In some instances, these
whites located on lands deserted by migrating Negroes [34]. Shugg
found manuscript records referring to rich river-bottom lands that al-
legedly could be occupied without paying a cent and without risking
anything but a lawsuit [35], but he said that many piney-woods natives
shunned the diseases, different methods of cultivation, and Negroes of
the lowlands. Such fastidiousness is not entirely plausible.
Shugg also alludes to a reversion to actual farming by some of the
planters ruined by the war:
[Some of the planters] regained a fair measure of comfort by
the proverbial sweat of their brows.* With "their sons and
grandsons following the plow and wielding the hoe," it soon
came to be noticed that "in many of the descendants of the
old planters a yeomanry is springing up as honorable as our
planting aristocracy of yore"[36].**
One such planter adopted owner-operation of his farm for reasons other
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than wartime devastation, and wrote to the Southern Cultivator:
The war left me an old but valuable plantation, a large stock
of horses, mules, mares and colts; also cattle, sheep and hogs,
and about forty freed negroes--fat, sleek and well cared for,
but who unfortunately took it into their woolly pates that I
had committed an unpardonable sin in ever having held them in
slavery, and consequently considered it their religious duty
to take everything they could lay their hands on from me, as
properly belonging to them. By stealing, slander, &c., I was
reduced in five years to running a two-horse farm, with very
limited means to do it with. During all these years, I had
tried hiring in all the usual ways, of wages and part of the
crop.... So at the commencement of last year, I saw that, unless
a change took place, I would be a ruined man. I determined,
therefore, to hire no hands that year, but to do the best I
could by my own labor and that of my son, a youth 19 years of
age [37].
This planter found himself "too little accustomed to manual labor" and
settled on hiring black workers by the day, but there were undoubtedly
others who tried the same thing. The Cultivator later reprinted an ar-
ticle by J.C. DeLavigne from DeBow's Review,which claimed that there
were enough abandoned plantation lands waiting for labor to be applied to
make everyone rich [38].
In testimony before the Industrial Commission during the '90's, the
Georgia State Commissioner of Agriculture remarked that "The most of the
landowners down there live on the farms themselves and cultivate what they
can, then they turn out or rent out the balance of the land under these
systems" [39]. Under normal circumstances, it might be expected that
these landlord/cultivators would locate themselves on the choicest plots
in their holdings.
Even the Hampton Institute's Southern Workman provides support for
the LOOH. Orra Langhorne wrote a series of "background" articles on
various aspects of Southern life for the Workman. One of her articles,
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"A Poor White Man's Experience Since the War," consisted of a short
biography of one James Johnson, a former overseer. Johnson lived in
Virginia, and had bought a few slaves and some poor land before the
war broke out. He lost the slaves and was drafted into the Confederate
army, but deserted before Lee' s surrender. Returning home, he and his
wife survived by planting a garden, some corn and tobacco. Johnson was
not absolutely penniless--he was able to trade some old harnesses and a
saddle for a plow without a point; then he bought a plow point with what
money he had. Then,
... Two or three years after the close of the war, Johnson found
himself going back to his old dreams of owning land, and it was
not long before he purchased an excellent creek bottom farm, to
which he has from time to time made additions, until he now owns
seven hundred acres of land... [40].
James Johnson's progress from overseer and owner of poor land to prosperous
white farmer owning rich land must have been repeated throughout the
South.
All the historical references in support of the LOOH to this point
have dealt with the pattern of land occupancy by the various groups. It
is also clear that many diverse individuals were conscious of the impor-
tance of land ownership in the determination of farmers' incomes. The
best examples of this consciousness came out during the debate over land
reform that followed the collapse of the Confederate armies. Proposals
for confiscation and redistribution of the lands of the defeated rebels
were made by Thaddeus Stevens and others at the close of the war. These
proponents of confiscation anticipated the LOCH, at least insofar as its
emphasis on factor ownership in income distribution is concerned.
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While the supporters of land reform in the South were able to
generate little support in the North, articulate Radical Republications
were not the only advocates of confiscation and redistribution of rebels'
lands. Large numbers of freedmen themselves ardently hoped for "40
acres and a mule" to accompany their emancipation [41]. Frederick
Douglass perhaps expressed best the feelings of frustration and bitter-
ness which must have overtaken the blacks as the realization dawned on
them that their dreams of land and capital ownership were to be denied:
History does not furnish an example of emancipation under
conditions less friendly to the emancipated class than this
American example. Liberty came to the freedmen of the United
States not in mercy, but in wrath--not by moral choice but by
military necessity--not by the generous action of the people
among whom they were to live, and whose good will was essential
to the success of the measure, but by strangers, foreigners,
invaders, trespassers, aliens, and enemies. The very manner of
their emancipation invited to the heads of the freedmen the
bitterest hostility of race and class. They were hated because
they had been slaves, hated because they were nowfree, and hated
because of those who had freed them. Nothing was to have been
expected other than what has happened, and he is a poor student
of the human heart who does not see that the old master class
would naturally employ every power and means in their reach to
make the great measure of emancipation unsuccessful and utterly
odious. It was born in the tempest and whirlwind of war, and
has lived in a story of violence and blood. When the Hebrews
were emancipated, they were told to take spoil from the Egyptians.
When the serfs of Russia were emancipated, they were given three
acres of ground upon which they could live and make a living.
But not so when our slaves were emancipated. They were sent away
empty-handed, without money, without friends, and without a foot
of land upon which to stand. Old and young, sick and well,
were turned loose to the open sky, naked to their enemies. The
old slave quarter that had before sheltered them and the fields
that had yielded them corn were now denied them. The old master
class, in its wrath, said, "Clear out! The Yankees have freed
you, now let them feed and shelter you" [42]!
The advocates of the land reform proposals often made the connection
between political democracy and landownership in classical Jeffersonian
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terms. Implicit in their arguments is the idea that in a competitive
market economy, ownership of the land is a crucial determinant of income
and economic independence. An ex-Confederate army officer would seem
to be an unlikely proponent of confiscation. Nevertheless, Sidney
Andrews, correspondent to the Boston Advertiser and the Chicago Tribune,
reported to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction a conversation he
held during a railroad journey with an ex-rebel army captain, a man
who had been a lawyer before the war. Andrews did not reveal the
identity of his train companion. He did record the conversation imme-
diately after it had been concluded, however, and this is what the
anonymous Confederate officer had to say:
No, I have not much faith in the idea that capital and labor
will reconcile themselves. Things are exceptional here. Our
capital is all in the hands of a few., and invested in great plan-
tations. Our labor is all in the hands of a race supremely ignorant.
and against whom we all have a strong prejudice. In my opinion,
you can't reconcile these two interests unless you put the labor
in subjection to the capital--that is, unless you give the white
man control of the negro. Of course, that can't again be allowed,
and therefore there's an almost impassable gulf between the negro
and freedom unless the government aids him.
I'll tell you what I think you [the victorious North] should
have done. The policy of confiscation should be rigidly carried
out at once. Mercy to the individual is death to the State; and
in pardoning all the leading men, the President is killing the
free State he might have built here. The landed aristocracy have
always been the curse of the State. I say that as a man born and
reared in Georgia and bound to her by every possible tie. Till
that is broken down there can be no real freedom here for either
the negro or the poor white. The result of the war gave you a
chance you will never get again to overthrow that monopoly. The
negroes and the poor whites are bitter enemies in many respects,
but they agree in wanting land. You should have carried out your
confiscation policy--divided up the great plantations into fifty-
acre lots, and sold them to the highest bidders. That would have
thrown some of the land into other large plantations, but it would
have been fair, and would have given the poor whites and the negroes
a chance. Give a man a piece of land, let him have a cabin of his
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own upon his own lot, and then you make him free. Civil rights
are good for nothing, the ballot is good for nothing, till you
make some men of every class landholders. You must give the
negroes and the poor whites a chance to live--that's the first
thing you should do. The negro has a great notion to get a piece
of land, and you should help him along by that notion... [43].
The former rebel told Andrews that "I should be shot before to-morrow
morning if I were to publicly say what I've said to you," [44] so there
is little wonder that Andrews would not reveal the identity of his
source.
The most eloquent advocate of confiscation was Thaddeus Stevens.
He argued forcefully that such an opportunity to build a more egalitarian
society in the conquered South would never come again:
But, it is said, by those who have more sympathy with rebel
wives and children than for the widows and orphans of loyal men,
that this stripping of the rebels of their estates and driving
them to exile or to honest labor would be harsh and severe upon
innocent women and children. It may be so; but that is the result
of the necessary laws of war. But it is revolutionary, say they.
This plan would, no doubt, work a radical reorganization in
southern institutions, habits and manners. It is intended to
revolutionize their principles and feelings. This may startle
feeble minds and shake weak nerves. So do all great improvements
in the political and moral world. It requires a heavy impetus to
drive forward a sluggish people. When it was first proposed to
free the slaves, and arm the blacks, did not half the nation
tremble? The prim conservatives, the snobs, and the male waiting-
maids in Congress were in hysterics.
The whole fabric of southern society must be changed, and
never can it be done if this opportunity is lost. Without this,
this Government can never be, as it never has been a true republic.
Heretofore, it had more the features of aristocracy than of
democracy--The Southern States have been despotisms, not governments
of the people. It is impossible that any practical equality of
rights can exist where a few thousand men monopolize the whole
landed property. The larger the number of small proprietors the
more safe and stable the government. As the landed interest must
govern, the more it is subdivided and held by independent owners,
the better. . . .How can republican institutions, free schools,
free churches, free social intercourse exist in a mingled community
of nabobs and serfs; of the owners of twenty thousand acre manors
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with lordly palaces, and the occupants of narrow huts inhabited by
"low white trash?"--If the south is ever to be made a safe
republic let her lands be cultivated by the toil of the owners
or the free labor of intelligent citizens. This must be done
even though it drive her nobility into exile. If they go, all
the better [45].
To summarize, then, the Land Occupany and Ownership Hypothesis is
consistent with the econometric findings of the previous chapter, and
has a basis in the narrative accounts of contemporary observers and care-
ful historians as well. Because of an identification problem, it is
fundamentally impossible to attribute productivity differences solely to
differences in land quality or to differences in skill levels of the dif-
ferent groups of agricultural workers. Nevertheless, the results con-
clusively eliminate the naive "legacy of slavery" notion that blacks as
a whole were less productive than whites as a whole because they were
deprived of human capital. The observed differences in productivity (with
white cotton farmers most productive, followed by black cotton farmers,
black non-cotton farmers, and white non-cotton farmers at the bottom of
the scale either less or no more productive than the black non-cotton
farmers) may, of coursehave been due to some combination of locational
fertility factors and human capital disparities, but again, there can
be no simple categorization of blacks as less productive than whites due
to the "legacy of slavery."
Similarly, whichever specification is used, a strong productivity
advantage is associated with cotton. The strength and uniformity of this
advantage is sufficient grounds to reject the hypothesis that cotton was
a relatively unprofitable staple. Rather it would appear that cotton
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enjoyed such a comparative advantage that anyone who had land suitable
for cotton culture could have generated more output in value terms by
concentrating on cotton than in alternative lines of agricultural pro-
duction. Nevertheless there must have been marginal lands, which were
about equally able to sustain cotton or the alternative crops. Crop
rotation alternating cotton and corn was surely practiced, and the two
crops were even occasionally grown side by side on the sane piece of
land [461.
The LOOH is consistent with all these findings, as well as with the
major result of marginal product factor pricing in contradiction of the
Exploitation Hypothesis. In fact one of the greatest attractions of
the LOOH is that it requires no market imperfections, no institutional
peculiarities, no deviations from an ordinary competitive private enter-
prise economy to explain all the econometric results. The very simplici-
ty and "naturalness" of the LOOH, flowing as it does out of normal com-
petitive behavior given the factor endowments of the various segments of
the population at the close of the war, recommends it as the "null
hypothesis" for future investigations of Southern agricultural productivity
and income distribution.
It was pointed out in the first chapter that "overproduction" might
mean a lack of price-responsiveness on the part of farmers who needed
to change their planting mix in the face of changing relative prices.
It is to this issue that attention will now be directed.
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of side-by-side cultivation, see Thomas E. Gregg, "Tobacco--
Sweet Potatoes -- Cotton and Corn Together," Southern Cultivator,
XXXVI (June 1878), 212. These are typical examples, and other
farmers wrote to the Cultivator reporting the same practices.
And all the propaganda in favor of agricultural diversification
would have been ridiculous if there had not been some flexibility
in the crop choice. At least some cotton land must have been
suitable for growing other crops.
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VII. COTTON SUPPLY FUNCTIONS, 1882-1914
A. The Model
The results of the previous chapters were based on production
functions estimated from cross-section data. As such, these results
reveal nothing about the price-responsiveness of Southern farmers, or
about the rationality or irrationality of their crop-choice decisions
over time. It has been shown that there was an over-all productivity
advantage in value terms associated with cotton culture, and it was
hypothesized that this advantage was a manifestion of cotton's com-
parative advantage in the South. Nevertheless the relative prices
of the different crop outputs varied over the years; and even if cotton
enjoyed a comparative advantage, variation in relative prices in a flexi-
ble system of agriculture would produce variation in the crop mix as
marginal lands were shifted between crops in response to the price
changes.
It has already been pointed out (Chapter I) that the price-
responsiveness of farmers constituted one aspect of the question of
"overproduction" of cotton. The South may have suffered from "over-
production" if cotton was not profitable in the aggregate or if farmers
clung to cotton production in the face of adverse price movements of
their staple. The first possibility has been shown to be unlikely.
Whether the second potential cause of overproduction was farmers' irrational-
ity and traditionalism, or merchants' insistence on cotton, it would have
been manifested in an unresponsiveness of cotton supply to changes in
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the relative prices of cotton and the alternative crops. Under
these circumstances, farmers might be said to have been "locked in"
to cotton culture, and this conjecture will be referred to as the
"Lock-in Hypothesis." Estimates of cotton supply functions for each
state based on time series data should provide enough information for
a judgement about price-responsiveness, and therefore should contribute
materially to the (somewhat belated) settlement of the overproduction
debate.
The supply model to be used has been applied many times,and in
widely different agricultural settings [1]. In this model, either
acreage in cotton or proportion of tilled acres in cotton is the de-
pendent variable, serving as a measure of cotton supply. The model
includes both a mechanism for formation of price expectations and one for
the adjustment of planted acreage to desired acreage with lags. The
final equation which is estimated can be derived from several different
"underlying" behavioral models, but it is useful to examine one such
model in detail in order to determine just what the estimates can and
cannot reveal about the decision-making process. In what follows, the
random disturbance term will not be included until later, because there
is no reason for believing a priori that a statistical disturbance
with desirable properties should appear at any one particular stage of
the derivation as contrasted with any other.
The behavioral equations of the model are
t - +
(7-1)
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Xt = Xt-1r t*- Xt) (7-2 )
e e eP t= P - +A/(P tl- P -) (7-3)
where
Xt* = the cotton acreage level desired by the agriculturalists
in year t. There are two forms of the model: one in which Xt =Stt~ t
the desired proportion of total acres in cotton, the other in which
X= A* = desired total acres in cotton.
t t
pe = expected cotton price relative to an index of the prices
t
of the major alternative crops in year t, and
Xt and Pt are the actual or realized values of these quantities
in the year t.
Equation (7-1) is the cotton supply function, in which the desired
total cotton acreage (or proportion of acreage relative to other crops)
is a function of the expected relative price including a trend.
Equation (7-2) shows the speed at which actual planted acreage adjusts
to desired acreage, with y the speed of adjustment, while equation (7-3)
describes the formation of price expections, with \ the speed of adjust-
ment.
The variables can be measured either in their natural units or
in logarithms. In this chapter, they are all measured in logarithms
except for t, so that the parameters can be interpreted directly as
elasticities. For example, the parameter P is the elasticity of the
desired cotton acreage or proportion of acreage with respect to expected
relative price.
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X* and P are unobservable, and must be eliminated before the
model' s parameters can be estimated. Easy algebraic manipulation shows
that from (7-2)
X* = (X - Xtl +X (7-)t t t 1 1
Multiplying both sides of (7-3) by @ and rearranging,
P = (1 -A)@P _ @ (7-5)
From (7-1), (7-1) lagged, and (7-5)
X* -a - 3t =1-A X - C - S (t-l)]+ A\ P Pt-(76
From (7-4), (7-4) lagged, and (7-6)
(X -xt- 1  xt- -a t (7-7)
=(1-A) (X - Xt-2 - a -5(t-1)] +A@ Pt-l
Multiplying both sides by y and rearranging terms in (7-7),
X= (a y + 5 - T ) +@ r APt-l +[(1- Y) + (1 - M)]Xt-l (7-8)
- [(1 - T) (1 - A\)]Xt-2 +5 T A\t
Now since y and ?\ enter eq. (7-8) symmetrically, models in which
either y or ?\ = 1 will be observationally indistinguishable. Further-
more, suppose the estimated coefficient of Xt-l is a and the estimated
coefficient of Xt-2 is b. Then
(7-9)
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-(1 - y)(1 - ) =b (7-10)
So
-(1 - y)[a - (1 - y)] = b (7-11)
y + (a - 2)y + ( - a -b) = 0 (7-12)
(2 - a) t2 a b (7-13)
Similarly
(2 - a) a + 4b (4)
In principle, therefore, estimates of (7-8) could be used to cal-
culate y and X, but there would be no way of determining which was
which. In fact the data suggest that either y or X is one. Estimates
of (7-8) give coefficients of Xt-1 and Xt which together imply values
of y and A which in every case but one are imaginary or outside the
range from 0 to 1. In addition, the quasi-t-statistics [2] of the
coefficients of X are generally small. These two facts indicate
that either y or A is equal to one, though it is impossible to determine
which. Fisher and Temin reached the same conclusion in their study of
the supply of wheat in the United States over roughly the same period:
We estimated such equations [including a term corresponding to
X ] for every state, but in no case did we find the coefficient
o he additional term to differ significantly from zero. More-
over, we generally found that the estimated coefficients could
not have been generated by models of this type with real values
of the y's [the respective speeds of adjustment, corresponding to
y and A in the notation of this chapter], let alone with p's
between zero and one. Accordingly, we conclude that if such models
are believed, then either price expectations or plantings are ad-
justed very rapidly [3].
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TABLE VII.1
Simultaneous Estimation of y and A [S form], 1884-1914
S = c + c2 t-1 + c3t
State
North Carolina
[quasi-t]
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
+ aS + bSt-2 + u t;
2
a b
.651 -. 255
[-1. 922]
.767 -.342
[-2.621]
.920 -.386
[-2. 388]
.577 -. 138
[-.856]
.953 -. 303
[-1. 603]
.656 -.311
[-2.174]
.518 .0958
[.594]
.613 -. 0527
[-.296]
.881 -. 236
[-1. 362]
.453 -. 151
[-. 944]
a + 4b
-. 596
-. 780
-. 698
-. 219
-.304
-. 814
.652
.165
-. 168
-.399
ut = Pu t1+ vt
n, al
not re al
11
Ty
II
II
y, A=1. 145, . 338
y,\= .897, .491
TA not real
"7
S = proportion of total acres planted to cotton; St and P in logs.
The numbers in square brackets below the b estimates are the quasi-t
statistics for testing the hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero.
u is a first-order autocorrelated disturbance, the vt are uncorrelated.
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TABLE VII.2
Simultaneous Estimation of y and X [A form], 1884-1914
A = c1 + c2Pt-1 + c3t + aA + bAt-2 + ut;
State
North Carolina
[quasi-t]
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
a
.645
. 492
.705
.631
.751
.747
. 0901
.390
.630
.659
b
-. 301
[-2.281]
-.235
[-1.684]
-. 1935
[-1. 113]
-. 252
[-1. 371]
-. 211
[-1.212]
-.283
[-1.865]
-. 0293
[-.177]
-. 106
[-.636]
.0245
[.144]
.145
[.763]
Ut = put 1 +vt
2
a +4b
-. 788
-. 698
-. 275
-. 610
-. 280
-. 574
-. 109
-. 272
.495
not real
t t
17
TI
I I
y, \ = 1.037, .333
y, \ = 1.174, .1671.014
At = total acres planted to cotton. Other comments are the
same as in the previous table.
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Thus (7-8) reduces to
Xt p p Pt-l+E[t + (1t- pt)Xt-l (7-15)
where all variables and parameters are as previously defined, except
for p. Since it is impossible to determine which of the two speeds of
adjustment is unity and which is not, p will denote the speed of adjust-
ment which is less than one, and will subsequently be referred to simply
as "the" speed of adjustment. For purposes of testing the price-respon-
siveness of the agricultural system, it really makes little difference
whether acreage allotments or price expectations are adjusted. Merchants
insisting on cotton culture can be thought of as being decision-makers
who prevented farmers from shifting crops to the desired alternatives to
cotton, or as decision-makers who maintained optimistic expectations of
the relative cotton price, thus insisting on continuation of its culture.
In other words, the identification of which speed of adjustment is equal
to one and which is not is really not important for the problem at hand--
the determination of whether or not the supply of cotton responded to
price changes or was restrained from responding because farmers were
"locked in" to cotton.
It was mentioned previously that there is no a priori reason for
introducing a statistical disturbance term at any particular stage
of the derivation of (7-8). If a disturbance which is not autocorrelated
is introduced in the underlying model (e. g. in (7-11)), then the dis-
turbance which will be present in (7-8) or (7-15) will be autocorrelated.
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This can be seen by carrying the disturbance through the derivation
of (7-8). Alternatively, if the disturbance term is first introduced
in (7-15), there is no a priori reason why it should not be auto-
correlated. Therefore it will be assumed that the disturbance is
linearly autocorrelated, so that the final equation which is estimated
is:
X ='p+P pP t1+5 t+(l-p)Xt1 +ut (7-16)
ut= put-l +vt (7-17)
with the vt uncorrelated.
Up to this point it has been assumed that (7-16) and (7-17) were
derived from an underlying behavioral model embodied by equations (7-1)-
(7-3) combined with the least restrictive assumptions about the dis-
turbance (except for confining it to no higher than first-order auto-
correlation). In this case, estimation of (7-8) shows that adjustment
either of price expectations or of the difference between desired and
actual planted acreages was very rapid. However, it is also possible
that (7-16) itself is the appropriate behavioral equation--that the
current level or percentage of cotton acreage was determined
by the previous period's relative price and the previous year' s level
of the dependent variable. If so, the model includes only one speed of
adjustment; p. In both cases the coefficient of Pt-l is the short-
run elasticity with respect to price.
The long-run elasticity with respect to price can also be determined.
In a model such as this one, which includes a trend term, the condition
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for long-run equilibrium is that X be growing smoothly according to
trend; i.e. that
Xt - X _ = 6 (7-18)
The logarithmic difference Xt - X is the proportional rate of growth
in period terms, and the rate of growth of the desired level X in thet
underlying model is 6. Because the model is one of adaptive expec-
tations, it is not possible to achieve X = X* in long-run equilibrium.t t
X * would require X Xt-l from (7-2), provided y / 0. But 
in
long-run equilibrium, Xt continues to grow because of the trend factor.
There actually is no paradox here. In the "steady state" long-run
equilibrium, the desired level X* grows with trend, and Xt can never
quite "catch up" to it because X adjusts only with a lag (see (7-2)).
Equilibrium is reached, however,when Xt is growing at the steady trend
rate 6. Thus, for any given price level P, substitution of (7-18) into
(7-16) gives for long-run equilibrium it
i = a- (1- P)6 +@ P +6 t (7-19)
Thus p is the long-run elasticity of Xt with respect to price. Note
that X is slightly smaller than X*, reflecting that Xt can never quite
t u t
ficatch up"? to its desired level, even in long-run equilibrium.
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B. The Results
Parameter estimates corresponding to both forms of (T-16) are
given in the following tables. In these tables S = the share of total
acres in cotton and A = total cotton acreage in year t. The span of
time covered by the estimates is 1883-1914. The starting-point was
chosen because the yearly USDA cotton price series does not begin until
1882, and the final year to avoid possible structural changes accompanying
World War I. 1883-1914 also includes roughly the period covered by the
production function estimates. Several interesting points emerge:
(1) Both forms of the supply function show a relatively good fit,
with the coefficients of both the price and lagged dependent variables
positive as expected in every case.
(2) In both models, the coefficient of Pt-l is almost always quasi-
significant. (See notes to the tables of results for a definition of"quasi-
significant".) Combined with the result that the sign is always positive,
this provides strong evidence that the Southern cotton farmers during this
period were definitely sensitive to changes in the relative prices of
cotton and the main alternative crops. Determination of the strength and
magnitude of these responses must wait for the subsequent analysis of
the relative sizes of the short- and long-run price elasticities.
(3) In the A model, 9 out of 10 of the coefficients of the trend
tt
are positive, and in the S t model, 7 out of 10 of these coefficients are
positive. This indicates that there was an over-all trend of increasing
total acreage devoted to cotton, and that a majority of states gave
increasing shares of the USDA major crop-acreage over to cultivation of
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cotton. By itself this is an interesting finding. However, it
gives no real help in settling the "overproduction" dispute, because
a positive trend to cotton acreage is consistent with both the Rational
Crop Choice Hypothesis and the "Lock-in" Hypothesis. If merchants in-
sisted that any farmer who fell into the toils of debt grow cotton and
continue to grow cotton, the ordinary variance in farmers' fortunes
would cause a few more each year to become caught in the cotton
trap. On the other hand, if the world demand for cotton was rising
with general economic growth, the Southern farmers would be expected
to expand its output at the same time. The only way the competing
hypotheses can be distinguished, therefore, is by further analysis of
the response coefficients themselves, and in particular by comparison
of cotton farmers' flexibility with the price-responsiveness of other
farmers who clearly were not locked in to production of a cash crop.
To this end it is possible to obtain another measure of the
speed of adjustment of the cotton supplier based on the estimates of
the parameter p for each state. This measure amounts to determining
how much of the total adjustment of the dependent variable in response
to a once-and-for-all price change would have taken place after a given
number of years. Ignoring the disturbance, rewrite (.-16):
X t= ap+p P +6 pAt+ (1- 4)Xt-l
Assume that at t = -c, the suppliers were in long-run equilibrium at
relative price level P. Now assume a once-and-for-all shift in the
price level to P'. After n years,
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TABLE VII.3
Cotton Supply Functions, 1883-1914 [st form]
St =Ot +@P Pt-l+ t + (l- 4)St-1 +ut ;
Ut = put-l+vt;
Estimated
Parameter
North
Carolina
all variables in logs except t.
South
Carolina Georgia Florida
a4p (s.e.
[quasi-t]
P t
-9.186(3.983)
[-2.306]
.318(.0598)
[5. 323]
00419(. 00205)
[2. 046]
.591(.139)
[4.2 47]
p .383
.778
.0102
.409
.827
R2
R2
-2.763(1.364)
[-2. 025]
.126(. 0265)
[4.745]
.00117 (. 000692)
[1. 695]
.576(.131)
[4.386]
.0390
.297
.00276
.424
.713
-4.176(2.117)
[-1.972]
.134(.0385)
[3. 473]
.00191(.00108)
[1.758]
.589(.147)
[4.015]
.108
.326
.00465
.411
.734
9.664(3.076)
[3.142]
.149(.0376)
[3. 975]
-. 00562(.00170)
[-3.298]
.464(.121)
[3.823]
-. 343
.278
-. 0105
.536
.695
22.333 24.775F(3,27) 42.921 20.477
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TABLE VII.3 -- Continued
Cotton Supply Functions, 1883-1914 [St form]
Estimated
Parameter Tennessee Alabama Mississippi
-3. 974(3.380)
[-1.176]
.321(.0767)
[4.191]
. 00147(. 00179)
[.817]
.747(.130)
[5. 728]
.220
1.269
.00581
.253
.711
-2.738(1. 407)
[-1.946]
.114(.0266)
[4.288]
. 00116(. 000704)
[1.652]
. 539(.169)
[3.181]
-. 0829
.247
.00252
.461
. 683
4.736(2.855)
[1.659]
.116(. 0298)
[3.894]
00277 (. 00151)
[-1.834]
. 453(.166)
[2. 735]
.550
.212
-.00506
.547
. 709
F(3,27) 22.119
P
R2
21.91219-403
345
TABLE VII.3 -- Continued
Cotton Supply Functions, 1883-1914 [s form]
Estimated
Parameter Arkansas Louisiana
-2.801(2.672)
[-1. 048]
.160(. 0476)
[3. 3711
. 00110(. 00139)
[.795]
.560(.157)
[3.553]
.147
.364
.00250
.440
.544
11.198 (7. 431)
[1.507]
.133(.0468)
[2. 8511
00615 (. 00394)
[-1. 562]
.679(.159)
[4.267]
.590
.414
-. 0192
.321
.886
-12.170(4.734)
[-2. 571]
. 0995(. 0317)
[3.137]
. 00614(. 002 45)
[2. 5051
. 457(.174)
[2.6181
.0842
.183
.0113
.543
.910
F(3,27) 10.748
Texas
a L
p
R 2
69.761 90.955
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TABLE VII.4
Cotton Supply Functions, 1883-1914 [A form]
At=a +@Pt-1+5[ t+(l-[)Al+ut '
ut = put +vt ; all variables in logs except t.
Estimated
Parameter
North
Carolina
South
Carolina
a (s.e.)
[quasi-t]
-6.509(3.504)
[-1.857]
.327(. 0637)
[5.140]
.00491(. 00215)
[2.281]
-8. 477 (2.546)
[-3.329]
156(.0384)
[4. 054]
.00661(.00188)
[3.525]
-11.255(3.892)
[-2. 892]
.179(.0526)
[3. 407]
.0644(3.211)
[.0201]
.147(.0511)
[2. 878]
.00765(.00264) .00148(.00178)
[2.900] [.832]
.512(.144)
[3.542]
.338
.670
.0101
.488
.818
.429(.144)
[2. 973]
-. 0925
.273
.0116
.571
.910
.560(.146)
[3. 830]
-. 0789
.407
.0174
.440
.926
.419(.146)
[2.876]
-. 184
.253
.00255
.581
.484
91.387 112.538
Georgia Florida
p
p
5 b
F(3,27) 40.44'7 8.429
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TABLE VII.4 -- Continued
Cotton Supply Functions, 1883-1914 [A form]
Estimated
Parameter Tennessee Alabama Mississippi
-.248(3.758)
[-.0660]
.330(.0729)
[4.5251
. 00110(. 00188)
[.585]
.618(.144)
[4.305]
.295
.864
.00288
. 382
.662
-5. 345(2.251)
[-2. 374]
.166(.0416)
[3. 988]
. 00453(.00177)
[2. 564]
.558(.151)
[3.686]
-. 208
.376
.0102
.442
.876
5.509(8.449)
[.652]
.152(.0434)
[3.512]
000645(. 00453)
[.142]
.126(.175)
[.720]
.766
.174
.000738
.874
.809
F(3,27 ) 17.596
a k
p
p,
63.635 38.175
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TABLE VII.4 -- Continued
Cotton Supply Functions, 1883-1914 [A form]
Estimated
Parameter Arkansas Louisiana
-12.198 (4. 360)
[-2. 798]
.143(. 0560)
[2. 557]
.00885(.00285)
[3.102]
. 348 (.164)
[2.123]
.0591
.219
.0136
.652
.834
45.33453
4. 421(8. 363)
[.529]
.192 (. 0665)
[2.885]
-. 00129(.00439)
[-.294]
. 674(. 158)
[4.261]
.574
.589
-. 00396
. 326
.802
-9.746 (9. 082)
[-1. 073]
. 0812 (. 0434)
[1.870]
.00578(.00528)
[1.096]
.848(.107)
[7.953]
-. 377
.534
.0380
.152
.984
Texas
1-kL
Kb
F ( 3,27 ) 36. 363 558. 040
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TABLES VII.3 - VII.4 -- Continued
Notes to the Tables
(a) The estimation technique used was identical to that of Fisher
and Temin's study of wheat supply [4]. Their discussion can hardly be
improved upon, and is quoted here with appropriate changes in notation
and numbering of the equations:
[Equation (7-16) was estimated] by choosing p so as to minimize
the sum of squares of the vt over all but the first observation.
In other words, given p, [(7-16) was lagged and multiplied by p,
the product was subtracted from the original equation, an
ordinary least squares was applied], choosing that value of p
which gave the smallest resulting error sum of squares. This
procedure uses the first observation only as a subtraction from
the second. If one believes that the process generating the
disturbances...was going on for a long time when the observation
period started, [then this] procedure differs from maximum likeli-
hood (assuming the vt normally distributed in the usual way) in
its treatment of the first observation, but is asymptotically
equivalent to maximum likelihood. If, on the other hand, one
believes that disturbances in the recent past before the first
observation were differently generated, then [this] procedure yields
the maximum likelihood estimator even in small samples...[5].
(b) The standard errors and t-statistics (shown in ordinary parentheses
and square brackets respectively) were calculated as if the serial co-
efficient p were given,and not estimated along with the other parameters.
Cooper has shown that when all independent variables are exogenous this
procedure is asymptotically valid, but in the presence of a lagged de-
pendent variable (as in the present case) the standard errors of the re-
gression coefficients will be biased downward even asymptotically. He
has also derived a correction which gives asymptotically unbiased estimates
of the standard errors of the regression coefficients even in the presence
of a lagged dependent variable [6]. Unfortunately, quantities which are
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TABLES VII.3 - VII.4 -- Continued
zero in the probability limit are not zero in the small samples (32 ob-
servations) involved here. The version of the Cooper correction in
the regression program package employed [71 uses only the asymp-
totically correct formulas, and thus generates meaningless statistics
(such as negative "variances") for several of the state supply functions.
For this reason the Cooper correction was not applied. Thus the
reported standard errors are biased downward and the reported "t-
statistics" are actually only "quasi-t-statistics." A parameter estimate
will be described as "quasi-significant" at a particular level if it
would have been significant at that level had its approximate and biased
standard error been exact. It should be noted that the sample sizes of
the Fisher and Temin wheat supply study were generally large enough for
the asymptotic properties of the Cooper correction to be rougly valid;
hence their "quasi-t statistics," while still only approximate, were
based on standard errors to which the Cooper correction had been applied.
Thus the standard errors in the cotton and wheat supply studies are
not exactly comparable. These difficulties do not affect the actual
parameter estimates, which are the only estimates that are compared
between the two studies.
(c) Approximate methods do exist for calculating the standard
error of the ratio of two regression coefficients. Also, the mean of
such a ratio (under the usual assumptions about the disturbance) is
approximately equal to the ratio of the means of the two coefficients [8].
The ratio standard errors would be useful in the subsequent comparison
of s estimates for the cotton and wheat supply functions. However,
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TABLES VII.3 - VII.4 -- Continued
given that (a) the standard errors of the cotton supply function param-
eter estimates are biased, and (b) the calculation of the ratio standard
error involves the covariances of the estimated coefficients which are
not reported in the published Fisher and Temin article, it was decided
not to compute the ratio standard errors.
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XT+n=a + P 'P +54T+n)+(1- )XT+n-1
=a t+pkP' +5 L(T+n)+(-)a+ '+ Tn1
+ (1- )XT+n- 2] +
n-1 n-1
=[a i+ P P' +5bk T] Z(1- [) +%L Z (n-j)(1-kL)J
j=0 j=0
+ (1- )n X
n-1 n-1
=[a+@P PI+5bT]k Z (1 -pk)o+5 Z (n- j) (1- )
j=0 j=0
+ (1 - )n[c +P P+b T] (7-20)
where
Now to calculate k(n), the proportion of the adjustment completed
after n years, it is necessary to compare X to what X would have
been if the price had remained at P, as well as to the level X would
have reached if it had achieved its long-run equilibrium value.
Define (see figure at the top of the next page)
k(n) = XT+n VT+n (7-21)
WTn T+n
Then
n-i n-l
k (n) = { (6+@ P' + 5 T) j (1 - )+% Z (n-j)(1-)'
j=0 j=0
(7-22)
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W = Steady-state path
of Xt for Pt=
X = Actual path
of X
V = Steady-state path
of X for Pt= P
t
(1 - k)
1- i-i)n
(7-22) reduces to:
k(n) = ([a +P P +5T][1- (1 )n] +
n-1
j=0
(n-j)(1 - Lt)j
(7-23)
k(n) =
n-1
(a-C) +@(P' -P)-(1 -4n(a-c ) +@(P' -P)] - bn+bk Z (n-j)(1-4)j
j=0
p(P' - P)
(7-24)
Observe that if F = 0, k(n) reduces to:
k (n) = 1 - (1 - )n
Xt
711
7
/
T
Since
n-1
j=0
i
+ (1 - L)n(c +@ P +5T ) - [C +@ P + 5 ( T+n)])/@(P' - P)
(7-25)
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Also, if 5 is small and n is not too large (so that a0:~ c and the last
two terms in the numerator of (7-24) are small relative to the middle
terms) then (7-25) will hold approximately. It should be noted that
in this case k(n) does not depend on the magnitude of the price change
at all. It can be seen from the estimates 'on pages 343 - 348 that b
is indeed small, exceeding .02 in only one case. For these reasons
the convenient approximation (7-25) will be used to calculate k(n),
rather than the exact expression (7-24). These approximate values of
k(n) for n = 1 through 5 years are given in the following tables.
The table of k(n) for the S form of the supply function shows thatt
every state but Tennessee and Louisiana would have completed over
90f of its final adjustment to even a substantial price change after
only five years. After three years, all the states except these two
would have completed over 3/4 of the final adjustment to a once-and-for-
all price change. Calculating the unweighted average of the k(n) values
for each state, it can be seen that the South as a whole would have
completed 2/3 of its final adjustment to a relative price change after
only two years, and over 80% of the final adjustment after three years.
Essentially similar conclusions can be drawn from the k(n) values in the
A model. These values of k(n) indicate that even though the cottont
suppliers adjusted to price changes with a lag, there is no reason to
believe that a state of chronic "overproduction" could have persisted
over a period of 20 or 30 years in the face of a drop in the relative
cotton price from its immediate post-war high.
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TABLE VII.5
Approximate k(n) for n=1 through 5, cotton
supply functions in St form.
State 1 2 3 4 5
North Carolina .409 .651 .794 .878 .928
South Carolina .424 .668 .809 .890 .937
Georgia .411 .653 .796 .880 .929
Florida .536 .785 .900 .954 .978
Tennessee .253 .442 .583 .689 .767
Alabama .461 .709 .843 .916 .955
Mississippi .547 .795 .907 .958 .981
Arkansas .440 .686 .824 .902 .945
Louisiana .321 .539 .687 .787 .856
Texas .543 .791 .905 .956 .980
Over-all
Average .429 .667 .801 .879 .924
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TABLE vII.6
Approximate k(n)for n=1 through 5, cotton
supply functions in At form.
State 1 2 3 4 5
North Carolina .488 .738 .866 .931 .965
South Carolina .571 .816 .921 .966 .985
Georgia .440 .686 .824 .902 .945
Florida .581 .824 .926 .969 .987
Tennessee .382 .618 .764 .854 .910
Alabama .442 .689 .826 .903 .946
Mississippi .874 .984 .998 1.000 1.000
Arkansas .652 .879 .958 .985 .995
Louisiana .326 .546 .694 .794 .861
Texas .152 .281 .390 .483 .561
Over-all
Average .491 .706 .817 .879 .916
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The results presented so far are suggestive of the price-
responsiveness of cotton farmers, but as such they provide no absolute
test of either the Lock-in Hypothesis or the Rational Crop Choice Hypothesis.
Without some standard of comparison it is not possible to say whether
the long- and short-run elasticities displayed for each state's cotton
supply function are large or small. The only way such a determination
can be made is by comparing the elasticities with similar parameters
estimated for a different group of farmers.
The material for such a comparison, fortunately, is at hand.
Fisher and Temin have estimated nearly identical models of the supply
of wheat from the wheat-producing states in the United States during
roughly the same period covered in the cotton supply estimates. In
the comparisons that follow, both cotton and wheat supply functions are
of the form of equation (7-16) with X = share of total harvested acres in
cotton or wheat. The sample in the Fisher and Temin estimates is from
1866-1914, which includes the 1882-1914 period but extends beyond
it, because the wheat price received by farmers was available for the
earlier years while a comparable cotton price was available yearly only
starting in 1882 [9].
There is one striking difference in pattern between the wheat
supply functions and the cotton supply functions. For 13 wheat supply
functions out of 17 the coefficient of the trend is negative, indicat-
ing that the trend in these states was to shift out of wheat rather than
to specialize in it more heavily. Certainly the argument that Northern
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TABLE VII.7
Fisher and Temin Wheat Supply Functions, 1866-1914 [S form]
St =a +Ppt-l+b [it+ (1-4 ) 1 +U ;
ut = put-,+vt ; all variables in logs except t.
Estimated
Paraneter
a c
[quasi-t]
p.
p
New York
2.896
[1.17]
.121
[3.05]
-. 0021
[1.54]
.848
[13. 73]
-. 435
.792
Pennsylvania
-. 271
[.24]
.0453
[1.97]
-. 0001
[.09]
.909
[12. 38]
-. 221
.498
Maryland Virginia Ohio
-2.154
[2.15]
.0704
[2.79]
.0009
[1.82]
.815
[9.15]
.142
.380
-. 789
[.50]
.0712
[2.31]
.0001
[.09]
.784
[5.50]
.283
.329
.217
[.07]
.191
[2.71]
-. 0007
[.44]
.788
[6.45]
-. 019
.902
R2 .960 .909 .859 .879 .741
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TABLE VII.'T -- Continued
Fisher and Temin Wheat Supply Functions, 1866-1914
Estimated
Parameter
5
1-p b
p
Michigan
9. 401
[1.20]
.277
[3. 57]
-. 0058
[1. 41]
.755
[5. 85]
.100
1.132
Indiana
24.394
[2.36]
.0229
[.32]
Illinois Wisconsin
6. 493
[1.04]
.0488
[. 65]
-. 0136 -. 0038
[2. 43] [1.14]
.0682 .720
[.19] [4.81]
-. 005
.0246
-. 386
.174
.987 .679R2 .952
[S form]
36. 441
[2.56]
.284
[3. 40]
-. 0203
[2.67]
.728
[7. 49]
-. 098
1.043
Missouri
2.806
[.94]
. 0278
[.87]
-. 0019
[1. 00]
.590
[4. 42]
. 331
.0678
. 605 . 733
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TABLE VII.7 -- Continued
Fisher and Temin Wheat Supply Functions, 1866-1914 [s form]
Estimated
Parameter
a6
5f
1-Lb
p
Iowa
6.570
[.16]
.162
[2.27]
-. 0040
[.18]
.848
[2.32]
.535
1. 067
Minnesota
10.018
[1.77]
.136
[5.10]
-.0057
[1.88]
.765
[5.51]
.503
.579
Kansas Nebraska
-18.306
[2.67]
.249
[2. 41]
.0090
[2.53]
.746
[4.32]
-. 074
.982
-1.720
[.31]
.0852
[2. 04]
.0007
[.23]
.929
[7.35]
.227
1.198
R2 .982 .984 .682
South
Dakota
6.196
[2.21]
.0804
[2. 09]
-. 0035
[2.23]
. 880
[10.92]
-. 058
. 669
. 926 . 926
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TABLE VII.7 -- Continued
Fisher and Temin Wheat Supply Functions, 1866-1914 [s form]
Estimated
Parameter
a t
1-p.
North Dakota
8.470
[1.90]
.144
[2.62]
-.0049
[2.02]
.650
[4.25]
-. 255
.412
California
8.656
[2.25]
. 0891
[.96]
-. 0048
[2.39]
.933
[20.12]
-. 118
1.336
R2 .820 .975
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farmers were locked in to wheat production cannot be made on the basis
of this trend. The crucial comparison to make between the results, in
light of this difference in trend, is between the respective price
elasticities and speeds of adjustment.
Before making the comparison, consider what the alternative hypotheses
would predict. In the "overproduction case, farmers presumably were pre-
vented from growing alternative crops because merchants who controlled
short-term credit lines to the farmers insisted on cotton. The typical
example would be the farmer who approached his merchant at the beginning
of the year for supplies, and was told that unless he planted cotton, the
credit would be withheld. The Lock - in Hypothesis would therefore predict
that in the short run, cotton farmers' responsiveness to price changes
would be weaker than that of Western wheat farmers. In the long run,
the price elasticity of the cotton farmers would probably also be lower
than the price elasticity of the wheat farmers. Most important, though,
is that if farmers really were locked in to cotton, they must have been
locked in in the short run, because the control of credit resulting in
the cotton preference had to be exercised on a yearly basis. No one
argues that farmers were instructed to grow cotton by bankers as a con-
dition for extending long-term mortgage loans.
On the other hand, under the Rational Crop Choice Hypothesis it
is the long-run price elasticity of cotton supply that would be lower
than the elasticity of wheat supply, because if cotton had a long-run com-
parative advantage inthe South, rational farmers would remain relatively
specialized even in the face of a secular price decline. Thus long-term
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price changes would have less effect on the cotton/non-cotton mix than
would comparable changes in the relative prices of wheat and other
Northern crops. In the short run, the predicted comparison of elasti-
cities is not clear. Short-run elasticities in these models are lower
than long-run elasticities, reflecting the lag in adjustment. Since
the Southern lands were not completely cotton-specific, it might be
expected that in the short run the first lands to shift from cotton
to alternative crops in response to a price change would be the marginal
lands, lands which enjoyed no great advantage in cotton culture due to
physical or climatic factors. These marginal lands, presumably, would
be easily shifted back and forth between crops in response to small
short-run price changes. If Southern farmers were not locked in and
were as rational in their crop choice decisions as Northern and Western
farmers, there is no reason to expect that the short-run price elasticity
of Southern suppliers should be any different from comparable param-
eters of the North and West.
Briefly, the Lock-in Hypothesis should predict lower short-run
price elasticity for Southern cotton supply functions than for the
wheat supply functions, possibly with lower long-run cotton price
elasticity as well. On the other hand, the Rational Crop Choice
Hypothesis predicts a lower long-run cotton price elasticity, and not
necessarily any difference in short-run price elasticity between cotton
and wheat supply functions.
Since of the three parameters--short-run price elasticity, speed
of adjustment, and long-run price elasticity--only two are independent
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(the third being a function of the other two), the discussion has been
conducted in terms of the long- and short-run price elasticities. The
discussion could equally well have been couched in terms of the speed
of adjustment and the long-run price elasticity, or the speed of adjust-
ment and the short-run price elasticity. In either case the Lock-In
Hypothesis would predict a relatively low speed of adjustment for the
cotton states as opposed to the wheat states. The Rational Crop Choice
Hypothesis would make no prediction about the speed of adjustment,
except that in combination with the short-run price elasticity, the
resulting long-run elasticity should be low.
The status of the competing hypotheses is revealed most clearly
when the various parameter estimates are ranked according to size:
[See the following tables] these results support the Rational Crop
Choice Hypothesis and are contrary to the predictions of the Lock-in
Hypothesis. First of all, the short-run cotton price elasticities are
all in the range of the upper half of the short-run price elasticities
for wheat supply. Similarly the cotton states' speeds of adjustment
are all in the upper range of the wheat states' speeds of adjustment.
Both these results are in direct contradiction to what would be ex-
pected in a system locked in to cotton, though both are compatible
with the Rational Crop Choice Hypothesis. In the case of long-run
elasticities, however, with the exception of Tennessee and North
Carolina, the Southern states' elasticities all lie in the lower range
of wheat states' long-run elasticities. Tennessee and North Carolina
are states on the border of the North and South. They are the two
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states with the smallest proportions of their improved acres devoted to
cotton. (See table of state-wide H/T values in Chapter IV.) It is in
precisely these two states that cotton would be expected to have the
weakest comparative advantage, and their relatively high long-run cotton
price elasticities reflect this fact.
This is a strong result. The supply functions whose parameters
were compared were identical in specification, including the error
structure. They were estimated by identical techniques, even using the
same computer program. The cotton supply functions and wheat supply
functions behave similarly, except for the trend differences and parameter
patterns discussed above. Both sets of supply functions fit the data
well, and have coefficient signs and values which are plausible a priori.
Nothing in the results contradicts the Rational Crop Choice Hypothesis;
yet to find support for the lock-in effect in the South, it would be
necessary to construct a tortuous explanation of the "paradoxical" re-
sults [10]. These findings show that the only way in which Southern
cotton farmers' response to price was different from Western wheat far-
mers was in the long run, when the over-all cotton productivity advantage
in the region applied. On the basis of these supply functions, there is
no evidence that Southern cotton farmers wer locked in to cotton culture
against their will or contrary to rational supply responsiveness.
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TABLE VIi.8
Comparison of Short-Run Price Elasticities
Cotton
State
Tennessee
North Carolina
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Louisiana
South Carolina
Mississippi
Alabama
Texas
Wheat
= short run price elasticity = pL
.321
.318
.160
.149
.134
.133
.126
.116
.114
.0995
.284
.277
.249
.191
.162
.144
.136
.121
. 0891
Deep South .0852
Range .0804
.0712
.0704
.0488
.0453
.0278
.0229
State
Wisconsin
Michigan
Kansas
Ohio
Iowa
North Dakota
Minnesota
New York
California
Nebraska
South Dakota
Virginia
Maryland
Illinois
Pennsylvania
Missouri
Indiana
For these tables, the "Deep South" consists of South Carolina, Georgia,
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas.
TABLE VII.9
Comparison of Long-Run Price Elasticities
Cotton
____ = long-run price elasticity =
Tennessee
North Carolina
Louisiana
Arkansas
Georgia
South Carolina
Florida
Alabama
Mississippi
1.269
.778
.414
.364
.326
.297
.278
.247
.212
.
1 8 3JTexas
Deep South
1.336 California
1.198 Nebraska
1.132 Michigan
1.067 Iowa
1.043 Wisconsin
.982 Kansas
.902 Ohio
.792 New York
Range 
.669
.579
.498
~412
.380
.329
.174
.0678
.0246
South Dakota
Minnesota
Pennsylvania
North Dakota
Maryland
Virginia
Illinois
Missouri
Indiana
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State
Wheat
State
TABLE VII.10
Comparison of Speeds of Adjustment
r1_= speed of adjustment = J
Mississippi
Texas
Florida
Alabama
Arkansas
South Carolina
Georgia
North Carolina
Louisiana
Tennessee
.547
.543
.536
.461
.440
.424
.411
.409
.321
All- South
Range
.932 Indiana
F.410 Missouri
.350 North Dakota
.280 Illinois
.272 Wisconsin
.254 Kansas
.245 Michigan
.235 Minnesota
.216 Virginia
.212 Ohio
.185 Maryland
.153 New York
.152 Iowa
.120 South Dakota
.0909 Pennsylvania
.0711 Nebraska
.0667 California
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Cotton
State
Wheat
State
.253 1
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NOTES TO CHAPTER VII
[1] See, for example, Marc Nerlove, The Dynamics of Supply: Estimation
of Farmers' Response to Price (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1958). Also, Vahid Nowshirvani, gricultural Supply in India: Some
Theoretical and Empirical Studies (M.I.T. Ph.D. Dissertation, Feb.
1968) and Jere Behrman, Supply Response in Underdeveloped Agriculture:
A Case Study of Four Major Annual Crops in Thailand, 1937-1963 (M.I.T.
Ph.D. Dissertation, Sept. 1966). The Behrman dissertation includes
a bibliography of other supply studies, particularly in underdeveloped
agriculture. The model has been employed in historical situations,
particularly in Franklin M. Fisher and Peter Temin, "Regional Specializa-
tion and the Supplyof Wheat in the United States, 1867-1914," Review
of Economics and Statistics, LII, No. 2 (May, 1970). The work here
follows Fisher and Temin closely, both in theoretical approach and
in statistical technique.
[2] See note (a) to the table of the main results, concerning why these
statistics are referred to as "quasi-t-statistics."
[3] Fisher and Temin, "Regional Specialization and the Supply of
Wheat...," 138.
[4] Ibid., 140-1.
[5] Ibid.
[6] J.P. Cooper, "Asymptotic Covariance Matrix of Procedures for Linear
Regression in the Presence of First Order Serially Correlated
Disturbances," (forthcoming) Econometrica, Vol. 40.
[7] The contents of J.P. Cooper's article are included in the ESP
Econometric Software Package Algorithm Manual (Cambridge, Mass.:
M.I.T. Information Processing Center, Xeroxed, April 1, 1970).
[8] H. Gregg Lewis, "On the Distribution of the Partial Elasticity Co-
efficient," Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 36,
No. 215 (Sept. 1941), 413-6.
[9] Fisher and Temin, "Regional Specialization and the Supply of Wheat...,"
134-49. The table that follows reproduces the Fisher and Temin
results from their model which is identical in form to (7-16). It
appears in "Regional Specialization. .. " on pp. 142-3. Fisher and
Temin's notation has been modified to conform to the notation of
this chapter.
In the tables, the numbers in square brackets underneath the
parameter estimates are the quasi-t-statistics, not the standard
errors. Also, the sample for the Dakotas runs from 1882 to 1914, and
for California, from 1868 to 1914, because appropriate time series
exist for those states only for those periods.
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[10] See Appendix 7, Section (5).
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APPENDIX 1
THE ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE
The proof of consistency and unbiasedness of the least squares
estimates of the production function parameters is exactly parallel
to that of Zellner, Kmenta, and Dreze [1]. First suppose u is nor-
mally distributed
c
E (e oi )
2
with mean 0 and variance a 0. Then
u .
e
2 2
1 0 00
aoo 2
du.
2
-u .
01
00 2 oi
** 2100
- 00 e2
2C00
e 2 1
-oo a 0 0 /v2
2
00
2
2
aoo
2
e du.
01
(u 22 2
- aoo) /20o
du .01
2
aroo
2
=e
Now for the i'th producing unit:
U .
Q. = A1P h k T e 01Qi l l l
so that writing a superscript + to indicate expected values:
2
= E(I) = Al h kY el00E(1.1
+Q=, e
1 27coo-u o
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Since it has already been proved that the form of tenure makes no dif-
ference in this system, the first-order conditions are the ordinary ones
for Cobb-Douglas production functions, except that the variables with
random disturbance components are all replaced by their expected values.
Thus ;
or log a + log Q -
or log p + log Q -
or log y + log Q -
+1C2 +log 1. +2 a- u o. = log w.
i 01 1
log. oo - logp
log k + GOO - u = log v.1
In each of these three equations let the deviation of expected prices
from actual prices be given by a disturbance u.. (j = 1,2,3), and the de-
viations from profit maximization due to managerial inertia or error be
given by u*. (j = 1,2,3). Define u.. = u.. +u... Then if w, p, and
31 31 31 31
v are the prevailing competitive prices of labor, land and capital:
log Q - log
log Q - log
log Q - log
1 0- u9= lo - }a0 o + u1
h- u. = log - + u
l i - 2k.- u9= log 
- a + ui
However:
log = log A+ log 1.+p log h. + y- log k. + u .
1 1 1 01
Substituting this into each of the three previous expressions:
- w
Qi +
1. i
h Pi,
k. ~Vi,
1
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logA+Ulogl +@logh +ylogk +u -logl -u =log w L 2
log o A+ l g o 1+logh.+y1ogk +u -logh. -u .=log p- - 2 +ui
1 1 1 01 1 01 P 2 00o 21
logoAg+log1 +Plogh. +ylogk.+u. - logk. -u . =log - - +U
i i i oi 1 01 T oo 31
The u . terms add out on the left side of each of these equations;
01
hence if the u. . are independent of the u ., the optimal factor inputs
will also be independent of the production function disturbance u ,
and ordinary least squares applied to
log 0. =log A+aX log1, +@ logh, +T log k +ulog3_ 1  1V 0 1
will yield consistent and unbiased estimates of the parameters of the
production function [2].
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NOTES TO APPENDIX 1
[1] A. Zellner, J. Kmenta, and J. Dreze, "Specification and Estimation
of Cobb-Douglas Production Function Models, " Econometrica, Vol.
34, No. 4 (October, 1966), 784-5.
[2] Ibid., 790-1.
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APPENDIX 2
AGGREGATION
The proof that production functions of the type used in the text
may be aggregated, with the input aggregates the natural sums of the
inputs on the individual farms, parallels a similar proof first given
by Solow [1]. County-wide aggregate production functions must exist
if the county cross-section data are to be used in estimating the param-
eters of the function. Since each county is specified to belong to
one and only one physical soil type category, the constant terms may
be assumed to be the same for each farm in the county. Let F be any
constant returns production function, with
= F(L., T., K.) for farm i,
L. = aW. +bB.
1 1 1
T. =c H. + d J.
1 1 1
and
W. = white labor input on farm i,
B. = black labor input
H. = cotton land input
J. = other improved land input
K. = agricultural capital input.
The parameters a,b,c, and d represent the productivity levels of the
respective inputs. This is the type of production function specified
in Chapter IV, except that the aggregation proof holds for any constant
returns function with inputs of this form--not only for Cobb-Douglas
functions.
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If the function is well-behaved, efficiency requires marginal
product factor pricing, and competition equalizes the factor prices
within the county:
BQ. BQ.
= aF (L., T K.) =- j = aF (L.,T.,K.) all i,jB)W. 1 i i i -W. 1 a a a
BQ. BQ.
= cF (L.,T.,K.) = = cF (L.,T.,K.) all i,j)H. 2 i i i 5H. 2 a a a
BQ. BQ.
1 F (L.T.,K.) = F (L.,T.,K.)FK = K 3 l ~BK. "i a K a a a
Since F is constant returns, these equations imply the equality of the
generalized factor ratios across farms [2] :
aW. +b B. aW. +b B.
1j 1
cH. +dJ. cH. +dJ.1 i a a
aW. +b B. aW. +b B.
K. - K. ;1 a
K.
cH. + d J.
1 1
K.
cH. + d J.
a a
all i,j within a given county.
a ZW. +bZB. = L
1 1
c ZH. +dZJ. = T
1 1
ZK. = K
1
where the summation runs over all the farms in the county. Further
define
aW. + b B.
1 L '
cH. + d J.
1 T '
Applying the "adding up" rule for proportions:
and
Let
K.
i ~ K
37T
Z(aW. +bB.) aW. b B.
Z(cHi + d J. )
Similarly
cH. + d J.
1 1
A. = T1.. Now:
1 1
aW. +b B. = \.L,1 1 1 cH. +dJ. = p.T1 J 1 and K. = ).K11
Q = ZQ =  F(\.L, pT, J.K)
= Z F(\.L, A .T, \.K)
1 1 1
= Z . F((L T, K)
= F(L, T, K) Z A.
= F(L, T, K)
(because of constant returns)
since 7\. = 1
Hence the aggregate production function exists, and the input aggregates
are the "natural" sums of the farm inputs.
or ?\ = [p.
Thus:
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NOTES TO APPENDIX 2
[1] Robert M. Solow, "Capital, Labor, and Income in Manufacturing,"
in National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Research
in Income and Wealth, The Behavior of Income Shares, Studies in
Income and Wealth, 27 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1964), 104-5.
[2] See Chapter III, Note 10.
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APPENDIX 3
THE DATA
A. The data for the production function estimates
The county cross-sections of values of each of the variables were
taken from the published Censuses of 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910 [1]. The
Census definitions of each of these variables, their units of measurement,
and the Census sources of the cross-sections are listed in the following
table. The volume numbers of the sources for each variable in each year
refer to volumes of the Census for that year.
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Census Definition, Units, and Source -- 1880
Variable
Q "Estimated value of all farm productions (sold, consumed,
or on hand), 1889," in dollars, Vol. III: Agriculture...., Table VII.
W Total white rural population = Total white population -white
population of cities and towns of 4000 inhabitants and
upwards.
Total white population, in number of people, Vol. I:
Population...,, Table V.
White population of cities and towns of 4000 inhabitants
and upwards, in number of people, Vol I: Population...,
Table VI.
B Total black rural population = Total black population - black
population of cities and towns of 4000 inhabitants and upwards.
The sources of these variables are the same as for the variables
used in computing W.
R R = W+B
H Acres in Cotton, 1879, Vol. III: Agriculture..., Table XIII.
T "Total improved land in farms," in acres, Vol. III,
Agriculture.. ., Table VII.
J J = T-H
K "Value of farming implements and machinery, " in dollars, Vol.
III, Agriculture...,., Table VII.
S. Soil type dummy variables, Vol. V-VI, Report on Cotton Production..,.
Table I (for each state's report).
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Census Definition, Units, and Source -- 1890
Variable
Q 'Estimated value of farm products, 1889," in dollars, Vol. V:
Agriculture..., Table 6.
W Total white rural population = total white population -white
population of places of 2500 inhabitants or more.
Total white population, in number of people, Vol. I:
Population..., Table 15.
White population of places of 2500 inhabitants or more,
number of people, Compendium..., Part I, Table 17.
B Same as for W, with blacks instead of whites.
R R = W+B
H Cotton acres, 1889, Vol. V: Agriculture..., Table 16.
T "Improved acres in farms," Vol. V: Agriculture..., Table 6.
J J = T-H
K "Valuation: Implements and Machinery," in dollars, Vol. V:
Agriculture..., Table 6.
S. Soil type dummy variables, same as 1880.
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Census Definition, Units, and Source -- 1900
Variable
Q 'Value of Products not fed to livestock, [1899]," in dollars,
Vol. V: Agriculture..., Table 19.
W Total white population = total white population -white
population for places having 2500 inhabitants or more.
Total white population, in number of people, Vol. I:
Population..., Table 19.
White population for places having 2500 inhabitants or
more, in number of people, Vol. I: Population..., Table 23.
B Sane as for W, with blacks instead of whites.
R R = W+B
H Cotton acres, 1899, and sea island cotton acres, 1899, both
from Vol. VI: Agriculture..., Table 10.
T "Improved acres in farms," Vol. V: Agriculture...., Table 19.
J J = T-H
K "Value of farm property: Implements and Machinery," in dollars,
Vol. V: Agriculture... , Table 19.
S. Soil type dummy variables, same as 1880.
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Census Definition, Units, and Source -- 1910
Variable
Q "Total value of all crops, 1909," in dollars, Vol. VI-VII:
Agriculture..., Table 4 (for each state).
W Total white population, in number of people, Vol. II-III:
Population..., Table I (for each state).
B Same as for W, with blacks instead of whites.
R Rural population = Total county population - population of
places of 2500 or more, Vol. II-III: Population.... Table I
(for each state).
Note that the proportion of blacks in this census year is
computed as B/(W+B), not as B/R,as in the previous years.
H Cotton acres, 1909, Vol. VI-VII: Agriculture..., Table 4
(for each state).
T "Improved land in farms," in acres, Vol. VI-VII:
Agriculture..., Table 1 (for each state).
J J = T-H
K Value of implements and machinery, in dollars, Vol. VI-VII:
Agriculture..., Table 1 (for each state).
S. Soil type dummy variables, same as 1880.
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Great problems are attendant on any use of Census data, even though
such data axe the best and most extensive quantitative record of agri-
culture for the period. The first difficulty with the census cross-
sections is that not all variables are measured at the same point in
time. For example, the output variable Q is an estimated value of output
in the year prior to the enumeration. Since the actual enumeration was
scheduled before all the census year's crops had been harvested, esti-
mated output of the previous year was the best measure of production
which could be obtained. Similarly the acreages planted to cotton and
to all the other crops separately tabled, as well as value of fertilizers
applied, are all estimated values for the year prior to the census year.
On the other hand the input variables of population, total improved
acres, and capital stock were all measured directly by the census-takers
in the years of the censuses. Thus an error is introduced by the timing
discrepancy. There is no way around this difficulty. Even so, the
various input and output variables probably did not change too drastically
from one year to the next, so that the error in measurement incurred by
using the XXX9 value of output or cotton acreage as a proxy for the (un-
observed) XXXO census year values will not be too great.
A second difficulty with the output variable is that it is not iden-
tically defined in the four census years, particularly with regard to
its treatment of the value of animal products produced on the farm. In
commenting on the inadequacies of this recorded output to measure real
farm income accurately, the Superintendent of the 1880 Census ob-
served that the returns from both 1870 and 1880 were likely to be on
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the conservative side because (1) the products were valued at the farm,
farm, not in the market; (2) "double counting was avoided by exclud-
ing the value of products fed to livestock [actually this is a virtue
rather than a drawback of the data], (3) the farmers were indisposed
to report the value of the products they consumed on the farm, and (4)
farmers tended to underestimate the value of their output out of fear of
taxation"[2]. The 1890 Census used the same form of inquiry relating
to the value of farm products as the tenth Census. These values were
also undoubtedly underestimated, since for the U.S. as a whole the
reported values of the "six cereals, with hay and cotton, had a farm
value in excess of that total [of all farm products] and ... it, there-
fore, was deficient to an amount in excess of the value of all animals
sold, and animals slaughtered on the farms, and of all miscellaneous
products of the farm" [3]. Of course this does not mean that the six
cereals and hay and cotton were meticulously reported and the value of
animal products systematically omitted, although for the reasons given,
the degree of under-reporting of livestock products was probably greater
than for the major crops.
Recognizing these difficulties, the compilers of the Twelfth Census
(1900) "made an effort to obtain, if possible, a more complete statement
of the value of farm products. To secure such a statement, the farmers
and enumerators were requested to state the value of all the important
staple crops raised on farms, that of all animals sold, and animals
slaughtered on farms, that of the poultry raised, and that of the various
products not otherwise reported." While "the values of the great staple
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crops, as cereals, cotton, and hay, were obtained with a comparatively
narrow margin of error," the compilers of this Census still felt that
miscellaneous products and livestock sale and slaughter were under-
estimated. Nevertheless: "The aggregate of such omissions is believed
to be not less than 5 nor more than 10 percent of the total reported
value of farm products" [4]. In the 1910 Census, the aggregate value of
all farm products was not collected. The 1910 Census supervisors apparently
despaired of being able to measure livestock output accurately:
It is impossible to give a total representing the value of
the annual production of all live stock products, for the
reason that the total value of products of the business of
raising domestic animals can not be calculated from the census
returns. Even if a total representing the value of the annual
production of live stock products could be obtained and were added
to the value of all crops, the sum would not accurately represent
the total value of farm products for the year, because much
duplication would result from the fact that part of the crops are
fed to the live stock [5].
In using the total value of all crops as the output variable in this year,
the double counting of adding the value of crops fed to livestock to the
value of livestock sold, consumed, or added to is again avoided, but at
the cost of underestimating the contribution of the livestock to total
production.
To summarize: for each Census the output variable tends to under-
estimate total agricultural output. The most persistent systematic under-
estimation is probably of the contribution of livestock to output, due to
exclusion of "betterments and additions to stock" for 1880-1900 and to
using the value of crops fed to livestock in 1910 to approximate the total
value of livestock products.
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The labor inputs consist of total black and white rural populations.
The difficulty here is in distinguishing the agricultural labor force from
the rural population. First of all, counties containing a city in which
either the black or white population of the city exceeded 10,000 were
excluded from the sample altogether. This was done to avoid contamin-
ation of the sample of rural counties by inclusion of the counties con-
taining cities such as Atlanta, New Orleans, etc. In addition, in 1880
the inhabitants of all cities with populations greater than 4000 were de-
ducted from the county populations to arrive at the rural population
figure; in 1890 and 1900 the inhabitants of all cities with total popula-
tions greater than 2500 were deduced; in 1910 the rural population was
reported directly. The 1910 rural population is directly comparable with
the 1890 and 1900 definitions, since the Census definition of rural
population excludes inhabitants of places of 2500 or more people [6]. Of
course this procedure is open to two sources of error. First, by de-
ducting the town dwellers from the total rural population, agricultural
workers who lived in the towns but worked regularly in the surrounding
fields were omitted, as well as some seasonal agricultural workers who
lived in the towns and who performed agricultural labor only at peak
periods. Counteracting this undercounting of agricultural laborers, the
procedure employed includes in the agricultural labor force the inhabitants
of the smaller towns and villages who were employed full-time in activities
other than agriculture.
As well as not attempting to assess the relative participation
of town and city dwellers in agriculture, no adjustment was made for the
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difference between total population and working population. In other
words, the same participation rate was assumed for the white and black
populations, and no correction was made for age structure differences.
It was simply assumed that total rural population was a proxy measure
for the total agricultural labor force of each race.
The acreage variables are the reported acres in cotton, and total
improved acres in farms. The Census definition of "improved acres" cor-
responds most closely of any of the Census land variables to the land
input to total agricultural production:
Improved Land includes all land regularly tilled or mowed, land
in pasture which has been cleared or tilled, land lying fallow,
land in gardens, orchards, vineyards, and nurseries, and land
occupied by farm buildings.... Substantially the sane classifi-
cation of farm land has been employed at the different censuses
beginning with 1880, except that in 1890 and 1900 no distinction
was made between woodland and other unimproved land [7].
Using total land in farms as the agricultural land input would include
some lands that made little, if any,contribution to output (i.e., it
would include lands which were claimed but not worked at all), while
any land input more restricted than total improved acres might exclude
some pasturage or other land which did contribute to total output.
The inclusion of land lying fallow in the improved-acres category
probably introduces some error into this variable as a measure of land
input to production, however.
When acres devoted to sea-island cotton and uplands cotton were
reported separately, the total cotton acreage figure was obtained by
simply adding the two cotton acreages. This ignores any difference
between the quality or land requirements of the two types of cotton.
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The agricultural capital variables used in all four Census years
was the "value of implements and machinery" total reported for each
county. Obviously implements and machinery were not the only com-
ponent of agricultural capital. Farm animals were a vital part of the
total capital stock, and fertilizers were also used. Nevertheless the
value of implements and machinery was chosen as the single measure of
farm capital. Land, labor and the possible capital measures were
highly correlated with each other. In test regressions this collinear-
ity was manifested in erratic behavior of the coefficient of total
number of draft animals when that variable was included in regressions
containing the other inputs. The coefficient of the draft animals
(horses and mules) variable was often negative, and seldom was it large
compared to its standard error. Similarly, no substantial improvement
in fit was obtained when both the value of fertilizers and the value of
implements and machinery were included in the regressions. No clear
superiority in performance between value of fertilizers and value of
implements and machinery emerged. In addition, many counties utilized
no fertilizer at all, and the form of the production function is such that
output is zero if the capital input is zero. Hence either the pro-
duction function would have to be respecified or the counties not using
fertilizer omitted from the sample, if fertilizer were used to measure
capital or entered the production function as another input.
For these reasons it was decided to use the value of implements
and machinery as the sole measure of agricultural capital input. Given
the high degree of collinearity between the potential candidates for
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measuring this variable, as well as the difficulty of many counties not
using any fertilizer, this choice of a capital measure is probably no
great source of error in the estimates.
Finally, the soil types are those of the 1880 Survey of Cotton
Production, edited by Eugene W. Hilgard. This 1880 survey classified
each county of the South as belonging to one of twenty-eight soil
categories [8]. Each state contained from 4 to 12 of these different
types of soil. Since the sample for each estimate of the production
function consisted of a particular state in a particular census year,
dummy variables for each state were defined on the basis only of the
soil types in each state. The definitions of the soil types correspond-
ing to the dummy variables for each state are as follows [7]:
Alabama:
Sl - Metamorphic Region
S2 - Coosa Valley Region
S3 - Coal-Measures Region
S4 - Tennessee Valley Region
S5 - Oak and Hickory Uplands, with Short-Leaf Pine
S6 - Gravelly Hills, with Long-Leaf Pine
S7 - Oak and Hickory Uplands, with Long-Leaf Pine
S8 - Central Prairie Region
S9 - Long-Leaf Pine Region
Arkansas:
S1 - Alluvial Region, Mississippi Bottom Lands
S2 - Alluvial Region, Crowley's Ridge
S3 - Gray Silt Prairie Region
S4 - Yellow Loam Region
S5 - Red Loam Region
S6 - Northern Barrens and Hills
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Florida:
Si - Oak, Hickory and Pine Upland Region
S2 - Long-Leaf Pine Region, Short Staple Cotton
S3 - Long-Leaf Pine Region, Sea Island Cotton
S4 - Pitch-Pine, Treeless and Alluvial Region, Sea Island Cotton
Georgia:
S1 - Northwest Georgia
S2 - Metamorphic Region, Blue Ridge Counties
S3 - Metamorphic Region, Middle Georgia Counties
S4 - Central Cotton Belt
S5 - Southern Oak, Hickory, and Pine Uplands
S6 - Long-Leaf Pine and Wire-Grass Region, Limesink Division
S7 - Long-Leaf Pine and Wire-Grass Region, Pine Barrens Division
S8 - Pine Flats and Coast Counties
Louisiana:
S1 - Alluvial Region, North of Red River
S2 - Alluvial Region, South of Red River
S3 - Tide-Water Parishes
S4 - Bluff Region
S5 - Attakapas Region
S6 - Long-Leaf Pine Region
S7 - Oak Uplands
Mississippi:
Si - Northeastern Prairie Region, Prairie Belt
S2 - Northeastern Prairie Region, Pontotoc Ridge
S3 - Yellow Loam Region, Brown Loam Table Lands
S4 - Yellow Loam Region, Short-Leaf Pine and Oak Upland Region
S5 - Cane Hills
S6 - Mississippi Alluvial Region
S7 - Central Prairie Region
S8 - Long-Leaf Pine and Coast Region, Long-Leaf Pine, Oak and
Hickory Uplands
S9 - Long-Leaf Pine and Coast Region, Long-Leaf Pine Hills and Flats
North Carolina:
S1 - Seaboard Region
S2 - Long-Leaf Pine Region
S3 - Oak Uplands Region
S4 - Transmontane Region
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South Carolina: [See note below]
Si - Long-Leaf Pine Flats and Savannahs
S2 - Marshes, Swamps and Live-Oak Lands
S3 - Oak, Hickory and Long-Leaf Pine Hills
S4 - Sand Hills Belt
S5 - Granite and Metamorphic Gray and Red Lands of the Piedmont
Tennessee:
Sl - Alluvial Plain of the Mississippi River
S2 - Alluvial Plain of the Mississippi River and Plateau Slope
of West Tennessee, Alluvial Plain and Bluff
S3 - Alluvial Plain of the Mississippi River and Plateau Slope of
West Tennessee, Brown Loam Table. Lands, Midland Counties
S4 - Alluvial Plain of the Mississippi River and Plateau Slope
of West Tennessee, Summit Region of Watershed
S5 - Western Valley of Tennessee River
S6 - The Highlands, or Highland Rim of Middle Tennessee,
Western Subdivision
S7 - The Highlands, or Highland Rim of Middle Tennessee,
Eastern Subdivision
S8 - Central Basin
S9 - Cumberland Table Land
S10- Cumberland Table Land, Valley of East Tennessee, and Unaka
Mountain Region, Table Land and Valley
Sll- Cumberland Table Land, Valley of East Tennessee, and Unaka
Mountain Region, Valley
S12- Cumberland Table Land, Valley of East Tennessee, and Unaka
Mountain Region, Valley and Unaka
Texas:
Sl - Oak, Hickory and Pine Uplands
S2 - Long-Leaf Pine Region
S3 - Southern and Coast Prairie Region, Region East of the Brazos
River
S4 - Southern and Coast Prairie Region, Region West of the Brazos
River
S5 - Central Black Prairie Region
S6 - Western Red Loam Prairie Region
S7 - Red River Alluvial Counties
S8 - Brazos Alluvial or "Sugar Bowl" Region
S9 - Rio Grande Valley
S10 - Non-cotton Producing Counties [not a physical soil type]
S11 - Unorganized Counties [not a soil type]
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The counties belonging in each classification were taken directly from
the state tables in 1880 Survey, with the exception of South Carolina.
For some reason no soil categorization table appeared for South Carolina
in the copy of the Census used, so the South Carolina soil types and
county groupings were taken from the reproduction of the Hilgard classi-
fications in Sutch and Ransom's "Economic Regions of the South" [10].
It would have been preferable to assign counties to more than one
soil type category in accordance with the proportionsof their farm areas
belonging to the different soil classifications. This was not done because
it would have required geometric measurements from the soil type maps of
each state to determine the relative proportions, and even this would
not guarantee that the farmlands were divided in proportions equal to the
division of total land area. Some lands were economically useless swamps,
mountains, or forested areas.
No comparable survey of soil types exists for the subsequent three
Censuses. For these years it was assumed that a county's soil type was
the sane as it had been in 1880. Since the soil type classifications
were based on chemical and geographical analyses, it is unlikely that
these characteristics changed much over the 40-year period. Counties
created after 1880 present a different problem. The 1910 Census includes
a list of all county boundary changes which took place after 1880 [11].
Using this list it is possible to determine the counties from which new
counties were created. Suppose the new county was created out of pieces
of n old counties. If apluralityof these old counties was of a particular
soil type, the new county was classified as belonging to that soil type
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category. If there was no such plurality the new county was arbi-
trarily assigned to one of the soil type categories which the old
counties belonged to. There were relatively few such cases. It would
have been better to assign the newly-created counties according to the
preponderance of area of each type of soil, but this would have required
use of detailed boundary-change maps, and it was felt not-to be worth
the data-collecting effort that would have been involved to obtain such
maps. As can be seen from the results, these simplifications of the soil
type classifications do not vitiate the usefulness of the Hilgard cate-
gories.
B. Data for the supply function estimates
In order to estimate cotton supply functions,for each Southern
state, of the type proposed in Chapter VII, two basic sets of data are
required. The first is a yearly time series of measurements of the
acreages in the various crops. The second is a comparable time series
of prices paid to producers for their crops. The time span 1882-1914
chosen for the sample was based on the availability of the data and to
correspond as closely as possible to the years covered by the production
function estimates.
The period 1882-1914 is of sufficient length to permit statistically
meaningful estimation of the supply function. 1914 was taken as the end
point to eliminate disturbances in price and/or structure induced by
World War I. The war may have disrupted Southern agriculture in many ways,
such as by draining agricultural labor away from the farms into the army
or by marking the beginning of the migration of blacks to the Northern
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cities [12]. The sample could not begin earlier than 1882 because no
state-by-state series of consecutive yearly cotton prices could be
found prior to that year. (See below for source and definition of the
price variables. )
The data on crop acreages harvested are the revised statistics of
the United States Department of Agriculture [13]. When the dependent
variable was the share of cotton acreage in total acreage of all crops,
total acreage was computed as the sum of all crop acreages available
in the USDA series, which consisted of cotton, corn, wheat, oats, tame
hay, barley, rye, sweet potatoes, potatoes, tobacco, and buckwheat. The
total crop acreages calculated in this way include most of the improved
acres reported in the census:
Sum of Acres Harvested in Eleven Major Crops as
Percent of Total Improved Land in Farms, 1890 [14].
State /
North Carolina 68
South Carolina 76
Georgia 74
Florida 70
Tennessee 65
Alabama 77
Mississippi 72
Arkansas 73
Louisiana 59
Texas 40
The low figure for Louisiana reflects the exclusion of sugar from the
sum of harvested acres; the low figure for Texas is probably due to the
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inclusion of cleared grazing lands in the Census definition of improved
acres [15].
The failure to include sugar in the Louisiana totals is probably
the most serious weakness in the acreage data, since sugar was an important
cash crop. A sugar-acreage series comparable to those for the other crops
was not found. No attempt was made to consider cattle or other livestock
as a possible alternative to cotton in the model, and this may lead to
some distortions of the results. However, since corn was the main food
for livestock this is probably not a serious omission except in Texas,
where many cattle grazed on open range land.
The USDA series are of acreage harvested in each crop, while the
supply function specification would indicate acres planted as the appro-
priate variable in farmers' decision-making. However, the difference
between acres planted and acres harvested (abandonment) is in part a
function of the same factors that influence supply (mainly the relevant
price). The remainder of the abandonment error may be subsumed in the
disturbance term, since it is a function of weather, pests and other
unpredictable events. Some trial regressions were run using yield as
a proxy for the weather factors leading to abandonment [16], but the
yield coefficient was rarely significant, and did not display any intra-
regional pattern. Hence yield was not included in the final specifi-
cation, and the measurement error involved in using acres harvested
rather than acres planted was treated as part of the disturbance.
The price data are crop prices paid to producers on December 1 [17].
They are not strictly prices at the farm gate:
397
The prices reported to the Department of Agriculture are the
prices at which the products first changed hands when sold by
the producers, usually the price the farmer receives in his
local market. For most farm products there is no price "at
the farm"; the prices called such include the variable item
of cost to the farmer of transporting the product to the place
where it changes hands [18].
It is reasonable to suppose, however, that the farmers or other decision-
makers (such as merchants who dictated crop choice) would have taken
account of these local transportation costs in making their planting
decisions, so this potential distortion of the "prices paid to producers"
should have no bearing on the role of the price variables in the cotton
supply functions.
The relative price appearing in the models is the price of cotton
divided by an index of the prices of the major alternative crops. This
index was constructed as a value-weighted index with 1890 as the base
year. Defining Y as the index of the prices of the alternative crops:
Pi
Y = Z t i
SP1890
i
where i = corn, wheat, oats and tame hay; and w = the proportion of
value from all four of the major alternative crops due to the i'th crop
in 1890. The procedure omits the crops other than cotton and the four
in Yt, but those five crops comprised the major part of the output of
the eleven crops in the acreage series:
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StatE
North
South
Geor
Flor
Tenn
Alab
Mi s S
Arka
Loui
Texa
Percent of value of cotton, corn, wheat, oats and tame
hay to total value of all eleven crops in the USDA
acreage series, 1890.
Carolina 77 (tobacco = 171)
Carolina 91
gia 95
Lda 77 (sweet potatoes = 14%)
essee 87
ama 96
Lssippi 97
nsas 96
siana 96 (but sugar not included
the "total")
98
in
The relative price variable used in the estimations was P cottont- t t
While this variable is correlated between states, there is some degree
of independent variation between states, as the following correlation
matrix shows:
s
Correlation matrix of
NC SC GA
North Carolina 1.0 .96 .92
South Carolina .95
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
relative price
1882-1914
FL TE AL
.48 .92 .94
.58 .94 .97
.64 .92 .93
.56 .59
-94
variable between states,
MI
.89
.94
.91
.61
.92
.97
AR LA TX
.88 .84 .82
.90 .90 .89
.89 .92 .87
.55 .61 .56
.94 .88 .88
.94 .93 .93
.93 .95 .89
.91 .93
.88
1.0
Finally the proper dating of the observations must be followed.
The acreage figures are given for the crop year. A crop year includes
a full growing season; so, for example, crop year 1882 begins in 1882.
Since the prices are December 1 prices, the Pt-l appearing with X in
in (7-16) is the price given for the year prior to the year of Xt'.
Farmers making decisions about acreage allotments in 1883 based their
decisions on the last available observed prices, those of December 1882.
Alternatively the cotton planting for 1883 would be based on the expected
price of cotton at the time of the harvest, which would be roughly the
same as the December 1883 price.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX 3
[1] The Census volumes which formed the basic data source for the pro-
duction function estimates were the following:
U.S. Census Office, Tenth Census, 1880, Vol. I: Statistics of
the Population of the United States (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1883); Vol. III: Report on the Production of Agriculture
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1883); Vol. V-VI: Report
on Cotton Production in the United States; also Embracing Agricultural
and Physico-geographical Descriptions of the Several Cotton States and
of California, ed. by Eugene W. Hilgard (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1884).
U.S. Census Office, Eleventh Census, 1890, Vol. I: Report on
Population of the United States (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1895-1897); Vol. V: Reports on the Statistics of Agriculture
in the United States, Agriculture by Irrigation in the Western Part
of the United States, and Statistics of Fisheries in the United States
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895); Compendium of the
Eleventh Census: 1890 (3 Pts., Washington: Government Printing Office,
1892-1897).
U.S. Census Office, Twelfth Census, 1900, Vol. I-II: Population
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901-1902); Vol. V-VI:
Agriculture (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902).
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States:
1910, Vol. II: Population, 1910. Reports by States, with Statistics
for Counties, Cities and Other Civil Divisions -- Alabama-Montana
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913); Vol. III: Population,
1910. Reports by States, with Statistics for Counties, Cities and
Other Civil Divisions -- Nebraska-Wyoming, Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto
Rico [sic] (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913); Vol. V:
Agriculture, 1909 and 1910. General Report and Analysis (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1913); Vol. VI: Agriculture, 1909 and 1910.
Reports by States, with Statistics for Counties -- Alabama-Montana
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913); Vol. VII: Agriculture,
1909 and 1910. Reports by States, with Statistics for Counties --
Nebraska-Wyoming, Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico [sic] (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1913).
In subsequent references to the Census, only the number and year
of the Census, and a shortened title of the volume of the Census
(e.g., Agriculture..., Population..., etc.) along with the appropriate
page or table reference will be given.
[2] Tenth Census, 1880, Vol. III: Agriculture..., xxv, cited in Twelfth
Census, 1900, Vol. V: Agriculture....,cxx.
[3] Twelfth Census, 1900, Vol. V: Agriculture..., cxxi.
[4] Ibid., cxxi-cxxii.
[5] Thirteenth Census, 1910, Vol. V: Agriculture, General Report..., 473.
[6] Thirteenth Census, 1910, Vol. II-III: Population..., Table 2
contains for each state a list of the county locations of incor-
porated places, which proved invaluable in locating the towns of
2500 inhabitants or more (4000 or more in 1880) in their respective
counties.
[7] U.S. Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States
Taken in the Year 1920, Vol. V: Agriculture: General Report and
Analytical Tables (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922),
17.
[8] Richard C. Sutch and Roger L. Ransom, "Economic Regions of the
South in 1880," Working Paper III of Southern Economic History
Project Working Paper Series (Berkeley: Institute of Business and
Economic Research, mimeographed, 1971), 12.
[9] Tenth Census, 1880, Vol. V-VI: Report on Cotton Production..., ed.
by Eugene W. Hilgard, Table 1 (for each state). The smallest
soil type divisions reported in these state tables are assignmed
dummy variables, even when these sub-divisions are part of a more
inclusive soil type (e.g., Sl and S2 in Arkansas, etc.).
[10] Sutch and Ransom, "Economic Regions of the South...," Table 2,
13-14; Table B-1, 64-68; Table B-2, 94.
[11] Thirteenth Census, 1910, Vol. II-III: Population..., Table V (for
each state).
[12] Paul S. Taylor, "Slave to Freedman," Working Paper VII of the
Southern Economic History Working Paper Series (Berkeley: Institute
of Business and Economic Research, mimeographed, 1970).
[13] The sources for both acreage and yield data are as follows:
(i) Cotton: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing
Service, Cotton and Cottonseed: Acreage, Yield, Production, Disposition,
Price, Value, by States, 1866-1952, Statistical Bulletin No. 164
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1955).
(ii) Wheat: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing
Service, Wheat: Acreage, Yield, Production, by States, 1866-1943,
Statistical Bulletin No. 158 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1955).
(iii) Potatoes: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricul-
tural Economics, Potatoes: Acreage, Production, Value, Farm
Disposition, Jan. 1 Stocks, 1866-1950, Statistical Bulletin No.
122 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953).
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Acreage and yield data for the other crops were not found in any
of the regular Department of Agriculture series such as the
Statistical Bulletins or the Miscellaneous Bulletins. These
acreages were instead found in mimeographed circulars printed by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural
Economics, titled and dated as follows:
(iv) Revised Estimates of Barley Acreage, Yield and Production,
1866-1929 (February, 1935).
(v) Revised Estimates of Corn Acreage, Yield and Production, 1866-1929
(May, 1934).
(vi) Revised Estimates of Oats Acreage, Yield and Production,
1866-1929 (July, 1934).
(vii) Revised Estimates of Tobacco Acreage, Yield and Production,
1866-1929 (August, 1935).
(viii) Revised Estimates of Buckwheat Acreage, Yield and Production,
1866-1929 (August, 1936).
(ix) Revised Estimates of Tame Hay Acreage, Yield and Production,
1866-1929 (December, 1936).
(x) Revised Estimates of Rye Acreage, Yield and Production, 1866-1929
(October, 1935).
(xi) Revised Estimates of Sweet Potatoes Acreage, Yield and
Production, 1866-1929 (February, 1937).
These bulletins and circulars will subsequently be referred to as
USDA Revised Estimates... .
[14] The state totals of improved acres in 1890 were taken from U.S.
Census Bureau, Abstract of the Fourteenth Census of the United
States, 1920 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923), 595-7.
[15] See Note 7 above.
[16] Following Geoffrey Moore's suggestion to Fisher and Temin,"Regional
Specialization and the Supply of Wheat...," 138.
[17] The source for all the price series was U.S. Department of Agri-
culture, Prices of Farm Products Received by Producers, 3.
South Atlantic and South Central States, Statistical Bulletin No.
16 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1927).
[18] Ibid., 2.
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APPENDIX 4
A SAMPLE OF DIRECT OBSERVATIONS ON THE DIVISION
OF SHARES BETWEEN THE FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
For each observation the source, terms of contract (when known)
and share of output received by the sharecropper are given. The
sample includes all instances of observations on the division of the
crop in sharecropping arrangements that were found in the course of
the research. It is extensive, but not exhaustive by any means.
Terms of Contract
1. John Caldwell Calhoun,
testimony, in Timothy
Thomas Fortune, Black and
White: Land Labor and
Politics in the South
(New York: Fords, Howard
& Hulbert, 1884; Reprinted
by Arno Press and the
New York Times, New York,
1960), 246.
2. Ibid., 247.
3. Robert Somers, Southern
States Since the War,
1870-71 (London and
New York: Macmillan and
Co., 1871), 146.
4. A.R. Lightfoot, "Condition
and Wants of the Cotton
Raising States," DeBow's
Review (Feb. 1869), 153.
5. Frances Butler Leigh, Ten
Years on a Georgia Plan-
tation [1866], cited in
Walter Fleming, Documen-
tary History of Recon-
struction, Vol. II
(Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark
Company, 1907), 300.
"The proprietor furnishes the
land and houses, including
dwelling, stables and out-
houses, pays the taxes, makes
all necessary improvements,
keeps up repairs and insur-
ance, gives free of cost a
garden spot, fuel, pasturage
for the stock owned by the
laborers, and allows the use
of his teams for hauling fuel
and family supplies, pro-
vides mules or horses, wagons,
gears, implements, feed for
teams, the necessary machinery
for ginning, or, in short,
every expense of making the
crop and preparing it for
market..."
"[Under renting] when the
laborer owns his own teams,
gears, and implements neces-
sary for making a crop...."
Not specified.
Not specified. The given
share value is the last
value given by Lightfoot,
and pertains to 1867.
Not specified.
1/2
2/3 or 3/4,
depending
on the fer-
tility of
the land.
1/2
1/2
1/2
Source
Share
to
Laborer
Terms of Contract
6. Enoch Banks, The Economics
of Land Tenure in Georgia,
Studies in History, Eco-
nomics and Public Law, Vol.
XXIII, No. 1 (New York:
Columbia University Press,
1905), 79
"The landlord furnishes
land, house, livestock,
farming implements and
seed...." [sometimes 1/2
the seed]
7. Ibid.., 80
8. Vernon Wharton, The Negro in
Mississippi, 1865-1890, Vol.
28 of The James Sprunt Studies
in History and Political
Science (Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina
Press, 1947), 69-70.
Wharton's sources are:
U.S. Commissioner of Agri-
culture, Report, 1867, 417;
and "Report of the Planters
of Washington County,"
Appleton's Cyclopedia, 1879,
p. 634.
9. James B. Runnion, "The Negro
Exodus,," Atlantic Monthly,
XLIV (Aug. 1879), 224.
10. U.S. Industrial Commission,
Reports of the Industrial
Commission, Vol. XI: Report
of the Industrial Commission
on Agriculture and on the Tax-
ation in the Various States
(Washington: Government Print-
ing Office, 1901), 135.
The landlord supplies
only land and house; the
tenant furnishes "all other
forms of capital as well as
the labor required in the
production of the crop."
a. Landlord supplies rations
[plus everything else?]
b. Landlord does not supply
rations.
c. Tenant also supplies half
the feed for stock [plus
rations].
a, b, and c apply to Green-
ville and Yazoo sections.
d. Laborer supplies only
labor (neighborhood of
Louisville).
e. Laborer supplies labor,
rations and feed (Tippah
County).
Landlord supplies only "the
use of the land, without
stock, tools, or assistance
of any kind."
a. Varies, depending on
laborer's "ability to fur-
nish more than his muscle"
[North Carolina]
b. Alabama: Laborer provides
labor alone.
2/3 of grain,
3/4 of cotton.
a. 1/4
b. 1/3
c. 1/2
d. 3/10
e. 1/2
1/2 to 3/4,
perhaps
averaging
2/3
a. 1/4 to
1/2
b. 1/3 of
cotton, 1/4
of corn
Source
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Share
to
Laborer
1/2
Source
11. U.S. Industrial Commission,
Reports of the Industrial
Commission, Vol. X: Report of
the Industrial Commission on
Agriculture and Agricultural
Labor (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1901), 918.
Testimony of Hon. Robert
Ransom Poole, Commissioner of
Agriculture of the State of
Alabama.
12. Benjamin Hibbard, "Tenancy in
the Southern States," Quarter-
ly Journal of Economics,
XXVII, No. 3 (May 1913) 485-6.
Terms of Contract
c. Alabama: Laborer feeds him-
self and pays for half the fer-
tilizer if any is used.
d. Tennessee: On [fertile] bot-
tom lands, new or highly im-
proved grounds, landlord fur-
nishing nothing but soil.
e. Tennessee: Lands of aver-
age productivity and condi-
tion, landlord furnishing
stock and seed.
f. Mississippi: Landlord fur-
nishing team, laborer feeding
himself and team.
a. "The owner of the land fur-
nishes the land and the tenant
house and all the teams and
implements necessary to make
a crop. The tenant furnishes
the labor."
b. "Landowner or landlord fur-
nishes everything, and fur-
nishes the tenant so many pro-
visions, say provisions for
6 months..."
a. Tenants who furnished little
or nothing in the way of equip-
ment.
b. Tenants who furnish a con-
siderable part of the equip-
ment, usually including one or
two mules.
4o6
Share
to
Laborer
c. 1/2
d. 1/2
e. 1/2
f. 1/2
a. 1/2 of
cotton, 1/3
of corn and
other crops.
b. 1/3
a. 1/2
b. 2/3 or
3/4
13. Theodore Salutos, "Southern
Agriculture and the Problems
of Readjustment: 1865-1877,"
Agricultural History, Vol. 30,
No. 2 (April 1956), 71.
Salutos does not specifically
footnote his generalizations.
But he does cite D. Wyatt
Aiken, "Agriculture in Missi-
ssippi," The Rural Carolinian,
Vol. 1 (May 1870), 476, for
1870 Mississippi agriculture
on "halves."
a. "The 'cropper' working on a.
'halves,' normally did all the
work himself and generally fur-
nished his own provisions. The
owner, as his part of the bargain,
furnished the land, a house, seed,
plows, hoes, teams, wagons,
ginned the cotton, and paid half
the fertilizer bill...."
b. Landlord furnished everything b.
but labor.
c. Landlord furnished everything c.
except labor and provisions.
1/2
1/4
1/3
Terms of Contract
14. Marjorie S. Mendenhall, "The
Rise of Southern Tenancy," Yale
Review, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Autumn,
1937), 125, citing:
a. "Report made upon the con-
dition of the South to
General Grant by Theodore C.
Peters, the former President
of the New York State Agri-
cultural Society, includ[ing]
a letter from a planter who
was head of an agricultural
club in South Carolina (1867)'.'
b. Report of Federal Com-
missioner of Agriculture,
based on information received
from correspondents through-
out the South (1867).
c. Harry Hammond(1866)
d. Harry Hammond (1869)
e. Harry Hammond (later than
1869, but date not specified)
15. Rosser H. Taylor, "Post-Bellum
Southern Rental Contracts,"
Agricultural History Vol. 17,
No. 2 (April 1943), 121.
a. Tenants fed themselves, and a. 1/2 of
paid for one-third of the com- the bread-
mercial manures. "Apparently stuffs and
the landlord commonly furnished 1/3 of the
mules, forage, utensils, hous- cotton lint.
ing, and fuel together with six
or eight acres gratis, to be
cultivated by the tenant's wife
and children."
b. South Carolina, with labor
furnishing its own rations.
c. Landlord furnishing food
and shelter.
d. Not specified.
e. Not specified.
Not specified
b. 1/3
c. 1/4
d. 1/2
e. 3/4
1/3
The following observations on the division of shares are all taken from
U.S. Census Office, Tenth Census, 1880, Vol. V-VI: Report on Cotton Pro-
duction in the United States: Also Embracing Agricultural and Physico-
geographical Descriptions of the Several Cotton States and of California,
edited by Eugene W. Hilgard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1884).
For each state's survey, the information below is taken from the "Cultural
and Economic Survey," sub-section titled "Labor and System of Farming."
Each state survey is separately paginated, and these are the page numbers
Source
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Share
to
Laborer
indicated in parentheses just following the state names. The groups of
names beneath the state name are the counties for which the particular
description of contracts and shares applies.
Source
16. Alabama (p. 155)
Terms of Contract
a. Landlord furnishes everything but
the laborers' board.
b. Landlord furnishes only land.
Share to
Laborer
a. 1/2
b. 3/4 of
cotton, 2/3
of corn.
17. Arkansas (p. 105)
a. Arkansas
Craighead
Cross
Crittenden
Desha
Garland
Pulaski
Lee
Mississippi
Union
Miller
b. Sevier
Pope
Columbia
c. Saint Frances
Clark
Conway
Franklin
d. Dallas
White
Woodruff
e. same counties
as in d.
f. Chicot
Scott
g. Grant
Marion
Faulkner
Howard
Crawford
a. Owner furnishes supplies and work-
ing implements (including one horse
or mule for every 15-20 acres).
b. Owner furnishes working implements
and horse or mule; laborer furnishes
supplies.
c. The tenant boards himself and pro-
vides the gin and press; the owner
furnishes all other implements.
d. Owner supplies everything.
e. Tenant provides all supplies
and implements.
f. Owner supplies everything but
provisions.
g. Owner provides only land.
a. 1/2
b. 1/2
c. 1/2
d. 1/2
e. 3/4
f. 1/2
g. 2/3
3/4
or
409
Source
h. Same counties
as in g.
i. Sebastian
Boone
Fulton
Baxter
j. Jefferson
k. Hot Spring
Prairie
18. Florida (p. 70)
19. Georgia (p. 172)
Terms of Contract
h. Owner furnishes everything except
gin and press.
i. Owner provides land and gin only.
j. Owner furnishes everything but
board... gardens are given to the
negroes rent free.
k. Same as d, e and f [note the
discrepancy - the terms in d, e
and f are dissimilar].
a. Landowner furnishes teams and
implements.
b. Landowner furnishes teams, imple-
ments and all supplies.
a. Landlord provides land alone.
b. Landlord provides land, implements
and teams; laborer boards himself.
c. Landlord provides land, implements,
teams and board.
Share to
Laborer
h. 1/2
i. 2/3
j. 1/2
k. Same as
d, e and f,
except 1/3
of corn is
included in
rent.
a. 1/2
b. 1/4 to
1/3
a. 3/4 of
cotton and
2/3 of corn
b. 1/2
c. 1/3
d. Appling County d.[See last column.] d. Labor alone = 1/3
of crop.
Land =1/3 of crop,
Stock, feed and
implements = 1/3.
20. Louisiana (p. 83) a. Owner furnishes land, teams
and implements.
b. Owner furnishes land alone.
c. Owner furnishes land, implements
and board.
a. 1/2
b. 3/4
c. 1/3
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Source
21. Mississippi (p. 154)
22. North Carolina (p.77)
23. South Carolina
(pp. 60-66)
a. Coast Region
b. Lower Pine Belt
c. Williamsburgh
County (in b)
d. Clarendon
County (in b)
e. Upper Pine Belt,
Silverton
Township
f. Barnwell
Hampton
Darlington
Marlborough
(Counties)
g. Aiken County
(of e)
h. Same as g.
Terms of Contract
a. Landowner furnishes land, imple-
ments and teams.
b. Landowner furnishes only land.
c. Landowner furnishes board and
everything else.
a. Landowner furnishes all neces-
sary supplies except food for the
laborer, and one-half of any fer-
tilizers that may be used.
b. Landowner furnishes land alone,
without supplies.
a. Landowner provides house, fuel
and 6 acres of arable land.
b. Landholder furnishes all
supplies.
c. Landlord provides land alone.
d. Landlord "advances" all supplies
[Note: Unclearof what this is an
observation].
e. Landowner provides house,
rations and three acres of land.
f. Employer furnishes land, teams
and implements.
Share to
Laborer
a. 1/2
b. 2/3 to
3/4 of cotton;
2/3 of corn.
c. 1/4
a. 1/2
b. 2/3 corn
3/4 cotton
a. 2/3 of
labor time
(4 days/wk.
for 10 mos).
b. 2/3 cotton
1/2 provision
crOE/3 to 3/4
d. 2/3 "net"
of crop.
e. Slightly
more than 1/4.
f. 1/3 to 1/2
g. Landlord provides everything but g. 1/3
food.
h. Landlord provides everying includ- h. 1/4
ing food.
Source Terms of Contract
i. Metamorphic Region: i. Landlord furnishes tools,
Laurens stock and stock-feed.
Chester
Abbeville
York
portions of Fair-
field & Spartanburgh
j. Metamorphic Region: j. Same as i.
Greenville
portions of Fair-
field & Spartanburgh
k. Greenville k. Landlord furnishes only land.
1. Metamorphic Region 1. Landlord furnishes land alone.
24. Tennessee (p. 104)
25. Texas (p. 161)
a. Owner furnishes land only.
b. Owner furnishes also supplies,
such as teams, implements, seed,
etc.
a. Owner furnishes implements,
teams and feed; buildings and
improvements are generally in-
cluded in Texas farms.
b. Renter furnishes own supplies.
c. Owner provides board in ad-
dition to farm and implements.
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Share to
Laborer
i. 1/2
j. 1/3
k. 2/3
1. 2/3 to
3/4
a. 2/3 of crop,
or 3/4 cotton
& 2/3 corn.
b. 1/2
a. 1/2
b. 3/4 cotton,
2/3 grain and
other products.
c. 1/3
From this compilation it is clear that the share of output received
in payment for labor services alone fluctuated between 1/4 and 1/2 of the
crop. In order to condense the mass of references to a few figures, it is
useful to calculate the unweighted average of all labor share values under
roughly comparable conditions as to the factors supplied to the landlords.
The observations listed under Category I below are those of the share of
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output received forlabor alone, as near. as can be determined from the
often-skimpy information provided on the terms of contract. In cases
where the shares of the different crops were different, both numbers
were included in the unweighted average. Similarly, Category II obser-
vations correspond as closely as possible to the shares received by the
tenant when the landlord supplied only land. Again, when several shares
are given for the same observation, all are included in the unweighted
average. Given these average labor and land shares, and assuming con-
stant returns and exhaustion of the product, the average capital share
can be calculated as well. (It simply equals one minus the sum of the
land and labor shares.)
The factor shares found from these direct observations, and the over-
all average competitive factor shares computed from the production function
estimatescorrespond rather closely:
Factor shares: labor land capital
Direct Observation of Share .415 .311 .274
Payments
Group I Production Functions .309 .396 .321
Group II Production Functions .319 .387 .315
(See Chapters IV and V for full discussion of these results.)
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Category I -- Laborer provides labor alone, with or without
provisions, including or not some portion of cost of ferti-
lizer, feed, seed, part or all of ginning.
Observation
Number
1
6
8a
8b
8c
8d
8e
l0a
lOb
lOc
le
lOf
lla
llb
12a
13a
13b
13c
14a
14b
Labor
Share
1/2
1/2
1/4
1/3
1/2
3/10
1/2
1/4, 1/2
1/3, 1/4
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2, 1/3
1/3
1/2
1/2
1/4
1/3
1/2, 1/3
1/3
Observation
Number
1 4c
16a
17a
17b
17c
17d
17f
17h
17j
18a
18b
19b
19c
19d
20a
20c
21a
21c
22a
23b
Labor
Share
1/4
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
Observation
Number
23e
23f
23g
23h
23i
23j
2 4b
25a
25c
1/2
1/4, 1/3
1/2
1/3
1/3
1/2
1/3
1/2
1/4
1/2
2/3, 1/2
Unweighted Average = . 415
Labor
Share
1/4
1/3, 1/2
1/3
1/4
1/2
1/3
1/2
1/2
1/3
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Category II
Landlord provides land alone.
Observation
Number
7
Tenant
Share
2/3, 3
1/2,
1/2
3
/4
/4, 2/3
2/3, 3/4
3/4, 2/3
2/3, 3/4
2/3
9
ld
12b
16b
17g
17i
19a
19d
2 Ob
21b
22b
23a
23c
23k
231
2 4a
2 5b
2/3
3/4,
3/4
2/3
2/3, 3/4
2/3
2/3, 3/4
2/3, 3/4, 2/3
3/4, 2/3
Unweighted average = .689
Average land share, assuming constant returns and exhaustion of
the product = .311.
3/4,
2/3
3/4
2/3,
2/3,
2/3
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APPENDIX 5
THE DIFFERENCE IN MEANS OF H/T AND B/R IN
COUNTIES RANKED BY OVER-ALL Si COEFFICIENTS,
WITH TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE
To begin with, the soil types were divided into the "best" and
"rest" soils according to the over-all rank of the coefficients of the
S.. The ranks of each soil type were averaged over the four census
years, with half of the soil types with the lowest over-all rank (hence
highest fertility net of race-and crop-associated differences) grouped
together as the "best" soils and the other half grouped as the "rest"
of the soils in each state. Since the soil type categories do not all
contain the same number of counties, there are usually different numbers
of counties in the "best" and "rest" categories.
The results of this division are given in the following table.
The "best" soil categories are ranked according to their coefficients
from the Group I regressions in the left-hand column. The right-hand
column of figures gives the corresponding ranking of each tabled soil
type for the Group II regression coefficients (to be introduced subse-
quently in the text). It should be noted that even net of cotton- and
race-associated fertility differences, the Mississippi River alluvial
lands are the most fertile soils in the four states where they are present
(Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi and Louisiana).
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Listing of the "Best" Soils by State, Four-Census Averages,
in Order of Net Residual Fertility
State Group II
North Carolina S2 - Long-leaf pine region
S3 - Oak uplands region
(l)-(2)
[tie]
S4 - Transmontane
region (l)-(2)
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
S2 - Marshes, swamps and live-oak
lands of the coast
S3 - Oak, hickory and long-leaf pine
hills in the Central Belt
S7 - Long-leaf pine and wire-grass
region, pine barrens division
S8 - Pine flats and coast counties
S6 - Long-leaf pine and wire-grass
region, limesink division
S4 - Central cotton belt
S4 - Pitch-pine, treeless and alluvial
region, sea island cotton
S3 - Long-leaf pine region, sea island
cotton
Sl - Alluvial plain of the Mississippi
River
S2 - Alluvial plain of the Mississippi
River and plateau slope of West
Tennessee, alluvial plain and bluff
S5 - Western valley of the Tennessee
River
S3 - Alluvial plain of the Mississippi
River and plateau slope of West
Tennessee, brown-loam table-lands,
midland counties
S4 - Alluvial plain of the Mississippi
River and plateau slope of West
Tennessee, summit region of water-
shed
S6 - The Highlands, or highland rim of
middle Tennessee, western sub-
division
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(4)
(3)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(6)
(5)
State Group I
Alabama S9
ST
Sl
S5
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
- Long-leaf pine region
- Oak and hickory uplands, with
long-leaf pine
- Metamorphic region
- Oak and hickory uplands, with
short-leaf pine
S6 - Mississippi alluvial region
S9 - Long-leaf pine and coast region,
long-leaf pine hills and flats
S8 - Long-leaf pine and coast region,
long-leaf pine, oak and hickory
uplands
S3 - Yellow loam region, brown loam
table lands
Sl - Alluvial region, Mississippi
bottom lands
S2 - Alluvial region, Crowley's Ridge
S6 - Northern barrens and hills
S2 - Alluvial region, south of
Red River [= S3]
S3
Sl
Texas
- Tide-water parishes
- Alluvial region, north of
Red River
S2 - Long-leaf pine region
S3 - Southern and coast prairie region,
region east of the Brazos River
[= ST]
S7 - Red River alluvial counties
Sl - Oak, hickory and pine uplands
[= Sl]
S10- Non-cotton-producing counties
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Group II
(1)
(3)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1)-(2)
(1)-(2)
(3)
(1)
(3)-(4)
(2)
(3)-(4)
(5)
Listing of the "Rest" Soils by State, Four-Census Averages,
in Order of Net Residual Fertility
State Group I
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
S4 - Transmontane region
Sl - Seaboard region
S3 - Oak uplands
region
Sl - Long-leaf pine flats and
savannahs
S5 - Granite and metamorphic gray
and red lands of the Piedmont
S4 - Sand hills belt
S5 - Southern oak, hickory and
pine uplands
S3 - Metamorphic region, middle
Georgia counties
Sl - Northwest Georgia
S2 - Metamorphic region, Blue Ridge
counties
S2 - Long-leaf pine region, short
staple cotton
Sl - Oak, hickory and pine upland
region
S8 - Central basin
S7 - The Highlands, or highland rim of
middle Tennessee, eastern sub-
division
S12 - Cumberland table land, valley of
East Tennessee, and Unaka Mountain
region, valley and Unaka
S10 - Cumberland table land, valley of
East Tennessee, and Unaka Mountain
region, table land and valley
S9 - Cumberland table land
S11 - Cumberland table land, valley of
East Tennessee, and Unaka Mountain
region, valley
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Group II
(3)
(4)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(3)
(4)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
419
State Group I Group II
Alabama S6 - Gravelly hills, with long-leaf
pine region (5)
S2 - Coosa valley region (7)
S8 - Central prairie region (6)
S4 - Tennessee valley region (8)
S3 - Coal-measures region (9)
Mississippi ST - Central prairie region (5)
S4 - Yellow-loam region, short-leaf
pine and oak upland region (6)
S5 - Cane hills (7)
S2 - Northeastern prairie region,
Pontotoc ridge (8)
81 - Northeastern prairie region,
prairie belt (9)
Arkansas S3 - Gray silt prairie region (6)
S5 - Red loam region (4)
S4 - Yellow loam region (5)
Louisiana S6 - Long-leaf pine region (4)
S5 - Attakapas region (5)
S4 - Bluff region [= ST] (6)-(7)
S7 - Oak uplands (6)-(7)
Texas S8 - Brazos alluvial or "Sugar Bowl"
region (10)
S9 - Rio Grande valley (6)-(7)
S6 - Western red-loam prairie region (8)
S4 - Southern and coast prairie region,
region west of the Brazos River (9)
S5 - Central black prairie region (11)
Sll - Unorganized counties (6)-(7)
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Define a new variable BEST = ES. where the index i runs over
those soil types whose coefficients rank in the top half of the mag-
nitude-ranking of the coefficients. The variable BEST is 1 for a
county whose soil belongs to the most fertile half of the soil types.
Define REST = E S. for the remainder of the soil type categories.
[Note: In cases where there was an odd number (2N+1) of soil types, the
BEST category was taken to be N soil types with the largest estimated
coefficients -- 2 out of 5 S. classifications, 3 in the case of 7 S5.,
etc.]
It is well-known that (omitting county observation subscripts)
an equation y = S1BEST + 2REST + u, when estimated by least squares,
yields = y for the counties belonging to the BEST soil type clas-
sification, while 2 = y over the rest of the counties. This is
easily seen by calculating the least squares estimates.
y. = (BEST). + 2 (REST).
Define X = (BEST) ; Z = (REST). for convenience of notation.
2 2 2
e = (yi - )= (y - 5 X - s2Z )
E = e
1
First-order conditions for a minimum sum of squares are:
= 2(y. - 1 X - 2Z )-X = 0
=E 2(y - X - 2Z ).. = 0
2S 1
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From the first of these conditions:
(y. X. - l X )= 0 since X.Z. = 0 for all i
11
2 2
But X. = 1 when X. = 1 and X. = 0 when X. = 0. So if n = the number
i 1 i 1
of counties whose soils are in the "best" category:
y - n 1  = 0
i e BEST
^ ln
1 n1 i C BEST 1
Similarly:
6 2= -- y.
2 n2 i s REST 1
Hence 1 and 62 are the "group means" of the variable yi for its values
when considering the counties with the "best" soils and with the "rest"
of the soils respectively.
One further transformation will simplify the subsequent tests.
BEST + REST = 1 for each county, or REST = 1 - BEST. So:
y = 1 (BEST-) + 2 (REST) + u
= 1 (BEST) + s2(1-BEST) + u
= 2 + (Si - 2 )(BEST) + u
Therefore ordinary least squares estimates of
y 0 *1(BEST) + u
will give as $ the difference in means of the variable y between the
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two groups of counties. The t-statistic associated with the estimate
of $l will test the significance of this difference of means.
Obviously exactly the same transformations could be performed
to test the significance of the difference of means for any other
variable between any other mutually exclusive and exhaustive classi-
fication of the counties into two groups.
The following tables show the differences in means and associated
t-statistics both for the proportion of acres planted in cotton and
for the proportion of blacks in the total population. It should be
noted again that the over-all "best" and "rest" soil type categories
are the same for every state in the Group I and Group II regressions
except North Carolina, for which the different results are both
reported.
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Group I and Group II Regressions, Over-all Best Soils
State
North Carolina
Group I:
[t]
Group II:
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
(H/T)BEST
1880
. 0804
[3. 318]
. 0311
[1.246]
. 000994
[.0233]
-. 0186
[-.745]
-. 0861
[-2.208]
.138
[7.222]
-. 00427
[-.141]
.0157
[. 458]
-. 0156
[-. 469]
-. 0746
[-1.283]
.100
[5.824]
- (H/T)REST
1890
.0825
[3. 332]
.0288
[1.129]
.00420
[.0927]
.00837
[.353]
-. 0863
[-2.292]
.131
[6.815]
-. 00678
[-.274]
.0261
[.733]
.00395
[.100]
-. 107
[-1. 970]
1900
.0826
[4.165]
.0175
[.837]
-. 0368
[-.830]
-. 0413
[-1. 643]
-. 0561
[-1.765]
.113
[6.312]
-. 0383
[-1. 371]
.0158
[. 483]
-. 0111
[-. 316]
-. 0665
[-l. 407]
1910
.0922
[3. 650]
.0298
[1.138]
.0372
[1.027]
-. 0147
[-. 563]
-. 116
[-4. 010]
.131
[6. 319]
-. 0541
[-. 830]
.0526
[1.729]
.0342
[.946]
-. 0782
[-2. 548]
-. 0309
[-1.22 4]
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Group I and Group II Regressions, Over-all Best Soils
State
North Carolina
Group I:
[t]
Group II:
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
(B/R)BEST
1880
.122
[3.116]
-. 0258
[-. 643]
.152
[2.508]
.0939
[2. 460]
-.151
[ -2. 014]
.123
[4.210]
-. 0973
[-1. 532]
.0564
[1.101]
-. 0196
[-. 339]
.151
[3. 033]
.132
[5. 368]
- (B/R)REST
1890
. 110
[2. 846]
-. 0336
[-.853]
.146
[2. 247]
. 142
[3. 727]
-.177
[-2. 702]
.131
[4. 628]
-. 0764
[-1.169]
.0687
[1.262]
. 00714
[.115]
.165
[3. 098]
1900
.115
[3. 016]
-. 0183
[-. 471]
.150
[2.529]
.164
[4.260]
-. 129
[2. 022]
.137
[4.766]
-.0674
[-1. 008]
.0821
[1. 503]
.0130
[.204]
.143
[2.610]
1910
.101
[2. 534]
-. 00280
[-. 0693]
.119
[2.288]
.152
[4.222]
-. 0706
[-l. 313]
.130
[4. 585]
-. 0541
[-. 830]
.0907
[1. 739]
. 0233
[.379]
.107
[2. 071]
.109
[5. 395]
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APPENDIX 6
A TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUM OF VALUES
OF CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTIONS
The derivation of this test is elementary, but it still seems to
be useful in situations such as the one in the text, when a group of
test statistics taken together proves to be significant even when some
of them taken individually are not, and the number of test statistics
involved is too small to allow straightforward application of the
Central Limit Theorem.
In the derivations that follow, the X. are independent random
variables distributed uniformly over the interval 0 to 1. These X.
can be interpreted as values of the cumulative distribution function
of any continuous random variable [1]. In the examples of Chapters IV
and V, the X. represent areas under the appropriate F density functions
to the left of the calculated F values for each state in each census
year. In the notation of those chapters X. = 1- P-value for each test.
Consider first the case of two such variables. Let
y2 = Xl +X2
The probability density function of y2 is to be found. The change-of-
variable technique [2] will be employed.
X 1 = y
and
X2 y2 -l
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The appropriate Jacobian for the change of variables equals 1, and if
f and g are the joint density functions of X1 and X2 and of y1 and y2
respectively, then g(y1 ,y2 ) = 1-f(X1 ,X 2 ) over the appropriate region.
X and X2 are independently distributed uniform random variables over
0,1; hence f(X 1 ,X 2 ) = 1 over the unit square in the X1 , X2 plane.
This region corresponds in the y1 , y2 plane to
0 < y 2 - 1; 0 < y1 < y2
1 < y2 < 2; y2 - 1<y 1
(1,2)
g(y1 ,y29=
(1,51)
Thus the marginal density function h of y2 alone is given by:
y2
h(y92 = l-dy O < y2  1
0
1
h(y2)= 1dy
2-1
h (y 2 = y2
= 2 
- y2
1 < y2 < 2
0 < y2 -
1 K y2 < 2
and
So that:
Yl
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h(y2
(1,1)
(1,0) (2,0) y2
The same approach can be applied to larger numbers of variables.
Consider three uniformly distributed variables, X , X2 and X3. Let
y, X, X 1 y
Y2 + X y 2 -y 1
y3 3 X3 y 3 -(y2 -y 1 ) -y 1 y3 -y 2
The Jacobian for the change of variables is again equal to one.
To simplify notation let g indicate the joint or marginal density
functions of the argument variables.
So g(y1 ,y2 'y3 ) = over the appropriate region in y , y2, y3
space. To find g(y3) it is first necessary to find g(y2 ' 3
y2
g(y2 'y3) l' (yy 2 , y3)dy1  when 0 < y2 : 10
= g(y 1 ,y 2 ,y3dy1  when 1 < y2 < 2
y2 -1
By reasoning analogous to that preceding, the range of y1 and y2 must
be the same as in the 2-variable case. Therefore:
g(y2 ',3) =2 0 < y 2 < 1
= 2 -y 2  y2 < 2
All that remains is to describe the range of y2 and y3. This is easy
to do:
Y3
If 0 < y 3 < 1
If l< y 3 < 2,
If 2 < y 3 < 3,
o Ky 2 K3
y3- <y 2 Ky 3
y3 -1 y 2 K2
(0,1)
(2,3)
(2,2)
)
Therefore:
y 2
y3
g (y3 ) y2 dy2 =
0
y3
g (y3  y2 dy2 + (2 - y2 )dy 2
y3-1
2 2 3
2 y + 2y2 - ~2~)
2 2
1 33 
-
2 2 3 2
1 (2y - 6y3 + 3)
when 0 < y 3 K 1
when l < y3 < 2
1
2 + 1
when 1 < y3 < 2
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Y2
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and
2
g(y 3 ) = (2 -y 2 )dy2  when 2 < y3 < 3
y3-1
1 (3)2
So the probability density function of y3 is given by:
g(y3
- (2y3 -6y + 3)
2 2
(y3 -3)
2 2
(1,0) (2,0) (3,0) 3
The derivation can be checked by calculating the total area under
the curve (which equals one) and the maximum value of the middle section
(which occurs at l1). Also, the segments of the function actually meet
at y 3 = 1 and y3 =2.
Finally consider the case of four variables. The procedure is
by now familiar, so the steps will be abbreviated:
y2 Xl +
y3 = X +X2 +X 3
y 4 = X +X 2 +X 3 +X 4
Jacobian = 1
g(y2'y 3 y4) = y2
= 2 
-y2
2
(y Y3
g(y3 'y4 2
2
(y3 -3)
2
The relevant region in y3 y4 space is:
y4
(0,1)
0 < y 2 <
1
1 K y2 < 2
0 < y3 <1
1 < y3 < 2
2 < y3 < 3
(3,4)
(3,3)
y3
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1 =y
X'2  2 1
x3  Y3  2
x4 Y4 3
4 2 3
g Y 3 d 4
g(y4 ) - dy 3 = 6
0
1 2 4
C 3 C 2
g(y7)= + -(2y - 6y 3 + 3)dy3
y4 -1 1
when 0 < y 4 < 1
when 1 < y < 2
1 3 2
= (-3y4 + 12y2 - 12y + 4)
Rather than continue the somewhat laborious computation, it is suf-
ficient to observe that the probability density function is symmetric
around y = 2.
g (Y )
1 3 2
-3y + 12y -12 + 4)
3
Symmetrical half
of the curve
(1,0) (2,0) (3,0) (4,0)
Calculation of any area under the density function is merely a matter
of integration, but the area of concern here is the area from y 4 = 3 to
y= 4. This area equals the probability that the sum of 4 P-values
will be less than or equal to one. The area is:
431
Y4
432
13 41
4 Y41
A ~ 6 dy4 2T4 - .042 < .05
0 0
This is the result used in the text.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX 6
[1] Robert V. Hogg and Allen T. Craig, Introduction to Mathematical
Statistics (Second Edition) (New York: The Macmillan Company,
1965), 178.
[2] Ibid., 115-25.
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APPENDIX 7
CRITICISMS AND RESERVATIONS
There are several issues that need to be raised in order to
achieve a completely balanced assessment of the methodology and results
of this study. These objections and criticisms do not by any means
invalidate the conclusions drawn in the main body of the text, but they
do reinforce the commonplace that the results of any empirical studyare
only as good as the data and the assumptions upon which they are based.
Also, by illustrating precisely the nature of any biases infecting the
estimates, it is possible to form a better judgment regarding their use-
fulness in interpreting Southern economic history. Several objections
will be considered.
(1) Arbitrary sample delimitation. The choice of single states
and single census years as the samples of counties from which the pro-
duction functions were estimated was partly arbitrary and partly dic-
tated by the nature of the data. Since the variables' definitions were
prone to change from Census to Census, any pooling of data over time
would have been subject to severe errors of measurement. On the other
hand, there is no intrinsic reason why larger sample regions than the
individual states could not have been chosen. Chow-type F-tests could
have been employed to determine whether several state cross-sections
could have been pooled, but these tests were not done. The state sample
regions were used primarily because of the ease of describing the re-
sults in terms of the "natural" political units.
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In conjunction with this decision, many statistical tests were
performed on the signs or values of parameters from the sample of
regressions, in order to discern over-all trends and region-wide ten-
dencies. The tests on the sample of coefficients require the independence
of the coefficient estimates from year to year and state to state under
null hypotheses typically tested--that no significant pattern was present
in the coefficients or their signs. Given the arbitrary choice of single
states in single census years as the data sets for each regression, the
assumption of independence may not be plausible. Rejection of the null
hypotheses of no pattern in the coefficients led to acceptance of the
simplest alternative: that the preponderance of signs indicated the true
direction of a systematic pattern. This was not the only possible alter-
native hypothesis, however. In particular, more complicated alternative
hypotheses involving the failure of the independence assumption could
have been accepted on the basis of the findings.
The basic point here is that, given the mass of data contained in
the Census cross-sections, there are several methods available for
processing it and casting it into tractable groupings. The method
chosen in the text is only one such method, and was somewhat arbitrary
at that.
(2) Errors of measurement in the labor force variables. In order
to interpret the difference b-a as a race-associated productivity dif-
ference, it is necessary that the variables W and B actually measure
the labor input attributable to the two groups of agricultural workers,
whites and blacks. There are two reasons why this might not be the case:
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(a) There might have been a systematic difference in the parti-
cipation rates of the two races. For example, if blacks were dis-
criminated against and paid lower wages than whites, the black parti-
cipation rate might have been higher than the corresponding white
rate, in order for the black families living at the edge of subsistence to
be able to survive. Thus a given number of rural black inhabitants
would be providing a larger amount of labor than the same number of
white rural inhabitants. In this case a positive value of b-a might
not indicate any productivity difference: only a difference in the parti-
cipation rates, with blacks having the higher rate.
(b) If there was a systematic difference in the quality or inten-
sity of labor provided by workers under various tenure arrangements,
and if these tenure arrangements were systematically associated with
racial differences (as, for example, a positive correlation between the
incidence of tenant farming and of black agricultural workers), then a
significant b-a might reflect only this labor intensity difference.
Similar objections could be raised regarding the labor input
measurements in the Group II model. This measurement error associated
with the use of total rural population as a measure of labor input might
explain a pattern to the sign of b-a, but it is hard to see how it could
account for the systematic regional differences which were found. As
in the case of the simple "legacy of slavery" idea, it is difficult to
see how a participation-rate explanation of the sign of b-a could
account for b-a positive in the Periphery, negative in the Cotton Belt;
or how participation rates alone could explain the over-all productivity
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ranking based on the Group II results, showing whites occupying the top
and bottom of the productivity scale.
(3) Possible bias in the relative crop productivity estimates. It
might be argued that the strength of the cotton-associated productivity
advantage was overestimated because not all improved acres were farmed
with equal intensity. The difference in intensity could be due to
greater labor requirements per acre for cotton culture than for other
crops. Also, the Census definition of improved acres included lands
lying fallow and used for grazing, lands which may not have been worked
as intensively as cotton acres. (See Appendix 3.)
The labor intensity argument is probably not too serious, since
the labor input is explicitly included in the production function.
Even if cotton required more labor per acre, it is hardly likely that
a cotton farmer worked harder than a grain farmer. Any extra labor
requirements should be reflected in a greater population in cotton
counties.
The possible error in using improved acres as the land input is po-
tentially more serious. To meet the objections, both the Group I and
Group II production functions were estimated, replacing T = improved
acres by T = total acres planted in corn, wheat, oats and cotton. The
results of these estimations were designated Group I-PA and Group II-PA
respectively (PA designating "planted acres" rather than improved
acres.) In the Group I-PA regressions, the coefficient of H/T would
tend to underestimate any potential cotton productivity advantage,
because in addition to the output of the four crops, the total
438
agricultural output of each county included the output of other crops
and the excess of the value of animal products over the value of the
corn and oats consumed by the livestock. Animals increased in value
due to their consumption of other grains, their grazing on improved
acres not counted in this definition of T, and their natural bio-
logical increase of growth and reproduction. The total acreage planted
to the four major crops underestimates the input of non-cotton land;
hence the coefficient d will tend to be overestimated in the regressions
because of the measurement error in the non-cotton land input.
The results of the Group I-PA and Group II-PA regressions are
not very different from the Group I and Group II results. The average
input elasticities are hardly changed, so the conclusions regarding
exploitation and returns to scale need not be touched. As expected,
the cotton productivity advantage is not as pronounced. It is still
unmistakable, however. Out of 38 estimated coefficients of H/T in the
Group I-PA equations, 28 are positive. If the sign of this coefficient
were a random variable with equal probability of being positive or being
negative, the probability of 28 or more positive signs would be
approximately:
Pr Z > 28 -19 = Pr(Z > 2.92) .002
38-2- )
where Z is the standard normal variable, using the normal approximation
to the binomial. Such a sign distribution is highly unlikely, even
considering that the test employed was a one-tailed test. In this
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specification the t-statistic of the coefficient of H/T was greater
than 2 in 18 of 38 cases, and greater than 1 in 26 of 38 cases. In
none of the cases in which the coefficient was negative was the ab-
solute value of the t-statistic greater than 1. Thus, even measuring
the cotton and non-cotton land inputs in such a way as to bias the
results strongly against indicating a cotton productivity advantage,
the advantage was still apparent.
Similarly, the advantage in productivity of white cotton farmers
over black cotton farmers is weakened by the re-definition of "total"
acres in the Group II-PA results, although every other pattern found
in the Group II tables was essentially unchanged.
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Four-Census Averages -- Group I-PA Results
State
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
. 405
. 303
. 460
. 322
.241
. 462
.310
.254
. 356
.121
.290
. 335
. 315
.141
.402
. 473
.279
.361
.214
.490
. 326
. 309
.276
. 479
.347
.166
.395
.377
. 355
.495
.323 .330 .353
V
1.021
.947
1. 051
.942
.990
1.101
.984
.992
.925
1.106
1. 006Over -all
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Four-Census Averages -- Group II-PAResults
State
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkans as
Louisiana
Texas
Over-all
. 417
. 316
. 413
.290
.242
. 445
.312
.249
.337
.118
.314
.292
. 338
. 398
. 126
. 401
. 474
.282
. 366
.212
.490
Y
. 309
.289
.256
. 479
. 345
.175
.394
. 383
.360
.499
.338 .349
V
1.018
. 943
1. 067
. 895
. 988
1. 094
.988
. 998
.909
1.107
1.001
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Coefficients of H/T with Associated t-Statistics
Group I-PA Regressions
State
North Carolina
[t]
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkans as
Louisiana
Texas
1880
.610
[3.289]
.162
[.326]
.546
[2. 082]
1. 385
[2.098]
.785
[2.908]
2. 431
[7.1821
1.375
[2. 426]
1.914
[10. 928]
-. 236
[-.592]
-. 695
[-. 645]
1890
-. 133
[-. 629]
-.253
[-. 471]
1.065
[5. 028]
1. 339
[3. 014]
-. 0509
[-. 262]
.284
[1. 133]
.211
[. 467]
.967
[7. 276]
-. 262
[-. 957]
1900
.168
[1. 018]
. 768
[2. 035]
.360
[1.770]
1. 464
[3.785]
-. 148
[-. 604]
.394
[1. 732]
.854
[4.172]
.845
[4.766]
-. 237
[-. 547]
1910
.297
[1.784]
1. 438
[5.525]
.390
[2. 635]
1. 416
[3.204]
-. 218
[-. 998]
.335
[1. 481]
.782
[2. 586]
.778
[5.910]
.654
[1. 992]
-. 000288
[-. 00216]
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Coefficients of B/R,with Associated t-Statistics,
Group I-PA Regressions
State
North Carolina
[t]
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
1880
.764
[4. 320]
.597
[1. 995]
.0184
[.144]
-. 440
[-1.124]
.313
[1.646]
-. 718
[-3. 679]
-. 213
[-. 628]
-. 539
[ -3. 768]
1.133
[2. 697]
1890
.554
[3. 024]
.308
[. 933]
.303
[3. 071]
-. 437
[-1. 109]
.463
[2.816]
.108
[.778]
.734
[2. 872]
.218
[1. 953]
.971
[4. 071]
1900
.661
[4. 715]
-. 306
[-l. 910]
-. 119
[-1. 506]
-. 499
[-1. 597]
.114
[.623]
-. 132
[-1.209]
-. 131
[-1. 407]
-. 0533
[-. 416]
.399
[1. 642]
.709
[.859]
.774
[4.62 4]
-. 514
[ -3. 391]
.111
[1. 704]
-. 133
[-.254]
.231
[1.215]
-. 305
[-3. 095]
-. 222
[-1. 921]
-.290
[-2. 982]
.0550
[.227]
.706
[2. 005]
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Sign Patterns for Group II-PA Regressions
State
North Carolina x y
x+z
y+z
South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Tennessee
Alabama
Mississippi
Arkansas
Louisiana
Texas
+ + + + - + - +
+ + + + + + - +
- -- + - + + +
+ ++ -+ - + -
- +- + - + + +
+ + + +- + -+
+ + -+ - + - +-
+ + + + - - - -
+ - + +
1880
+ +
1890
+ +
1900
+ -
+
+
1910
+ +
+
xy
x+z
y+z
x
y
x+z
y+z
Group II-PA Results,
1880-1910, All South
22 16
29 9
20 18
25 13
1880-1890, All South
15 4
15 4
9 10
11 8 BC ( BN
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Sign Frequencies
BN WN
WC ( WN
WC Q BC
BC Q BN
BN 3 WN
WC Q WN
WC Q BC
1900-1910, All South
7 12
14 5
11 8
14 5
South Carolina + Georgia + Alabama
Arkansas + Louisiana, 1880-1910
BN OWN
wc WN
WC Q BC
BC BN
+Mississippi +
11 13
21 3
10 14
18 6
BN (DWN
wC Q WN
WC BC
BC BN
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x
y
x+z
y+z
x
y
X+Z
y+z
North Carolina +Tennessee +
1880-1910
11 3
8 6
10 4
7 7
Texas +Florida,
BN WN
WC Q WN
BC WC
BC BN
This last case of the results for the Periphery is the only one of
the sub-regional and sub-period breakdowns in which the actual ranking
of the productivities is different from that of the Group II results.
It can be seen that in all the Group II-PA results white cotton far-
mers appear to have "lost" in productivity, but that the over-all
ranking of the productivities of the different groups of farmers is
essentially unchanged. White cotton farmers are still generally among
the most productive farmers, other white farmers among the least pro-
ductive; with blacks in between and with black cotton farmers generally
more productive than black non-cotton farmers.
The insensitivity of the main conclusions to such a major change
in the variable definitions is important. The acreage planted to corn,
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x
y
x+z
y+z
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wheat and oats greatly underestimated the land input to agricultural
products other than cotton. Nevertheless the cotton productivity
advantage continued to show through clearly, despite the fact that the
estimate of c-d was biased downward by the measurement error. Similarly,
with some weakening of the productivity advantage to white cotton
farners, the basic productivity rankings of the Group II model were
again found in most cases. The most important conclusions of all,
those regarding exploitation and the marginal product of labor, were
unchanged. For these reasons the results reported in the text on crop-
associated productivity cannot be too far wrong at worst. Total im-
proved acres is a priori a better measure of the land area input than
the acreage planted to the four crops, and even the severest sort of
bias deliberately introduced fails to eradicate the comparative ad-
vantage of cotton in the South.
(4) The Taylor series approximation. Only the linear approxi-
mations of the production functions were estimated. It was shown
earlier (see Chapter IV) that these linear approximations were better
approximations the smaller the productivity differences between the
different types of land and labor employed. It would have been ideal
to perform non-linear estimations of the production functions, or alter-
natively to include more terms of the Taylor series expansions in the
equations finally fitted. The fact that the linear approximations
fitted well and revealed significant patterns in the coefficient signs
is really the only justification for not attempting the non-linear
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estimations. Of course, given the massive amount of data involved, the
computational problems involved in non-linear estimation would have
been severe.
(5) Alternative parameterizations of the Overproduction Hypothesis
in the cotton supply functions. It is usually the case in parameteriz-
ing a somewhat vague collection of ideas such as the Overproduction
Hypothesis that more than one model may be taken as a fair representa-
tion of the hypothesis. For example, in using the farmers' speed of
adjustment and price-responsiveness to distinguish between the lock-in
and rational crop choice possibilities, it was assumed in the text that
farmers' responses were symmetrical with respect to either rising or
falling prices. The magnitudes of the respective speeds of adjustment
and price elasticities were then taken as indicative of the flexibility
of the farmers in making crop selection decisions. This is not the only
possible specification, however. A plausible version of the Lock-in
Hypothesis might be that farmers were able to shift rapidly into cotton
culture when the (expected) relative cotton price was rising, but that
they were not so able to shift out of it when the (expected) price was
falling. Alternatively such a specification might involve two different
speeds of adjustment, one appropriate for years in which the desired
acreage (or share of acres) in cotton was greater than the previous year's
actual acreage (or share), and the other applying to years in which
desired share was smaller than the previous year's actual share. If such
a specification were closer to the truth than the symmetrical adjustment
of the model actually used, relatively high speeds of adjustment might be
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merely a reflection of a greater number of years of increasing cotton
prices than of decreasing cotton prices.
This is not the only possible variant in parameterizing the Lock-in
Hypothesis. The trend variable in the cotton supply function may actually
be a proxy for some other variable or for a structural change in the
pattern of supplier behavior, different from the "pure" trend as which it
is interpreted in the text. For example, in an earlier version of the
supply model [1] the trend was replaced by a "tenancy-trend" variable
constructed by linear interpolation between the census years of the per-
cent of farms operated by tenants of all kinds. Because of the strong
trend component in this variable, the estimated supply functions includ-
ing it were very similar to those with a pure trend. In particular,
the ranges of long and short-run price elasticities and speeds of adjust-
ment were roughly the same. This earlier version of the model was em-
ployed at the outset of the research, when this investigator was con-
vinced of the validity of the Lock-in Hypothesis a priori. Ten-
ancy was included as a proxy for merchants' control of the planting
decisions. The argument presented in that earlier paper was that the
tenancy-trend proxy picked up all lock-in effects, so that the esti-
mated elasticities and speeds of adjustment should not have been radically
different from similar values for Western wheat farmers. The tenancy-trend
coefficient was positive for every state in the A (total cotton acreage)
model, and was positive in 7 of 10 states in the St (share of total
acreage in cotton) model. These results were interpreted as indicating mer-
chants' pressure for cotton cultivation. However it was pointed out
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at the 1971 Cliometrics Conference in Madison, Wisconsin, that the
link between the tenancy-trend variable and any meaningful measure
of merchant control was nebulous at best [2]. The theoretical results
of Chapter III undermined every link between tenure and other variables,
and the production function estimates further reduced expectation
a priori of a lock-in effect. The interpretation of the supply function
estimates proposed in the text is both simpler and more consistent with
the other strong results than any complicated interpretation based on
tenancy. This is an appropriate opportunity to reject the tentative
conclusions of the earlier version of the supply model.
This list of objections is not complete by any means. All things
considered, it would seem that the objections do not seriously call
into question any of the important conclusions in the body of the text.
At least the burden of proof now rests with adherents to the hypotheses
rejected as a result of analysis of the estimates.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX 7
[1] Stephen DeCanio, "Tenancy and the Supply of Cotton in the South:
1882-1914," unpublished paper presented at Cliometrics Conference
in Madison, Wisconsin, April 3, 1971.
[2] Particularly enlightening was the discussion of Claudia Goldin
and the comments of Richard Sutch.
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